Indian Philosophical Quarterly

Vol. 21

1994

COMPILED

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly

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
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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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A CONCEPT OF MAN

I

It is often urged that one of the major findings of modern scientific age is that the universe is totally governed by strict deterministic laws. Does the human kind constitute an exception to this claim? I propose in this essay to develop and argue for an affirmative reply to this question.

I find the thesis of absolute determinism not in order at least with regard to ourselves mainly for three reasons. First, the thesis of absolute determinism cannot consistently be propounded as a philosophical doctrine. Secondly, determinism cannot be true of our lived life. Thirdly, man as an agent cannot be denied freedom. I shall take up these points in order, in the next section and the two following.

II

• The theory of absolute determinism (TAD) can keep itself alive only by annihilating itself. This self-inconsistency of TAD consists in the fact that it cannot consistently be offered for consideration. To ask us to consider a thesis is to ask us to judge it and then, if found acceptable, to choose it and reject as false a theory that contradicts it. TAD, however, is one which denies the possibility of choice, and therefore refutes itself. If all our deeds, thoughts and benefits are thoroughly determined, that would be the end of choice about reasoning, since we would be left only with *necessary* reasoning. If no evaluation of reasoning can in principle be made, how can the determinist argue with a straight face that his position is the right and true one? We cannot argue to a conclusion which undermines the value of argument. If whatever

we think is a necessary product of all of the factors that determine
our thoughts and beliefs, then in each of us the thoughts are what
they must be; consequently, no discourse,including that of the
determinist, can be put forward for rational appraisal. No one will
ever be justified in claiming any view to be true, determinism
included.   But if, on the other hand, it is urged that TAD has
been formulated and developed in and through some ingenious
reasoning, then the determinist's whole reasoning should be carried
out on a level above any on which determinism can have any
relevance. The determinist in this way is like one who writes
something down and then at a certain point does erase it. Or,
to change the analogy, the acceptance of TAD ultimately will
lead, to use an example given by Ramsey in a different context,
to 'the absurd position of the child in the following dialogue:
"Say breakfast". "Can't". "What can't you say?" "Can't say breakfast".[1]
TAD in this way is unable to provide a non-self-contradictory
legitimation of itself, and of the means whereby we have arrived
at it.   In truth, the determinist, while avowing a deterministic
theory of human thought and action, is tacitly exempting himself
from the theory, and he is there as the best witness against its
truth. Furthermore, it appears extremely difficult to envisage in
what way TAD could at all be tested. If all human thoughts and
actions are determined in every way, there would be left no room
whatsoever to test any theory - TAD included, for to test a theory
it is necessary that things can be manipulated, in the last analysis,
freely.   If human freedom is truly an illusion, no human being
would ever be free to develop and examine any theory in any
sphere. The whole point may be put succinctly: none of us can
have any reason for supposing any view, TAD included, to be
true if TAD is true; conversely, if we do have reasonable grounds
for believing anything at all to be true, then TAD is refuted.
The thesis of absolute determinism in this way is, if I may speak
a bit rudely, an intrinsically hopeless position.

The determinist might at this point insist that all the above
arguments do not really refute his theory, but only prevent him
from *proclaiming* it, i.e., from providing grounds for acepting it
to be true. It is still possible, as he might urge, that what he
is asserting is true. This however, will not do. For in that case
any damn theory could be regarded as true. If there is no burden

to establish a theory as true, or, if its truth-claim is withdrawn, then, one might wonder, in what serious sense the theory could be regarded as a genuine philosophical view. And, to be frank, in that case we, as philosophers, would have nothing to bother about the alleged 'theory'.

III

It would be interesting to note that even if the point that, in order to be true, TAD need not be offered as a philosophical doctrine be conceded, the determinist would not gain much. For one thing, life as it is lived by us would largely be inexplicable and appear rather enigmatic if determinism reigns everywhere in it. If, that is, we are ready to draw conclusions from the way we *do* live with each other, it would become really hard to embrace full-fledged determinism. Truly speaking, with regard to our interpersonal relationships, TAD appears-thanks to Strawson[3] - quite out of place. This is because our interpersonal relationships essentially involve various 'reactive attitudes' (as Strawson very aptly terms them[4]), such as gratitude, remorse, resentment and the like, the validity of which is hardly tenable in the web of complete determinism.

This sort of view, though not exactly this one, is also upheld by another philosopher - Corliss Lamont. To quote him: '...in the novel dialect of determinism many words lose their normal meaning. I refer to such words as *refraining, forbearance, self-restraint,* and *regret.* If determinism turns out to be true, we shall have to scrap a great deal in existing dictionaries and do a vast amount of redefining. What meaning, for example, is to be assigned to *forbearance* when it is determined in advance that you are going to refuse that second Martini cocktail ? You can truly forbear only when you refrain from doing something that it is possible for you to do. But under the determinist dispensation it is not possible for you to accept the second cocktail because fate has already dictated your "No"'[5].

Anyway, let us come back to the point of interpersonal relationships. Not infrequently, in our relations with one another we display and think that we have good reason to display such feelings as gratitude and resentment. Again, we often take pride

in our achievements and feel remorse for what we regard as misdeeds. These sorts of interpersonal relations, it may be noted, may be of two kinds. First, they may be such within which the reactive attitudes grow; or, secondly, they may be (which Strawson seems not to take note of, but which Bennett very intelligently notices[6]) such toward which the reactive attitudes readily point. To illustrate both: if I resent someone's treatment of me, there may already have been some non-detached relation between us; or there may not have been antecedently any such relation between us, though my very resentment immediately creates one, or sets the stage for one. Be that as it may, it should be clear that any of these non-detached attitudes could not be justified or at least would become utterly pointless if determinism reigns over all actions to the effect that none of us could ever have acted otherwise than as he did. Any such attitude is justified only if it is assumed that the person about whom the attitude is shown deserves it. But to handle people in a deterministic fashion is to leave out of account any question of whether it is an individual's fault that he has done something wrong or whether it is to the individual's credit that he has done something right.

If in this way freedom is the logical postulate of interpersonal discourse, then, to the extent we are incapable of omitting our interpersonal relationships (entailing the reactive attitudes to ourselves and each other) from the account of life, TAD simply becomes inapplicable to the human world. We may add more. Just as no theory of number would be worth defending if it did not minimally give an account of our entrenched practice of counting, similarly no theory of human beings would be worth defending if it did not capture or range over our practice of interpersonal relationships. To deny man these relationships would be to eliminate some of the most profound of human existence. This is because man must live not merely *among* but *with* other human beings; consequently he *must* be a citizen of the interpersonal world in which people matter to each other; hence different reactive attitudes *must* obtain in human life. So, if these attitudes do not allow man to run his life without freedom, if freedom is a precondition of these attitudes and hence of human life too, then surely the demise of our freedom would amount to the demise of human life itself. Seen in this light, our lived life does not simply allow us to

deny freedom in it. On the contrary, it (the lived life) demands us rather to axiomatically assume ourselves as free beings. To put the whole point in one proposition: even *if* .TAD could be retained at a theoretical level, in practice things do not work out in quite deterministic way. If, however, the determinist urges that in maintaining that man is determined, he has in mind a sort of 'man in abstraction', then, we are afraid, his whole thesis would be empty of that deep and important sense in which a given outlook is 'on' for people at the actually lived level, and in that case we have really nothing serious to quarrel with him. For, we are here concerned not with any 'theoretic man' which instantiates none of *us*.

Apart from this 'existential undeniableness' of our freedom in action, there seems to be a sort of desirability of it. For, the enjoyment of freedom in action means the satisfaction of certain desires - desires that we possess as social beings - whereas its absence means their frustration. The satisfactions at stake are those which accrue to a person of whom it may be said that he lives in a community of persons. The corresponding frustrations are those suffered by a person of whom it may be said that he is estranged from such a community or that he finds himself a helpless or a completely passive bystander to the activities of his fellow beings.

TAD, thus, becomes an unworkable position - to say the least - in *human* life.

IV

Next comes the point of human agency. And our task is to show how this aspect of ourselves is quite difficult to liquidate or explain adequately in terms of the deterministic model, i.e. in the model in which the occurrence of anything X is so (causally) connected with the later occurrence of something else Y that given X, Y *must* occur. It is important to stress what the *denial* of this exactly amounts to. It is this: the occurrence of X does *not* make the occurrence of Y absolutely necessary, i.e. the occurrence of X does not *necessitate* the occurrence of Y. Let us then see how man's agency makes it impossible to apply the deterministic model to him.

At least one condition seems to be necessary for saying of a man P that he is the agent of a certain action A, namely that P can, in some ultimate sense, be said to *own* A and in that way is supposed to have a particular *answerability* for A. It is not necessarily implied that everyone does answer for all or any of his acts; but it is implied that everyone is answerable, i.e. is liable to answer, for what he *does.* Indeed, being answerable is inalienably linked up with the idea of agency. Had people never conceived of themselves as answerable beings, it is doubtful whether they would ever have thought of themselves as agents either.

Now, to hold someone *particularly answerable* for some action is not just to ask for a mere explanation, but to take *him* to task for the action. The importance of answerability may vary with the seriousness of the case; what might appear trifling in one case may be quite pressing in a rather extreme one. Thus, the excusability of actions done in negligence or inadvertently varies with the gravity of the ' offence'. Austin once pointed out that 'I did it inadvertently' is excusable, if I did tread on a snail but not if I did tread on a baby. In any case, the point remains: if to call P the *agent* of A (of whatever sort) is not a mere verbiage or a linguistic fiction but something seriously meant, then P *is* answerable for A. Now, it might be obvious that P's owning as well as being answerable for A entails, among other things, that the occurrence of A was not due to some antecedent factors all of which did lie entirely beyond P's manipulation, i.e., that P was in some way or other able to intervene into or arrest some or all of the steps leading to the occurrence of A, in brief, there prevailed some real opportunity somewhere for P to make A *not* to happen. Suppose that there were always a sufficient set of conditions such that a man could never help but do exactly as he does. But *if* there were such a set, we could never meaningfully speak of his being answerable for what he does. In other words, any thesis that holds that each of us *is* a field of causes - an arena where all the occurrences *inevitably* follow exclusively from antecedent factors, cannot possibly elucidate what we mean by action, agent and answerability. Indeed, for my answerability, for any of my actions, to have any validity or even significance, there must be some area, with regard to whatever I do, within which

I can exercise my own discretion. For, if there is not- if it is the case that there was no scope whatsoever for me to have the option of whether or not to doA, prior to doing A, or, in case A has already taken place, whether or not to do it once more, it would be really inept to say that I *did* A. My understanding to do a certain thing means both that it would be possible for me not to do it and that I exclude this possibility. It is important to note that for P's being the agent of A it is necessary that 'doing A' and 'not doing A' are *simultaneously possible* for him to actualise and he opts for doing A. Once this essential link between *agency* and the corresponding *option* be seriously recognised, it can hardly be maintained, as some have done,[7] that to undermine the sense of freedom does not automatically undermine agency.

In fact, it is ultimately upon this option that anyone is deemed answerable for, and thus is taken to be the agent of, his action.[8] The agent's being answerable for his action would itself become utteerly pointless or else would amount to some unacceptable position, if he is denied the said option altogether. For, to deny P this option would in the last analysis amount to asserting that whatever P *does* is the only thing that he can *do*. But clearly it would be wrong to demand that what someone *does* and what he *can* do should, of necessity, coincide. Furthermore, to uphold this sort of coincidence would be to deny that anyone could ever *do* anything except in the trivial and unexciting sense that each of us is just present as a mere figure in the whole drama in which none could ever fail to play the allotted role to the perfection.

V

So we conclude: the phenomenon of man is not just a part of the natural, i.e. the physical, order. Infected by the tendency to maintain the the so-called unity of science, many wish to subject every phenomenon in the universe to the 'scientific model', urging that everything must be understandable by the employment of scientific theories. There is no harm, as such, in being immersed in the scientific tradition. But things begin to become dangerous when one gets oneself trapped or overwhelmed by it and consequently begins to fail to appreciate or to refuse to acknowledge whatever eludes science. If we are speaking of the practicability of ' scientific

explanation', it is in fact a good rule that every phenomenon is or could be totally explicable exclusively in 'scientific terms', except when we come to the phenomenon of man. To argue that the human creatures are completely explainable by the scientific method alone is to construe knowledge of persons on the model of knowledge of material object which persons, in all likelihood, *are* not. If, on the other hand, some phenomena cannot be captured in the scientific net, why not forget the ambition of capturing everything in the scientific net? Reality is not just physical reality, and any physical conception of reality must include an acknowledgement of its own incompleteness. Of course, one might argue that our bodies and in particular our central nervous systems are in toto subject to the physical laws. But, then, one must be careful to recognise that this sort of view leaves the main question, how anything in the world can be a subject in interpersonal relationships or can be an answerable agent, unanswered. The crucial question is not whether description of ourselves can be given solely in scientific or physicalistic terms, but whether this sort of description leaves a significant gap in our conception of ourselves as *humans.* I think it does.*

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. F.P. Ramsey, 'Philisophy' in *Logical Positivism* (ed. A.J.Ayer), The Free Press, New York, 1969, p. 325

2. *Cf.* Augustine Shutte, 'The Refutation of Determinism' in *Philosophy,* Vol.59, No. 230, Oct., 1984, p. 485.

3. See his 'Freedom and Resentment' in his *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays,* Methuen, London 1974.

4. *Ibid.* These attitudes are also called by Strawson '"sentiments" toward ourselves and others'. See his *Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, p. 31.

5. Colliss Lamont, 'Freedom of Choice and Human Responsibility'in *Philosophy and Contemporary Issues* (eds. John R. Burn and Milton Goldinger), Macmillan Publishing & Co., Inc., New York, 1980, p.30.

6. Jonathan Bennett, 'Accountability' in *Philosophical Subjects* (ed. Zak Straaten), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 43.

7. For example, see R. Taylor, *Action and Purpose,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 140. Also see Thomas Nagel, The *View From Nowhere,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 111.

8. I am not claiming that this is the only way to bring out the logic of human agency. Others have tried to explicate the notion of agency in ways different from the present one. One may recall here the famous essay 'Agency' of Donald Davidson. [In *Agent, Action, and Reason* (eds. Robert Binkley and others), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971.] He there gives a necessary mark of agency in terms of intention. He claims that a person P is the agent of an event *a* only if there is some description, *x* of *a* such that '*P* did *x* intentionally' is true. I would not, for obvious reasons, go into the details of Davidson's view. But one thing perhaps is clear: Davidson's view would not be inconsistent with ours insofar as an action is identified as one done intentionally by the agent. (For some critical comments about Davidson's thesis, see James Cornman's 'Comments' in *Ibid*)

*An earlier draft of this paper was read in an All India Seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, (W.B.) in 1990. Part of this paper was read in an All India Seminar organised by Indian Philosophical Association, in Bombay in the same year. The discussions at the two seminars did much to widen my conception of the present problems. I must express my sincere thanks to the members of these seminars.

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KAI NIELSEN ON CULTURAL IDENTITY, SELF DEFINITION AND PROGRESS IN PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

The defence of Universalim or Universalistic ideals and perspectives has increasingly become vehement and unrelentingly vocal since, perhaps, the publication of Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature*.[1] Rorty's thesis opened a floodgate of critical reviews, rejoinders and commentaries. One (in)direct consequence or fallout of these efforts is, may be, the first international symposium on Universalism held in Poland in 1989, ten years after Rorty raised considerable intellectual dust with his publication. I have, elsewhere,dealt with some of the criticisms against Rorty by Putnam, Jackson and Others.[2] My principal interest and concern for now is with Kai Nielsen's interesting articles published in *Metaphilosophy*[3] and *Human Studies*[4].

Summary of Kai Nielsen's Arguments

According to Nielsen there have been two dominant contending poles:" the ideals of Universality of the Enlightenment, and the claims of particularism of the counter Enlightenment."[5] Particularism does not entail enthnocentrism but recognises the importance and primacy of "local attachments: a self-identity as a particular kind of cultural identity".[6] For Nielsen, we can have it both ways, that is, keep universalistic ideals and at the same time recognise "ourselves as particular sorts of persons, the bearers of a particular culture and tradition.'[7] Quoting Herder but largely disagreeing with Herder's main thrusts, Nielsen concedes that :

1. tradition and local attachments fetter us;
2. local attachments enable us find signification in our lives and help sustain that sense of significance;

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3. there is extreme diversity and different forms of life, but denies that
4. these diverse and different forms of life are "equally valid, equally worth living and incommensurable";
5. there is no genuine Achimedean point to make any evaluative comparisons;
6. there are no universalistic legitimating standards, values and norms;
7. there is no *supra* community such as humanity itself with which we can identify.

To escape from our cultural imprisonment occasioned by the facts of our own socialization, Nielsen endorses the proposals of Georg Gadamer. Gadamer's proposals amount to this: we reject some of our inherited belief systems which are mere "Cultural prejudices unsustainable in the light of a cool and informed investigation",[8] and accept only those "legitimating beliefs which would have to be accepted by any rational person in an ideal speech situation".[9] Filtered thus, our "local attachments would still remain attachments, but would be genuine legitimate beliefs."[10]

Against this background, Nielsen suggests that "we may continue to have ethnic loyalties but our self-definitions will no longer be in purely ethnic terms. Since they must be sustainable under ideal speech situations, they will be beliefs that all *rational agents* will find reasonable to hold under such conditions",[11] (my emphasis). Nielsen concludes that only this will prevent us from lapsing into crude, bare faced, self-defeating cultural relativism. The merit here, according to him, is that in his proposals are embedded "elements of what are in both relativistic views and more universalistic views: we start with considered convictions but they also must be considered convictions which stand up to critical probing from a universalistic standpoint."[12]

Simply put, cultural identity and self-definition are meaningless, perhaps, senseless without due cognizance of both the particular and universal apsects. In other words, particularism is perfectly compatible with universalism"[13] because "genuine self-definition is rooted in some distinctive cultural identity but does not imply relativism or the rejection of universalism."[14] What Nielsen has

succeeded in doing is to draw attention to the need for proper accounting of both views, two views that are ineluctably interlocked in the phenomenal drama of life. It is perhaps only this recognition that can sustain both sides and ensure a credible balance without doing violence to either side. Yet this quest for balance, substantially in Aristotelian mould, is suspect. I return to this theme later.

In another highly engaging paper: "Can there be progress in Philosophy",[15] Nielsen makes the following points:

1. "that there are varying social practices; and

2. because they vary, not infrequently, they do conflict;

3. it is the task of philosophy to help in providing answers to these problems by showing which social practices ought to endure, which should be reconstructed, and which should be abandoned." [16]

4. Philosophy's task here in terms of providing answers to these problems is eminently required because "the issues raised by the problems of men cannot be resolved simply by appealing to existing social practices, context dependent though justification may be, for the heart of the controversy is the genuine and serious conflict of competing social practices."[17]

5. Only "Philosophy - as - critical theory" can accomplish this task of resolving the problems arising from conflicting social practices;

6. Such a critical theory will "share the fallibilist attitude of the sciences, such a comprehensive holistic theory will provide a comprehensive critique of culture and society and of ideology." [18]

7. "Such a theory is not just a dramatic narrative or a word-picture, but a genuinely empirical-cum-theoretical theory, a descriptive- explanatory theory showing us the structure of society, the range of its feasible transformations and the mechanics of its transformation. It will provide a rational justification, for saying, of its possible transformations, that one transformation is a better transformation than the others. It would consider the comparative adequacy of ways of life that might claim our allegiance."[19]

Against this background and quite in substantial agreement with Habermas, Nielsen insists that there is need for:

1. "a rational consensus as distinct from a purely historically and culturally fortuitous consensus;

2. a standard to carry out progressive social criticism and make a critique of institutions and ideology;

3. otherwise we are mired in a relativistic morass in which only negative criticism is possible."[20]

Nielsen, therefore, carpets Rorty, Foucault, Lyotard and other antifoundationalists for insisting that :

1. "we have no need for such an Achimedean point or indeed any Achimedean point;

2. the search for a standard, for a holistic critical theory is a search for a grand metanarrative which is nothing but a nostalgia for the absolute;

3. the criteria for validity and rationality are first order discourse of our distinct language-games which in turn are embedded in our (distinct) forms of life;

4. what is given there are a complex cluster of social practices"[21] each validated by its own internal standards;

5. there are no context independent criteria of rationality and validity. A search for a more profound legitimacy is a search for the colour of heat;[22]

6. a search for an Achimedean point is grossly irrelevant because "rational argumentation can only be conducted in accordance with the most reflective and aknowledgeable application of the social practices of a given community at a given time;[23]

7. there is, therefore, no determining what is rational by some extra-historical, universalistic set of criteria. There is and can be no such historical legitimation.[24]

Nielsen is uncomfortable with these explicitly antifoundationalistic views essentially because he belives that:

1. universalistic ideals are much more encompassing than local attachments;

2. the human family is one and the same irrespective of language, conflicting life styles, social practices, etc;

3. the criteria for validity, rationally and legitimation must necessarily be one irrespective of the varying systems of convention, life styles, social practices and local attachments;

4. there will surely be no credible solutions to the problems of men and of life if we do not have universal rational standards of criticism, validation, and legitimation; and hence

5. a social practice is justifiable and complete "if we can tie whatever particular phenomena to some transcontextual general consideration;[25]

6. for self-definition to be a credible human exercise, which it surely is, it cannot be entirely and absolutely culture dependent. To be worth it and credible, self-definition must necessarily exhibit the ineluctible matrix of particularism and universalism;

7. because underlying "the social and historically conditioned knowledge that structures the social world is a foundation of universal truth, and it is the sole business of philosophy to uncover the absolute foundation that undergirds this knowledge."[26]

In the preceding paragraphs I have tried to present the salient points in Nielsen's two articles under reference. I do not pretend to have done a good job in this summary or to have done justice to his views therein. What I have attempted doing is simply to extract what I consider germane in them in terms of my present, and immediate purposes.

The Issue at Stake

The significance of the interdepenence of Nations, National Economies, peoples and World Systems has refocussed attention on universalistic ideals. It is as if we have gradually exhumed the old metaphysical controversy concerning the status, role and place of universals. Particularism, it would, thus, appear, is in retreat from the barrage of attacks against its ideals and practices. Yet particularism rather than eclipse under this sustained, unrelenting attack continues to attract more and more followerships. What then

is responsible for its survivalist trait against the background of the ever growing, and still forceful influence of Universalism? But first what is universalism?

Dictionary definitions derive it from the Latin word - *Universalis,* which means : common, general, belong to, done by all, affecting all. It is everything that exists everywhere. Janusz Kuczynski has defined universalism as "not a dogma but a process of thinking on a global scale that takes mankind as its group subject. It replaces power and subjection with the dialectics of partnership and communication. It rejects both nihilism and authoritarianism; it recognizes that nothing human is alien to one without surrendering to relativism, to the view that everything is good and true for its time and its proponent".[27]

Conflating both definitions the following accounts are suggestive:

Definition 1 : Universalism means something that is common to all, done by all and affects all.

Definition 2 : Universalism means everything that exists everywhere.

Definition 3 : Universalism means thinking on a global scale that takes mankind as its group subject. All three definitions allude to the same thing in varying degrees.

In other words, the definitions are not substantially different from each other.

What is particularism? The Dictionary meaning suffices for present purposes and needs. It means "relating to one as distinct from others".[28] The only way of distinguishing one thing from the other is through the examination and analysis of quiddity, that is, the analysis of their essence. In other words, a painstaking analysis of genus and species. For examples, under the genus Tree, there are different species: iroko, obeche, mango, etc. Under the genus Fruit, there are different species : tomatoes, apples, pawpaw, etc. By the same token under the genus Man, there are different species of mankind: German, French, Chinese, Polish, English, Irish, Spanish, Nigerian, Indian, Jew, Arab, etc. Ethnographically, this has been reduced to the three main groups of mankind: Europoid, Mongoloid and Negroid. The subdivision, though merely ethnographic, is significant because it is not arbitrarily determined. Rather the subdivision is culture dependent.

Culture is, thus, the boundary marker differentiating one humankind from another. "Culture is a normative frame or script in which expectations concerning appropriate behaviour are defined consensually in a given community. Distinctive human behaviours such as language, art, religion, philosophy, ethical practices, mythology, what people feel angry or sad about, etc. are learned and thus vary across cultures".[29] Above all, culture gives us, individually, a credible frame of reference, that is, a system of standards and values usually merely implicit, underlying and to some extent controlling action or the expression of attitudes, beliefs and ideas. And contrary to "the explicit part of a culture (fine art, music, literature, etc) implicit values, attitudes and beliefs are experienced as a part of one's self, as something granted. This deeply ingrained part of the culture influences all our experiences, feelings and behaviour".[30] Surely, there are cross-cultural differences, emotional expression, moral behaviour, stereotypes, eating habits, dressing habits, problem solving mechanisms, etc. The implicit culturally determined values, conjunctively, validate acceptable and unacceptable patterns of behaviour, patterns of superior or subordinate relations, definitions of the good, the bad, the beautiful, the ugly, the right and wrong, the truth, and false, the objective and knowledge. Hekman has suggested that "in the broadest sense what some philosophers are arguing is that the basis of human knowledge lies in the social, cultural and historical conditions of human life rather than in transcendent, absolute, or universal truth. In other words, they are claiming that what we call knowledge (truth, objectivity, good, right, wrong etc.) is a product of the particular social and historical situation in which particular humanbeings (humankinds) find themselves".[31] To this extent, these implicit values are essentially like cognitive maps automatically activated. Their activation does not result from any desired intentional effort or ratiocinative process, but is triggered by familiar stimuli usually radically associated within the past. Nielsen has not decidedly discounted these issues, but reading him suggests that he takes them as unproblematic in terms of his compatibility thesis.

Identity and Difference

I Concede the following grounds to Nielsen :

1 There is only one known human race or family;

2. what binds us together in terms of biology is significant;

3. the human predicament as evidenced in birth, suffering, torture, hunger, disease, loneliness, death, etc, are not radically dissimilar;

4. the problems of men as everything that exists everywhere is not radically disparate;

5. whatever tends to separate us, and keep us apart from one another is artificial because these are man-made, and to a large extent ideological.

Yet, I differ and very significantly from Nielsen's position because I am of the opnion that:

Although there is only one known human race or family, this family is predicated on one surname but with different first names. Individual identity is lost without the first name. Group identity is lost without it. The surname implies identity while the first names imply diversity. The family is primordially one, yet the diversity in its membership does no violence to it. It in fact enhances the identity epitomised by the surname. In other words, variation and diversity are characteristics of particularism and universalism.

Our common biological determination is essentially important, yet history and context are far more significant and important in terms of determining and defining what we are, who we are, and why we are the way we are. It is essentially important that the individual is understood as a crossingpoint of socio-cultural and historical influence. In other words, the socially and culturally aroused self is the only authentic self, and the demand to realise or actualize one's self is a constant. The eseential link between human thought and human social existence cannot easily be wished away. In the words of Malholtra, "the social situatedness of the self and the interconnection bnetween language, communication, and awareness of self"[32] is beyond doubt.

The problems of men are indeed the same everywhere but the answers and solutions differ "over cultural space and over historical time." These answers and solutions are not the same, have never

been the same and may never be the same. Rothbaum has, for example, suggested that there are two kinds of environmental control. "In primary control, people try to influence the existing reality by changing other people, circumstance or events. In secondary contrrol, people try to accommodate themselves to external reality by changing their own attitudes, perceptions, goals and desires. The Western approach aims for primary control, if one does not like something, change it. The Eastern approach recommends secondary control, if one has a problem, learn to live with it".[33] According to Iga, "the point is not that one form of environmental control is better than the other, but rather that each has its place. Emphasis on primary control encourages self-expression, independent thinking, change and competition, while secondary control leads to continuity, attachment and serenity".[34] The specific human problem here is environmental control which is universal but the responses, the answers and solutions are dissimilar, as indeed they should be. Since each aspect has its place, role and function it is needless to "consider the comparative adequacy of ways of life that might claim our allegiance". It does not even make sense to talk of this comparative adequacy because the Western approach is adequate to its ways of life, the Eastern to its ways of life, the African to its ways of life, etc. There is, thus, no neutral way of deciding which of these ways of life is better than the others. There are no cultural achievements common to humankind.

It is as a result of the ideological mask, consciously put on, that has accounted for our inability to see others as one of our own kind. It is these ideological positions bordering on self interest and prejudice that has, for examples, stultified efforts to find solutions to the Sourth African tragedy and the Arab-Isreal conflict. It was what justified the Atlantic slave trade, and much earlier Aristotle's robust justification of slavery. These are obviously concrete exemplifications of the problems of men which are not soluble, if at all, by the employment of "a rational consensus as distinct from a historically and culturally fortuitous consensus".

The important but unanswered question is this: How can two unidentical things be at the same time identical? How can two black things become one white thing ? Nielsen's thesis of compatibilism between particulars and the universal offers no explanation. In the

absence of such an explanation I can only say that his thesis of compatibilism is a veiled attempt at reductionism. Yet, an individual in a mob has no identity.

Self-discovery, self-knowledge, self-fulfilment are man's true destiny. To be profoundly human is a cultural imperative. The cultural process enables man to know himself. Indeed know Thyself is, still remains, the way to wisdom, the wisdom that is predicated on culture which moulds an individual into a significant being. Nielsen thinks, perhaps not, that it is better for our common humanity that we *forget* the significant differences that are intrinsically part of our humanness and our one human family. How possible is it for example to convince an Indian or an African; Ah! we were once Indians or Africans, but now let's forget all that because we are now universal men. This is impossible for now because there is nothing like a universal man, universal language, religion, ethical codes and social practices to which the entire human family is subject. I think, therefore, that it is far more fruitful and rewarding that we acknowledge the primacy of these differences and *understand* them for what they are. Their understanding can lead to better appreciation of the nuances of particular cultures. Rather than impede universalism, such an understanding could make for better awareness, the enlargement of perspectives, the mutuality of conceptions, the reciprocity of perspectives and indeed make us less slavish to our narrow visions. To reduce, abandon or minimize the place of particularism is to become centreless, is to become centreless subjects.

To avoid being centreless what is required is not a cultural shift of emphasis towards the Western version, vision and definition of reality, religion, ethics, philosophy, truth, objectivity and social practices. It is equally not the wide scale embrace of universalism or the adoption of Nielsen's compatibility thesis. What is required and urgently needed is the emphasis on integral living, empathy, dialogue, and tolerance. UNESCO launched the World decade for Cultural Development on January 21st, 1988. It drew up a comprehensive global agenda for the rectification of socio-cultural imbalances, achieving a sustainable ecologically orientated development, and providing better opportunities for access to cultural participation for the neglected segments of the human family. The agenda focussed on the following objectives:

(a) acknowledgement of cultural dimensions of development;

(b) affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities;

(c) broader participation in cultural life;

(d) promotion of international cultural cooperation.

A properly organised implementation of these objectives could give us a better insight into the existing cross-cultural similarities and differences whose content should teach (assuming we are ready to learn) us to grant other cultures the same significance which we recognize for our own values.

Self-Definition or Self-Abnegation

On self-definition Nielsen had this to say. "It remains the case that genuine self definition must be a cultural identification and a cultural identification cannot but be a distinct cultural identification in terms of some particular culture. What makes us something, what gives our lives meaning, are our distinctive cultural identities. If we lose them we lose ourselves".[35] "It may be that all genuine self definition is rooted in some distinctive cultural identity".[36]

Furthermore, "in acquiring a language we acquire a distinctive view of the world and a distinctive culture. The language and with it the conceptual scheme we acquire and the way we acquire it differs radically over cultural space and over historical time".[37] Nielsen concludes that all these are perfectly compatible with universalistic ideals. I have alluded to the fact that Nielsen is in quest of balance, harmony or concord between particularisim and universalism and concluded that this balance, if it is feasible and achievable, is suspect. Nielsen's compatibility thesis, if it is to achieve its intended goal (whatever this goal might be) needs a foundation. I am not persuaded that there is a place where this foundation can be firmly grounded. To say that A and B are compatible is to say that A and B are suited to each other; are in accord with each other; are able to exist together with each other. Now, how compatible are Otakpor an Igbo, and Nielsen a Canadian, in terms of individual goals, aspirations, definitions of self and reality, etc.? How compatible are a colonized subject

and the colonizing masters? On another level, how compatible is my society burdened with univerified foreign debt with Nielsen's which is debt free to a certain degree? If they are, in what terms? If there is no compatibility at the level of identity, does it make any sense to suppose its existence at a higher, abstract level? I think not.

I am not, in the least, optimistic about the kind of raproachment that Nielsen seems to favour. To get the particular and universal views to live together, along side each other in accord, to reduce the internal and external tension that is part and parcel of the drama of life, is more than formidable considering how right boundary lines of universalism has been drawn. In an intellectual climate where any talk of the particular tends to be regarded as contributing very little or nothing towards the understanding of ourselves and the way we are, the pursuit of the ideals of universalism has come to mean the derogation of particulars. Yet, we cannot look at the world in an undetached way, because there is nothing like uncontaminated truth. We look at the world from a vantage point that is somewhere in particular, because each of us is a particular person with a personal view of our own. We cannot overnight become centreless persons without radically breaching the ontologically priviledged position of our personhood.

It is plain, perhaps not, that Nielsen does not want to minimize the achievements of culture in terms of enabling us to define ourselves, to find and locate ourselves and give concrete expression to our personhood. Yet, the move towards a scientific image of culture which Nielsen favours is lucid exemplification of an image steeped deep in an overly ambitions analytic tradition. As a conceptual tool, this tradition, powerful though, has not succeeded in explaining the subpersonal systems that mediate our behaviour and that which makes ratiocination and performance possible, because performance, ratiocination, rationality, justification and standardization are context bound. All justification, according to Dewey, is context bound and inescapably involves reference to existing social practices. Outside this framework, we lose our cultural identity, our self definition and affirmation. We lose ourselves in the ultimate. Otakpor has suggested that "to lose pride in one's culture is a loss of pride in one's self. And for any man, this is moral and cultural death".[38]

In other words, any attempt to subject the particularity of our experiences to universalistic ideals will only succeed in relinquishing this particularity. The overwhelming consequence is self-abnegation not self-definition as Nielsen has vigorously contended and defencded. Abnegation and alienation are the results (or should I say the benefits) of disownedness.

What is the self-definition of a Canadian who is rational enough to find reasonable beliefs to hold under an ideal Igbo speech situation? None. The speech we share defines the world common to us. As Wordsworth puts it:

"the very world which is the world of all of us - the place where, in the end, we find hapiness, or not at all"

The Igbo world is not common to everyone, it is not a world where in the end we all find hapiness or meaning, therefore no one, Canadian or not, who is not an Igbo can authentically define and locate self in such a situation. And no matter whatever the degree of considered convictions entertained under such a situation, universalistic claims come to nought. The self makes no sense outside context and history, the claims of universalism notwithstanding. Outside this framework what only remains or counts is Nietzche's "creative mistrust" or Foucault's "anonymous thinking, knowledge without subject,theory without identity".

It is ideological not theoretical to suggest the use of philosophy - as - critical theory by other cultures; or to suggest that there are necessarily no solutions to the problems of men if there are no universal standards of criticism and validation; or that there is need for a universal standard with which to carry out progressive social criticisms and to make a critique of institutions and ideology; or that there is an Achimedean point at which comparisons can be fruitfully made.

What is critical about critical theory ? Perhaps nothing, except an ideology. How do we determine a universal standard? Which institutions are under reference? Critical theory is nothing other than a new euphemism for mental recolonization and the subjection of other humankinds not regarded as one of us. It is the latest

in the transformational process of colonial trinity of the Queen, the Bible and the Gun. In its place what is being suggested by Nielsen and others, in a subtle manner, is a new trinity of universal standard, validation and legitimation. But, then, we exclude ourselves from the canons and demands of this new trinity (just as in the earlier one) which we nonetheless impose on other humankinds not regarded as one of us. Afterwards, we are the first world from whom all other worlds should borrow.

It is grossly unethical to exclude ourselves from the demands we impose on others, especially those others who are disadvantaged, one way or the other. Against this background the carefully defined talk of universal standard, of legitimation, of justification, and of validation is not rationally warranted, because there is no neutral way of establishing the priority of the principles of legitimation, justification, validation, standard and even of rationality.

The Political Question

I am a Nigerian and therefore a Negro and an African. The socio-economic, political, constitutional, judicial and cultural history of my country in the last century and a half is a history predicated on colonialism, the struggle for liberation and political independence. I was born into colonialism, was nurtured by it, matured in it and attained adulthood during the period. I was therefore formally socialized and schooled by its dominant ethos, norms and social practices. Its overwhelming effects have been radically and absolutely totalizing (need I say universalizing). After thirty two years of political independence (1960), I am still wholly subject to the after effects of colonial rule and subjugation. Igbo is the language natural to me. I write and speak English as a second language. I grew up with the conceptual apparatus and scheme inherent in my natural language. I think and see the world like a typical Igbo adult. My reading, speaking and understanding of the English Language, arguably, affords me that much.

Now, in the name of universalism, a completely abstract entity, Nielsen is suggesting that all these be put behind me, because these peculiar aspects of ME are compatible with universalism. In other words, he is suggesting that I should forget who I am

and what I am. I should forget the *why* of who I am. This means that I should stand outside the social practices that are part of ME; that I should stand outside those culturally determrmined implicit values that are intrinsically, ontologically, ontically and avowedly significant in terms of my personhood, my self-definition and cultural identity. This means that I should have no goals and no aspirations. I should not be goal orientated, all in the pursuit of the fleeting, the totalizing and the centreless. Surely, this will result in a one dimensional milieu where I and my kins would have no history (even colonial history) and would be reduced to playing the role of part-man or, worse, no-man.

The justification of my actions according to Ross "takes the form of unpacking or articulating the particular commitments and attachments that characterize my situation, the way of life to which I am inextricably bound. We do not ascend from our situation to an increasingly impersonal consideration in order to generate a *bona fide* justification."[39] Such justification based on impersonal consideration, to a large extent, is holistic. And to avoid the dilemma of embarrassments I need, as Hampshire suggests, to "either abandon the way of life to which I am now, whether by choice or circumstance, committed, or I would find that many of the other activities and practices, to which I am at present committed, have lost their significance, have become confused and incoherent"[40] Baselessness, homelessness and centrelessness are the cumulative results of such an endeavour. It amounts to cultural suicide. In such a climate of baselessness, homelessness, centrelessness and ahistoricity, where the base, home, centre cannot hold because there isn't anymore any base, home or centre, everything conspires towards a philosophy of the meaningless and the absurd. Nobody associates a life of value with such a scheme.

The most deadly sin is the mutilation of my consciousness, of my sense of self, of my personal worth, of my self-definition and cultural identity by colonialism. Universalistic ideals can do nothing useful other than exacerbate and reinforce this mutilation which is alreaddy very visible in every aspect of my life. I am neither any more perfectly Igbo nor English, neither existentially Igbo nor English. Nobody will take me as an English gentleman because culturally I am supposed to be Igbo. Yet, I am not a

universal man because there is no universal man, only a cultural
man exists. Feeling does not, never, discover the absolute or the
universal. If the enormity of this neither-here-nor-there is to be
avoided we must strike out for an authentic, integral and cultural
humanism in which the what, how and who I am is predominantly
dominant. Paroding W. B. Yeats, I can say this :

> Reason guard me from those thoughts man think.
> In the mind alone,
> He that sings a universal, absolute song,
> Thinks in a marrow bone.

Over two centuries of cultural contact(remember this is not
focal in the contact, the economic is) between the West and the
rest of the human family, what is the picture like? What is the
result of this contact? Which culture has gained or lost ever since
this contact? Which culture is still gaining? The answers to these
questions and more are plain, and indeed obvious. The West gained
enormously and lost nothing, and the West is still gaining and
increasingly tightening its stranglehold on other cultures. In addition
to these gains, what the West has done flawlessly is to distance
itself from the rest of us. For examples:

Western mode of dressing has spread throughout the world
but the West has adopted nothing in this respect from other parts
of the world. The colonizing zeal did not include the adoption
of whatever is good from the cultures of the so-called savage
and primitive peoples outside Europe and North America. No English
man dresses like a Nigerian or Indian, and No French man dresses
like an Algerian or a Togolese. No American dresses like a
Phillipino.

Western food items are served in Nigerian Hotels, but Hotels
in London or Paris have no Nigerian - African or Indian food
on their menu list.

Africans listen quite often to Western classical music (Mozart,
Benthoven, etc) but only a few Westerners or none, listen to Igbo
music, Akan music or buy these records. Perhaps only the West
makes music, others make noise; yet this noise has meaning and
relevance.

Western Languages (English, French, Portuguese, German, Spanish, Italian, etc.) are spoken outside the West by many non-Westerners, yet only a hand full of Westerners can communicate effectively in any African or Indian language.

Western religion and philosophy has spread to all nooks and corners of the World; yet only a handful of Westerners can discuss the world view of the Igbo or Ashanti, assuming that there is recognition that these people have world views, at all.

The West has vehemently opposed the New World Communication and Information Order mainly because it is not in its calculated self interest that such a new scheme for world information and communication should exist.

It has equally opposed the formation of a new economic world order because, again, it is not in its interests that such an order should exist.

Against this background, Zimmerman has suggested that "Western man now understands himself as a self-willed subject who regards everything as an object for economic exploitation (and cultural subjugation). Western society is egoism on a planetary scale".[41] This egoism ensured security through the manipulation of things and peoples that are not regarded as one of their kind.

Consequently, it is difficult to accept the thesis, goals and ideals of universalism as something that is common to all of us, or as something that is everything that exist everywhere. Colonialism is not universal. Victims of Apartheid and Colonialism are not likely to forget (they can forgive) too easily the mindlessness that attended the rape of their culture and civilization. There is no denying the fact that culture is dynamic, or that no culture exists - develops in isolation, but Western culture vis-a-vis other cultures has not exhibited this dynamism. Cultural dynamism in Western terms is a euphemism for cultural imperialism. It is another name for insisting on the superiority of one culture over all others. How can there be something that is common to all of us, something that affects all of us when one of us, because of the accidents of history, embraces cultural insularity and only espouses mutuality,

universalism, interdependance and co-existence at his own convenience?

Universalism has suddenly become a catch-phrase and indeed fashionable because it is evident that the West is gradually losing out in terms of power shifts in World politics and economy. Yet:

When the Roman Empire was at its glorious apogee nobody talked about the world embracing universalistic ideals. Roman culture, language, law and civilization was, then, the in-thing. Many of the ancients, either by force or circumstance, aspired to become cultured Roman citizens, not universal citizens.

When Spain and Portugal received the Papal Bull of Demarcation, dividing the World between them, in 1492, they did not preach universalism. The Papal Bull did not include universalistic ideals because the Spaniards and Portuguese were slave dealers. Or is slave trade and universalism compatible?

When Britain and France gradually took over from Spain and Portugal, and became militarily, economically, politically and diplomatically dominant in the World, the world did not collapse under the barrage of universalistic ideals. Both countries did not espouse universalism while perfecting and refining the mechanisms of the Atlantic slave trade. The slave trade across the Atlantic was not abolished because of its unverrsalistic disflavour. It was purely on the basis of economic considerations. It should be noted also that the French assimilation policy in Africa was intended to make French gentlemen and ladies out of Africans, not to make them universal individuals.

Since the end of the second world war when the USA became the foremost military, industrial, economic, political, and doplomatic gaint in the world, no one has bothered us with universalistic ideals. Like the Romans in the earlier period, the "Yankees" bestride the World with their flamboyant life styles, social practices and slangs. It has long been fashionable to identify with anything American, in many parts of the world.

So, what is the rationale for the renewed interest in universalistic ideals? It is simply that a power shift is occuring as we move

towards the edge of the 21st century. According to Spengler, "one fact above all stands out, that Europe (the West) no longer possesses its former monopoly of military power which enabled it to force the other continents to submission-- by contrast to their position in the last century, the European (Western) powers are no longer amongst themselves. The coloured world itself has become a great power, in Africa, in East Asia, amongst the Islamic peoples and in Central America."[42] It is not just military power that is slipping away, the west is gradually losing in terms of industrial, economic, political and importantly cultural power. The co-called third world peoples are gradually rediscovering and regaining their identities, earlier mutilated, and in the process have increasingly become culturally assertive.[43] Western power base is, surely, scientific and technological, but technology is not easy to control, albeit, unsuccessfully. Mumford has made the interesting observation "that technology is like water turned on by the sorcerer's apprentice; we can start it, but we do not know how to stop it"[44] from overflowing or overflooding the landscape. What is happening now is entirely novel: it is Western defined experiment to live without a culture and to subtly subject other humankinds to this experiment, subjection not by gun boat diplomacy but *via* the use of standards of measurement, justification, validation, legitimation and objectivity which is alien to the others. As Spengler suggests,"when the freezing point of a culture is reached, it expands and breaks whatever may try to contain it. Then with its spiritual substance exhausted, outward expansion is the only gesture of life that is left."[45] This outward expansion of the Western defined experiment, as this point in time, will fail, and *ab initio* has failed. The Western defined ideal of a universal humankind is a myth, fashioned to cushion western nostalgia concerning matters that are gradually slipping out of hand. As Senghor puts it, "we still disagree with the West: not with its values any longer but with its theory of the civilization of the universal...... In the eyes of Westerners the exotic civilizations are static in character, being content to live by means of archetypal images, which they respect indefinitely".[46]

Conclusion

Universalistic ideals are an epitome of the Enlightenment theory of knowledge predicated on a single criterion of justification.

Its claim to absoluteness is not immune from challange. Particularism constitutes the most effective challange. Its supposition and avowal of an Achimedean point of objectivity, truth, knowledge and comparison is pretensious because Gadamer has shown that all understanding is governed by prejudice. The single criterion and single aim theories, as Hampshire puts it, "discard the peculiar interest of the species, and the interest of its future, as perpetually open to unforseen alternatives. The single criterion arrests development both historical and personal...."[47] To arrest development both historically and contextually, and thus remain perpetually open to unforseen alternatives that are alien is to self abnegate just for the fun of it. Yet, we can still remain open in another sense to the extent that "each tradition or culture reminds us from remote regions humans derive. Each is a bright thread layed through the corridors of labyrinth to help us find a way into the open".[48] The only thing that counts in this "open" is the acknowledgement, recognition and celebration of presence, of each others' presence. The issue of acknowledging each other's presence is neotically related to the dialectical tension between particularism and universalism, and noematically intrinsic to the essence of particularism *per se.* The Igbo, according to Achebe, "insist that any presence which is ignored, denigrated, denied acknowledgement and celebration can become a focus for anxiety and disruption. To them celebration is the acknowledgement of a presence, giving to everybody his due".[49] Presence is, thus, the critical issue, not universalistic ideals. Of what use are these ideals when we make no efforts to acknowledge the presence of the other, or when we are unable to step out in pure disinterestedness from the totalizing self-centredness towards our otherness? These are of little or no use at all. Presence is, thus, "the critical question, the critical word. Its denial is the keynote of colonial ideology. Were there people there? Well..... not really, you know... people of sorts, you understand."[50]

The new philosophy is not philosophy-as-critical theory because such a philosophy is "insensitive to the human need, to inhabit a world that makes (cultural) sense"[51], and also because such a philosophy would have necessarily "hoisted itself on its own petard"[52]. A philosophy-as-critical theory hoisted on its own petard mainly because of its insensitivity to our otherness cannot ensure progress in philosophy. This cannot make for progress in philosophy. Against

this background, progress in philosophy is neither feasible nor achievable as per Nielsen's account. Surely, there can be progress in philosophy, if and only if, such a philosophy critically reckons with the issue of presence, of each other's presence. The new philosophy, then, is the one that rejects cultural imperialism and emphasises mutuality, pluralism, cultural identity and the celebration of each other's presence. It is a phillosophy that rejects exploitation and domination and emphasies the dialectics of partnership, empathy, dialogue and tolerance. It is a philosophy that is aware of the possibilities available to it for the celebration of our otherness; is aware of the plurality of worlds, laws, standards, justifications, validations, legitimations, truths and cultures. In the ultimate, it is a philosophy that reckons with the fact that our own world necessarily interlocks more and more with the world of others. As Hamidou Kane puts it "we have not had the same past you and ourselves, but we shall have, strictly, the same future. The era of separate destinies has run its course".[53] This is only a possibility for now, but its concrete actualization should reveal the fundamental equality of all people. In one of his most important poems, *Prayer to Masks*, Leopold Sedar Senghor offered this prayer:

"That we may answer *present* at the rebirth of the world like the yeast which white flour needs[54] (my emphasis).

Kai Nielsen's theory is a good one and I believe that a good theory should, at the least, attempt to explain the greatest possible range of facts and behaviour and that a good explanatory model, like his, facilitate understanding. I am appreciative of his efforts in this regards, and of the fact that he alerts us to the abuses of an overly relativistic standpoint. Yet, I remain unpersuaded that his arguments offer us a good enough explanation to take us some where from where we are at the moment. What, who, How, and Where we are at the moment is overly important, if we are ever going to be in a better position to pinpoint our next starting point. We can never start from NO WHERE culturally.

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WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY

It would be a trivial an exercise to define certainty in the sense in which it would be a trivial exercise to define terms like 'truth', 'beauty', 'good', 'yellow' etc; for they are simple, unanalysable terms. This does not mean that we are forever deprived of using such terms in our day to day affairs. One can devise certain criteria to assess the nature of such terms. Whether those criteria are acceptable to everyone is a different question altogether. What strikes my mind is that the so called dispute in philosophy about certainty, strictly speaking, is not a dispute about certainty as such; but it is a dispute concerning the criteria of certainty. Well, one might go to an extent of saying that how can anyone formulate certain criteria of certainty without explaining what it is all about. Then, again, we are caught up in a vicious circle. Thus, the problem of certainty has been one of the major philosophical problems that haunted the minds of epistemologists of all times. The generations of epistemologists have tried to find an acceptable solution to the problem of certainty. In spite of their valient attempts to resolve this problem, it remaains, till date, very elusive in the sense that it invokes a major philosophical debate. A peripheral knowledge of the issues concerning epistemology reveals us that scepticism, an alleged counterpart of certainty, has been a serious check on certainty.

My principal objective in this paper would be to highlight the subtle nature of Wittgenstein's line of argument against Moore and scepticism as expounded in his later work *On Certainty*. It is a known fact that Moore took exception to sceptic's remarks against the existence of material objects external to the mind. In order to repudiate sceptic's claim, namely, that there is no solid proof for the independent existence of material objects, Moore, in his lecture delivered to the British Academy in 1939, held with

appropriate gestures, "Here is one hand" and "Here is another" to show that material objects exist external to the mind. This argument of Moore became a main target of Wittgenstein's criticism. According to Wittgenstein, Moore's arguments do not provide any proof for the independent existence of material objects as the arguments put forward by Moore are not claims to knowledge at all. However, it was not Wittgenstein's intention to deny the general purport of Moore's arguments against scepticism in general. Let us examine the tenor of Wittgenstein's attack on Moore and scepticism.

Moore, in his characteristic style, as a champion of common sense philosophy, argued to show that there is substantial proof in accepting the view that material objects exist external to the mind in his papers, "A Defence of Common Sense", and "Proofs of an External World". In addition to that, he expressed the view that there are a good number of propositions which he knows for certain. Some such propositions are "The Earth Existed long before I was born", "There were other human beings besides me". All these propositions, held Moore, are truisms. Wittgenstein does not deny this fact. In fact, he recognises the peculiar logical status of these propositions. But, what is wrong with Moore's propositions, as Wittgenstein sees it, is that they are not the cases of knowledge at all. This statement of Wittgenstein certainly does not debar him from criticising scepticism. Like Moore, he too was critical of scepticism. His caustic reaction to scepticism is found in his *Tractatus*, long before he launched a scathing attack on scepticism in his much later work *On Certainty*. Scepticism, writes Wittgenstein :

> ...is not irrefutable, but obviously non-sensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For, doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only when something can be said.[1]

This pithy saying about scepticism has many interesting implications. I do not think that Wittgenstein deviates from this position of *Tractatus* while attacking scepticism in his later writings.

At the outset, Wittgenstein provides us with an incisive analysis of the nature of doubt. The analysis is as follows :

(a) *Doubt is not possible without proper grounds*

One of the preconditions for a doubt is that it needs some valid grounds. Wittgenstein reiterates this point.[2] Sceptics like Descartes would have been complacent with this condition since Descartes 'universal doubt' was built upon an *ad hoc* gound, namely, the 'malicious demon'.[3] Before anyone questioned the *validity* of such an *ad hoc* ground, Descartes asserted that it is not a necessary condition that the ground itself be certain. For Wittgenstein, such a ground is as good as not having a ground; because mere imaginary ground for doubting something should not be taken as a gound at all. In this context Wittgenstein says that one has to distinguish a situation where doubt is not reasonablle from the one where doubt is logically impossible.[4] Nevertheless, warns Wittgenstein, there is no clear cut line that separates the former situation from the latter.

(b) Doubt is not a mere verbal uttarance

Wittgenstein contests that doubting something just for the sake of doubting does not in any way make any difference.[5] It is beyond one's own imagination what difference that it can make to anyone. Thus sceptic's doubt concerning the existence of material objects does not have any practical significance, as the grounds on which his doubt rests is very shaky.

(c) Doubt is possible only in the context of a language-game

Wittgenstein expresses the view that in order to doubt 'P', one must know what is meant by 'P'. For example, when a person expresses a doubt concerning the existence of material objects like 'tables', 'chairs', and 'trees', then he must be in a position to know what is meant by such objects like 'tables', 'chairs', and 'trees'. Such an understanding, holds Wittgenstein, presupposes a language-game in which these expressions are used. Thus, the language-game itself rules out the possibility of any such doubt. Because, to doubt these expressions is to question the very meaning of these expressions that are being used in a given language-game. On this ground, argues Wittgenstein, the sceptic's doubt destroys itself as it questions the meanings of the words used to express it. A language game is a practice that involves agreement or disagreement of foundational beliefs that give meanings to the words

that are being used. To put it in the language of Wittgenstein,"
Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings."[6] This
is tantamount to saying that "If you are not certain of any fact,
you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either."[7] If
Descartes says that the 'malicious demon' is deceiving him totally,
then it is also capable of deceiving him even with regard to the
meaning of the word 'deceive'. Thus, the argument of Descartes
is self-stultifying.

(d) There cannot be a universal doubt

The very essence of language-games as illustrated by Wittgenstein
in his *Philosophical Investigations* reveals that there cannot be a
universal doubt, since doubts are restricted to their respective language-
games. For example, explains Wittgenstein, a student interested
in learning history frequently iterrupts his teacher with all sorts
of doubts even before he learnt the actual language-game of history.
The doubts expressed by the student do not mean anything as
he is yet to learn how to ask questions in that particular language-
game. After all, the doubt presupposes belief. Here in this case
there is no belief; hence there is no doubt. Thus, "A doubt that
doubted everything would not be a doubt."[8]

(e) Doubt presumes certainty

It has been shown that a genuine doubt can only make sense
in the context of a language-game or in a framework of reference
which by itself is not a subject of doubt. Wittgenstein supposes
that " Doubt is only possible where testing is possible."[9] Our doubts
rest on the fact that there are many propositions which are exempted
from doubt. These propositions, according to Wittgenstein, constitute
the world view. They form the system within which all testing
takes place.[10] As a matter of fact, they serve as 'hinges' or 'substratum'
or 'scaffoldings' of our ordinary beliefs that are testable.   Thus,
doubting, warns Wittgenstein, presupposes certainty.[11]

The above analysis clearly vindicates that none of the
considerations advanced by Wittgenstein concerning the nature of
doubt justifies scepticism.

Now, Wittgenstein takes up the issue that if certain propositions

serve as the 'hinges' or 'scaffoldings' of our beliefs, then those propositions (foundational propositions) are not doubted. If this were the case, are they also the propositions about which we cannot be mistaken? Wittgenstein's answer to this question is a negative one. He says that their certainty cannot in anyway guarantee that they cannot be mistaken. In this context Wittgenstein draws a wedge between a mistake and other forms of false belief. Suppose, for example, a person may think that he is living in a place for a long time other than the place where he is actually living. Such a claim, holds Wittgenstein, is not a mistake; but a kind of mental disorder.[12] The difference between a mistake and a mental disorder is that there can be valid reasons for a mistake committed in the recognition of a fact; whereas in the case of a mental disorder there can only be causes which are strictly pathological.[13] This distinction between a mistake and madness may not be palatable to the sceptic. However, the sceptic may claim that if his belief turns out to be false, then there is sufficient ground for him to cast doubt on it (false belief) irrespective of its place in a rationally accepted system of beliefs.[14] In this context, Wittgenstein aptly points out that Descartes himself admitted this fact in his *Meditations* while illustrating the argument from dreaming. Descartes writes:

> ...how can I deny that these hands and this body belong to me, unless perhaps I were to assimilate myself to those insane persons whose minds are so troubled and clouded by the black vapours of the bile that they constantly assert that they are kings, when they are very poor; that they are wearing gold and purple, when they are quite nacked; or who imagine that they are pitchers or that they have a body of glass. But these are all madmen, and I would not be less extravagant if I were to follow their example.[15]

In spite of this profound statement, Descartes, just like lunatics, doubted the existence of material objects. Thus, he was inconsistent with his own position. Proceeding further, Wittgenstein unfolds another important distinction between a mistake and madness. In the case of the former it involves a judgement, though it may be false, while the latter does not.[16] With these few remarks on the distinction between a mistake and madness, Wittgenstein keeps the sceptic at bay.

Now turning to Moore's attack on scepticism, Wittgenstein observes certain lacunae in Moore's arguments against scepticism.

K. SRINIVAS

Moore maintained that there are a good number of propositions which he knew them for certain. In line with Moore's claim, Wittgenstein holds the view that there are many propositions which are not doubted and also mistaken. For example, the proposition "I have never been on the Moon" cannot be doubted since its negation cannot be taken seriously.[17] These propositions, according to Wittgenstein, have a peculiar logical status. Neverthless, he warns us not to arrive at a drastic conclusion that since there are a good number of propositions whose validity cannot be doubted, it does not mean that they can be known for certain. The statements "I know where I am feeling pain", "I know that I am in pain" are as senseless as the statement "I know that I have pain". Wittgenstein asserts, to give a statement "I know that I am in pain" is to give a misleading interpretation of the "grammatical proposition" that there is no such thing as doubting that I am in pain. The kernel of Wittgenstein's argument is that it is senseless to lay claim to knowledge where doubt itself is senseless. Thus, Wittgenstein exposes the triteness of Moore-type propositions.

When Moore refuted the sceptic's claim that the existence of material objects can be doubted by advancing a proof like proposition "I know that here is my hand", Moore, observes Wittgenstein, committed the same mistake as sceptic did when he staked a claim to the knowledge of existence of his own hand which is not considered a knowledge claim at all. Apart from that, the assertion "I know that here is my hand" is senseless for the following reasons.

(a) In the assertion "I know that here is my hand", "I" is superfluous. To this extent this assertion of Moore is misleading.

(b) The assertion "I know that here is my hand" can have some significance in a rare and uncommon circumstances. In such circumstances, the meaning of that assertion may be clear; but it does not provide any answer to the sceptic.

(c) Unless it is possible to doubt the assertion "I know that here is my hand", or be mistaken in believing it, one cannot be said to know that "here is my hand".

(d) Sometimes the assertion "I know that here is my hand" is used in our ordinary conversation either as a "misleading

"grammatical expression" or as an expression of one's linguistic capability.

The reasons adduced by Wittgenstein are logical and convincing. The quintessence of Wittgenstein's treatment of knowledge and certainty can be summed up by raising a question "Can one say; where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either."[18] This question undermines the view that first-person knowledge alone can be called knowledge since some sort of privileged access is accepted in those cases of knowing one's private mental states in which some philosophers have located the source of knowledge, meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein's main objective here is to show that psychological concepts do not really denote something essentially private. They have public accessibility insofar as the language, that is used to express such psychological states, has public use. Wittgensstein does not deny the fact that there cannot be any doubt about anything. A doubt, as he sees it, can make any sense only in the context of a framework of reference which by itself is not a subject for doubt. Every framework of reference, according to Wittgenstein, is rooted in certain foundational beliefs. These beliefs are relatively foundational like the bed and banks of a river which determine the direction of the flow of the waters.[19] Such beliefs constitute "foundational propositions" whose apodeictic nature in practice and action reveals us "that certain things are indeed not doubted."[20]

When Moore said "I know that here is my hand", his claim to knowledge of his own hand goes against the view that there are certain foundational beliefs which permit us to articulate a great number of propositions. Not only that, the assertion "I know that here is my hand" can also mean that one can play several language-games with the expression "hand" in the sense in which one can make assertions such as "I have pain in the hand", "This hand is stronger than that". In such cases the doubt with regard to the existence of one's own hand, for that matter anyone's hand, does not arise, since its usage is part of our foundational beliefs. Thus, there was no need for Moore to stake a claim to the knowledge of our foundational beliefs, since they are in a way taken for granted. Moore may enumerate several empirical

propositions that need no special testing. Such propositions, argues Wittgenstein, "stand-fast" like solid rocks.

What really stikes a critic of Wittgenstein's lline of argument is that Wittgenstein takes it for granted that there are certain indubitable truths about reality which form the grounds for our foundational beliefs. These foundational beliefs give rise to the articulation of various propositions that become part and parcel of our language-games. These language-games, in turn, represent various forms of life. Also, these foundational beliefs back up the agreement or disagreement of our linguistic practices. Thus, for Wittgenstein, the validity of our foundational beliefs consists in the role that they play in our day to day linguistic practices. One does not question the validity of these practices. But, they are no exceptions to the sceptic. Still he may challenge the very admissibility of these foundational beliefs as a base for our linguistic practices. Perhaps this may be the reason why Moore was rather forced to utter a statement that can elicit some persuasive force. Hence, Moore resorted to saying "I know that here is my hand", thinking it would serve as a proof for the existence of material objects. However, neither the arguments advanced by Moore nor the arguments advanced by Wittgenstein would really satisfy the sceptic. Wittgenstein knows this fact; whereas Moore was serious about the remarks made by the sceptic. All that Wittgenstein intended to show was the procedural inconsistencies involved in the arguments of Moore and the sceptic. He Knows it for certain that he cannot convince a lunatic. Though Wittgenstein differs with Moore in his approach to the problem, both Moore and Wittgenstein have the same ontological committment. In the case of Moore, the material objects such as tables, chairs, serve as the ontological base for Moore-type propositions; whereas in the case of Wittgenstein they serve as the foundational beliefs. The only point that Wiittgenstein intends to make is that the attempts of Moore to silence the sceptic are in a way nothing but barking our way up to a wrong gum tree.

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METAPHORICAL REFERENCE IN PAUL RICOEUR : A STUDY

Paul Ricoeur in his *The Rule of Metaphor* develops a theory of metaphor which is distinct from the rest of the theories propounded by many scholars on this subject until recent times. In this theory of metaphor, one can see the shift from rhetorics to semantics and from semantics to hermeneutics.[1] This clearly shows that for him, metaphor is analysed from three different levels: (1) rhetorical, (2) Semantical and (3) heremeneutical. This movement from rhetorics to hermeneutics through semiotics and semantics is the primary study undertaken by Ricoeur in *The Rule of Metaphor* (Henceforth RM). This progression is analysed by him through the changes in the world, the sentence and finally in discourse. In this paper, I propose to discuss two important themes that are interconnected in Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. The first theme of this paper will focus on the shift from rhetorics to semantics and the limitation of the rhetorical approach. It will also explain how Ricoeur treats metaphor as a semantic innovation. The second theme will deal with the hermeneutical approach to metaphor which is the central study of RM. It also deals with the importance of metaphorical reference in Ricoeur's thought.

I

Ricoeur's first study, "Between Rhetoric and Poetics" in RM, deals with Aristotle's analysis of metaphor which starts with the idea that the word or the name is the basic unit of reference. It treats metaphor as a figure of speech. Aristotle's approach to metaphor is situated at the crossroads of two disciplines--rhetoric and poetics with distinct goals: "persuation" in oral discourse and the *mimesis* of human action in tragic poetry.[2] This in short means that metaphor has two functions namely, a rhectorical and

a poetical. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle defines metaphor in the
following way.

> Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something
> else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from
> species to genus, or from species to species, on the grounds of
> analogy.[3]

In the ancient and classical rhetorical approach, metaphor is
reduced to a mere ornament of speech. Metaphor is nothing but
a decorative phenomenon. This approach makes metaphor a trope,
i.e., a change or derivation affecting the meaning of words. Here
metaphor does not convey any information and appears merely
as a stylistic ornament.[4] Hence Ricoeur argues for the need to
move from this semantics of the word to the semantics of discourse
which treats metaphor as a phenomenon of predication, an unusual
attribution precisely at the sentence-level of discourse. A purely
rhetorical treatment of metaphor is the result of the excessive and
damaging emphasis on the word[5] and hence for Ricoeur, there
is a need to replace this by sentence as a basic unit. It is
the discourse taken as a whole that bears the meaning in an
undivided way.

This does not mean that Ricoeur altogether rejects the definition
of metaphot as word. This is said to be the nominal definition
of metaphor (held by Aristotle, Fontainer, for example), whereas
the definition of metaphor in terms of sentence is said to be the
real definition of metaphor. Ricoeur sees the intimate relation that
exists between these two definitions and says that the nominal
definition need not be abolished by the real one because the word
remains the locus of the effect of metaphorical meaning. It is
the word that is said to take a metaphorical meaning.

It is appropriate in this context to deal with two historically
important theories of metaphor which Ricoeur examines in RM.
In the third study, "Metaphor and the Semantics of Discourse"
in RM, he makes a thorough study of metaphor where it is treated
not as a deviant denomination, but as impertinent predication. This
approach to metaphor at the level of sentence calls for a distinction
between the substitution and the tension theory of metaphor. As

per the substitution theory, (*i.e.*, nominal definition) metaphor is nothing but a substitution of one word for another. The substitution of figurative for literal meaning is necessary when there is a gap in the lexical code or else it is to serve an ornamental function.[6] In the tension theory, (*i.e.*, real or genetic definition) metaphor is considered to be an agent generating a tension in a phrase. Here, metaphor presupposes a tension between a literal and a figurative interpretation of the statement. In this process, the literal interpretation of the statement is rejected and in its place, the figurative interpretation is taken into account and thus it becomes meaningful. Thus Ricoeur makes it clear that metaphor belongs to the whole statement and not to the particular word. Metaphor proceeds from the tension between all the terms in the statement. This makes Ricoeur's theory of metaphor as a semantic one, i.e., it has to deal with discourse. This means that metaphor which is predicative function occurs only in the context of a statement.

Metaphor is a semantic innovation according to Ricoeur. It does not occupy any state in established language. It occurs only within the discourse. Without semantic innovation, a statement becomes absurd. Because of this, a word in a statement attains a new value and gives the statement a "new pertinence".[7] In metaphor, there is a three-fold tension which gives rise to the semantic impertinence and which leads to the semantic innovation as a way of resolving it. The idea of tension is applied in the following way :

(a) tension within statement (between tenor and vehicle, between focus and frame, for example);

(b) tension between two interpretations (between literal and metaphorical interpretation, for example);

(c) tension in the relational function of the copula (between identity and difference in the interplay of resemblance).[8]

All these three-fold tensions operate at the level of meaning in the statement to lead to the semantic innovation.

Max Black in his *Models and Metaphors*[9] examines metaphor at the level of the statement as a whole in order to account for a change in meaning that is centred in the word. For Black, a term functions as a metaphor only in a statement because statement

is the fundamental semantic unit. By rejecting the substitution theory
of metaphor and by introducing the "interaction theory of metaphor",
Black speaks of the interaction that takes place between the undivided
meaning of the statement and the focused meaning of the word.
His theory of interaction operates between the levels of "focus".
The focus is a word and the frame is a sentence. The frame
functions like a filter or a screen and when a term is put into
a frame, a new aspect is reached.

By examining Black's theory of metaphor, Ricoeur makes
it clear that though metaphorical meaning is an effect of the entire
statement it is focused on one world. For this reason he says
that metaphor is a semantic innovation that belongs at once to
the predicative order (new pertinence) and the lexical order
(paradigmatic deviation)[10]. In this context Ricoeur remarks that strictly
speaking there is no conflict between the substitution and interaction
theories because both approches are grounded in the double character
of the word. The following passage in RM explains this :

> As a lexeme, the word is a difference in the lexical code..... As
> a part of discourse, it bears a part of the meaning that belongs
> to the entire statement.[11]

II

The second theme we shall take up for discussion is about
the relation between metaphor and the reality. Do metaphorical
statements say anything about reality? For Ricoeur, the problem
of reference can be studied from two different levels of semantics
and of hermeneutics. In semantics, it deals only with entities belonging
to sentence and in hermeneutics it addresses entities that are larger
than the sentence and it is here we are concerned with the reference
of the metaphorical statement which has the power to redescribe
the reality.

Ricoeur makes use of Fregean distinction between sense and
reference to explain the opposition between the semiotics and
semantics. Sign differs from sign whereas discourse refers to the
world. Difference is semiotic[12] whereas reference is semantic.
Ricoeur says :

What is intended by discourse, the correlate of the entire sentence, is irreducible to what semiotics calls the signified, which is nothing but the counterpart of the signifier of a sign within the language code.[13]

Thus Ricoeur links the problem of reference with the notion of the intended by discourse which goes outside the language. What is intended by discourse points to an extra-linguistic reality which is its referent,[14] says Ricoeur. The intended, which is the counter-part of the entire sentence, is distinguished from the signified because of its transcendence-function.

It is interesting to note that though Ricoeur accepts Fregean distinction between sense and reference, he rejects the Fregean notion of reference which is applicable only to scientific statements and not to poetic statements. By rejecting the Fregean position, Ricoeur argues that a metaphorical statement achieves its reference upon the ruins of what might be called its literal reference.[15] It is true that Ricoeur also admits that the literary work through its structure displays a world only under the condition that the reference or descriptive discourse is suspended.[16] The literary work gains its denotation as a second-level denotation by means of the suspension of the first-level denotation of discourse.[17] Thus, Ricoeur argues that a metaphorical statement emphasises the relationship between the suspended and displayed reference. Just as the sense of the metaphorical statement is gained through the literal sense, the reference of the metaphorical statement is captured through the literal reference.

Ricoeur compares his theory of metaphoric reference with that of the generalized theory of denotation developed by Nelson Goodman in *Languages of Art* and Max Black in *Models and Metaphor*. For Goodman, metaphor is an unusual application of a familiar label to a new object that resists at first and then gives in. "It is an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting", says Goodman.[18] Ricour commends Goodman for admitting that as a symbolic system, poetry has a referential function as in the case of a descriptive discourse. But what is interesting is that here Ricoeur goes further and says that in the metaphorical discourse of poetry, referential power is linked to the eclipse of ordinary reference.[19] Similarly he says

that a poetic discourse faces reality by putting into heuristic fictions whose constitutive value is propositional to their power of denial. It helps in redescribing reality. The heuristic fictions shows the link between fiction and redescription.[20]

Another significant contribution of Goodman is that for him, the poetic discourse through their "transferred status" add to the shaping of the world. They are "true" to the extent that they are "appropriate".[21] But Ricoeur goes beyond this to say that in discourse of poetry, reality "invents" in both senses of the word: "what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents."[22]

In the last study, "Metaphor and Philosophical Discourse", in RM, metaphor is approached from the level of hermeneutics which has moved from rhetorics to semantics and from the problem of sense to the problem of reference. The question which Ricoeur raises here is this: *what* philosophy is *implied* in this movement?"[23] The question here is two-fold. The first question is whether a philosophy is *implied* and the second question is which type of philosophy is involved in this movement. Ricoeur approaches both questions simultaneously. While explaining the independent nature of the philosophical discourse he argues that philosophical discourse cannot be reduced to metaphorical discourse. The discontinuity between these two discourses are analysed by him in the study of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Heidegger, and Derrida. In his study of Aristotle's doctrine of analogy of being, he proves that there is no direct passage from the semantic functioning of metaphorical expressions to the transcendental doctrine of analogy.

Similar approach has been made by Ricoeur with regard to Heidegger who declared that the metaphorical exists only within the metaphysical. This dictum suggests that both metaphysical and metaphorical transfers constitute one and the same *uber-tragung.*[24] For example, in metaphysics there is a transfer from visible to the invisible world and in metaphor, there is a transfer from literal to the figurative sense. Thus both transgressions constitute one and the same transfer. But Ricoeur points out that it is not metaphor that carries the structure of metaphysics; instead, metaphysics seizes the metaphorical process in order to make it work to the benefit of metaphysics.[25]

Ricoeur considers as naive the view that the semantics of metaphorical utterence contains ready-made an immediate ontology which philosophy has only to elicit and to formulate.[26] He abandons this view and admits that the metaphorical utterence makes speculative discourse possible. A poetical discourse sketches a tensional conception of truth for thought, whereas the possibility of speculative discourse lies in the semantic dynamism of metaphorical utterence.[27]

III

Let me repeat some of the observations I have made so far:

(1) In Ricoeur's theory of Metaphor, there is a movement from rhetorics to hermeneutics because the rhetorical approach treats metaphor as a stylistic devise, whereas the hermeneutical approach treats metaphor from the discourse level. (2) Metaphor is a semantic innovation and it gives a new value to the statement. (3) Metaphorical statement has the power to redescribe the reality and hence it has both sense and reference. (4) There exists both *relation and difference* between different modes of discourse. (5) The metaphorical utterence makes speculative discourse possible.

At the close of this study it can be stated that Ricoeur's study of metaphor is without a doubt an excellent examination dealing both with the history of the subject and with different contemporary theories of metaphor. It can also be stated that it accommodates theories of metaphor transcending their limitations.

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BRADLEY AND WITTGENSTEIN ON LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE

In what follows, I wish to examine the views of F.H. Bradley and Ludwig Wittgenstein about language, thought and experience. Usually Bradley is known as an idealist metaphysician and Wittgenstein as the precursor of both logical positivism and ordinary language or linguistic analysis. The early Wittgenstein, too, developed a kind of metaphysics through truth-functional analysis of language. But at the same time, one can discern a close affinity between Bradley and Wittgenstein. The present essay is an attempt in this direction.

Both Bradley and Wittgenstein had almost similar views about philosophy. Bradley says :

"Philosophy is a satisfaction of what is known   as the mystical side of our nature".[1]

The mystical side of life may be said to be the aspect which is not in consonance with pragmatic or utilitarian consequences. In this sense, philosophical questions resemble those of religion. The mystical side of life is not amenable to observation and experiment. In consequence, it cannot be studied by the scientific method. Seen in this light, it can be said that Bradley wishes to distinguish philosophy from sciences. Wittgenstein, too, took philosophical issues very seriously. For him, it was the problem of his existence. Both Bradley and Wittgenstein agree on the point that even if all scientific questions are solved, the problems of life may remain untouched and unsolved. Both of them wish to distinguish the philosophical quest from that of the scientific one. Plato and Kant also come very close to Bradley and Wittgenstein in this respect. In the *Critique*

of Pure Reason, Kant visualizes the indomitable urge in man to transcend the bounds of scientific domain. Plato, too in the *Timeus* and other writtings, imagines such a role of philosophy as a response to certain basic urge in man. Seen in this light, philosophy turns out to be a subject as music, painting and religion. The latter do not aim at discovering truth at par with scientific ones. They aim at satisfying the mystical aspect of existence.

Language has occupied the focal point of both Bradley and Wittgenstein. Both the philosophers accept that knowledge is judgemental or propositional. For bradley, the unit of thought is the judgement, whereas for Wittgenstein, it is proposition. Though both judgement and proposition are expressed by means of language, yet they (judgement and proposition) have been treated as non-linguistic in nature. The acceptability of such a thesis depends upon the answer to the question how are concepts and language related? Both judgements and propositions consist of concepts or ideas. Bradley distinguishes between two senses of 'ideas'; (i) ideas as mental images or pictures, (ii) ideas as universals or meanings. Ideas in the sense of universals or meanings come very close to concepts. But now the question is : Are ideas or concepts non-linguistic in nature? Can they exist without having any connection with language? Imagine a hypothetical situation where nobody uses any language. Under such condition can we say that concepts disappear? Concepts or ideas are not linguistic in nature for the simple reason that they cannot be said to belong to any language but the expression and growth of concepts or ideas are very much connected with language. Ideas, concepts and language are intimately connected but one cannot be identified with the other. If the material body is not there perhaps no thought would be possible but for that matter thought cannot be treated as material. In the rationalist tradition, pure thought and pure concepts without any admixture or contact with the material body have been visualized. But we wish to point out that the idea of pure thought in this sense is unintelligible. Historically, language has proved as an effective medium for expression of ideas or concepts but that does not make ideas or concepts linguistic in nature. The materialist, on the other hand, committed similar mistake of equating ideas or thought with their base, i.e., the material body.

Being concatenation of thoughts and ideas, judgements and propositions cannot be construed in linguistic terms. For this reason, they (propositions and judgements) turn out to be a kind of universal and this universal is a unitary meaning. Sometimes, it has been argued that the so-called proposition and judgement are not universals but mere abstractions from the linguistic elements, i.e., sentences. Such a view of judgements and propositions is reflected in the interpretation of the philosophical doctrines of later Wittgenstein by some scholars.

From one stand point, language can be construed as consisting of physical components in that it involves sounds and words which are physical in nature. In order to obviate certain confusions, distinction has been made between language and speech in the recent years. Speech is that which is expressed by means of language. It is bound to be non-linguistic in nature for the simple reason that the same speech can be made in different languages on different occasions. The pure mechanistic and behaviouristic account of language fails to account for its persistent aspect. Language as a system of sound or physical elements is bound to be ephemeral. If there is no persistent element in language, after we utter a sentence or a group of words, the so-called speech would disappear. But this does not happen. It proves that there is something that underlies all linguistic phenomena. This is the persistent apsect of language.

The behaviourist and the mechanist might argue that the so-called persistent apsect of language can be explained by invoking the mind-brain identity argument. It runs as follows: The use of language makes its impression felt on the brain cells and whenever we utter or hear the same linguistic expression, we tend to recall only one kind of meaning. But this type of physicalistic explanation of language and meaning is unacceptable on the ground that a purely mechanistic interpretation cannot account for variety of meanings that the same linguistic expression gives rise to. Meanings grow and grow richer. This aspect of language and meaning cannot be explained by accepting one-to-one correlation of linguistic expressions with the impression on the so-called brain cells.

Both Bradley and Wittgenstein recognize the importance of universal elements in language and speech. Without these elements

thought and communication will be impossible. Communication is an inter-subjective act and for it to be possible, certain persistent and universal elements are absolutely necesarry. Both judgements and propositions are assertions either positive or negative. But according to Bradley, all judgements are interconnected so as to form a coherent, consistent and logical system; whereas, no such coherence exists among propositions. It is precisely because of this reason that Bradley advocates monism and Wittgenstein pluralism. For Bradley, the entire communication system is a unitary whole wherein all aspects are internally connected. A judgement is characterized as a mental act. This means that it is opposed to physical acts. But it should not be taken to mean that they (judgements) are subjective in nature. As a matter of fact, a judgement is the union of subject and predicate. This proves the objective character of judgements. But the nature of the predicates is such that they (predicates) mutually lead to one another. This kind of argument is the source of monism. A proposition like a judgement is the union of subject and predicate but Wittgenstein does not admit the mutual implication of predicates. This is why the propositional view of knowledge leads to pluralism and realism whereas the judgemental view to monism and idealism.

Ideas and Meanings

Both Bradley and Wittgenstein are concerned with linguistic communicative system. Both in the early and later works, communication was one of the major concerns of Wittgenstein. Again, Bradley and Wittgenstein were busy in exploring the basis, presupposition and implications of such a communicative system. Their discovery was that ideas, concepts or meanings constitute the basis of communication. The entire idealistic tradition in philosophy upholds this type of view and it has, in its turn, led to the theory that the world is a system of ideas or concepts. Bradley is no exception to it. Frege, too, belongs to this tradition but with a difference. He makes a distinction between meaning and reference. In this respect, he comes very close to Bradley. If meaning is tied down either to the mental image or to the physical fact, it ceases to have intersubjective character. The empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume tried to interpret meaning in terms of psychic content. Bradley says :

"In England at all events we have lived too long in the psychological attitude".[2]

If meanings are understood in terms of psychic contents, interpersonal communication becomes impossible for the simple reason that what one means and understands belongs entirely to one's psychic world and others cannot understand it. One's own mental or psychic centent is one's own private possession and nobody, even in principle, can have any access to it. The fact that we understand each other and interpersonal communication is possible, proves that meanings can never be understood in terms of psychic or mental contents. Plato, Kant, Bradley and Frege were responsible in saving meanings or ideas from being merged either into physical fact or mental content. But at the same time, once meanings are understood in terms of objective ideas they become very general and fail to secure unique references. Bradley says

"And if you take this mere idea by itself, it is an adjective divorced, a parasite cut loose, a spirit without a body seeking rest in another, an abstraction from the concrete, a mere possibility which by itself is nothing".[3]

This view of meaning seems to be based upon the assumption that there is a diametrically opposed relationship between meaning and reference. Referring cannot be done with nouns and adjectives which are otherwise meaningful. But I wish to point out that general expressions llike common nouns and adjectives with the help of other words such as definite articles, prepositions and etc. perform the act of referring.

There is no word in any language which is not used either directly or indirectly to secure reference. This shows that meaning and reference are vitally connected. By treating meanings as mere souls Bradley did not take note of the referring aspect of human speech. The empiricist attempt to locate the origin and source of ideas and impressions can be interpreted as an attempt to trace out the point of reference of communicative system. But where to locate it? Hume could have located it in the external world. But he preferred to locate it in the internal world which is supposed to be the seat of knowledge and understanding. Further, the urge

to make a radical distinction between meaning and reference compelled Hume to treat impressions purely as undifferentiated, elementary and without any part. The reason for treating the impressions as fleeting could be the following :

There is no necessary connection between what an expression means and that it refers to. Even if this reason is accepted, yet it cannot be agreed upon what meaning and reference are not at all connected. Hume and other empiricists seem to be arguing that meaning and reference are not at all connected. Bradley went in the opposite direction. If the empiricists assimilated meanings to reference, Bradley sought to assimilate reference to meanings. In fact, Bradley in the process, tried to demolish 'reference'. This is why he argues that by applying any number of categories or concepts one cannot secure unique reference. In fact, application of more and more categories moves in the direction of further generality. The unique reference is never secured. As a matter of fact, the supposed object of reference goes on receding to the background.

Wittgenstein. on the other hand, looks at the problem of meaning and reference altogether from a different stand point. In the early writings, particularly in the *Tractatus* he seeks to explore the base of language. For him, language or communicative system at the base, is purely referential. The referring function at this level is so strong and sharp that linguistic expressions get glued to the world, as it were. His argument is that language at the base consists of pure names and those names only refer and do not describe. Meanings get divested of descriptive contents and only referring functions remain in the end. This is just the opposite of what Bradley advocates. For Bradley, language of communicative system is non-referential at the base. Whereas, for the early Wittgenstein, it is purely referential at the base. For Bradley, meanings are souls without a body; for Wittgenstein, meanings are pure bodies (in the sense of reference) without a soul. Seen in this light, Bradley and the early Wittgenstein appear to be poles apart; the former busy in dicovering a communicative system hedged in by reference alone. The dispute revolves round reference-free and reference-bound communication. Whose view is to be accepted? Is Bradley to be accepted in lieu of the early Wittgenstein or

vice versa? The answer to this question can be given only after explicating the nature of linguistic communicative system.

Language Games, Immediacy and Experience

In the later work, the *Philosophical Investigations* (Henceforward P.I.) Wittgenstein looks upon language as a form of life. In other words, he gives up the meaning - reference dichotomy. The entire communicative system is treated by Wittgenstein as a game and apart from meaning and referring, myriad forms of other functions are also visualized. Bradley overlooked the fact that referring function is built into the very fabric of language. As a result, he recommended suicide for thought :

> "Thought is relational and discursive and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation ?"[4]

How to understand the expression 'suicide by thought'? From the context, it appears that Bradley is pleading for a non-categorial, non-conceptual mode of understanding. He visualizes a kind of understanding where differentiation and distinction do not exist at all. If a kind of holistic understanding is being pleaded for then it is different from what is known as non-categorial mode of understanding. As a metaphysician, Bradley proposes to see the world without application of categories, thoughts and concepts. What could be the nature of such a world? Bradley's answer is that it is a kind of undifferentiated whole. When all the categories and concepts are suspended what remains is the pure and immediate experience unalloyed by any language and meaning. In this sense, it is unutterable. On the other hand, Wittgenstein in both the works (early and later) argues in support of the view that experience is based upon and bound by language and concepts. In short, experience is linguistic and conceptual in nature. Even in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein advocates this view though it is generally accepted that he develops a kind of mysticism in it. The world and reality are tied down to language and concepts. In the *P.I.* the reality and the world have been construed as forming the ingredients of the form of life. Seen in this light, Wittgenstein comes very close to Kant. Plato eliminated experience from the domain of universals

and cencepts. Bradley was highly critical of categories.   But it is only Kant and Wittgenstein who point out that human experience and, for that matter, the world cannot be understood without application of categories and concepts.

Now the question is how are language, thought and experience related to one another? How do Bradley and Wittgenstein visualize this relation? Can language and thought depict what is experienced? Bradley's argument is that language and thought are constructions. They are improvised artefacts. Thought is nothing but the totality of concepts, categories, universals and meanings. This is the rationalist position. Wittgenstein, particularly the later one, comes very close to the rationalist position but with a difference. It is this: For the rationalist, there is no world except the pool of concepts or categories. But for Wittgenstein, the world is always found mixed up with concepts. Though Bradley does not accept the innateness of ideas as Descartes and Leibnitz did, yet he recognises some kind of inevitability and inexorability with respect of meanings. Wittgenstein, too, recognises the ambiguity of ideas and meanings. In this respect, Bradley and Wittgenstein are at par with the rationalists but neither of them will agree with the latter's thesis that the world is nothing but concatenation of ideas or meanings. Further, the rationalist will not admit the importance of raw and pure experience unmixed with any concept at all in the manner of Bradley. Rather, for the rationalist, the so-called raw experience is a kind of confused and indistinct concept or meaning.

The empiricists, on the other hand, treat both language and thought as constructions. In this respect, Bradley comes very close to the empiricists. The thesis that knowledge begins with experience is very significant in this context. This means that all ideas, meanings, concepts and categorries are later constructions. Though Bradley upholds the ultimacy of immediate experience yet he cannot be regarded as an empiricist for the simple reason that he uses 'experience' in a very different sense. For the empiricist, experience is primary but ideas and meanings get attached to it in due course of time. In a sense, experience works as a progenitor of ideas. But for Bradley, only after all ideas and meanings have been demolished pure experience emerges. In fact, the process gets reversed in case of Bradley. Further, for the empiricist, experience is atomic and

discrete, whereas for Bradley, experience is holistic and totalistic. A kind of pluralism is built into empiricism whereas a kind of monism is built into Bradley's thesis. But the point of affinity between the empiricist and Bradley should not be ignored. It is this : Both Bradley and the empiricist treat experience as purely immediate and undifferentiated.

Bradley's concern with immediate experience is likely to create an impression that the problems of meaning and reference are not problems for him. In short, one might conclude that philosophical problems about language were of no interest to Bradley. If he was interested in anything it were the problems of epistemology and metaphysics. On the other hand, Wittgenstein's central concern was the problem of language and meaning. Seen in this light, Bradley and Wittgenstein appear to be poles apart. But we wish to point out in this connection that in a very significant sense, both Bradley and Wittgenstein were concerned with the problems of meaning and reference. This can be proved from the analysis of various passages occuring in the writings of both the philosophers. Bradley's main contention in *Principles of Logic* (both the volumes) as well as *Appearance and Reality* is that unique reference cannot be secured by language and concepts at all. He maintains that the conventional linguistic devices with the introduction of so-called referring expressions like 'this', 'here', 'now' and etc. cannot serve the purpose. He says:

> "It is in vain that we add to the original, an assertion 'this', 'here' and 'now' for they are all universal. They are symbols whose meaning extends to and covers innumerable instances".[5]

So, Bradley recommends abolition of linguistic and conceptual devices for the purpose. But can unique reference be secured without the use of language and concepts? The answer to this question ultimately depends upon what is meant by ' unique reference'. If referring is regarded as a linguistic act, then all refrences including unique reference can be secured only by language. If 'referring' is regarded as a physical act then holistic experience becomes unnecessary for the simple reason that without using any language one can refer to an object by touching or lifting it. If we use neither language nor physically touch the object, we cannot refer

to it at all. Experience is neither physical nor llinguistic. Therefore, the so-called holistic experience cannot serve the purpose for which it has been invoked. In fact, whatever little reference could be secured by the use of concepts, gets blurred when concepts are detached. Holistic experience by virtue of its nature cannot specify things. Rather, it removes all types of distinctions. How can one secure unique reference when all distinctions are removed? Bradley has no answer to it. Further, Bradley ovelooked the fact that unique reference is a linguistic act and it is built into the communicative system. Holistic experience might be serving some other purpose but cannot secure unique reference. Plato did not care for any reference at all. He did not wish to soil the meanings with reference. On the other hand, Bradley sacrificed meanings in search for references.

Wittgenstein discovers the missing link, i.e., the linguistic devices of the act of referring. In the *Tractatus*, referring was conceived as something automatic. The truthfunctional analysis of language reveals this type of unique reference. The logical proper names:- the termini of the elementary propositions, directly refer to the objects. So, there was no need on the part of early Wittgenstein to think in terms of holistic experience.

In the later works, particularly in the *P.I.*, the idea of 'context' plays a very crucial role. Context includes very many things. It includes in itself the place, time and even the way one speaks. Bradley did not take note of the context. In fact, his entire analysis was based upon a presupposition that language at the base is context free.

As a result, he even treated the first person autobiographical statements as context-- free. Bradley says:

"I have a toothache--both the I and toothache are mere generalities. The actual toothache is not any other toothache and the actual I is myself as having this very toothache".[6]

Bradley's argument is that no word in language can secure specific reference. Even apparent referring expressions such as 'I' and 'toothache' fail in this respect. Bradley maintains that the

so-called referring expressions are really general in nature. The expression 'I' is used by each one of us. In fact, it cannot be said to have a uniquely referring function. By arguing in this manner, Bradley wishes to demolish all language. As a result, a gap is created between language, thought and experience. On the other hand, the later Wittgenstein wishes to integrate leanguage, thought and experience.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
PUBLICATIONS

A FEW NOTES ON BENTHAM'S CONCEPT OF UTILITY

The utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill have invited endless streams of comments and criticisms since the days they came out. In the present article I shall note some of my observations regarding Bentham's concept of utility. My purpose is to show that Bentham perhaps does not deserve atleast some of the adverse comments traditionally made against him.

The principle of 'utility' or 'the greatest happiness' is regarded to be a self-evident principle of conduct by Bentham, constituting the first principle of morality.

According to him, man is a pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding animal and that the only thing that can impel him act is the prospect of getting pleasure and avoiding pain.

The paragraphs with which Bentham begins his book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* are bold and sweeping.

"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure.* It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other hand, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will subject to it all the while. *The Principle of Utility* recognises this subjection and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity

by the hand of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of senses, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light".[1]

The Principle of utility is based on the ideas of pleasure and pain, and is conceived by him to be the first principle of morality.

Bentham goes on to explain :

"By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of very action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the hapiness of the party whose interest is in question : or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to appose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasures, good or hapiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happenings of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered : if the party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual".[2]

In fact, Bentham's principle applies not only to morals but also to legislation and his aim is to apply his principle to legislation and to reforms of it. He has, as Davidson states it[3], a living and practical interest, in the welfare of the community at large. Hence, he substitues for the principle of utility the more significant phrase "The greatest happiness principle". The point can be established from Bentham's own statement elaborating the terms 'pleasure' and 'happiness' indicating their relation to 'utility'.

In a foot note in the pages between 33 and 34 of his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* Bentham says :

"The word *utility* does not so clearly point to the ideas of *pleasure* and *pain* as the words *happiness* and *felicity* do: nor does it lead us to the consideration of the *number,* of the interests affected;

to the *number,* as being the circumstances, which contributes, in the largest proportion, to the formation of the standard here in question, the standard of right and wrong, by which alone the propriety of human conduct in every situation, can, with propriety, be tried. This want of a sufficiently manifest connexion between the ideas of *happiness* and *pleasure* on the one hand, and the idea of *utility* on the other, I have every now and then found operating, and with but too much efficiency, as a bar to the acceptance, that might otherwise have been given, to this principle".[4]

However, as Bentham states it, pleasure and pain point out what we ought to do, so they also determine what we shall do. The principle of pleasure-pain, he finds, detemines man's action, and also recommends it as the criterion of right and wrong. Though it is not much evident in these opening lines whether he means that the pleasure-pain formula actually determines our ideas of right and wrong or that he wishes to assert the formula as the true criterion of our duties, Bentham's adherence to the letter position is clear from the discussion of the subject in the course of his entire work. In the context of the same section, as mentioned above, he asserts the formula as the indisputable principle of all judgements of right and wrong and even claim its denial to be fallacious and contradictory.[5] In a statement[6] in another context Bentham also argues that the utility, or the principle based on the ideas of pleasure and pain, is one which defines the meaning of right and wrong and the terms have meaning only when understood with reference to this principle.

In spite of various arguments in favour of interpreting his statement as being meant to assert the position that human beings are psychologically incapable of disputing this principle and, thus, are incapable of conceiving something as right and wrong in any other way, it has always appeared to me that Bentham and the utilitarians in general rather assert the principle as the true principle of right and wrong and the entire utilitarian theory of Bentham and Mill should be ssen as a normative theory of individual ethics and legislation.[7]

The principle of utility as the first principle of morality is a self-evident principle and is used to provide the test of right

and wrong and the principle itself is incapable of being proved, since a chain of proofs must begain somewhere. He holds that to give such proofs is not only needless but also impossible, and any attempt to deny the principle of utility must be self-defeating.[8]

However, in order to prove the indisputability of the principle of utility Bentham argues that one who does not accept utility as the ethical first principle, may take several steps to disprove the principle but at last will have to realise that the greatest happiness principle is the only valid principle of morality.

Bentham considers the following points in order to establish his thesis. (a) The person who does not believe the principle of utility will have to decide himself whether he will discard it altogether. But then he will have to find out the *reasons*[9] for it.

(b) He will have to decide whether he will judge and act without reference to any principle, or whether he will have to find out any principle other than the principle of utility.

(c) Supposing that he has found out one such principle, then, he will have to satisfy himself whether it is an intelligible principle or not. If his first principle be, merely an expression of some sentiment, then his whole system will be founded on caprice.

(d) He will have to enquire whether his first principle is tyrannical or hostile to human beings (i.e., one may say, against their interests).

(e) He will have to decide that his first principle is not an anarchical one and that there are not as many different standards of right and wrong as there are men. And he will have to take into notice that to the same person the same thing cannot appear to be right now, and to be wrong later on.

(f) Supposing that any principle, other than the principle of utility, is a right principle to be pursued by all; supposing (what is not true) that the word right can have a meaning without reference to utility, let him decide whether there is any such thing as a motive that a man can have to pursue the dictates of it.

Finally, if it is not possible, then it is useless to try to look for any principle, other than the principle of utility and this seems inevitable in view of what are stated above, that the validity of any alternative principle presupposes the principle of utility of justifying itself.

Bentham rightly points out the logical fact that if the principle of utility is to serve as the criterion of all moral evaluation, be the first principle of morality, it cannot be subject to the kind of evidence that is based on the principle itself. But there seems to be something more about it as I have already suggested. The concept of a man's welfare which consists in the fulfilment of all his interests-that is to say, a man's prosperity-is taken by him to be a basic idea, nothing except which he can conceive as the end for which one should act. Bentham continues to argue: "Admitting any other principle than the principle of utility to be a right principle, a principle that it is right for a man to pursue: admitting (What is not true) that the word *right* can have a meaning without reference to utility, let him say whether there is any such thing as a motive that a man can have to pursue the dictates of it: if there is,let him say what that *motive* is, and how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce the dictates of utility: if not, then lastly let him say what it is this other principle can be good for?[10]. In this statement Bentham enquires whether there is any such thing as a motive that a man can have for pursuing the dictates of that which is not based on the principle of utility and if there be any, what should be the point of its pursuit in doing moral action.

We cannot deny, as I have mentioned, that both the founders of the utilitarian theory (and Bentham more prominently) take it for granted as a basic truth that a man can under no circumstances act for the sake of anything which does not serve his utility in whatever way, or, in other words, for the sake of pleasure and believes this attitude to be basically justified. Even, to say so, it is inconceivable that we should try to do anything except for the sake of promoting our welfare, or sometimes, for avoiding what is harmful. But in addition to this, Bentham also seems to find a relation between motive and utility, which makes it a logical impossibility that one should act for the sake of anything which

is not in anyway related to his utility, That this analysis of Bentham's theory is not reallly a too ambitious one is evident from the way Bentham wants to define the concepts "right" and 'ought' and also from his defining the motive of an action in terms of one's idea of 'good' for what. In fact, if motive of an action, as we commonly understand it, is the reason for one's doing the act, it is naturally related to the idea of its utility, i.e., one's interest in doing the act, the benefit one hopes to derive from his doing the act, in whatever sense it is taken.

It should be noted carefully that in his analysis of the concepts of pleasure and pain Bentham seems to repudiate the ideas of utility as being based on a person's feeling-state so to say, which he believes, will render it subjective and varying from man to man, state to state. If pleasure is a subjective state of feeling, it cannnot provide us with a criterion of practical judgement, he says, specially one for legislation which has to refer to a verifiable standard.

That the pleasure-pain, which is set by Bentham as the true criterion of human conduct, is not really a feeling-state is further suggested by two things: in the first place, by his mentioning of such thing as benefit, advantage, gain, emoluments, etc., which he seems to identify with pleasure, as determining the value of an act[11] and secondly, by his idea of measuring pleasure and pain in a way in which one cannot believe one can weigh one's feeling. Regarding the former, none of the terms which he seems to identify with pleasure stand for a state of feeling, rather they are conceivable only in terms of achievements, in terms of various objects, place or position and can indeed be objectively identified, the necessity of doing which he demands of a true criterion of human conduct and for the reason of which he suggests the subtitution of the term happiness for pleasure as we have seen. ·

Regarding the second point Bentham's idea of measuring pleasure does sensibly apply to tangible objects and, as Mitchell[12] correctly points out, has a pecuniary note about it. Moreover, Bentham in the context of this very chapter, which we are mainly discussing here, has made a statement, (to which I have referred above), which denies that the criterion of our conduct is a kind of feeling. In fact, many of the well-known criticisms against utilitarianism

are based on the assumption that the utilitarian criterion, namely, pleasure-pain, is a state of feeling. However, if my observation,which I share with some others, stands, it will not only relieve the utilitarins of the charge of defining a moral concept in terms of a psychological state, but will establish this theory as a logically tenable theory of morals as we may then tend to find it to be based on the indisputable fact that nothing can be good for a man (or a community) unless it serves his true interest, in whatever way it is conceived.

One may not fail to take note of the fact that Bentham does not define the principle of utility by means of the greatest happiness of the greatest number of men. In fact, though Bentham refers to the idea of the greatest happiness on the whole as the criterion of a man's conduct and so the determining criterion of its utility, he makes a clear distinction between what would add to the utility of one's act in the capacity of a private person and what would render one's act useful when he plays the role of a legislator.

As he clearly states in the context of the discussion in the course of which he defines the concept of utility, by the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to lead to increase or decrease the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, if the party is the community in general, then it is happiness of the community, if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.[13]

What Bentham wants to say in this is that the utility of an act, when some one is acting in the capacity of a private person, must be different from that of an act when some body is acting in the capacity of a legislator, because in the former one's interest in his own prosperity and happiness, while in the latter it is the good of the community as a whole.

However, according to Bentham, community itself is not conceivable except as a sum total of individual citizens and Government should act only in a manner that the interests of all the individuals are best realised.

On the other hand, Mill by defining utilitarianism which is to set a standard for each individual conduct, in terms of the

greatest happiness of the greatest number,prescribes an idea of an individual morality which is directly connected with the idea of the individual as a social entity.

As I have earlier stated, Bentham conceives the community as nothing more than an aggregate or a sum total of individuals.[14] He is primarily concerned with the good or welfare of the community and not simply of the individuals, but nevertheless, of the community which is composed of individuals, though the individual is one whose happiness is attained through co-operation with his fellows. In *Political Thought in England-the Utilitarians from Bentham to Mill,* Davidson says, ".....an individual who is by nature social- whose very existence and whose continued welfare depend on the existence and co-operation of others, to whom he is linked by bonds of altruism and human affection, and whose claims and interests his own egoism is bound to respect." And the idea of this individual Davidson ascribes to Bentham. However, it appears that while Mill prescribes the greatest happiness of the greatest number as a criterion of human morality, Bentham finds a practical difficulty in an individual's propspering by himself without seeking co-operation of his fellow citizens.

Bentham, on the whole, is individualistic in his approach and his idea of a whole is the idea of an aggregate. One cannot say anything about the interest of the community, he says, without understanding what is the interest of the individual. The promotion of the interest of the individual depends upon the augmentation of the sum total of individuals' pleasure or diminution of the sum total of his pain.

Mill, on the other hand, criticizes Bentham for holding that the community is a collection consisting of individduals[15] though he himself is not really far removed from this position.

According to some commentators, Bentham maintains a dual standard in relation to the conduct of the individuals and that of the community. I should refer to the comments made by Plamenatz and D. Lyons in this connection.

Plamenatz charges Bentham for trying to reconcile two incosistant doctrines 'egoistic hedonism' and 'altruistic hedonism'-

and thereby maintaining a 'dual moral standard'. Plamenatz says, "....it seems to me that Bentham, without quite knowing what he is doing, is trying to reconcile two irreconcilable doctriness: egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism."[16]

However, we may refer to the comment made by D.Lyons in defence of Bentham. Lyons says, "..Bentham seems to conceive of this basic principle as if it applied in only two contexts - public and private. Ethics is private when a man directs his own behaviour and no one else is subject to this control. He decides what he himself shall do; he does not direct others. (Private does not mean that others are not affected, but that others are not under one's direction). The standard that accordingly applies (by application of the differential principle) is that of self-intrest. Ethics is public in the context of Government in the ordinary sense. Here, too, we may speak of behaviour being directed, influenced, or controlled, and it should be emphasized that Government for Bentham, is concerned not merely with determining what people ought to do, but also with controlling or at least influencing behaviour with getting to do it. The Government, as a whole, (as personified for example in Bentham's legislator or his "Sovereign") may be thought of as 'directing' all the mmbers of the community."[17]

Thus, it may appear that Bentham accordingly embraces two distinct standards, one for each branch of ethics. In political affairs the happiness of all members of the community should be served, while in private matters one would serve his own interests, but the charge, Lyons says, does not really hold. For the standardd is throughout utility, interest or benefit of the party concerned. Only, as Bentham correctly points out, the benefit of a man as a private individual is not identical with that of the community, which he represents while acting as legislator.

What is really interesting is, as it is evidently reflected in his felicific calculus, that Bentham's entire conception of happiness is numerical in character. His conception of the happiness of the community or the society, as we have already discussed, is that of an aggregate consisting of the amounts of happiness enjoyed by the particular individuals and has no universality or generality about it and, as an individual's greatest happiness represents a

totality of the pleasure of his particular achievements or his moments of prosperity.

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5.   *Ibid.*

6   *Ibid.*

7.   *Ibid.,* p. 39.

8   Bentham says, "Has the rectitude of this principle been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it susceptible of any direct proof? It would seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless".
Bentham : *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* p. 36., Warnock (ed.) Fontana, England,1972.

9.   Italics mine.

10.   Bentham, J. *op cit.,* pp. 34-35.

11.   cf. ".... to pleasure, whether it be called *good* (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure), or *profit* (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument of distant pleasure), or *convenience,* or *advantage, benefit, employment, happiness,* and so forth: to pain, whether it be called *evil* (which corresponds to *good*), or *mischief,* or *inconvenience,* or *disadvantage,* or *loss,* or *unhappiness,* and so forth".
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14. Bentham states : "The community is a fictitious *body*, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of the community then is, what? -- the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. "- Bentham: *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Warnock (ed.), Fontana, U.K., 1972., p. 35.

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DISCUSSION

KUHN, BARNES AND THE QUESTION OF RATIONALITY IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SOCIETY

This paper is essentially an exposition of Barnes' book *Kuhn and the Social Science.*[1] The book is an important one in many respects. But its importance, at least, for us in Africa resides in the implicit contribution it makes to the debate on rationality. Although this is not discussed in a full-blown manner in the book, one can draw an implication on this from the book cosidering the fact that the group the author belongs to has contributed to a debate about rationality.[2] I will, therefore, use this review as a foil to make a foray into this embattled territory of the question of rationality in the African traditional thought. But I shall first situate Barnes' position in the larger context of rationality of science and his group's position before delving into the problem of rationality in African traditional thought. I need to say at the outset that I cannot deal with the vast literature written about rationality in African traditional thought but what I shall say in this review captures the essential points of those involved in this controversy.

Kuhn's book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* has attainted something of a classic in the philosophy and sociology of science. The book challenges and subverts the conventional wisdom about science as a neutral, value-free enterprise untainted by sociological factors. Critical rationalist school in the philosophy of science- a school Popper belongs to and, in fact, champions its cause- sees science as a rational activity. Science is conceived by this school as the only human culture that can give us true knowledge. Science is thought of as a progressive, cumulative activity, steadily

giving rise to increasingly elaborate theoretical construction[3]. Kuhn's account of science runs against this image of science. He sees science as, like the history of society itself, discountinuous- as punctuated by conceptual leaps or conceptual changes and trasmutations. The main thrust of his analysis of science revolves around paradigm. A paradigm is an exemplary piece of scientific research focus which a group of scientists work within or around. The paradigm provides a working model of how to do science in some area, providing the conceptual apparatus, methods, standards of validity and so on which govern the research practice of the whole "scientific community" engaged in this particular specialism. The methodological adequacy of the rules of the paradigm is rarely questioned; scientific education tantamounts to indoctrination into the established paradigm, and a failure to solve a "puzzle" within the purview of the paradigm will be viewed by the scientific community as that of the researcher, not the paradigm. This period of getting along well within the paradigm Kuhn calls "normal science". But the paradigm at a particular time might be confronted by a crisis or, to use Kuhnian idiom, anomaly which the conceptual tools of the paraadigm will not be able to deal with. This period would be a crisis within the scientific community.

In order to resolve the crisis a new model or conceptual apparatus for doing science in the crisis area would have to be generated. The community of specialists may come to accept the new model or, better still to use Kuhnian idiom, the paradigm for research provided it can deal with the anomaly. When this happens Kuhn speaks of a "revolution". A revolution occurs when the specialists decide that the new paradigm can deal squarely with the anomaly and can grapple with physical reality better than the old paradigm. What is involved in switching from one paradigm to the other? Although reasons might be adduced for switching from one paradigm to another, this can only be justified to a certain degree. Justification has to stop at a point and a step made which has no justification. The scientific community cannot look outside for any help because the community itself decides on this new paradigm. It is the final court of appeal. Kuhn believes that certain extraneous factors influence the scientific community; on most occasions social factors in deciding finally about a new paradigm.[4]

Kuhn's characterization of science has a definite tinge which is partly caused by the metaphors which he finds it natural to use-and this is that the scientists form a "community" of practitioners. The subject of "scientific community" is a central focus of his work, with an emphasis on the social solidarity, a settled way of life with its own habit and routines. This patterned way of life in the community is brought about by the socializing process the scientists went through or, put more stronglly, the indoctrination process that they underwent and which made them into a closed society ready to defend the conceptual models they had been socialized into. I will like to point out that this point and others have been amply criticized[5].

Since Kuhn's book came into the light of day, it has been read and interpreted in different ways to support different revolutionary positions in the philosophy and sociology of science. Indeed, it has generated a ferment of revolutionary ideas, for the very reason that it transformed our accepted belief about science and it wrought a revolutionary transformation of science.

The significance of Kuhn's work is not lost on the social scientists. They see the different contending schools or methodologies in the social sciences as analogical to what obtains in the natural science where you have paradigms contending in the same terrain and none is held superior to the other. They do not see the multiplicity of approaches - like structural functionalism, conflict theory, medium theory etc - as an inhibitting factor for social sciences developing into a fully developed scientific enterprise[6]. Rather they see this as a healthy factor for the development of social sciences into a full-fledged science. The present book under review gives a sort of consolation to the social scientists in their endeavour, not explicitly but implictly. Kuhn's idea has been united with semiotics- the science of signs - and structuralism in France by the group associated with the French marxist philosopher, Althusser. In the U.S. and Britain, various social scientists have also appropriated the concept of the paradigm as a sociological category, which has affinity with concepts like "scientific community", "invisible college" or "social network". This is evident in the number of studies that have been carried out on the emergence and development of new scientific specialities or disciplines[7]. Varying factors are given to social and

cognitive factors that shape the orientation of these groups, and it is claimed that no adequate distinction can be upheld between these two factors.

Barry Barnes has been a consistent aadvocate of the position that collapses both social and cognitive factors into one another. He belongs to the Edinburgh group-other members are Bloor, a philosopher and Shapin, an historian of science. Their view is highly influenced by modern sociology of knowledge, and it is a consciously relativist programme-they call it the "strong programme" in the sense that there is a strong interaction between social factors and congnitive contents of scientific knowledge. Scientific ideas are not given any privilege status, and they should be studied, from the point of view of sociology, in exactly the same manner as religious beliefs, myths, magical mythologies etc. The group depicts scientists as cosmology builders. In books upon books, and in many articles this group has pushed Kuhnian ideas to an extreme form[8]. 'Drawing on the works of the well-known anthropologist Mary Douglas-her concepts of group and gird-and that of Jurgen Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests*, and using the history of science, this group advocates a social reconstruction of scientific research programmes, as opposed to the earlier rational reconstruction espoused by philosophers like Popper, Lakatos and Laudan[9]. The position of this group has landed it to an extreme form of relativism. Therefore, the debate between this group and the critical rational school regarding the strong programme the group espouses revolves upon issues like epistemological realism contra - relativism.

The main thrust of Barnes' book is to develop a social epistemology that will give a proper anchor to the Edinburgh group's position. It is therefore written to shore up the weakness in the strong programme. The book is not so much about Kuhn or Kuhn's theory; rather it uses Kuhn as a foil to explore the epistemological implications of the Kuhnian ideas.

The group's earlier programme focused principally on the terrain of sociology and the history of science. In the ensuing debates that this generated, some philosophers of science-like Laudan and Mary Hesse-have vehemently opposed the Edinburgh group's epistemological relativism. The opposition to the group's position

is weaned around the logic of reason as opposed to the logic of history or growth of science, and this opposition has revitalised realism in the philosophy of science. It is this controversy that has made Barnes to take up the discussion in this embattled terrain of the philosophers.

The main disposition of the book under review is devoted to arguments concerning knowledge and cognition, and giving accounts of conventionalist and instrumentalist epistemologies. Barnes' point of departure is that the resistance to the sociological factors (or backgrounds) in science of what is valid and true, or rationally justified has almost been overcome. Resistance to this position remains only among a few pockets of positivist and critical rationalist philosophers: otherwise it is now accepted that knowledge is now held to be socially constitutive. This position strikes one as a highly conventionalist one-and the implication is that of conventionalist epistemology. He believes that what remains now for conventionalists is to convince scholars who are averse or opposed to this position. This task, Barnes admits, is important because the precise implication of the position that knowledge is socially constitutive is not firmly formulated and hence not clear. He sees this fuzzy formulation of the position that knowledge is socially constituted as the root cause of the opposition to it, and hence the embracement of the realist position, whereby knowledge is portrayed as a representation of reality. The nagging worry of Barnes is the obvious contradiction between realist and social constructivist epistemologies, and part of the job of his analysis in this book is to dissolve this contradiction.

If the evaluation of the present state of the debate over relativism given by Barnes is accepted-in which the philosophers of science with relativist leaning make appeal to realist position to butress their point-then his ambition to harmonise the two divergent position is justified. But his perception of the debate over relativism appears oversimplistic and his attempt to unite the two positions-considering the fact that the dividing line is about rationality in science- is gratuitous. Barnes' social constitutive or constructivist account of knowledge does not really square with the logic of reason position of the realist; they are rather poles apart.

Even if we were to accept Barnes' account of the situation, our expectations are dashed. His foray into the landscape of philosophy

of science, unfortunately, has not done much to bring about the much needed clarification, particularly when it comes to the analysis of the strong programme thesis and lending credence to it. The impression one gets is a flat-footed, plain conventionalist and pure instrumentalist philosophy of science which falls short in some ways of a fully worked out and sophisticated rival tradition of the empiricists and logical positivist camps-the tradition which Kuhn subverts by rejecting the fact/theory and fact/value dichotomies. This tradition has laso had its rebel within its rank; for instance Quine has debunked the fact/ theory etc. dichotomies in his influential paper, "The Two Dogmas of Expiricism"[10]. The only saving grace of Barnes' project and which makes it interesting in this book is that he makes use of certain amount of theorizing from social anthropology and the philosophy of biology, in particular the area of taxonomy and classificatory systems. His main thesis about classificatory systems and taxonomy is that they are culture-bound; this thesis has to do with the realist/nominalist controversy which has far reaching implications in other areas of philosophy. One other enduring value of the book is Barnes' suggestion that concept-learning is a cultural phenomenon and this has ramification for epistemology---especially cognitive epistemology.

As I have earlier pointed out the rejection of the demarcation between science and non-science is grounded on the sociology of knowledge, in that social factors or phenomena are important and considerably influential in any branch of knowledge. Any mode of discourse, to use Foucoultian idiom, is determined by social factors. Although this is over exaggerated, there is a grain of truth in this thesis because any branch of knowledge is to some extent socially determined. Barnes thinks that science is social. There is something paradoxical in Barnes' position. In attempting to defend his position against the attack of realist he lands himself in the same position of some logical positivists, because they too cast off realism and uphold an instrumentalist and conventionalist position, in order to defend their philosophical tradition against the realists. What has emerged now is that the old controversy between realism and instrumentalism has assumed a new dimension, with the latter getting a backing from the sociology of knowledge.

I have gone to this length to review the basic thesis of Barnes and his group in order to draw out some implications over

the question of rationality in African traditional thought. The group's strong programme denies that the concept of rationality is universally the same. In Barnes' and Bloor's contribution to the book, *Rationality and Relativism*,[11] they vehemently argue against the universalist conception of rationality *a la* Horton. They are of the opinion that rationality is culture-bound, and what is accepted in that culture as rational may not be accepted in another. There are not objective, external criteria for evaluating rationality, and that explanation is hence symmetrical within the culture. Drawing on the works of scientific enterprise and social anthropologists, they include that theree is more to be said for relativism in rationality than against it. Beliefs of people depend on their conviction that they serve them, and the epistemic status of the beliefs has to be weighed or evaluated within the totality of that society's culture. Their position, in a nutshell, is simply an extreme form of relativism in terms of rationality.

It would be seen that their position is at variance with that of Horton. They believe, pace Horton, that the western conception of rationality is not the only form of rationality. I need not rehearse Horton's position[12] here because· it is wellknown but suffice it to say that he believes, following Popperian philosophy of science, that the western scientific society is more rational, objective and empirical and these attributes distance it from the African traditional thought which he feels does not have those attributes. Although Horton notes that both thoughts have theoretical underpinnings; they seek underlying simplicity, orderand unity; they place things in a wider context than common sense. Horton further notes that in African traditional thought theory and common sense have complimentary roles in everyday life and thought just like science. But the fundamental difference between traditional thought and western scientific society is that in the former there is no alternative to the existing body of theory whereas in western science this is· not the case. Furthermore , western science is objective while this is not the case with African tradtional thought. And following Popper, he believes that in western science theory is not a closed chapter but an open one. Hence he believes that western science is open and the African traditional thought is closed. These two terms are Popper's own too. (See Popper's *Open society and its Enemies*).

There are a number of criticisms that could be levelled against Horton, and the Edinburgh group's position seems valid in face of the revised view we now have about science. Science is not the paradigm of rationality as we thought it was. Horton's position is still enclosed within the Popperian philosophy of science. Hence the unwarranted claims he has made for western science on the basis of this Popperian position.

The Edinburgh group's strong programme hass debunked this because its concepton of science is radically different from that of Popper and Horton, and this position of the group has been influenced by Kuhn's revolutionary thesis about science. So on the whole rationality, according to the Edinburgh group's position, is not a universal thing; it is culturally determined. One could also add that western science, following Edinburgh group's stand is not more rational than the African traditional thought. At any rate, as Wiredu has rightly pointed out, the traditional western thought was not more rational than any other thought; neither does the average western man think more rationally than an average African man as Horton would want us to believe[13].

It is, however, necessary, despite my strong objection to Horton's view, that in this part of the world we need to develop a scientific culture. This suggestion does not necessarily diminish our culture and it does not mean that African traditional thought had not served us well but for us to move into the mainstreeam of world scientific culture. Africaan scieties have to develop scientific culture tempered with our African humanness. It is through this that we can participate in the world universe of discourse.

In rounding off this paper what has to be pointed out is that the Edinburgh group's view has subverted some "standard views of science" as a rational enterprise like Kuhn's position.

Not only this the hallmark of the group is sociology of knowledge coupled with the history of science, and this has made it possible to look afresh at certain basic fundamental issues, not only in science, but also in other modes of knowledge; and the impact of all these is that culture, or society determines beliefs, view; in fact knowledge in general. This position affects the concept of rationality as a culturally determined phenomenon[15].

The group's position reinforces the views of some African phillosophers, like Anyanwu, who have consistently disputed the universality of western conception of rationality, and have argued that Africans have their own concept of rationlity or, to use Anyanwu's phrase, "mind-set" different from the so-called western's own. In an exposition like this the complexities of the issue cannot be properly discussed and justice done to the various view points in this contested terrain due to limitation of space. However, I can only end by saying that the Edinburgh group's thesis has to be explored by African philosophers, for it portends enough fruits of enduring values for African philosophy in general.

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NOTES

1. B. Barnes, *Kuhn and the Social Science* (London: Macmillan, 1982)

2. M. Hollis and S. Lukes, (eds.), *Rationality and Relativism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

3. K. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1959) and also *Conjectures and Refutations* (London: Routlledge & Kegan, 1963). Laudan's view is not altogether dissimilar to this despite his distance from this position. For his position, see L. Laudan, *Progress and its Problems* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).

4. T. Kuhn, *The Structure of scientific Revolution*. 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1970); see also M. Mulkay, *Science and the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979).

5. For this, see I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.) *Criticisms and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1970)

6. Sheldon Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories" in *Politics and Experience* (eds). P. King and B.C. Parekh (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1968).

    Alan Ryan, "Normal Science or *Political Ideology*" in *Philosophy, Politics and Society* Vol. IV (eds.) Laslatt, Runciman and Skinner.

    T. M. Bottoomore, "Competing Paradigms in Macrosociology" in A. Inkeles et al; *Annual Review of Sociology* (Palo Alto, 1975), pp. 191-202.

7.   For this point, see R. Robertson, "Towards the Identification of the Major Axes of Sociological Analysis" in John Rex, (ed) *Approaches to Sociology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974).

8.   Their major books are B. Barnes, *Interests and the Growth of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977);

    B. Barnes, *Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974);

    D. Bloor, *Knowledge and Social Imagery* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); D. Bloor, *Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge* (Londn: Macmillan 1983).

9.   For Lakatos' major work, see his *Proofs and Refutations* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1976) and his contribution to *Criticism and Growth of Knowledge,* where he modifies and refines Popper's position.

10.   V.W.O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (N.Y.:Harper and Row, 1961).

11.   Barry Barnes & David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge", in M. Hollis & S. Lukes, Op. cit.

12.   R. Horton, "African Traditional Thought and Western Science" in B. Wilson, *Rationality,* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970); see allso the refined restatement of his position in Hollis and Lukes, *op.cit.* entitled, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited". A point has to be made that it is not correct to compare the traditional African though and western science, for they are not on the same par or identical hence incomparable. For this point see Wiredu, " How not to Compare Traditional Africans Thought with Western Thought" in *Philosophy and An African Culture* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1980). In a private conversation with Wiredu in 1979 in Ghana he was of the opinion that it was illicit to have compared these two different modes of knowledge. They are totally different.

13.   K. Wiredu, *Ibid.*

14.   See Chinweizu "The Scientific Ethos and the Modern Nation State". *Guardian* Sunday, June 24th 1984; and also A. Irele, "Culture and the Idea of Nigeria", Forthcoming in *African Philosophical Inquiry.*

15.   I will like to point out that western society is now facing a crisis of rationality, For this see A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1981).

16.   K.C. Anyanwu, *African Experience in American Marketplacce* (New York: Exposition Publishing Press, 1983).

BOOK REVIEW

Bhate, Saroja and Bronkhorst, Johannes (eds.); *Proceedings
of the First International Conferance on Bhartṛhari,*
University of Poona Jan. 6-8, 1992; Asiatiche Studien,
XLVII-I-1993, Peter Lang, pp. 1-273.

This book is a collection of 15 papers presented in the conference
and a bibliography on Bhartṛhari's (B) *Vākyapadīya* (VP) appended
to it. Since the text of the VP is not studied properly as a coherent
text so far, there is a lot of misunderstandings about it. So, I
cannot use a frame of reference to say what is the right view.
To overcome this difficulty, I propose first an outline of the necessary
conditions of the possibility of intelligible communication or the
meaningful use of language. (In this connection I have made use
of an unpublished paper by Prof. K.J. shah, presented in the Prof.
D.P. Chattopadhyaya Felicitation Seminar, New Delhi, April, 1993,
titled : "World and Sentence: Two Perspectives").

In the VP, B is discussing a theory of meaning - the relationship
between language, thought and reality i.e., the conditions of the
possibility of meaningful use of language. The book has three
kāṇḍas. In the first *kāṇḍa* called *Brahma Kāṇḍa,* B follows the
traditional method-the *prasthāna trayī* - of knowledge, theory and
practice as is found exemplified respectively in the *Upaniṣads,*
the *Brahma sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā.* There is no knowledge
without theory and practice (implicit or explicit), there is no theory
without knowledge and practice, and there is no practice without
knowledge and theory. In each case one is stressed (*pradhāna*),
though the other two are not absent. In the first 42 *Kārikās* of
the first kāṇḍa the experience of language is stressed, in the 43-
117 *kārikās* the theory of language is stressed, and in the *kārikās*
from 118 to 146 the practice of language is important. The last
nine *kārikās* contain a theory of error. I am giving below the
conditions of the meaningful use of language based only on the
theory part; but the considerations of knowledge and practice are

also implicit here. In the second *kāṇḍa* B applies the theory of meaning to sentences, and in the third *kāṇḍa* the same theory is applied to words.

Now, what are the conditions of the meaningful use of language? B argues in the first 44 *Kārikās* thus : those who know the words (*śabda* means word, sentence or language, but the contexts are clear) know that in the word in use, there are two words (words in use is two-fold). One is the cause of many words, while the other is employed to refer to the meaning. Here, we have the word in the intellect (*paśyantī*), which is the cause of many words and the word employed to refer to the meaning. Meaning is an object connected with an action. The given examples are : bring the cow, eat the curds. Besides the word in the intellect and *vaikharī*, the spoken word, there are the *madhyamā* (the word which is the middle one--word in the mind) and *parā* (though there is dispute whether B accepts *parā* or not). It is important to consider these connections when one is considering *paśyantī* and *vaikharī*. The word in the intelllect is not the word in the mind. The word in the intellect involves self-consciousness. The relationship between the physical and mental is built into the meaning of the word.

Then, a question is raised in I.45 as to whether these are two words or one word with two functions on account of the difference in point of view. Then comes the important phrase: 'whether the understanding is one or the other' (this phrase is repeated many times in the VP) when the relationship of the internal to the external exists. This phrase is important in understanding the relationship between grammar and philosophy according to B. The question as to how much does the form of language (grammar) reflect the form of meaning or negatively, how much important is the grammatical distinction of the forms of language without reference to the question of meaning, is also important.

One can think of both the kinds of words being associated to sound, if one looks at VP I.47 - that which is first thought of in the intellect and which is made the name of some meaning, is turned by the articulatory organs into sound - to be the view accepted by B and is understood properly. The process of adaptation of the

sense of hearing and the word to the sound is described later in the VP. I. 77-79.

What is *sphoṭa?* One understanding of it is 'the word in the intellect' (also see VP. I. 102). 'Others have declared that whatever is produced by the organs of articulation, through the contract and separation, is the *sphoṭa,* while the sound produced by the initial sounds are the *dhvanis'.* Even if the second view is accepted, the relationship between the sequential and sequenceless remains. Whatever is meant by the word--the word in the intellect, *madhyamā* or the *vaikharī--*the relationship of the sequential and sequenceless will remain. Or, if we mean only the spoken word, which on the one hand refers to the word in the intellect and on the other to the meaning, the relationship of the internal to the external remains.

The Revealed and the Reavealer : VP.I. 55-56. A light is similar to the word (in the intellect or spoken word). It reveals and is revealed; but the attention is focussed on that which the light reveals, and not on the light itself. Like the light, the words have two powers--to reveal and to be revealed.

Now, according to this account the necessary conditons for the meaningful use of language are : (1) the word in the intelllect - *paśyantī,* (2) the spoken word - *vaikharī,* (3) the *madhyamā* the mediating word between the *paśyantī* and *vaikharī.* This differs from person to person according to the intellectual ability - *pratibhā.* (4) The object connected with an action: the examples are - bring the cow and eat the curds. Thus, the meaningful use of the word is the meaningful use of the sentence. The *anvitābhidhānavāda* and the *abhihitānvayavāda* are different from this.

In the absence of any one of the four conditions mentioned above there cannot be meaningful use of language. (1) If *paśyantī* is not there, then it is not clear that the speaker and the hearer are referring to the same thing. (2) In the absence of the spoken word, there is no communication.(3) *Madhyamā* is necessary because no thought is possible without language. Here, in *madhyamā, paśyantī* definitely comes in contact with *prākṛta dhvani* - primary sound. (4) In the absence of the object being connected with an

action, there will be no knowledge, no thought and no action. All these four conditions are jointly absolutely necessary to have a meaningful use of language.

When a seminar is held on a particular author like B, one expects that his text is to be studied and the important issues, conclusions and perspectives concerning it are articulated and discussed. Thus considered, in the context of the present seminar it turned out to be bad luck for B. Nobody cared to study the issues in the VP, except the study of some concepts falling outside the issues discussed therein. When relevant issues are not studied, perspectives cannot emerge. Therefore, this seminar on B ended unfortunately without a perspective. The readers do not even see a statement in the whole collection that B is proposing a theory of meaning. B does, however, bring out issues and perspectives in the VP, which are comparable to different systems of thought in Indian or Western tradition. But since issues and perspectives were not brought out, the whole seminar remained, by and large, irrelevant as far as the Indian and Western thought are concerned.

Since the theory of meaning of B is not considered, each concept discussed by the authors is out of context. The concepts which are discussed do not seem to have any definite function in the context of B's theory of meaning. Therefore, each paper in itself and the whole collection of papers together are without any orientation. Neither the organisers nor the contributors put forth any orientation. Indian thought, when presented without a perspective, is prone to lapse into Indology, while Indology with a perspective is likely to lead to the emergence of proper Indian philosophy. In this collection each author took one or the other concept from B or some historical account of B or both, and wrote the paper. The papers can be classified into three groups : (1) poor Indology, (2) glaring mispresentation of B's thought and (3) papers irrelevant to B's thought. I will illustrate with examples each of them and offer some further comments.

1. Poor Indology : The book begins with an 'An Introduction to the study of Bhartṛhari' by Prof. Ashok Aklujkar, University of British Columbia. On p. 11 he says that B's work is a work on grammar. When one is discussing the nature of the relationship

between language, thought and reality surely grammatical issues also will be involved. When one discusses the nature of the sentence, nature of words also will be involved. From this it does not follow that VP is a work on Pāṇiniyan grammar. It is a theory of meaning as I have shown above, though the discussion is based on the pāṇiniyan tradition. Prof. Aklujkar says (p.12) that B had himself *indicated* as the basic modes of his theoretical reflection: *jñāna, śabda* and *artha*. If one knows the text, it is not Prof. Aklujkar's *discovery*. The wholetext is about it as I have explained above. But again the relationship between *jñāna śabda* and *artha* is not the same in B and modern Western thought. Nor do our Indologists know what can be the relationship between Indian and Western thought. On p. 19 Aklujkar sees linguistic philosophy as just the dissolution of problems and B as a man interested in documentation [*Ibid,* p. 18, (3.5)]

Prof. Aklujkar further claims that he has chosen the main concepts in the VP for his dissertation. How can one decide what is the main concept in the VP without seeing the theory of meaning which is discussed in it? In this whole book there is no mention even about the theory of meaning of B, its important tenets or perspective. The whole thought in Aklujkar's dissertation as well as in the introductory paper is, broadly speaking, scattered, unconnected concepts. Concepts are discussed, not the issues. Without the issues, the concepts themselves are not clear. For example, see his dissertation on *Prākṛta dhvani* and *vaikhṛta dhvani* (pp. 11-13). Such gimmicks can hardly show what is meant by them. One is the sound associated with the *madhyamā* and the other, *vaikharī*, is related to the necessary conditions of manifesting word. The problem discussed there is the relationship between the sound and the *sphoṭa*.

Then he speaks about the need for a critical edition of the VP with full application of the principles of textual criticism. But different kinds of texts may need different approach. When more than one word can be used, the decision to use one and not the other is made on the basis of the issues under discussion. The issues give meaning to the text. A coherent interpretation of the text and clarity regarding the issues are the basic condition for a critical edition, which Aklujkar unfortunately does not seem

J. OUSEPARAMPIL

to see.His emphasis is on the methodology that needs to be followed, not the issues under discussion.

On p. 18 (3.4) Aklujkar says that B's original ideas cannot be distinguished on the basis of the study of the VP because B did not say anywhere 'I think', 'I propose' etc. B's thought is a system. Each concept's meaning is articulated in the system. How can one hope to study B's ideas independently of taking into account his conceptual framework, issues discussed, interconnections between them together with the sort of rationale by which they are backed ?

On p. 27 (5.10) Aklujkar seems to present a totally misleading understanding of the form and content of the VP. It is a characteristic piece of misunderstanding coupled with a tinge of arrogance because the first *kāṇḍa* discusses the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of words and this inclues *Brahma,* as also sentence and word. The relationship of all these is brought out in the first *kāṇḍa.* The second *kāṇḍa* discusses the issue of the primacy of the sentence and its relationship to the words. The third *kāṇḍa* brings out how different kinds of words fit into this sort of understanding. Aklujkar's confusion seems to stem from the fact that he does not see the issues in the VP and their interrelationships. Likewise, the further conclusions he draws from his misconceptions concerning the context of the three *kāṇḍas* are not borne out by the text. The basic issue is not what we may be pleased to read in B, but rather what B intends to put forth and which is consistent with his conceptual framework.

2. A Glaring Mispresentation of B's Thought : Prof. Saroja Bhate has contributed a *prima facie* bold article : "B on Language and Reality"(pp.67-73). She draws a conclusion that according to B language is fictitious and it cannot represent reality. Language is not at all connected with the external world (p.73). To draw this conclusion she quotes from the VP. But what is surprising is the fact that : (1) all the quotations from the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (3.3.33 onwards) which the learned authoress refers to are given to articulate the views of the Vijñānavādins (Buddhists) which B refutes from 3.3.71 onwards. (2) The quotations from 3.14.15 etc. are from the views of the opponents of B, which B answers from

3.14.42 onwards. (3) All the quotations from 3.11.5,6 etc. are the views of the *Vaiśeṣikas* which again B refutes. All these passages are quotes by the authoress without distinguishing between the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *uttarpakṣa* - the rejected views and the accepted views. The quotation from II-251 is outside the context. In II.119-134, B describes 12 views regarding the meaning of the sentence. Each one of them, in his view, is partial because of the stressing on one or the other aspects of the four conditions of the meaningful use of language without the others. She has mistaken them for the opinion of B. In the VP II. 135-142, B is describing the ordinary man's understanding which is full of mistakes because he fails to see the truth. The seer's vision is not the basis for ordinary transactions. Therefore, one has to be careful even while taking the sense-perception to be true. One has to carefully examine various instances of it. The given examples are hare's horn and sky-flowers etc. The authoress does not pay careful attention to the meaning of the text, and instead prefers to jump to conclusions not borne out by the text. Her translations are so distortive that they do not sustain even her wrong interpretations. To conclude, it must be said that such writings as this, where one does not understand even the issue under discussion and disregards the distinction between the accepted and the rejected views need to be despised. A text cannot be studied in a free-style way and yet hoped that it would bring forth illumination.

3. *Papers irrelevant to B's Thought* : Prof . Johannes Bronkhrost,Lausanne, writes a scholarly article (pp. 75-94) on *Bhartṛhar*i and *Vaiśeṣikas.* His attempt is to throw light on *Vaiśeṣika* system from the study of the VP because in B's writings, especially in the *Samuddeśas* the *Vaiśeṣika* categories play a role. Secondly, he wants to draw more information concerning *Vaiśeṣika* system from B's VP, especially pertaining to the pre-*Kātaṇḍi* period of the former.

First of all, let me hastern to point out that historical information regarding the origin and growth of philosophical ideas in Indian philosophy and religion is extremely scanty, especially when there are certain categories and expressions used by adherents of different schools. Often, the same concept used by different schools means differently. The meaning of it needs to be determined through

taking into account the function of the concept in the theory or thought of the system. When I apply soap for washing the cloth, I see foam there. When I apply shampoo to wash the hair the foam appears on the head. When the boat moves on the backwaters, there is foam behind the boat in the water. When rice is cooked in water, foam is formed. From this I cannot claim there is soap on head, or in the backwaters or in the rice pot. Similar is the relationship of ideas shown by Prof. Bronkhrost in the VP and Vaiśeṣika texts. It proves nothing. Even when some of the details are similar, the directions of the details are different.

The author has a reemarkable knowledge of the VP. He quotes from the VP. II. 8-9. Then he comments that for B sentence is the real unit of language and the individual words are the result of artificial analysis. Yes, this is the view of B. But what he quotes from (II.8-9) is the *Mīmāṁsaka* view, not B's view. In the above quotation individual words are said to be meaningful. Therefore., what he says about the nature of the sentence and word, must have been gathered from elsewhere in the VP or from hearsay.

The article ends without a perspective. When a perspective is missing the very understanding is in doubt. Such studies do not add anything worthwhile to the thought of the VP which is a system of thought or a treatise; not a random *saṁgraha* in the sense of a careless collection of ideas. The VP is not akin to a vegetable market where different ideaas are collected for their being sold. When one fails to interpret the VP coherently, one may escape saying that the VP is a *saṁgraha* in the sense of a collection (see John D. Kelly, p. 172). It is being guided by such consideration that persons like Prof. Aklujkar, John D. Kelly, Prof. Bronkhrost etc. go in to study the VP for collection of materials, build an inventory and documentation with the sense of a big shopper and hope to sell the goods so collected to all and sundry, in short whoever pays and is prepared to be fooled.

The introducer (Aklujkar), the organizeers and editors (Profs. Bhate and Bronkhrost) do not seem to have succeeded even in mentioning the issues raised and discussed in the VP. Instead, they seem to spread the net of misunderstandings and misconceptions

wide open. The other articles in this collection too are not better.
To illustrate the point I give another example.:

Akihiko Akamatsu, Fukuoka, presents a paper on *pratibhā*
and the meaning of the sentence in B's VP (pp. 37-43). He at
least states the problem clearly and intelligibly. However, the author
does not seem to be clear about the relationship between the meaning
of the sentence and that of the words. If one knows B's opinion
properly, he would first try to see the place of *pratibhā* in the
use of the sentence. Given this, one can see that the rest of the
discussion becomes redundant. For instance, he says (2.1) "In the
VP, B makes a distinction between two types of meaningful units
of language : (1) the word and (2) the sentence. Where is it
said ? Nowhere. He quotes as B's opinion VP II.45. Again, it
is the *Mīmāṁsaka's* view : words and sentence as meaningful units
of language is also the *Mīmāṁsaka* view. Instead of following
the issue in the VP, he goes to Dharmakīrti and makes confusion
worse confounded.

If one knows what the VP is all about, different issues
should have been assigned to various contributors for being discussed.
Instead, here each one has taken one concept or another for the
paper, without considering whether it has any important bearing
upon and relevance to the VP. Since almost each concept considered
is out of the context, the whole exercise has unfortunately culminated
into a prolonged irrelevance. In almost all the articles their contributors
mix up the text of the VP with the history of (mis)understanding
of it in other authors in the grammar tradition or in other traditions.
They almost freely mix up the ideas and make a confusion at
the cost of coherent understanding of the text. When one discusses
a text, every word of it may not be considered; but the concerned
issues cannot be left unconsidered. There seems to be utter lack
of any logic behind the choice of the themes which are considered.

In consequence, the seminar under consideration appears to
have given rise to four-fold consequences : it brought (undue)
publicity to the organizers, entertainment for the participants, ignominy
for B, and woe to those who may use these articles as the secondary
sources on B and thus may come to share the sort of confusions
and misunderstandings contained in the contributions. Can we hopefully

look forward to another (inter) national conference on B's VP
where his text will be coherently studied?*

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   * We are given to understand that some papers contributed
to the seminar under consideration though were invited, submitted
sufficiently in advance and were presented as well as discussed,
are not included in the published proceedings of it, while others
never invited, announced or contributed to the seminar are included.
The rationale, if any, of such discrimination could best be known
to the Editors of the volume.

                                        EDITORS

So long as the Pratap Centre of Philosophy, Amalner was under the jurisdiction and control of the University of Poona, it used to function and operate as part of the Department of philosophy, University of Poona. Recently the said Centre has been transferred under the jurisdiction and control of the North Maharashtra University, Jalgaon, completing the requisite legal and administrative formalities. Consequent upon this, with the approval of the University of Poona, certain changes in the ownership format of the journal are introduced with effect from the first issue of the current volume. Such changes will appear uniformly in every issue of the journal to be published thereforth and the annual declaration required to be made as per rules of the Registration of Periodicals Act of the Government of India. We earnestly hope the concerned will take the change under consideration in its proper spirit and continue to extend their valued co-operation to the journal as up till now.

EDITORS

PROFESSOR K. P. MISHRA

We are sorry to report untimely and sad demise of Professor Krushna Prasad Mishra, former Head, Department of Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Orissa. Born in 1934, he earned his Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Toronto, Canada. Apart from teaching philosophy in Utkal University for the last thirty years and more, he participated in number of conferences, seminars and delivered lectures on special occasions. His philosophical publications include *Wittgenstein, Principle in Contemporary Moral Philosophy : An Enquiry into the Concept of Principle in the Moral Philosophy of R. M. Hare, K. Baier and M. C. Singer.* He also contributed essays to different philosophical journals from India and abroad. He was a Commonwealth Scholar (1963-67), a Fullbright Research Scholar (1988) and a Sectional President of the Indian Philosophical Congress (1974). He edited Mānasa, a cultural Journal in Oriya for many years. Besides, he was a well-known writer in Oriya, wherein in he has to his credit more than a dozen literary works and many acclaimed short stories. He was recipient of the Orissa Sahitya Academy Award and took keen interest in literary and cultural activities. In his passing away we have lost a researcher, a teacher, a well known literary figure in Oriya and a lovable person.

EDITORS

PHILOSOPHY, EDUCATION AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE

I

Philosophy and Social Involvement

In contemporary India philosophers are often exhorted by some non-philosophers as well as by some of their co-professionals to take interest in social or practical affairs of the country, obviously implying the accusation that they do not, or do not as much as, or in the manner in which, they should. The former are generally people holding positions of political or beaurocratic influence, who have not, and perhaps are not expected to have, tried to acquaint themselves with any kind of serious philosophizing. This may not be true of the latter. But it is almost always true of them that they have not actively, or for a long period of time, engaged themselves in philosophical studies or research. But both the groups of exhortationists are either unclear, or hold some unrealistic view, about what exactly a philosopher should do to get himself honourably acquitted. That is why their exhortation does not give any helpful guidance, even to him who takes it seriously, as to what he should do, as a philosopher, with regard to social affairs in general, or with regard to some specific one.

It does not, however, mean that the accusation is totally baseless. An accusation may be based on some real lapse committed by the accused, though the accuser is not able to properly identify it, or to articulate what the latter should do to compensate for it. The above accusation does seem to me to be largely justified. Excepting a few, the competent, hard core, contemporary Indian philosophers have not written on issues of social or practical relevance. The result is that there is a great dearth of good   philosophical

works in such areas as applied ethics, professional ethics, and social and political philosophy. Some incompetent ones, or some of those who do not possess professional expertize in any hard core area of philosophy, have. They have, beacause they think, which is farthest from the truth, that these issues are the easiest ones to write on, or that to write on them one does not have to school himself rigorously in any sort of technical philosophizing. Their writings may fulfil some degree, or promotional, requirement of theirs, but certainly not the need for good philosophizing on social or practical problems.

What sort of interest in social affairs would be a *philosophical* interest, in which particular way one should take interest in them *in virtue of his being a philosopher,* in contrast with his being, say, the chairman of a flood-relief committee, is itself an important philosophical question. To have even a reasonably acceptable answer to it would require a great deal of philosophizing, and would in no way be an easy matter. Therefore, we need not be surprised if an exhortationist does not have it. To go deeper into this question would require a detailed discussion about the nature of philosophizing relevant, or pertaning, to social issues, or social living in general. This would mean discussing the nature of philosophizing done in such areas as applied ethics, social ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy etc. This cannot be done with any amount of fairness within the limits of this essay. I shall, therefore, make only a few remarks, which hopefully would give at least a working idea, clear enough for the present purpose, of what can be called a philosophical concern with social affairs.

There are several things one may do to exhibit his interest in social affairs. For example, he may organize a movement to prtotest against deforestation, or against rigging in political elections. These things he can do without having any philosophy in his head, and certainly without having any ability to do philosophy creatively. He may even do them more effectively than a competent philosopher. If the latter ever does any such thing equally effectively, it would not, or need not, mean that he has done it *because* he is a competent philosopher. Again, if they are things which any citizen ought to take interest in, the philosopher also ought to, but not because he is a philosopher; rather, because he is also a citizen.

There is another, not so directly an active, way to be involved in social affairs. For example one may write on some current social issue of importance in a persuasive manner to attract people's attention, to create public opinion for or against it. This is what a good, professioonally conscientious, journalist does, or ought to do. But in such ventures even the ablest philosopher may not compete with him. And, when he does not, or does not want to, we cannot accuse him of being, as a philosopher, incompetent, or a derelict in the performance of a duty. If, on the other hand, he fares as well as, or better than, an able journalist, his success would be an evidence for, or a result of, his journalistic, and not his philosophical, competence. All this is so because philosophical competence and journalistic competence are different types of competences, though it is not impossible that a certain individual possesses both.

It does not, however, follow from the above that there is no way in which a philosopher, as a phiilosopher, can take interest in social or practical affairs. Philosophy being a predominantly cognitive inquiry, his concern with social affairs or problems has to be predominantly cognitive. He would, for example, be exhibiting his *philosophical interest* by logically analyzing in a critical and comprehensive manner a matter or issue of social importance and bringing out some of its not-so-clear conceptual componnents, its relationship with some other issue or issues, the assumption or assumptions which an actual or proposed solution makes, or which an appropriate solution should make, the viability of some of these assumptions, the coherence or incoherence of a solution with the general social ethos, etc., etc. He would, in effect, be presenting, and sometimes drawing, a conceptual map of the social reality, or of a sector of it, a map more or less comprehensive, depending on the area or areas to which the issues, studied by him, belong. He would, in a sense, be concerned with the human phenomenon of social living.

Social living is living in an actual social world constituted by a complicated network of (social) relationships. But it is not just that. It also comprises a number of policies, plans and projections, sometimes neatly formulated, but generally half-formulated, illformulated, or unformulated. They have, almost invariably, a normative or evaluative

core with explicit or implicit indications as to the direction or directions social life should take. A philosophical scrutiny of social living, therefore has to examine its normative core as well, and the examination may require or inspire the phillosopher to make some normative suggestions. But all this has to be done on the cognitive plane and with a convincing logic. An exercise of this type may not look attractive or useful to the people at large because appreciating, or even understanding, it presupposes a good deal of intellectual sophistication. Social philosophy, like any other branch of philosophy, is a professional, an elitist, enquiry. The philosopher need not feel shy in admitting that it is. The importance of a map is realized by a traveller journeying, or intending to journey, in the country mapped only if his journey is planned and purposive, and he would be able to use it only if he is able to interpret it.

As examples of some socially relevant issues in today's India a philosopher may attend to, we can mention those of reservation in jobs and in enrolment in academic institutions, secularism versus religious commitment, social responsibility of intellectuals, professional versus general morality, commitment to a cause versus commitment to a party, legal and moral rightness, the social role of education as an inculcator of values, etc. I shall be concerned in this essay only with the last one, and shall limit myself to discussing primarily, or almost exclusively, the role of formal education. Education is a very important socializing agent. But it has not received any serious consideration from contemporary Indian philosophers. They seem to have left it almost exclusively to the care of the teachers of training colleges and the (so-called) educational administrators or managers. They have their own role to play, but they cannot play the role which philosophers can and should.

II

Collapse of Values

Any Indian with a social conscience cannot help feeling concerned about the quality of life in post-independence India, particularly in the last three or four decades. Without straining his eyes even a little, he can notice the collapse, or near collapse, of values in any walk of life he cares to turn his gaze on. Whatever be

the anount of resources, material or human, which the country acquires, or hopes to acquire, by tapping its indigenous potentialities, or by extensive borrowings, they are not likely to be appropriately used for the welfare of its people if its existing value-orientation remains what it at present is.

It may not be an exaggeration to say that we are passing through a period of value, or moral, crisis. It is natural in such times to turn towards education for help because it is one of the commonest and most respected means for the inculcation as well as protection of the values the society prizes. It is, therefore, very important to find out how best the prevailing system of education can be used, with some adjustments, here and there, if necessary, to tone up the value-sense of those who go through it. It is hoped that a large majority of the youth would, if they do not already do, go through it. It is also reasonable to hope that through them the value-sense of others who do not, or would not be able to, can as well be improved because some contact or communion between the two groups is bound to take place. This is so because, almost truistically, the objective of any worth while educational scheme is to help and motivate the educatee to develop a sense of commitment to a set of values considered to be desirable.

But the collapse of values is neither less pervasive, nor less apparent, in the field of education. Even with half-closed ears one hears almost every day of a *student* having used unfair means in an examination with a revolver in his underpocket; of a *teacher* having helped him with the materials to copy from, or having manoeuvred his own doctorate by giving, directly or indirectly, illegal gratification to his supervisor or to the examiners; of the *management* of a school, consisting of some influential people, having arranged, of course on payment, for an examinee's answering his examination questions in his bedroom; of a politician or a highly placed *bureaucrat*, having helped the student, or the teacher, in getting a lucrative job, or promotion to a higher rank, leaving behind many contesters of decidedly superior merit, etc., The obvious lesson is that the existing educational system needs to be refurbished in such a manner and to such an extent that it regains its (lost) agency for the inculcation and preservation of values and becomes capable of contributing its due share to the upliftment of the quality

of life in today's India. It is in this context that the talk of value education has acquired its currency.

This talk has become fashionable in diverse circles of people, for example among bureaucrats and policy planners, their political bosses, social workers, religious leaders, educationists, teachers, etc. But more often than not, it is ritualistic or ceremonial, or vitiated with an incorrect, or unrealistic, understanding of the process of education.

My concern with value education, or education in this essay would be predominantly pragmatic, or rather crudely matter of fact, and only minimally or peripherally theoretical. The reason is my conviction that to restore to the prevailing system of education its legitimate role as the inculcator and preserver of (at least some) values we need simply to ensure that it operates in a normal, unobstructed, manner. This is so because, as will be explained in the next section, some values are internal, indigenous or natural, to education. An educational process would get them inculcated if it is simply let to run its course without any extraneous interference, irrespective of the theory or theories of value, or of education, which are considered to be sound (or unsound). To be sure that an education system is value-oriented, we do not have to wait until the time philosophers have the good luck of formulating some impeccable theory of value, or of education. Rather, we have only to let it function the way it should ordinarily, or normally, function as per our *ordinary, common-sense*, understanding of what it is to impart and to receive education. The task of making education value-oriented should, therefore, be approached with an open mind, and more importance should be attached to the existential peculiarities of the Indian situation than to some academic consideration born out of any abstract theorizing.

III

Education's Internal Values

Education could be formal or informal, imparted in the school or around the family's fireplace. Both are necessary to make one properly educated. They supplement each other. Sometimes there

occur situations in which it becomes difficult to distinguish between them. For example, some formally organized institutions have made an experiment to impart education to their students in an unstructured, non-rigorous, manner by artificially creating situations in which they, on their own, acquire some information, preceive a problem, or inculcate some skill. Similarly, the members of a family may contrive to impart some knowledge or skill to the children of the family in a semi-structured, or formalized, manner, without giving any appearance to the latter that they are being educated in a formal manner . I am concerned here, as already said, with the sort of education which is in intention as well as in appearance formal education. It is the education imparted in academic institutions which are required to run according to some formalized, or formalizable, rules and regulations, standards of evaluation, norms of performance, etc., pertaining to the various groups of individuals formally or organizationally associated with them. Broadly speaking, there are three such groups, namely, those of educatees, educators (or teachers) and some others who provide the non-teaching, supporting, facilities, A governmental policy, or planning, is by and large, concerned with formal education. It may as well be called curricular education because it invariably centres around some more or less formally structured curricula.

Certain values are basic, indigenous, or *internal* to any worth-while, well-conducted, formal education, in the sense that they are actualizable in the very process of imparting/receiving, in the normal way, any type of education, humanistic, scientific, technological, or professional. They are built into, or constitutive of, the very concept of formal education, i.e. of our ordinary understanding of what it is to impart/receive education. That is why we do not consider it unfair, or incorrect, to forbear to call an educational system educational if it does not aim at, or geenerally lead to, their inculcation. These values are not valid only in the realm of education, i.e., only as long as one is engaged in imparting or receiving education. Rather, they make the personality of the ' individual, who has inculcated them, shine in every walk of his life, private and public. More importantly, the habits of mind he develops in the process, or as a result, of inculcating them have the potentiality to flower up, given a proper social climate, in some prizeable social or moral values of universal relevance, the

acquisition of which is the basic constituent of the personality which makes one a decent, cultured, human being we call a gentleman.

It is obvious to any observer that our present educational institutions, barring a tiny minority, are not nurturing education's internal values. They do not sincerely try to nurture them, and when a few of them do, they are very often obstructed either by some internal agency, say a group of students, teachers, or non-teaching functionaries, or by some extrnal one, governmental, political, or communal. To ensure that they contribute to improving the quality of life by turning out viable individuals with a sense of commitment to a set of values, they need to be helped and monitored to impart education in the natural, normal, unimpeded, manner, so that education's internal values are not tampered with. These values are *processional,* i.e., inculcated in the normal process of education; that is why it is necessary that the normal process is not interfered with. Therefore, to the question 'What sort of education is fit to promote a value-based style of living?' my answer is 'Any sort, humanistic, scientific, technological, or professional, conducted in its natural, normal, way'. And, to the question 'How?' my answer is 'Through the inculcation of its internal, processional, values'.

There is a strong feeling in the minds of some that, by incorporating in the curriculum some sort of specific instruction about some chosen values, in a deliberate, well-planned, manner, we can go a great way towards making the educational system value-oriented, and through it the general social and societal framework. This move would, in effect, mean prescribing a specially designed course on some values. It would be one among the many the educatee, has to take. A system in which its existing courses are not properly conducted, or conducted in a manner which encourages the inculcation of some disvalues, cannot be expected to run its newly introduced value-course the way it ought to be run. There can be no guarantee that it would be free from the existing evils, for example, those of using, or helping one to use, unfair means in examinations; trying to get, or giving, high grades on the basis money given, or received or on that of communal considerations; not studying, or teaching, the full course but only the answers to a selected number of questions likely to be asked;

not attending, or teaching, scheduled classes but joining, or encouraging one to join, some seasonal, private coaching sessions, etc., etc. In all likelihood, the value-course would, like others, either contribute to some undesirable kind of value-orientation, or turn into a non-functional ritual. This does not imply that talk of values has to be completely avoided, or excluded from the curricula. It may be incorporated in some direct or indirect way. We may even highlight the present-day relevance of some specific moral or social values. But all this can contribuute to value-orientation only if education is imparted, i.e., the scheduled cources, including the newly introduced course on values, are conducted, in a manner which lets the internal values of education to being instilled/imbibed in the normal way. But if the latter is done, even if no (separate) course on values is given, it would not matter much. Almost all the values we need to make life worth living would get reinforced, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, through the cultivation of education's internal values. It seems to me that this would be a more effective and less resistence-provoking way to develop the value sense of the educatee than giving him a specially designed course on values.

IV

The Context of the Worthy Life

A sensible educational policy must be reinforced with (at least) a working conception of the worthy life. This only means that it must be inspired with, or guided by, one, and not that it should possess a well-articulated, full-blooded, theory of the good life, or wait for its formulation by someone. However, the guiding conception, or theory, must be chosen arbitrarily or at random, or be imported wholesale from outside. Rather, it should be one which, by and large, is a faithful representation of the ideals, aspirations, and preferences of the country's enlightened and cultivated citizens, and congruent with its cultural traditions they honour and feel proud of. With all this in mind, it seems to me that the worthy life can be characterized as one which, on the whole, is socially cohesive and individually satisfying. That is, one can be said to be leading a worthy. life if, on the whole, in his dealings with other members of the society he coheres with, or honestly

tries to cohere with, the greatest possible number of them he is concerned with and as an individual feels a sense of satisfaction or fulfilment. This conception of the worthy life will do for any sort of social policy, and definitely for an educational policy which has its focus on the value-contributing capabilities of education. Moreover, what is in its favour is that this is what we ordinarily mean by the worthy life, and it can be easily seen to be deeply entrenched in our evaluative consciousness, moral, religious, as well as social.

It is a brute fact that, by nature, we want to live and not to commit suicide. But if life is not worth living, if it is better to die than to live, then it would be a sign of perversion in our nature. It would mean that we are so made that we want to, when we ought not to, live. But it is qually natural to believe that life is really worth living. To believe the contrary would surely be a torture. This does not mean, however, to believe that every kind of life is worth living. Rather, it means that some kinds or styles of life are, and most of the others which are not can be made, worth living. We assume that almost everyone can lead his life in more than one way and adopt means to make it worth while if in its present form it is not. To drop this assumption would amount to conceding that the human situation is unimprovable, and therefore, would entail the futility of all attempts at individual and social planning, or human engineering.

Let us now ask the question 'what are the factors which constitute the worthy life, or contribute to making a life worthy, if it is already not?' Quite naturallly there would be several. But however short a list is prepared, education would (or should) surely figure in it. That education affects and should affect the quality of the educatee's life is too obvious to be emphasized. It is a common remark about an individual, whose life-style we consider undesirable, that he has been given bad education, or no education. This is so because education is a great refining and culturing agent, an important means of coverting an unworth, or indifferent, life-style into a worthy one. If any time it fails to perform this role, it would mean that it itself has become degenerate, or the social complex it belongs to has become degenerate. Its failure is normally a symptom of degeneration in

both, since degeneration in one invariably leads to degeneration in the other.

It is the context of the worthy life which I take to be the proper universe of discourse for dicussing the value-inculcating role of education, i.e., for not only discussing how the educational process can effectively get certain values inculcated but also for ascertaining what sort of values it should get inculcated. It is extremely necessary to emphasize this truth because it seems to have almost completely forgotten by a large majority of people involved in the actual practice of receiving and/or imparting education. It has become most fashionable to talk about education in the context of its joborientedness or skill-orientedness. But unless a viable conception of the worthy life is the moving force, acquisition of the job-performing ability, or of skill, cannot be trusted to have been imbued with the right kind of value, or to have not been imbued with some corrupt values. Lacking the right kind of value-orientation, a highly skilled person may not just be a poor job-performer but a social menace. Almost in every organization, one can very easily locate a person who is highly competent but extremelly poor in his performance and adept in motivating some others to follow him.

Quite a few educators, what to speak of educatees, forget that *the whole point* of getting a job is *not* that it provides one with the means of his livelihood. Rather, his performance of the job must contribute to the dignity of his life and to that of some others he would be concerned with. This it can do only if it itself is dignified. But more often than not any reference to what may be called a dignified or worthy life is thought to be a matter of concern only for some workshy philosophers, and not at all for result-oriented educationists, administrators, or planners. This pernicious line of thinking has motivated many students to adopt the foulest means to score high grades in examinations, and many teachers to write for examinees cheap help books to secure success without any serious study. It has also led to the emergence of a class of unscrupulous middlemen who are ready to help both the groups in their projects, provided they are properly paid for their services. Writing or publishing a cheap help-book, which makes serious study unnecessary, is as abominable as, and perhaps more

than, inventing, or manufacturing, an instantly energizing drug which makes health care dispensable. The former damages the thinking ability of its reader and the latter some vital organ of its consumer.

V

Return to Internal Values

The stand I have taken— that education can contribute to the values essential for making life worth while by getting inculcated its internal values is plainly a naive or common-sensical one. Its being so I consider to be a reason in its favour. Just for this reason, if for no other, it deserves to be taken seriously. But then I must illustrate what I mean by an internal value and how it can contribute to raising the quality of life.

Wε can identify an internal value even in the most elementary or primitive stage of education. Take, for example, almost the first stage of educating a child, the process of teaching him writing the letters of the alphabet of the language taught. What a conscientious teacher aims at is not just to make him learn how to write the letters. As soon as his pupil acquires some manual control, he tells him that he has to write the letters not merely correctly but also beautifully. Rather, he would begin his lessons by asking him to copy some beautifully written or printed specimens of the letters. This is not accidental, nor anything extraordinary. The aim of learning how to write is not just to acquire the ability to write but to write elegantly. There is a value the teacher wants and helps the pupil to inculcate, namely, the value of elegant hand-writing. It gives to the child an idea, of course a rudimentary one, of what it is to do something elegantly.

Similarly, the teaching of linguistic structures, or some grammar, begins at a very elementary level. It *seems* to aim at merely enabling the child to express himself correctly , i.e., to speak and write the language taught in a *grammatically correct* manner. But this is only the *apparent* aim. The real aim is to help him to inculcate what may be called the value of communicative excellence, i.e., the ability to express his thoughts and feelings in a coherent, concise

and cultivated manner. The acquisition of this ability takes time and is obviously a gradual developmental process, which may never come to an end. When one makes some progress in this process and becomes linguistically mature enough to enjoy expressing himself in an elegant manner, mere grammatical correctness ceases to be a matter of prime importance. How greatly is commumicative excellence valued by linguists is very vividly asserted in the classical couplet about the Sanskrit grammarian (= linguist) that, when he succeeds in saving even half a syllable, he is as happy as if he has been blessed with a son.

Since communication takes place in a society and involves interaction with others, communicative excellence can naturally ramify into the moral excellence of expressing oneself truthfully without hurting any feeling of the addressee. The moral principle 'Tell the truth but avoid telling it unpleasantly' can, without undue strain, be taken to be a social exemplification of the value of excellence in communication.

There are several internal values of education. Some of them are the following : respecting a fellow student because of his being a fellow student and not because of his parents' social or economic status, elegance in behaviour inside (and outside) the school, law-abindingness, punctuality,cooperativeness, i.e., sharing benefits and burdens with others and consequent curtailment of inordinate self-interest, commitment to complete an assignment in time, pride in academic excellence, or just excellence, sense of desert or prizing a good grade only if obtained deservedly, respect for institutional discipline and norms, openmindedness or aptitude for healthy criticism , etc. They are internal to the educational process at all levels because any educational institution, to function in the normal way, has to see that they are respected and imbibed by the educatee in a routine manner. They are the constituents of the process. They are values in perpetual operation in the normal implementation of curricular as well as extra-curricular programmes, and not things which have to be emphasized in some specially designed schemes.

The educatee must learn to behave in a certain manner inside the school premises, to respect the rules made by the sschool

for him, to cooperate with his fellow educatees, to be proud of his excellent performance because it is excellent, to feel elated for his good grades given to him because of his merit, to feel humiliated by being given a grace marks, etc. These things he has to do and the school has to train him to do because they are as central to the process of receiving / imparting education as conscientiously studying / teaching the contents of the courses prescribed. They do not form a set of special requirements, nor do they require the introduction of any specialized methodological innovation.

In fact, whatever be the technique of methodology of education, and the subjects taught, the values mentioned above have to be operative if the target is to educate. Rather, if there is sincerity in receiving and imparting education. Further, if an educatee develops commitment to these values and behaves accordingly while remaining inside the school premises, his ccommitment is very likely to percolate in his behaviour even when he is outside, or leaves the school and joins a profession.

I have illustrated the values mainly in respect of the educatee, but their inculcation entails corresponding behaviour on the part of the teachers as well as on that of the supporting agencies, which include not only the non-academic staff but also the concerned Governmental personnel and the society. In fact, all of them have to play a very important role. Very often the educational machinery ceases to function in the normal, natural, way because some section of this large class of functionaries dishonours some of the values or encourages some disvalues. Any backsliding on the part of any one of them would have some adverse effect on what others do, or think they ought to do. For example, if the teacher does not care for any one of the values, the pupil may also not, and if the society does not, it would be extremely difficult even for the most sincere teacher to procure its inculcation by the pupil, or its compliance by a class four employee. All these values are inter-linked, and therefore together they constitute the normal practice of education. To waterdown one is to waterdown at least a few others. If the teacher is unpunctual in taking his classes, the inevitable result would be inadequate coverage of the course concerned. This would encourage slackness on the part of the pupil, motivating

him to ask for the postponement of the examination which would disturb the examination schedule. Inadequate course coverage may also prompt him to use unfair means in the examination and when punished to take help from some unscrupulous politician who is waiting to jump in the dirty pool. It is clear that so many immoralities would then very smoothly enter not only the world of education but also the wide world outside it. All this is not a mere guess but a common reality of contemporary Indian life. To see that the values I have talked about are internal to education we have simply to recollect and reflect on what we ordinarily understand by educating and getting educated and expect of an academic institution. It is not at all idealistic but completely normal to say that a school has to start functioning and close regularly at a certain time of the day, students and all others concerned have to be punctual, students have to treat each other, and have to be treated by others, teachers as well as non-teachers, alike, as students, i.e., equally, governance of the school has to be done by uniformly applicable rules, teaching and evaluation have to be done in a non-discriminative manner and as per the school schedule, teachers have to keep themselves academically well-equipped to provide good teaching, academic things have to be done only on academic considerations and academic decisions taken only by academic people, school discipline and elegance in behaviour, inside and outside the school, have to be respected and cultivated, etc.

Almost all moral values can very smoothly be nutured through the inculcation of education's internal values, without necessitating any special effort. This is so because the inculcation of the latter provide a very favourable concrete setting for that of the former. To respect the school discipline, for example, the educatee may have to sacrifice some of his pressing desires. Suppose he wants very strongly to occupy the front seat in the class room but the school discipline requires that a student shorter than him should be there. This would mean he has to take a back seat, sacrificing at least some comfort he would have otherwise got. Such compliances would generate in him a care for the convenience or comfort of others which is the basic constituents of the moral virtue of benevolence. Similarly, the school regulation that he must abstain from receiving from any one else, directly or indirectly, any help in answering his questions in the examination hall (or at home), if respected

and complied with, would generate in him a regard for, and readiness to follow, a cluster a moral requirements. It can generate in him a sense of justice and fairplay even at his own cost, a sense of law-abidingness out of respect for the law, a sense of rectitude at a time when he may feel strongly that he needs to do something wrong etc. In a like manner, respecting a fellow student simply because he is a fellow student can develop into the disposition to respect a person as a person, which is a basic ingredient of the concept of each one of democracy, socialism, and secularism. All this would mean that he is being given a moral training, which if not obstructed, would hopefully develop in him a highly stable moral will, which is another name for a good moral character. But this means that a school which disregards the values, which naturally go with an educational practice, does not merely turn out incompetent and unscrupulous graduates but undesirable and unethical individuals.

Being educated, i.e. educatedness, is itself a great value. It is a supervenient value in the sense that it depends on education's pursuing its internal values. The extremely high status of this value has to be instilled in the mind of the educatee as much as, if not more than, any other moral or academic value. If an educatee feels, after having gone through the educative process, that he has become not only more qualified for a certain job, but also worthier as an individual than he was before entering into it, it would mean that he has learnt to appreciate the value of educatedness and that the educative process has functioned the way it ought to have. If he does not have this feeling, either the educative process has failed, or he has failed to receive what the process tried to give. This value as well can be instilled in the educatee's mind by trying to instil in him due regard for the internal values, backed by the society's honouring them, but certainly not by sermonizing. It does not need to be said that very many of our educatees attach no great value to the education they have received. An important cause of this is the neglect of the internal values by the school they were educated in.

I have already indicated my lack of enthusiasm for making some values the content of a separate course with a view to facilitate their inculcation. Values can be taught with a very high degree

of sophistication in academic courses and philosophers have been doing that since ages. Such exercises are mostly logical and always highly theoretical. They are very useful for conceptual enrichment, but not so useful for their inculcation. To design a course on values with the motivation to encourage their inculcation is something very different. Some well meaning people believe that it would help their inculcation, and it is this belief which is behind the proposal off and on made to introduce moral education, in all types of education, as a separate course to be taught in a period or two every week. I am highly sceptical about the success of such a course. Values are inculcated more by observing examples and practices and by sincerely pursuing them, than by direct instructions. Moreover, moralizing, or sermonizing, is so common in the country and very often from those whose mouths are vociferous in direct proportion to the dirt of immoralities on their hands, that the chances of even a well-conducted moral instruction becoming counter-productive cannot be ruled out.

However, something could be done about the content of education to promote value-inculcation. In this connection, I would like to make the following suggestion:

To instil a sense of value in the mind of an educatee is to help him to build some value attitudes, some dispositions to think and behave in a certain manner. For example, the value of discipline inculcated by an educatee may be exhibited, in later life, in his disposition to stand in a queue at the railway booking counter, or in talking gracefully with his superior who has taken a hurtful but just action against him. A value attitude may be rooted in an emotion or desire, or in some rational consideration. If the former is the case, in some difficult, trying, or entirely novel, situation it may backslide. But if the latter, the chances of its remaining stable are much greater. Therefore, a programme of education should strengthen the educatee's rationality and ground his value commitments in it. It should satisfy his questioning, doubting, propensities, develop in him a free, critical, mind, and make him realize that it is most rational for him to develop a set of value-attitudes. This would amount to convincing him, or to helping him to be convinced on his own, that he can lead a worthy, or happy, life, in his private as well as public dealings, only

by inculcating certain values. Since commitment to values would then be generated in him through his own rationality, the educative process cannot be accused of doing indoctrination or brain-washing. Some feel that there are some spiritual values embedded in our culture which should be inculcated. But even their inculcation should be done, if it is to be done, through his rationality. Only then it can be hoped to be stable.

The plausible way to strengthen rationality as well seems to be to conduct all courses in such a manner that his critical, logical, abilities are properly nurtured. A special course in critical thinking may be designed and it may be to some extent helpful, but it would not be very effective if other courses are taught in a dogmatic or doctrinaire manner. It should be noted that this course would not be on values. Its thrust would be on developing the educatee's rationality and through it on convincing him that it is in his best interests that he has a certain sort of value-commitment.

To conclude, what I have been arguing for can be summarized as follows :

Every worth-while educational programme assumes a conception of the worthy life and aims at helping the educatee to make his life worth living. This it does by instilling in his mind a set of values which are internal to its normal implementation. These values flower up into some others which are morally and socially desirable. To inculcate, or instil, values is to develop a set of value-attitudes, or dispositions, to think and behave in a certain manner. These attitudes are stable if they are grounded in rationallity. To nurture rationality, or the rational temper, it is necessary that in all courses taught to an educatee care is taken to encourage in him the spirit of free and critical enquiry. This process may be helped by teaching a special course with its thrust on the development of rationality. But it would be only minimally, or not at all, effective if other courses are taught dogmatically. However, the special course need not be on values, or be on values only indirectly. It should rather try to promote the development of value-commitment in the educatee by convincing him that having the commitment

is more rational than not having it, or hopefully, that having it
is rational, while not having it irrational.[2]

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NOTES

1.   See my 'Educational Policy and Value-Attitudes', *Ānvikṣikī,* Vol. I, 1968, pp.
     51-58 (Philosophy Department, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi).

2.   An extensively revised version of the author's key-note address entitled 'Education
     as Inculcation of Internal Values' delivered on June 29, 1992, to the I.C.P.R.
     sponsored National Seminar on Value Education, held at National Institute
     of Education,   New Delhi, June 29 to July 1, 1992.

Comments on this paper from interested scholars are welcome
and they would be published in the journal if found worthwhile.

EDITORS

CAN THERE BE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA?

I

The ontological argument for Divine existence is quite a prestigious one in Western philosophical literature. No argument of such sort is found to be offered in Indian philosophical tradition. What may be the reasons for the difference ? One might think that such an argument is not possible in Indian Philosophy. In this paper an effort willl be made to show that an argument of the ontological sort should be possible for proving the Divine existence in Indian Philosophy, particularly in *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, if the relevant theories are reviewed carefully. To this effect I have presented a comparative study in order tó show that there could be a fruitful dialogue between the East and the West. So far as this argument is concerned, I add thereupon some critical remarks.

II

The basic contention of the ontological argument for the existence of God is that the reality of God is involved in the idea of God. There is something, it is argued, unique in the idea of God and hence it cannot be an ordinary idea. St. Anslem has formulated this proof in the following way. He distinguishes two sorts of being *in re* and in *intellectu,* and of these the former is the superior to the latter. Now, that God exists both *in re* and in *intellectu,* nothing greater than God could be conceived of as existence. Therefore, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, must be existing *per necessitatum.*[1]

St. Anselm's version of the argument[2] was accorded an ambivalent reception at the hands of St Thomas. He allows that the basic

proposition "God does not exist"is self-contradictory[3]. Hence, the proposition "God exists" turns out to be a self-evident one. But one has to distinguish between two senses of self-evidence; (a) self-evident in itself and (b) what may or may not be self-evident to this person or that. For St Thomas the proposition "God exists" is self-evident in itself, since its subject and predicate are identical, i.e., God is his own existence. Yet, he insists, *a la* St Anselm, on the distinction between what exists in reality (*in re*) and what exists only in thought (*in intellectu*).

It was in terms of this distinction that Kant unequivocally rejected the argument in *CPR* (A599/B627)[4]. To say that existence is not an ordinary or real predicate implies that it is presupposed by the categorical attribution of others. To say that something exists is to take it for granted that it has many other attributes. It would be a case of semantic solecism to claim if one says that "some tame tigers growl, and some do not", and means that "some tame tigers exist, and some do not". Hume's argument was the sharpest : To say that this or that being never existed may be a false proposition, but it is perfectly conceivable and implies no contradiction.

The debate on the ontological argument has left its mark on modern symbolic logic. Russell's *Principia* provides for a fundamental distinction between those propositions which assert existence and those which do not (e.g. [(∃ x) and (x)]. The ontological argument from St Anselm to Descartes, fails to distinguish between *concept* and *object*. It is one thing to manoeuver with the definition of a word (in this case, the term 'God'), and quite another, whether that word, however defined, does or does not have actual application.

A valid ontological proof must be prefaced by a demonstration that the relevant concept of God is itself legitimate and proper. That is, if God is possible, then God exists, corresponding to the modal theorem Mp ⊃ p and not the other way round.

Descartes investigates into the nature of ideas. They are, for him, either *factitious*, or *adventitious*, or *innate*. The factitious ones, such as a barren woman's son or a square circle cancel themselves

out, or else, they are figments of the imaginations, such one like that of a winged horse. The adventitious ones are empirical ideas, such as those of predicates of objects of empirical knowledge. But exceptional are the innate ones, those that arise in the mind with the mere operation of thought. There are immune to misperception or perceptual errors llike seeing a snake in lieu of a piece of rope. They are beyond any possible doubt. Their indubitable character is owing to their being *clear* and *distinct* ideas. Mathematical ideas such as that of a triangle is a clear *and* distinct idea. If an idea is clear, then its properties are cognizable without distortion, and when it is distinct, it can be spelt away from other ideas, as when we say that a triangle is not a square in virtue of its geometrical properties. Of the lot of innate ideas indubitability is the basic property.[6] *Cogito* is one such paradigm idea. But what about the status of the adventitious ideas of the objects of knowledge obtainable or obtained by the *Cogito?*

Supposing that they are not concatenations proffered by a demon, they need be guaranteed by a veracious being. God is looked upon or thought of as a veracious person, i.e., one who does not delude us. A finite being such as I am cannot be a veracious person. Neither could the progeny nor the offspring of finite beings be veracious. God alone is veracious because he is infinite. And his veracity is a part of His perfection. And it is inconceivable that a Perfect Being does *not* exist. Hence, if God is a Perfect Being, He exists necessarily. All that it means is that the idea of God as a Perfect Being implies its own reality or existence.

If it is said that what we think is not necessarily real, all proofs and reasonings will be in vain. If thought cannot be valid of a reality which is beyond the thinker, we shall enter into a hopeless scepticism. If God is described as a Being who is the totality of all reality, it is difficult to assume that such a conception is a mere idea in mind. Because, thought has reference to being, without which it would be meaningless. If there were no being, there would be no thinking. The phenomenon of thinking corresponds to the being. The Ontological Proof represents an artificial way in which men sought to justify to themselves a faith.[7]

III

In Indian philosophical systems the Ontological-like argument

for the existence of God is not usually met with. But if the systems are carefully reviewed, the Ontological argument can be given for the existence of God from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* point of view. We shall try to show that *Nyāya* initiates a discussion into the possibility of the concept of God as modern logic requires.

In *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* God is described as *Paramātmā* which is a form of *Ātmā,* one of the accepted substances (*Dravya*), which is again included under category (*Padārtha*). That which is meaningful and existent is called *Artha* or *Padārtha*. That which is meaningful is accepted as existent to the ordinary human intellect. That which can convey meaning is in another way called *Padārtha*, which follows from the literal meaning of the term '*Padārtha*'. The *Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas* do not accept the entites like sky-flower (*Ākāśa-Kusuma*), barren women's son (*Vandhyāputra*) etc., as *Padārtha*, as they have no existence at all.[8] It may be argued that the usage of such words carries a special significance as it indicates that they refer to "null-class". This is also rejectable to the *Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas* as they do not accept even the absence of those entities that are not *Padārtha* or meaningless or nonexistent objects. According to them, any type of discussion should be confined to those entities that in reality exist. To nullify something which is unreal is insignificant. The negation of an entity which really exists makes sense. To negate something which is '*Apadārtha*' or unreal is meaningless, because there is a scheme of seven *Padārthas* under which all existent objects are included. In order to schematise their system they have made such classification. The negation of an object, the *Naiyāyikas* observe, is possible if that object or absentee (*pratiyogī*) really exists in the world (*Prasaktasyapratiṣedhaḥ*). Hencee, the absence of the entities like sky-flower etc (*ākāśakusumam nāsti*) cannot be regarded as an instance of absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) as the absentee (*pratiyogī*) of this absence is unreal (*alīka*). This type of *Abhāva* is technically expressed by the *Navya Naiyāyikas* as *Alīkapratiyogitākābhāva*.[9] Hence, 'there is absence of colour in air' (*vāyau rūpam nāsti*) is taken as an instance of *Atyantābhāva* by Annambhaṭṭa, because the absentee of this absence is 'colour' which is a real entity.[10]

Moreover, there is no proof as to the fact that there is no God. An absence may not be perceived if there is the non-

observation and imperceptibility of the *Pratiyogī*. The absence of the object which is not capable of being perceived is not perceptible.

It may be argued that, though the absentee *(Pratiyogī)* of the absence of hare's horn is not perceptible, the absence of it is perceptible. In the like manner the absence of God may be perceived, though He is not perceptible. What is to be understood by the term 'the absense of hare's horn'? Whether it means the absence of the hare's horn or it means the absence of horn in hare. The former is not true, as hare's horn is an absurd entity. Neither positive nor negative answers are forth coming. Because, in the case of the perception of an absence of a jar, there is an argument in the form of *Tarka* in the form : 'If this were on the ground, it would have been perceived'. As it is not seen, there is the absence of jar. In the case of the perception of absence, the existence of the counterpositive is to be imposed. Hence, its presence is hypothetically assumed initially and afterwards its absence is perceived. The object which has no existence cannot be thought as existing and hence the absence of an absurd entity is not perceived. The second alternative that there is the absence of horn in hare is not also true.

The counter-positive of the absence of horn is 'horn' and the locus of it is 'hare'. The 'horn' (but not hare's horn) is capable of being perceived as it is found in cow etc. Hence, the absence of it is also perceptible. If counter-positive is not capable of being perceived, its absence cannot be perceived. In the light of this argument, it can be that as the counter-positive (i.e., God) of the so-called absence in the form, 'There is no God' is not an object of ordirnary perception, the absence will also be the same. Hence, absence of God cannot be known through ordinary perception.

The absence of God is not also proved by inference. If it is proved by inference the *Sādhya* and *Pakṣa* will be "the absence of existence' *(astitvābhāva)* and 'God' respectively. If God is considered as having the absence of existence, He (or he?) is to be described as an absurd entity *(alīka)*. If *Pakṣa* is taken as an absurd entity, there would occur the fallacy called *Āśrayāsiddhi* or *Pakṣāsiddhi*. If 'non- existent God' is taken as *Pakṣa*, there would occur the same fallacy. In order to avoid this defect, if God is described

as nonabsurd, He will be existent, which would lead to the fallacy
Bādha again. The *Pakṣa* as endowed with the absence of *Sādhya*
is *Bādha*. Here, *Pakṣa* i.e., God is endowed with the absence
of the same. Hence, the absence of God is not proved through
inference also.[11]

Following the same line of argument the *Naiyāyikas* can say
that if it be asserted that 'there is no God', the statement automatically
implies that there is a real entity which is God. It may be asked
whether God is included under *Padārthas* or not. If God is counted
amongst the *Padārthas,* then it follows that God is there. If not,
God would be treated as *Apadārtha* or unreal entity *(alīka)* and hence,
its conceptual nihilation is nonsensical. We may say with the *Naiyāyikas*
that, if there is thought of an object, there is reality. The reality
does not stand over against thought but it is immanent to it.

It may be argued that, though God is absurd *(alīka),* could
be He the object of our knoowledge? Hence, there is no harm,
if an infererence is drawn retaining 'God' in the place of *Pakṣa.*

This is not in order. For, an absurd entity cannot have
qualificandness *(Viśeṣyatā).* In other words, if 'God' is really an
absurd entity, He (or he?) will not have capability of being a
substratum of the absence of existence. As an absurd entity is
devoid of any character, it cannot be identified with the qualifier.
Sky-flower, being an absurd object, cannot be introduced with the
qualifiers like white, red, etc., as it is not capable of being
known through these. In the same way, the property called
qualificandness *(Viśeṣyatā)* may not remain in an absurd object.
As an absurd entity is devoid of any character, no object is identified
by it. If God is really an absurd object, He (or he?) cannot be
the locus of the qualificandness in the form of substratumness
(āśrayatā) of the absence in the form 'no God'. In other words,
there cannot remain the substratumness of the absence of God
due to His (his or its?) absurd character.[12]

The form of the ontological argument from the *Nyāya* stand
point would be more firmly set if the following citation from
the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya is made . The verse runs
as follows :

"Ityevaṁ śrutinītisamplavajalairbhūyo-
bhirākṣālite yeṣāṁ nāspadamādadhāsi
hṛdaye te śailasārāṣayāḥ 1
Kintu prastutavipratipatti
vidhayo' pyuccairbhavaccintakaḥ
kāle kāruṇika tvayaiva
kṛpayā te bhāvanīyā narāḥ" ll [13]

That is, "Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find any place, though repeatedly washed by the inundations of ethics and sacred texts; still in time, O Merciful one, Thou in Thy goodness will save those people too, because even in going to controvert Thy existence they have earnestly meditated on Thee"[14] If the Spirit of this *kārikā* is carefully pondered over, we shall notice an outline of the ontological argument. It is stated here that an atheist is found to have God's mercy even in going to controvert God's existence as he concentrates on God. As he engages to disprove God's existence, he keeps meditating on Him. The very act of meditating on God implies His existence. It is very much similar to Hegel's ideas in favour of Ontological argument. But if one avers with Kant that the existence is not the predicate of the content of the idea, we suggest the following consideration given by Hegel. The act of concentration or meditation on God involves His being. The act of concentration becomes meaningless if there is no actual being. The phenomenon of concentration involves the existence of the object concentrated upon.

If someone seriously wants to disprove the existence of God, he commits fallacies like *Āśrayāsiddhi* etc. as told earlier. If he does not want to disprove God with argument, he automatically admits his existence. If someone forwards some argument in order to prove or disprove something, it presupposes the 'real existence' of that object. Otherwise, it will turn into a meaningless activity. If series of arguments is given in favour of non-existence of an unreal object, it will be infractuous, Hence, if someone adduces some arguments in order to disprove God, he has to admit his existence in order to make himself free from the commitment of fallacy mentioned above. If he admits God, the denial of His being

should be meaningless and self-contradictory.

Moreover, the sentence *'Īśvaro nāsti'* is not meaningful owing to the lack of *Yogyatā* (consistency), one of the criteria for a meaningful sentence. The consistency in meaning is called *yogyatā (arthābādho yogyatā)*. If .one wants to deny God's existence with the sentence mentioned above, the sentence shall not convey the intended meaning, as the sentence will lack consistency or *yogyatā*. As the sentence 'He is watering with fire' *(vanhinā siñcati)*, is not a meaningful one owing to lack of consistency, the sentence mentioned above about God is also insignificant. If God exists, the denial of it is inconceivable, just as watering with fire is inconceivable.[15]

IV

It has been seen that Ontological argument for the existence of God is formulable in terms of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* apparatus. If we have the idea of God, one of the *Padārthas,* it guarantees its existence. It is a remarkable fact that Descartes said that man's knowledge of God is due to God Himself and hence He is the sufficient reason of the idea of Himself.

Though Kant has said that the 'existence' is not the predicate of the content of ideas, he has a point to say thus. because to his opinion it does not give any new information. If some one has the idea of God, it is meaningless to say that He exists or does not exist. The predicate of the content of idea is not possible as there is no actual predication. If something is predicated, it would lead us to the defect of tautology. Accordingly, Kant is right. The *Naiyāyika* believes in this issue. *Īśvara,* if admitted as a *Padārtha,* the terms *'nāsti'* or *'asti'* are superfluous and tautologous, when appended to the subject.

Yet, the standpoint in favour of the Ontological argument may not be ignored in the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems. Though the existence may not be the predicate of the content of the idea of God, yet it cannot perhaps be denied that the notion of God involves his being. Though it seems that there is no predication, yet careful thinking would reveal that there is really a 'predicate',

as a notion of something cannot be entertained without its Being. The reality is not against thought, but is immanent to it.

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THE 'IS/OUGHT' RELATION IN HUME

The last paragraph of Book III, section I, part i of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*[1] has been called the "most influential passage" of the *Treatise*, by Harrison who introduces his explication of this text by also mentioning that it seems to have been "inserted almost as an afterthought" [69]. Harrison continues his exposition by citing the text in full, and, if I might be allowed to imitate the more renowned scholarship,[2] it would be appropriate to begin by citing Hume's complete text :

> I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no propositions that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought,* or *ought* not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommened it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attentioon wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relation of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason. [T 469-70]

Since I already have aped the commentators in supplying Hume's full text, I will now further emulate them by using one of their opening paragraphs as an introduction to my own analysis :

Thus ends Section I, part i, of the third Book of the *Treatise*, a quotation so familiar that it recently has been described as 'an old, well-scarred, and still fascinating battle ground'. To add yet another article on the subject might seem inexcusable, but I believe that Hume's own view has not yet been quite correctly presented. [Yalden-Thomson 89]

To add another paper on Hume's meaning may seem inexcusable, but not for the reason Yalden-Thomsom believes. Another paper may be inexcusable because Hume's view is already correctly, and I will argue, quite clearly presented, not by any of the commentators, but by Hume himself. It is the purpose of this paper to show that concerning the 'is/ought' dichotomy, Hume meant nothing mysterious or inconsistent with the principle theses of his own philosophy. When Hume entitles the section in question, "Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason," [T III, I, i] it is because he simply means that no evaluative judgement can be produced solely from fact, that is, that no 'ought' can come directly from an 'is'. This paper will examine the commentaries on Hume's moral philosophy, and will argue to the conclusion that though Hume is able to propose a system of morality empirically based, he does maintain that moral distinctions are logically separate from those of reason.

Part I: Deriving 'Ought' from 'Is'

MacIntyre's "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'" is a classic study of Hume's position, and almost no English language article dealing on this subject would be complete without referring to it. The first section of this paper will focus mainly on MacIntyre and the other commentators who support or attack his interpretation. MaIntyre believes that what he calls "the standard interpretation of Hume," [242] that is, that no 'ought' can be derived from an 'is', is "inadequate and misleading" [242]. He claims this is so for several reasons. Hume's logic is flawed, Hume himself does not observe his own principle, Hume has been incorrectly interpreted, and the incorrect interpretation of Hume has led to problems in contemporary moral philosophy which are solved if one adopts MacIntyre's premises [242].

MacIntyre argues that if one were to attempt to derive 'ought' from 'ises', the only way to proceed would be by deduction, since,

he claims, that Hume rejects induction because he holds that demonstrative arguments are either deductive or defective [246]. Inductive reasoning is not allowed: "... there can be no *demonstrative arguments* to prove, *that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience'* [T 89]. However, in deriving a moral statement from factual statements, he finds that unless one of the premises contain or were actually a moral statement, there would be no possible deductive connection between the moral conclusions and the factual premises [246]. This is exactly Hume's point, but since there are moral statements, the only way that MacIntyre thinks we can derive them is through entailment ---that the 'oughtness' of a conclusion is somehow entailed by the 'isness' of the premises; "And certainly entailment relations must have a place in moral argument, as they do in scientific argument" [MacIntyre 245]. The problem here is that entailment, as presented by MacIntyre, is really a species of influence, and this procedure has already been argued to be defective. To MacIntyre, it seems that Hume is at once rejecting induction and also accepting it as a connection between factual premises and moral conclusions (since they are not connected through deduction) [246; cf. 256]. This is the flaw in logic which MacIntyre sees in Hume.

MacIntyre, however, notes that the particular use of words by Hume seems to argue against the 'standard interpretation'. Though he has previously argued that the 'standard interpretation' cannot hold since 'oughts' are derivable from 'ises' via entailment, he now suggests that Hume's arguments have nothing to do with entailment at all. Instead, following the *Oxford English Dictionary's* listings, MacIntyre concludes that Hume's "deduction" in the passage in question really means "inference" [253]. He supports his claim with one citation of Hume's "That politics may be Reduced to a Science" showing that Hume did seem in that one instance to use the word "deduce" when he actually meant the word "infer"[254]. He thus concludes that Hume does suggest that moral statements may be inferred from factual ones, albeit not by deductive means.

MacIntyre then moves on to demonstrate that it is possible to infer an 'ought' from an 'is', and he does this to counter the claim that Hume does assert the autonomy of morals. His

counter-example reads :

> If I Stick a knife in Smith. they will send me to jail;
>
> but I do not want to go to jail;
>
> so I ought not to (had better not) stick a knife in him. [256]

The inference in undeniably valid, and it works, according to MacIntyre, because the transition from 'is' to 'ought' is made by the notion of 'wanting' "We could give a long list of the concepts which can form such bridge notions between 'is' and 'ought': wanting, needing, desiring, pleasure, happiness, health– and these are only a few. I think there is a strong case for saying that moral notions are unintelligible apart from concepts such as these" [257-8]. By making this claim, MacIntyre also believes that this shows that Hume is, as a moralist, not too far removed from Aristotle and not especially similar to Kant [264]. By MacIntyre's interpretation, Hume (and Aristotle) both hold out that morality may be guided by a hypothetical imperative ('caunsel of prudence'), and such imperatives are clearly rejected by Kant as not having any moral significance.

The argument that MacIntyre gives, however, is flawed since, in it, a pure 'ought' is not derived from pure 'ises' because an 'ought' is already included among the premises—namely, one ought to do what is good for one to accomplish what one wants (or not do what would result in a situation one does not desire). Hudson remarks that the wanting or the goodness of an action is not truly part of the deduction from the 'is' to the 'ought', but just happens to be among certain circumstances involved with the actions, though by no means required by the actions [251]. Harrison also notes that the concept of 'good' really does not belong to the factual realm [75-7] "It would be good if this clock is (were) correct' is to say that 'this clock ought to be correct', but neither statement is at all equivalent to 'this clock is correct' [cf. Harrison 73]. MacIntyre's example cannot stand as a counter-example to Hume because the minor premise entails not just a factual statement, but also an evaluative one.

MacIntyre might find support in Searle's argument, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'," which is a critique of the 'is/

ought'dichotomy which he claims to dissolve even though he is not particularly "concerned with Hume's treatment of the problem" [43]. Searle's contention is that it is very possible to provide at least one counter-example which logically relates evaluative (ought) statements to descriptive, factual (is) statements [43-4]. Searle does provide what he believes to be such a counter-example in a five step series involving promise keeping, which, alll things remaining equal, is based only on factual statements of what it means to keep a promise, but concludes with the evaluative statement that the promise ought to be kept:

Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, five dollars."

Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.

Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay smith five dollars.

Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.

Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.[44]

Searle holds, again all things remaining equal, that the move from the first four steps to the fifth is an example of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. Factual statements which contain words like "promise," "five dollars," "married," or "home run" are, according to Searle, statements which presuppose certain types of institutions [54]. Without the institutions which underlie each of these concepts, the concepts do not describe anything meaningful, for each of them are founded in constitutive rules on which their existence is logically dependent [Searle 55]. For example, the statement, 'if one is playing baseball and is tagged out at second base (a factual statement), then one ought to leave the field' (an evalluative statement), can make sense only given the constitutive rules of the institution of baseball. Thus, Searle maintains that there are some facts which occur in the context of certain institutions which are made of constitutive rules which involve obligations and commitments, and within these systems it is very possible to derive 'ought' from 'ises' [57]. If this is true, then Hume cannot be taken to mean that no moral judgements are derivable from factual ones without at the same time being terribly mistaken.

Harrison believes that Searle is in error on this point. Because 'institutional' statements are synthetic and not analytic, says Harrison, they entail both a factual and a non-factual statement at one and the same time [74]. Harrison may be correct, but I will leave Searle's position alone for the present time.

MacIntyre further asserts that Hume himself is guilty of not following the principles which he prescribes. He notes that Hume justifies his defense of justice with the presumed factual observation that to act justly is in one's best interet [248]. The following text, although not cited by MacIntyre, supports this claim : "And justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd to be common to all" [*T* 498]. That 'one *ought* to do what is in one's best interest' is not, says MacIntyre, a moral statement for Hume, but has to function as "at best a kind of compressed definition,"[249] but it is from this definition that Hume derives the moral conclusion that one ought to be just. Even though this interpretation is similar to the refuted interpretation above of acting because of self-interest, MacIntyre believes it to be one of several examples, where Hume himself derives an 'ought' from an 'is'. He also interprets Hume to appeal to this type of reasoning in his essay, "On Suicide" [248].

Against the position that Hume has been correctly understood, MacIntyre points out that the 'standaard interpretation', which is that 'Hume holds for the autonomy of morals from reason, is plainly mistaken. Referring to the passage given at the beginning of this paper, MacIntyre stresses that Hume writes that it ''seems altogether inconceivable" and not that it "is altogether inconceivable" that 'ought' statements should be derived from 'is' statements [252]. This notion is also stressed by Hunter: "It seems inconceivable that ought-propositions should be deducible from is-propositions, but is not in fact inconceivable" [150]. What both men go on to suggest in light of this point is that while Hume does hold that moral conclusions can be derived from factual statements, no system with which Hume was familiar yet had done so successfully [Hunter 150; MacIntyre 253].

Flew clearly rejects this interpretation. According to Flew,

that Hume writes "seems altogether inconceivable" is nothing other than an "ironically modest way of putting the point that it is altogether inconceivable, and hence that a reason *could* not be given" [292]. This is a very simple point, and I would agree with Flew's reading of the statement, however, I would add that the reason why Hume was not familiar with any prior system which legitmately did derive evaluative statements from factual statements was because there were none, and according to Hume, there could be none.

Almost as an aside, MacIntyre poses the question of whom it is that Hume accuses of making the illegitimate passage from . 'is' to 'ought' [258]. MacIntyre believes that the "all the vulgar systems of morality" against which Hume rails are nothing other than eighteenth century religious moralities of the day [259]. What Hume wishes to do is found morality, not on the basis of any religious claim to the affirmation of duty, but on empirical matters of fact of the passions [260]. Thus Hume is shown to hold there is an incorrect way to move from 'is' to 'ought', namely via religious grounds, even though MacIntyre believes that Hume himself holds that such a transition is possible.

Capaldi disagrees with MacIntyre's understanding of the vulgar. It is not any one particular group to whom Hume refers, but to all systems in which moral distinctions are external and independent of human perceptions [131]. Hume does write that his system opposes "all the vulgar systems of morality", and this is reminiscent of earlier in the *Treatise* where he mentions the "fallacy of *all* this philosophy" [*T* 413] (italics added) which presupposes the efficacy of reason over the passions. It is more likely that instead of any religious group, Hume is more challenging the rationalists [cf. Capaldi 127-8] or any who do not distinguish between objects and perceptions.

In the near-conclusion of his article, MacIntyre claims that he has been able to show what it is that Hume actually means in the 'is/ought' passage. He maintains that Hume did believe that one could make the transition from an 'is' to an 'ought', but that the transformation is difficult and not deductive; that Hume himself actually does make the transition in his account of justice;

and that one of Hume's purposes was to warn against making this passage to the 'ought' in a faulty manner,[258]. Furthermore, against the 'standard interpretation', Hume does not assert the autonomy of morals, but by MacIntyre's example of a moral conclusion derived from what he considers factual premises, MacIntyre thinks that he provides evidence that 'ought' can be derivable from 'ises' [261]. MacIntyre maintains that Hume's main concern in the passage is to found morality in human nature, [264] the knowledge of which, after all, Hume does suggest is "founded on the observation of an uniformity in the actions" [*T* 403].

Other interpreters besides MacIntyre also support the thesis that Hume actually does allow that evaluative statements may be derived from factual ones, Hunter, as noted above, agrees with MacIntyre that Hume remarks only that it "*seems* altogether inconceivable" that an 'is' be derived from an 'ought' and not at all that it *is* indeed inconceivable that such be the case [Hunter 150]. That both commentaators bellieve that Hume later goes on to show that it is possible to make the logical transition from 'is' to 'ought' leads to the conclusion that hume must think that the two kinds of statements are linked, or else he would have to reject his own theory.

Hunter makes other suggestions for interpreting Hume so that we might understand him to mean that there is not a valid 'is/ought' dichotomy. One of these, which is also endorsed by Yalden-Thomson, [91-2] is that "sentences expressing *ought*-propositions are paraphrases expressing *is*-propositions, and paraphrasing is not deducting" [Hunter 150]. According to Hunter, what Hume means is that evaluative statements cannot be deduced or inferred from factual statements because they are, in effect, the same statements. "What rules out the inference of 'ought' from 'is' is not that 'ought' is too far from 'is', but that it is *too close*" [Hunter 150]. Yalden-Thomson makes a similar point by stating that for Hume, to say 'one should do X' (an 'ought'), is the same thing as to say 'if one were to do X, one would meet with moral approbation of an impartial spectator'(an 'is'); the one statement is merely the paraphrase of the other [93].

Hunter and Yalden-Thomson are clearly correct in pointing

out that many 'ought' statements can be reduced by paraphrase to 'is' statements. In the next section, I will suggest that the type of 'ought' sentences derivable from Searle's 'institutional facts' are cases in point. It is, however, quite another matter to claim that *all* 'oughts' are likewise reducible. This not only plainly contradicts Hume's express statement concerning 'ought' statements, but also seems contrary to ordinary (moral) sense.

That Hume is mistaken regarding moral judgements is argued further by Hunter. He takes seriously Hume's claim that "Here [a sentiment] is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object" [*T* 469]. Hunter maintains that from this it follows: "The distinction of vice and virtue is not founded *merely* on the relations of *objects,* because it is founded on the *sentiments* felt by *people contemplating* relations of objects. It is not perceived by reason alone, because these sentiments themselves are the objects not of reason but of feeling" [151]. Because moral judgements are based on individual sentiments, Hunter fears that Hume's theory, if interpreted to assert a logical gap between moral judgement and statement of fact, will lead to logical contradictions :

> For among other things, it has the consequences that if one person says of an action that it is wholly virtuous and another person says of the same action that it is wholly vicious, these two people would not be contradicting each other, since one is saying the logical equivalent of 'I [Smith] feel a peculiar sort of pleasure, and I do not feel a peculiar sort of pain, on contemplating this action', while the other is saying the equivalent of 'I [Jones] feel a peculiar sort of pain, and I do not feel a peculiar sort of pleasure, on contemplating this action', and both these statements could be true. If they were both true, and Hume's analysis were correct, then one and the same action would be both wholly virtuous and wholly vicious, which in the ordinary senses of the words used, is absurd [151-2]

Just as there are many interpreters of Hume who claim that he does not mean to establish an 'is/ought' gap or, that even if he did, it cannot be defended, there are others who do claim that Hume does very much believes there to be an 'is/ought' gap, and that this position is defensible. The next

section will examine more closely Hume's text with the intent of showing that Hume does mean to claim an unbridgeable gap between the descriptive and evaluative. What we will discover is that the 'is/ought' dichotomy is consistent within Hume's philosophical framework and that though many are puzzled by Hume's meaning in this famous paragraph, it actually bears its significance quite close to the surface.

Part II: The 'Is/Ought' Relation

While Hume and the 'is/ought' dichotomy have both their supporters and their detractors, it is interesting to note that the question of the 'is/ought' gap does not even arise for many of the French commentators. They, along with some anglophone interpreters of Hume, do not seem to concede that there is such a problem, and they are able, then, better to understand Hume's moral principles to the extent that none of them gets caught in any web of words trying to determine what else it may be that Hume means; their interpretation of Hume is rather literal, and it is based on the corpus of his writings rather than the select paragraph concerning the putative 'is/ought' question. For them, the question is not whether Hume actually held or merely seemed to suggest that moral statements were not derivable from the factul, but rather a more basic inquiry: if evaluative judgements cannot come from descriptive judgements, then how do we get them?

To answer the above question, we will have to examine better than in the previous section Hume's notions of passion, reason, and sentiment. What we will find, I believe, is that 'ought' and 'is' actually do have a very intimate relationship, though it will emerge that this relation is not one of Hume's four philosophical relations, nor could it ever be possible for Hume to base any moral principles on reason alone.

From Book II of the *Treatise* we already know that "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will" [*T* 413], and this is in accord with what we find in the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals:*[3] "Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action" [*E* 294]. What does move the will, though, is the passions, both violent and calm. This is not to say that

reason cannot have an effect on the passions, for it is certain
that it may direct the passions insofar as it informs them of means
to the passions' ends. Indeed, as Harrison observes, reason cannot
affect the passions except to the extent that there might be a
passion to be reasonable [8].

Passions alone, then, are what can motivate the individual,
and passions, we are told, are founded on pleasure and   pain,
through which the mind, "by an *original* instinct" naturally tries
to pursue (good) or to avoid (evil) [*T* 438].

> DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply. and AVERSION is
> deriv'd from evil. The WILL exerts itself. when either the good
> or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the
> mind or body.

> Besides good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure. the
> direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct,
> which is perfectly unaccountable... These passions. properly speaking,
> produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other
> affecctions. [*T* 438]

If this is true, however, then it seems to sever not only
the necessary connection (if there were one) between what is done
and what *reasonably* might be done (since what is done is accomplished
through the passions which affect the will, and these may operate
without the least tincture of reason), but also the connection between
what is done and what ought to be done, unless what ought to
be done *is based solely* on the passions themselves which have
already been shown to have no relationship to reason. "[O]n peut
conjecturer que la morale ne se fonde pas sur la vue de certaines
relations découvertes par la raison" [LeRoy 209]. This, however,
is precisely Hume's point.

Morality has no foundation at all in the reasonable, and can
be based only on the passions: "Morality; therefore, is more properly
felt than judg'd of; tho' this feeling or sentiment is commonly so
soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea" [*T* 470];
"[M]orality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be
*whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing
sentiment of approbation;* and vice the contrary" [*E* 289]. This has

not escaped the attention of some commentators: "...le vrai moteur de notre action et, le vrai juge des valeurs, c'est le sentiment pur, parfaitement indépendant des facultés intellectuelles" [Boss 665].

If it is the case that morality is based on the sentiments, then it follows that it is the sentiments, and not reason, which is the judge of morality. It is no surprise, then, that this is just what Hume maintains. "All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, whenever a man is conscious of it" *[Of the Standard of Taste 84]*. Vice and virtue are determined by personal sentiments:

> Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our *own* sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of *our* conduct and behaviour. [*T* 469] (italics added)

Furthermore,"Truth is disputable, not taste [sentiment]: what exists in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment" [*E* 171].

If the basis of morality is "founded on the sentiments felt by people contemplating" [Hunter 151], then it folllows that no universal morality can be postulated— that is, different people may posit different moral judgements regarding the same events. This, however, 'seems altogether' to be one of Hunter's objections to Hume's program, and that is because it *is* one of Hunter's objections. If we refer earlier in this paper to his work, we see that he argues that a logical contradiction could arise between what Smith and Jones take to be a virtuous act: "If... Hume's analysis were correct, then one and the same action would be both wholly virtuous and wholly vicious, which, in the ordinary senses of the words used, is absurd" [152]. But in this claim Hunter is guilty of seeing

the action from the vulgar point of view instead of from the philosopher's, for he confuses what is perceived with the actual object. The "one and same action" is, in example, not one and the same perceived both as virtuous and as vicious. It is instead the same action which is perceived by Jones to be vicious and by Smith to be virtuous. Note, that 'perceived' may be read as 'felt' or 'experienced'. That two people might have different experiences of the same happening is not that unusual, so I do not see the force of Hunter's objection except to remark that the outcome he predicts is a likely and correct one. That it is not what Hunter might prefer, or that it does not offer a universal ground on which to base morality, should not surprise one who has been following carefully Hume's text.

Hume did write, after all, that he believes that his moral system "wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality" [*T* 470], and I believe that what he meant was that he knew that his system based on the egoism of the passions rather than external moral rules would be contrary to the established morality posed by the religious authorities of the day (*pace* MacIntyre) or to most other systems commonly believed by non-philosophers. I follow Capaldi here in thinking that by the "vulgar" Hume only refers to what he has previously referred to as the "vulgar" — the common masses who do not distinguish between perceptions and objects and believe in the continued and distinct existence of immediate objects of perceptions [130-1; cf. *T* 157, 192-3, 222-4]. I woulld not doubt, either, that Hume also has in mind the moral philosophy of his day which he believes is founded in "metaphysical arguments" based on the supposed "eternity, invariableness, and divine origin" of reason [cf. *T* 413].

From these considerations, it appears that the mystery has been taken out of the 'is/ought' question, since it is rather clear that ought statements can come only from the sentiments which have no direct basis in reason, and it is clearly underlined by Hume why this might subvert the vulgar systems of morality. For this reason, one might maintain that no more needs to be addressed on the issue. This, however, would be remiss for it ignores Hume's own desires to explain fully how his discoveries and principles

apply to morality and society which "lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these particulars" [*T* 271]. What remains to be seen is how Hume is able to develop a collective morality from his doctrine of (psychological) egoism.

Though Hume believes that each person has an individual grounded in his or her distinctive sentiments, nevertheless, there is still a uniformity in what all people feel. This uniformity is what Hume calls "We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible" [*T* 575-6].

> Thus it appears, *that* sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, *that* it has a great influence on our taste or beauty, and *that* it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues. From thence we may presume, that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues; and that qualities acquire our approbation, because of their tendency to the good of mankind. This presumption must become a certainty, when we find that most of those qualities, which we *naturally* approve of, have that tendency, and render a man a proper member of society. [*T* 577-8].

> This has been noted by at least one commentator: "L'existence des lois morales est donc reconnue généralement même par les hommes les plus corrompus, qui ne peuvent se défendre d'avoir égard à la morale de leur groupe et au devoir social, sens même penser aux contraintes qui pourraient s'exercer sur eux" [LeRoy 207].

The effects of this sympathy may be discovered and used by reason in an effort to better direct the passions.

> Puisque 'toute la moralité dépend de nos sentiments' [*T* 636] et que les sentiments varient non seulement selon les individus mais aussi chez chaque individu, comment un quelconque jugement moral peut-il acquérir la moindre stabilité? A cette objection, Hume répond que l'entendement corrige les variations affectives spontanées, sans pour autant les annuler jamais. [Brahami 219; cf. *E* 285]

Reason, as "slave of the passions" [*T* 415] is needed, then, not because it can caause any of the passions, but because it

may direct them [*T* 414]. "...et c'est aussi l'avis de Hume— que sentiment et raison s'unissent intimement en morale. Le sentiment y est principe d'action; la raison lui montre quels objets et quelles conduites lui permettent de satisfaire ses fins; elle est un quide utile; mais elle n'est qu'un quide" [LeRoy 211].

Reason, by acting as only a guide, is now in a position to inform the individual, not as to the morality or immorality of action x, (again, it is the passions which determine morallity of any action [cf. Brahami 223] but as to the llikelihood of the approbation or disgust of others toward action x. It is not that the opinions of others, even if there were one hundred per cent agreement, that makes action x virtuous or vicious, but that the presumed opinion of others might shape the individual's sentiments toward action *x*.

> The main point to be emphasized is. of course. that Hume never accepts 'all or most people approve of *x*' as justifying. by equivalence of meaning. the statement '*x* is virtuous'. Knowledge of what people approve of is. all the same. very relevant to our own approvals and disapprovals. not as evidence. but as a causal factor which may operate through sympathy. [Ardal 193]

Furthermore,

> Le judgement moral est essentiellement la contemplation désintéressée d'un charactère. L'observation et l'expérience nous apprendront que les sources de l'approbation morale sont tout ce qui est utile ou immédiatement agreable à la personne ou aux autres [*T* 717]. et jamais. condition impérative de la validité du jugement. à celui qui juge. [Brahami 220]

Hume's moral philosophy is, on this count, quite far from that of the vulgar; it is based on individual human natures and not at all in external, metaphysical concepts. Yet, in the introduction to the *Treatise*, Hume claims that he will present a system which might put moral science on a par with the certainty of natural science. [*T* xix] and if he claims that morality is based on the individual rather than universal concepts, some may agrue that his program is thereby lost. I would like to suggest. with the support of several commentators, that this is not so. Hume does find a connection between the 'is' and 'ought' which binds them altogether, and which also provides for the same amount of certainty

as is allotted to natural science, although this link is not one of his four philosophical relations.

Following Hume by maintaining a sharp distinction between the descriptive and the evaluative, I suggest that the relation between them is the same kind of connection as exists between necessity and causality. Just as I never can know certainly what will occur when the moving billiard ball strikes the one stationary ball, so too I never can know certainly whether any action x will be virtuous or vicious until after it has been subjected to my sentiments. I cannot judge this for my own action, nor even less am I able to judge others' actionss. I am not alone in my thinking here; others also hold similar theses: "La vertu et le vice sont plus sentis que jugés; nous les percevons exactement comme nous percevons la necessité de la connexion causale" [LeyRoy 214]; "The truth is, therefore, that 'is' and 'ought' propositions are not *themselves* related at all; the states of affairs to which they *refer* are related causally, the notion of cause being analyzed in the usual Humean way" [Jones 59]. This causal-like relation may be that relation to which Hume refers in the 'is/ought/' paragraph, and if it is taken to be that, I do not see any contradiction within that paragraph, nor within the whole of the text.

This interpretation now frees Hume having to accept Searle's postulated institutional facts' — which were claimed to be what is needed to go from factual statements to moral judgements. The baseball player who is tagged out at base ought to leave the field, not because of the "institutional" fact of the rules of baseball, but because of a judgement made which indicates probable moral disapprobation in light of this fact if the player does not leave the field. There is a quasi-descriptive element here, which depends on our anticipation of the feelings which the player has (and possibly our sympathy with those feelings); but this descriptive sense is not moral or prescriptive, and is common in ordinary contexts ("the toaster was repaired yesterday, so it *ought* to work").

Likewise, Jones will pay Smith the five dollars because Jones, based on experience, anticipates moral approval for doing so. In all cases, the 'is' is related to the 'ought' which follows, but the 'ought' is never derived from the 'is'. The 'ought' is always based on the individual's sentiments at the time, and as such, it seems altogether inconceivable that the actions which folllow are guaranteed to occur, though, like the stationary billiard ball's

projected movement in face of the other ball's moving toward it, we can easily, from experience, suppose the outcome.

The puzzles that have been 'discovered' in the 'is/ought' text of Hume now appear to be resolved. Morality is based on an empirical foundaation, has no basis in reason alone, and is freed from the vulgar notions of externally applied criteria for morality. 'Is' propositions have been shown to have no logical connection with 'ought' statements, and the relation between 'is' and 'ought' sentences is one of certainty, though it is not one of the philosophical relations. Natural philosophy has been freed from superstition and is raised to the same level as natural science. This is the goal which Hume says he means to achieve by writing the *Treatise*, and he has indeed reached it.

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NOTES

1. Citations from Hume will be from the *Treatise* and are denoted by '*T.*' The Selby-Bigge's edition is used throughout.

2. MacIntyre, Hunter, Hudson, Capaldi, Harrison, Pigden, and Yalden-Thomason each cite the passage in full at the opening of their works on this subject.

3. Citations from this work are denoted by '*E*'. The Selby-Bigge's edition is used throughout.

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REMARKS ON WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILLOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

I) Introduction : (a) Philosophy of mathematics was Wittgenestein's first and the most enduring love. Wittgenestein's introduction to philosophy in general and to the philosophy of Mathematics in particular came when he read Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* in 1909. From that time till 1944 he repeatedly returned to the problems in the field. Even when he thought of problems in ethics and psychology, mathematics was not far removed from his mind.[1]

Philosophy of Mathematics was dominated during this period by the problems thrown up by the discovery of transfinite numbers. It is, therefore, necessary to describe briefly this development. Dedekind (1831-1916) introduced the nation of a set as a collection of different things which can be considered from a common point of view, can be associated in mind.[2] Cantor(1845-1918) formed the Set $N = \{1,2,3.....\}$ and raised the question : How many elements are there in the set N? Or, in short, what is the number of N?

In counting bananas from a bunch we count each banana against a natural number in the succession 1,2,3.... and if the bunch gives out at number 5 we conclude that the bunch has 5 bananas. Against what willl we count the elements of N ? Cantor said, 'Count them against the numbers 2, 4, 6 ... in succession'. What do we find ? The set N will give out simultaneously when the succession 2, 4, 6 ... gives out.

Consider the set $E = \{ 2, 4, 6, ...\}$. We counted N against the elements of E. But *prima facie* N has more elements than E; in fact E is a part of N. Still we find that pairing the elements of N and E as $1 \leftrightarrow 2$, $2 \leftrightarrow 4$, $3 \leftrightarrow 6$ etc. shows that N and E give out simultaneously. Therefore, Cantor concluded that the

number of both N and E is the same and it is an infinite or transfinite number. Cantor called it 'aleph-not'.

Cantor defended the transfinite on the following grounds. 1) We can postulate a world of mathematical entities (which we call the world -3) because it influences the structure of our mind. 2) In the world -3 we are free to introduce new concepts provided they are free from contradiction and stand in a fixed relation to previous concepts. 3) Because of these two conditions on a new concept, its introduction is not likely to cause any harm.[3]

(b) The discovery of the transfinite number had certain novel features.

Firstly, it did not come as a solution of some problem. Thus, the transfinite number had no instrumental value. It came as a result of original and ingenious merging of the notions of counting, number and set. Thus, it appeared to be an autonomous growth of mathematics.

Secondly, when more and larger transfinite numbers were introduced and their arithmetic was constructed, the concept began to exercise a charm. Wittgenstein writes, "If you can show there are numbers bigger than the infinite, your head whirls. This may be the chief reason this was invented".[4] It, therefore, became necessary to legitimise their existence as bonafide mathematical entities.

In merging the notions of counting, number and sets Cantor had bent and distorted them. Thus, counting had been equated to pairing; sets were formed of numbers which were not objects and the number itself was regarded not as sign in the standard succession 1, 2, 3 ... but as the number of a set. The legitmization of the transfinite numbers, thus, demanded a revolution in attitudes to these basic notions of mathematics. Naturally the exercise of incorporating the traansfinite in mathematics was termed as a 'foundational study'.

II) Logicism : (a) Peano (1858-1932) had organised the whole of arithmetic in a deductive system which began with three undefined terms and five axioms.[5] Russell tried to derive this system from another system based on ideas of Cantor.

Russell begins with equivalence of two non-empty sets A and B. They are said to be equivalent if to each element in A corresponds exactlly one element of B and *vice versa*. A class of sets in called an equivalence class if any two sets in the class are equivalent. Each class of equivalent sets is a number which is called a cardinal number to distinguish it from natural numbers. Of course, every natural number turns out to be a cardinal number. But there are cardinals, for example, the equivalence class which has the set N = {1, 2, 3 ...} as a member, which are not natural numbers. Thus, transfinite numbers are now at par with natural numbers and are legitimately accepted as mathematical entities.

Russell now showed that all the three undefined terms of Peano can be defined in terms of set-operations and the axioms of Peano can be proved as theorems. Thus, whole of Peano's arithmetic, arranged in a deductive system, is derivable from the notion of a set and of set operations. So far the question of defining a set did not arise.

(b) Given a set S and an element x, it must be possible to decide if x is a member of S or not. So long as S was finite it was possible to decide it. With the introduction of infinite sets like N it became necessary to lay down a criterion for membership. This criterion is the presennce of a property in x which other members of S possess. In short the set S is given in terms of a predicate. Russell called this the principle of abstraction.[6] A set S consists of objects a, b, c, ... if the replacement of x in the sentence "x is P" by a, b c ... makes it a true statement. This connection between a set and a predicate reduces sets to predicates and set operations to statement calculus.

Replacement of a set by a predicate had an unintended consequence. It led to Russell's paradox. To overcome the paradox Russell introduced axiomatic set theory. This raised the question: what axioms can one take in constructing a theory ? Russell's original criterion was that axioms must be statements which are logically true i.e., tautologies. But at least three axioms in Russell's theory were not logically true.[7] Then the criterion for acceptance of an axiom was decided to be that the axioms must not lead to a contradiction.[8]

In addition, Russell systematized methods of proof, introduced a very extensive symbolism and brought a minute discipline into mathematics. In the present paper we are not going to consider these aspects. (c) This construction of arithmetic from the sets could be regarded as a mathematical theory and in that case Wittgenstein had no quarrel with it.[9] But the logicists made wider claims and about these claims Wittgenstein had strong reservations.

The first claim was that the logicism was a philosophy of mathematics. Russell felt that any science begins with a set of observations which are taken as axioms. What goes forward from the axioms is the subject matter of that science, while what goes backward from the axioms in search of a new set of more reliable and obvious observations is the philosophy of that science. Hence, logicism was a philosophy of mathematics.

In logicism numbers are reduced to sets and sets to predicates. Thus, every mathematical statement is ultimately a formal logical statement. Thus, the logicists had reduced mathematics to formal logic.[10] Since logic is a more fundamental and reliable science, logicism had provided mathematics with a sounder foundation. That is why logicism is a foundational study.

Thirdly, the logicists had improved the method of proof. A proof of a theorem relates the statement of the theorem with the axioms in an indubitable and logically perfect manner. Hence, the truth of a theorem depends on laws of inference and axioms. Therefore, the only harmful thing to mathematics is a possible contradiction between axioms themselves.

Under this straight-jacket formalism, mathematics had become bereft of content. "Pure mathematics consists entirely of assertions that, if such and such proposition is true of anything, then such and such proposition is true of that thing. It is essential not to discuss whether the first proposition is really true, and not to mention what the anything is, of which it is true'.[11]

The above consequences flowed from the attitude of the logicists towards mathematics which was summed up by Russell in the following beautiful words. "Remote from human passions, remote

even from pitifull facts of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home."[12]

III) The Beginnings : (a) For Wittgenstein the logicist programme was misconceived in three respects. Firstly, the account of mathematics which it gave was artificial and a-historical. Secondly, what it was designed to achieve, namely the legitimization of the transfinite, was not a worthy goal because the transfinite was an unnatural and cancerous growth on the body of mathematics.[13] Thirdly, the only control on the growth of mathematics, according to the logicists, is the fear of a contradiction. This Wittgenstein finds ridiculous.

We shall beegin by considering Wittgenstein's account of mathematics which will give us an opportunity to dwell upon the first point of his attack on logicism. The latter two points will be discussed when we consider Wittgenstein's conception of control on mathematics.(b) Mathematics begins with techniques. Consider the technique of addition and the statement $2 + 3 = 5$. Adding 2 sheep to 3 sheep, adding 2 cows to 3 cows, adding 2 loaves to 3 loaves etc. are empirical processes and the processes result respectively in 5 sheep, 5 cows and 5 loaves. These empirical processes constitute a form of life from which emerges the agreement that $2 + 3 = 5$. This is an agreement not in opinion but in the form of life.[14] From several such agreements results the technique of addition.

Technique emerges from experience but later on it is conceived as independent of experience.[15] Once a technique is detached from experiences its rules become timeless and universal.[16] As a code of rules the technique ceases to refer to external objects and the rules become internal relations.[17] Thus, the rule $2 + 3 = 5$ becomes a rule about signs 2, 3, 5, and +. Its referents such as sheep, cows or loaves are left out of consideration. A technique which is born out of experience now becomes a standard to judge an experience.[16]

Once a technique is established it grows or extends for various reasons. Thus, new demands are made on the technique, for example the technique of division was asked to carry out the division

$8 \div 3$ and the demand was met by introducing fractions. A simplification in calculations is introduced such as the notion of 'carry' in the technique of addition to facilitate addition of large numbers.

(c) The logicists, however, ignored the historicity of arithmetic altogether and constructed a new technique based on set-operations. A new technique is needed if either (i) the existing technique is found useless in practice or (ii) the new technique has simple methods of calculation e.g. the method of logarithms. On the first count we find that airthmetic was not found wanting in any respect and, moreover, the results in logicist arithmetic are in no way different from those in ordinary arithmetic.[19] As for the second point, it is patently true that logicist calculus is far more laborious than ordinarry arithmetic. "How this calculus of Russell's can be extended you would not know for your life, unless you had ordinary arithmetic in your bones. Russelll doesn't even prove 10 x 1000 = 10,000."[20]

It may be argued that the results in ordinary arithmetic and the logicist arithmetic agree is a coincidence. But results in logicist arithmetic fllow from indubitable logic.[21] When ordinary arithmetic is giving good results, it is well established by custom and when there is no scope for doubt about its efficacy, what do we gain in learning logicist arithmetic? Indeed, if the results of logicist arithmetic are different from those of arithmetic, it is the former that will be in doubt.[22]

Moreover,Russell's arithmetic is based on a particular technique of logic. If there is another logic giving the same results, which one will you take as foundation? We will go "a step further back in order to find something solid which underlies both"[23] the logics and this search will never end. Further, why should one believe that logic is more sacred than arithmetic. It is as much the result of a consensus as ordinary arithmetic. It too is a consensus generated by a shared form of life.[24]

After elaborating this background Wittgenstein concludes : "Why should one want to connect arithmetic with logic? Suppose we said, 'Disregard the connection between arithmetic and logic entirely. Consider arithmetic as a technique which our children

learn–perhaps with an abacus.' Isn't that all right? Why hanker after logic?"[25]

IV) *The Growth* : (a) Mathematics grows by adding new techniques to its repertory. Some of these techniques come from the empirical domain as, for instance, arithmetic was isolated from empirical processes. But here we are interested in the growth of mathematics from within. An elementary example of this type of growth is Matrix Algebra.

When a technique comes from the empirical domain its efficacy in the practical life sustains and sanctions it. But many times a technique developed from within mathematics is so remote from experience that it is difficult to substantiate its worthwhileness. Such is the case, for example, with the technique of counting roots of an equation where the same root is counted many times.[26] It is, perhaps, this type of consideraion that led to the postulation of a mathematical realm. "...certain branches of mathematics have been developed in which the charm consists in the fact that pure mathematics looks as though it were applied mathematics – applied to itself. And so, we have this business of a mathematical realm."[27]

The positing of a mathematical realm brings forth the belief that mathematics is a physics of such a realm and that mathematical truths can be discovered by experimenting with the objects in this reality.[28] But this is misconceived. For, an experiement leads to a synthetic statement about reality; it does not give us a rule and mathematical statements are rules.[29] A synthetic statement can be falsified, whereas a rule cannot.

But the conception of a mathematical reality is flawed basically because we will have to postulate different realities corresponding to different techniques. "Similarly, there will be a reality for which $25 \times 25 = 625$ and another in which $25 \times 25 = 624$ ...The whole thing crumbles down because you are making the assumption that once you are in the right world you will find out."[30]

(b) When the notion of a mathematical reality is rejected we are left with the logicist conception that mathematics is merely a game of signs played with meticulously formulated rules. The

signs have no specified referents.[31] But to Wittgenstein this position is totaly unacceptable on two counts. First, the basic techniques are obviouslly derived from real processes and therefore the signs in the technique have real referents. Secondly, new techniques such as, for instance, counting, do seem to describe reality. In fact, had this not been so, a technique would remain a game and not become mathematics.[32]

Here we reach a crucial stage in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Gerrard Steve observes[33] that Wittgenstein had two philosophies of mathematics. The earlier one based on the calculus conception and the later one based on the language-game conception. We hold that the later philosophy was not based on the language-games. It was a direct development of the earlier one using the language-games as a control on development of mathematics and the key idea here is that of a concept.

(c) Recall that the rule $2 + 3 = 5$ was abstracted from several _____(A)

real world instances like 2 sheep + 3 sheeps = 5 sheeps, 2 sticks + 3 sticks = 5 sticks _____(I)
_____(II)

etc. This abstraction was the result of an agreement. On what consideration was this agreement based? First, it was observed that there was some family resemblance in the instances I and II. This likeness might not be objective. It was the community which reached the conclusion (A) that might have invented likeness in I and II. Secondly, the like practices (I) and (II) must have operated on like objects. The objects did not multiply when the process was being carried out, for example. Had a sheep calved, the result (I) would not hold. This was not possible with sticks. But sticks and sheep had this likeness viz. that the units survived during the operation. This likeness between a stick and a sheep is not objectively there. It is an invention by the community. Finally, in making the rule (A) from the instances (I) and (II), it was agreed that while there did exist instances where the rule (A) did not work, they are to be ignored in two senses. One, the adverse instance is not to be regarded as a falsifier of the rule

(A) though it could be a falsifier of the synthetic statement (I) and, two, the domain of the rule (A) is so minutely demarcated that adverse instances are automatically barred.[34]

The rule (A), thus, becomes a concept of which instances (I) and (II) are members. Signs 2 and 3 and 5 refer to concepts of which, respectively 2 sheeps, 3 sticks and 5 sheep are instances. Thus, what mathematics deals with are not empirical objects,[34] but concepts. A concept captures several real world objects but a concept is not a mere collection of objects. This is why Wittgenstein calls a concept 'the limit of the empirical.'[36] How does a concept differ from the instances of it? A concept does not cover an instance in entirety. When we say that 2 sheeps is an instance of the concept 2, we ignore such facts as that the sheep are alive, that they have tails etc. Secondly, a concept is permanently incomplete i.e., no amount of instances either exhausts or completely determines a concept.

According to Wittgenstein, mathematics grows by forming new concepts[37] or enlarging the old ones. Mankind is completely free to carry out this activity. That is why, he is averse to the contention of those who postulate a mathematical reality, that the reality could be extended in a particular direction and not in the other.[38]

V) Autonomy and Control : (a) A technique or a concept in mathematics is often enlarged in response to demands made upon it by the developments in other techniques and concepts. For example, the concept of integration was enlarged from Rieman's conception to that of Lebesgue's because the related concept of function was already extended to include inordinately discontinuous functions. Such expansion is mostly uncontroversial like the expansion which takes place in finding the solution of an external problem.

The introduction of the notion of the transfinite numbers was an autonomous development. It could be compared with the invention of the non-Euclidean Geometry. In both the cases, the growth took place not because the solution of an external problem demanded it, but because an inventive scientist made an ingenious extension of an existing concept or of several concepts. In inventing the

transfinite numbers for example, Cantor extended the concepts of counting and number.

The question now is, how to distinguish a bonafide development from ravishment of imagination ? Why should we accept the transfinite numbers as genuine mathematical entities? Is there an objective criterion to differentiate a natural growth from a cancerous one?[39] At different times philosophers had suggested different criteria.

(b) The intuitionists proposed that the basic intuitions of time and space are central to mathematics and that the invention of the transfinite is violative of the intuition of time. But intuitionist conception of mathematics is totally foreign to Wittgenstein's way of thinking. For him, mathematics is the product of a mathematical activity and that activity consists of making decisions according to a well established practice. There are not ingrained intuitions in mind which are revealed in mathematics. He remarks, "Intuitionism is all bosh—entirely."[40]

Russell had introduced the fear of a contradiction as a control on growth of mathematics. Acceptance of a new concept must not lead to a contradiction. There are two ways in which a contradiction controls growth. One, a new concept must be presented in the form of a proposition and the proposition requires a proof. A proof must not contain a contradiction. Since in this paper we are not going to consider Wittgenstein's thoughts on proof, we leave this approach here. The second is that the axioms must not contradict each other. If they do, any proposition is provable in the system. Wittgenstein ridicules this fear of a conttradiction. He says that if there is a contradiction we can just ignore it.[41]

(c) We have already seen that, according to Wittgenstein, a concept is never complete and we are free to enlarge a concept in any manner. Freedom of mankind to carry out the mathematical activity at its pleasure is admissible for Wittgenstein. On what ground, then, can he condemn the invention of the transfinite number?

Wittgenstein compares the case of the transfinite with a situation in chemistry. Suppose the valency technique allows the expression $H_2 O_4$. There is no substance in reality that answers to this expression.

What will be our reaction to this state of affairs. We will say, "That system of valencies wasn't chosen at random, but because it fitted well with facts. But once chosen, what is possible is what there is a picture of in the vallency language. We have adopted a language in which it makes sense to say $H_2 O_4$ .... It isn't true, but it makes sense."[42]

Now let us see the position of 'aleph-not'. True, it is not possible to reach aleph-not in ordinary arithmetic. But suppose it was possible. What sense the expression 'aleph-not' has? For this we have to imagine a situation where 'aleph-not' cannot be describeed without bringing in the use to which it is put.[43] This is the device of a language game.

In the context of ordinary arithmetic 'aleph-not' cannot be used in the sentence, 'Give me aleph-not rupees.' Not because there are not aleph-not rupees but because 'aleph-not' is not a number in the sense that 4 is a number. On the other hand, we can say, 'Jack knows aleph-not multiplications', in the sense that given two natural numbers he can find the product.[44]

The confusion resulting from using 'aleph-not' in the sense of 'four' conferred certain charm on 'aleph-not'. A calculus was created in which 'aleph-not' could be interpreted in this charming way. This is a retroactive revision. But this calculus is artificial and a-historical. Transfinite must not confer meaning upon the calculus, instead of getting one from it.[45]

This is the reason why Wittgenstein regards the transfinite as an arbitrary, aimless and senseless construction. It is not a natural growth of mathematics. As a mathematical theory, the transfinite and its calculus given by Russell may be consistent. But as a metaphysics of mathematics it is responsible for much sin.[46]

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Notes

1.   See Monk (1990).

2.   Dedekind (1963), p. 45.

3.   Cantor (1955), p. 67

4.   Wittgenstein (1983), p. 16. Also Monk (1990), pp. 415-16.

5.   Rusell, B.(1959, p.78

6.   Rusell B. (1914), p. 214.

7.   Rusell   B. (1930),   p. 139-40.

8.   *Ibid*, p. 93.

9.   L 14.

10.   Rusell (1959), p. 96.

11.   *Ibid*, p.75.

12.   *Ibid*, p. 61.

13.   Monk (1990), p.440 Monk gives a quotation from R which is not found in my edition of 1956.

14.   PI. Remark 241.

15.   L 4. All the calculi in mathematics have been   invented to suit experience and then made independent of experience.

16.   R 160. A rule qua rule is detached ... although what gives it importance is the facts of daily experience.

17.   L 75.

18.   L 107 mathematical truth isn't ... it is the natural way to do it.'

19.   L 159.

20.   *Ibid.*

21.   L 172. '... that logic should be, as one might say, is no way arbitrary.'

22.   R 81.

23.   L 172.

24.   L 183-184.

25.   L 271

26.   L 153-54.

27.   L 150.

28.   L 94-95.

29.   L 93.

30.   L 124.

31.   Russell (1959), p. 75.

32.   R 133. It is the use outside mathematics and so the meaning of the signs that makes the sign game into mathematics.

33.   Steve (Gerrard) (1991), p. 126.

34.   R. 14.

35.   By objects we do not mean 'things' but also processes and practices and groups of objects.

36.   R. 121.

37.   R 180. But he adds that there are regions in mathematics where the concept formation plays no part.

38.   L 137.

39.   For Wittgenstein the work of Cantor was 'a cancerous growth, seeming to have grown out of the normal body aimlessly and senselessly.' Quoted in Ray Monk (1990), p. 440.

40.   L 237.

41.   L 138. A contradiction does not even falsify anything. Let it lie. Do not go there.

42.   L 146

43.   Monk (1990) p, 330.

44.   L 170.

45.   R 63.

46.   Monk (1990), p. 416.

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SPIRIT, ESTRANGEMENT AND UNIFICATION : HEGEL'S PHILLOSOPHICO–RELIGIOUS QUEST

The issues concerning Spirit, Estrangement and Unification are the fundamental pre-occupations to Hegel's philosophico-religious quest. The object of philosophy as well as that of religion, for Hegel, is Absolute Truth or God; and it is Spirit that justifies those claims of philosophy and religion. Spirit is, in fact, the unifying agency that connotes the living unity amid the estrangement. Spirit is the living law that unifies the estranged reality so that the latter becomes living. The process of unification and the notion of Being, as Hegel declares, are equivalent; the coupla 'is' in every proposition expresses a unification of subject and predicate, in other words, a Being.

The objective of this paper is to formulate Hegel's philosophico-religious quest by developing its key concepts- Spirit, Estrangement and Unification. It is proposed to be achieved in the folllowing manner: Part I : Hegel's exposition of Spirit as the central concept of his philiosophico-religious quest, and at the same time, as the locus of both estrangement and unification. I shall basically dwell upon Hegel's early work which has hitherto been neglected. Part II: A critical assessment of the basic charges levelled by Ludwig Feuerbach on the one hand and Charles Taylor on the other against Hegel's doctrine of Spirit.

Before I come to Part I of the paper, I would like to point out that there have been several reactions to Hegelianism, not only in the field of philosophy, but also in the fields of psychology, theology and socio-political philosophy. It is virtualy impossible in this short essay to identify all the reactions against Hegel from different schools of philosophy that emerged after the death of Hegel. I have chosen Feuerbach and Charles Taylor for two

reasons, namely, (i) Feuerbach was a pupil of Hegel and he was the first to have come out during 1830 to 1843 strongly against Hegel's doctrine of spirit and its theological bearings. (ii) Among the present-day Hegel scholars, Charles Taylor is the one who tries to interpret Hegel's philosophy during 1975-79 by rejecting Hegel's claim for Spirit. In my attempt to refute the charges levelled by Feuerbach on the one hand and those of Charles Taylor on the other, I shall try to integrate Hegel's philosophico-religious quest on the basis of his doctrine of Spirit.

PART I

Hegel's doctrine of Spirit or *Geist* is central to his philosophico-religious quest. Hegel says, "Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship *(Die philosophie ist der selbst Gottesdienst);* it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God... The object of religion as well as of philosophy is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God... In philosophy, religion gets justification from thinking consciousness."[1]

There is perhaps no part of Hegel's philosophy responsible for the origin and sustenance of this faith than his philosophy of religion, and there is no part of his philosophy which the post-Hegelians, including the present-day Hegel scholars, are less willing to accept on its own terms.

The basic issue, I wish to develop, is that the central religious claims of Hegel's philosophy is that we cannot speak of the reality of God without at the same time speaking of selfconsciousness of human mind, nor fruitfully pursue that interrogation itself unless we conceive our activity in doing so as one sustained and made possible by God. I shall argue that the connection of philosophy and religion is the presupposition to Hegel's epistemological quest of absolute knowledge. My thesis is that the locus of absolute knowledge, Estrangement and Unification is the celebrated doctrine of Spirit.

Hegel's Spirit is, above all, a doctrine about the relationship between thought and objective reality. Hegel means by speaking of

Spirit as the mediation or middle point between the Idea (the categories and the Notion which are also known as the truth in the most absolute and objective form) and Nature (the sphere of external existence which the truth is 'about'). The term' 'Idea' Hegel designates to the absolute truth. Nature is the term which Hegel gives to that truth as we find it in the outward existence of the world. Spirit, however, is the mode of existence of the whole in which everything which is known is embodied in being. Idea and Nature are dialectical opposites, but Spirit is the unity between them. Hegel's contention is that there is something which is identical neither with the sphere of our thought nor with thee objects of our thought. It is the *Geist* which imparts an intelligible form of both these spheres. Spirit is the active synthesis of our consciousness of the world, and what we are conscious of. This is Hegel's epistemological quest too. In epistemology, then, we are concerned with the object of which we are conscious with our consciousness of it. But this is of such a nature that the distinction between what exists *for us* and what exists *in itself* is not a distinction between what is available to us in consciousness and what is not. Both sides of the distinction fall within the grasp of consciousness. In other words, the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself is not acceptable to Hegel. The basic question, for Hegel, is how in consciousness we are related to our objects, and when our object is our own consciousness, it is clear that there is no danger that our consciousness should have an existence *in itself* which is in principle hidden from us and separate from that consciousness as it exists *for us*.

In formulating his own position, Hegel applauds Kant's discovery of the 'transcendental consciousness' as the ultimate source of conceptual synthesis. He approves Kant's criticism that consciousness can not be an object of sensibility and hence categories cannot be applied to it. But this is not, Hegel contends, because categories overstep their legitimate limits, but because soul is a living and active being, just as complex as it is self-identically simple. In fact, its simplicity is just as indivisible whole that is constituted solely by the cohesion and inseparability of its diverse traits, aspects and activities. Kant's objections, according to Hegel, are valid but his reasons are wrong ones.

Hegel elucidates two aspects of Spirit; first, that Spirit requires

the distinction of subject and object, and second, that Spirit overcomes the supposed distinction between subject and object. The first is the moment of estrangement and the second is its transcendence or unification. Spirit is, thus, the locus of both estrangement and unification.

Hegel takes over the doctrine from Kant that consciousness is necessarily bipolar and it is part of Hegel's general espousal of the view that "rational awareness requires separation. Consciousness is only possible when the subject is set over against an object."[2]

Issues and aspects concerning estrangement/unification have been fundamental preoccupations to Hegel's philosophico-religious quest. In his early writings known as *Theologische Jagendschriften* (1790-1800), Hegel first raised the question of estrangement and as his works proceeded, estrangement was destined to play the key concept of his system. I am required to elaborate two questions; first, what are the historical determinants and conditions underlying Hegel's views on estrangement/unification? Second, what is the nature of his concern with the Spirit in this early phase? The significance of these two questions consists in explaining Hegel's fundamental claim that 'philosophy is itself a religious activity'.

To the first question, it can be pointed out that the question of the historical efficacy of estrangement/unification had formed one of the perennial themes of entire German idealism. And, I must add, to anticipate a later discussion, it continued to appear even after Hegel's death especially among the Young Hegelians of 1830s. In his early fragments, Hegel discusses the loss of freedom and unity in the private and social existence in the modern era. "This loss of freedom and unity," says Hegel,"is patent in the numerous conflicts that abound in human living, especially in the conflict betweeen man and nature. This conflict, which turned nature into a hostile power that had to be mastered by man, has led to an antagonism between idea and reality, between thought and the real, between consciousness and existence."[3] In the *system fragment*, Hegel furnishes a more precise elaboration of the philosophic import of the antagonism between subject and object, between man and nature. This was an earliest formulation of the concept of estrangement which was destined to play a decisive part in the future development

of Hegel's philosophy. For instance, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), estrangement is expressed in terms of 'Independence and dependence of self-consciousness', in *Science of Logic* (1812-16), it expresses in the process of the deduction of categories, in *Philosophy of Right* (1821), it is manifested in 'rationality and actuality', in the *Encyclopaedia...* (1830), it is expressed in the dialectic of the subject *versus* dialectic of the object. It has to be noted carefully that all these modes of estrangement are located in the Spirit because it is the Spirit that sustains throughout different stages of estrangement.

Just as estrangement is located in the Spirit, similarly, transcendence of estrangement or unification is also located in the Spirit. In his early writings, Hegel uses the term *Geist* (Spirit or Mind) to designate the unification of the desparrate domains and it became the defining characteristic of almost all the issues concerning estrangement and its transcedence. "Mind is essentially the same unifying agency as life—Infinite life may be called a Mind because Mind connotes the living unity amid the diversity... Mind is the living law that unifies the diversity so that the latter becomes living."[4]

What is so remarkable in his early fragments entitled *Glauben und Wissen* is that, "Unification and Being *(sein)* are equivalent; the Copula 'is' in every proposition expresses a unification of subject and predicate, in other words, a Being."[5] This concept was later on exhaustively developed by Hegel in the *Science of Logic* in the context of the categories of Pure Being and Determinate Being. The distinction and relation between 'being' *(seiendes)* and 'to be' *(sein)* resolves the conflict between being and non-being, between one and many, and so on. The determinate being refers to particular things in the world. But Pure Being is attributable to everything whatsoever. Pure Being is what particular beings have in common and is, as it were, their substratum. Hegel quite often terms the Pure Being as the 'essence of all beings' – the divine essence –and hence ontology and theology get combined.

Hegel also begins by describing the sphere of Absolute Spirit in general as the sphere of religion. Hegel says that one way in which the movement of Spirit can be known is by philosophy whose element is 'discursive thought', just as another way is

religion whose element is 'inward integrity of piety'. John Walker explains, "This total movement through which finite and infinite Spirit are mediated one with the other [is] religion, although it is also the object of religion as it [is] of philosophy in a different mode. There is a highly significant sense, for Hegel, in which philosophy can know about this movement only because philosophy is itself inside it, and only if philosophy knows that it is inside it. The relation of religion to absolute Spirit is not only one of knowing; it is one of being. And if that is true of philosophy, it is only so because the element of philosophy – freely self-mediating Spirit, which knows most adequately about itself and about the world in the medium of philosophy–has been prepared for in the element of religion."[5] Indeed, in the transitional paragraph which leads from the discussion of religion to the discussion of philosophy in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel says the same thing.

PART II

It is above all because Hegel considers philosophy to be itself a religious activity and its justification by Spirit and not just because Hegel is a Christian philosopher who occupies himself with religious matters and speaks favourably of the central tenets of Christian belief–that the Hegelians of 1830s and 40s have been overwhelmingly hostile to Hegel. In the present century, the challenge to Hegel's philosophico-religious quest has come not only from critics hostile to Hegel's general project in philosophy such as Karl R. Popper,[7] but also from writers broadly in sympathy with that project. The philosophico-religious issues is Hegel have been criticised by theologians and philosophers alike; by atheists, materialists and orthodox Christians.

It will perhaps be more important for our present argument to discuss those philosophers who are in sympathy with Hegel's general project in philosophy and yet, who have held specific religious claims of Hegel's philosophy to be philosophically indefensible. I want to argue that during Hegel's own life-time the logical disputes in his writings gave rise to two schools which are, to use Strauss's own phrase, known as the Right-wing and the Left-wing Hegelians. There were followers of Hegel who–as if out of respect for Spirit–held Hegelianism as the actual end of philosophizing. These were

166

known as the Old Hegelians, and shortly thereafter, the Right-wing Hegelians. Opposed to them, there was another group of the followers of Hegel who attempted to develop the spirit of Hegel's philosophy beyond Hegel, even to the point of contradiction. They have come to be known as the Young Hegelians, and afterwards, the Left-wing Hegelians. Old Hegelians, such as, Von Henning, Hotho-Forster, Marheineke, Hinrichs, Daub, Conradi and Schaller, "... preserved Hegel's philosophy literally, continuing its individual historical studies, but they did not reproduce it in a uniform manner beyond the period of Hegel's personal influence. For the hostorical movement of the nineteenth century they are without significaance. In contrast with these Old Hegelians, the designation Young Hegelians... arose."8 Young Hegelian movement rests upon the belief that Hegelianism did not die with Hegel. In 1830, all who were to become the central figures of the Young Hagelian school were Arnold Ruge, Feuerbach, Max Stirner, David Strauss and Bruno Bauer. As an identifiable philosophic movement, Young Hegelianism endured for two decades 1828 to 1848. Young Hegelianism can be said to have made one of its earliest appearances in a letter that Feuerbach sent to Hegel on 22nd November 1828. The letter was enclosed along with a copy of his recent doctoral dissertation, *De Ratione, une, universali infinita,* and both testify to their author's indebtedness to Hegel. But Feuerbach took the opportunity to introduce his own perception of imports of Hegelianism. To Feuerbach, Spirit, after having worked for centuries upon its development and completion, has finallly revealed itsellf in Hegel's philosophy. It is now the mission of Spirit, acting through its desciples–the Hegelians, particularly, the Young Hegelians–to rationalize the world. At the initial stage, Feuerbach acknowledges that "the knowledge gained through the study of Hegel should not merely be directed to academic ends, but to mankind..."8 However, as Feuerbach's work proceeded, he started levelling fresh charges against Hegel's doctrine of Spirit.

Feuerbach has levelled three basic charges against Hegel's philosophico-religious quest. First, in *Towards a Critique of Hagelian Philosophy* (1839), Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's Spirit is in fact, based on his own conception of a philosophical materialism. Says Feuerbach, "The Hegelian philosophy is, uniquely, a rational mysticism ...it fascinates in the same measure as it repels ...The reason why Hegel conceived those ideas which express only subjective

needs to be objective truth is because he did not go back to the source of and the needs for those ideas. What he took for real reveals itself on closer examination to be of a highly dubious nature. He made what is secondary primary, thus either ignoring that which is really primary or dismissing it as something subordinate."[10]

What is primary for Feuerbach is the material substance existing independently of us but is wholly accessible to our cognition. Feuerbach's materialism is, in fact, based on his radical humanism as found in his major work *The Essence of Christianity* (1841). And this brings us to the second charge against Hegel. He posits the absolute priority of actul human experience, of the directly apprehended world of nature and society in which man lives. His unqualified humanism denies the relevance of the speculative philosophy of Hegel. With his enthusiastic humanism, Feuerbach is opposed to the very concept of philosophy which, according to him, is nothing else but religion rendered into certain ontological and epistemological position. Rejecting Hegel's Spirit, Feuerbach says, "The *absolute* to man is his own nature. The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own nature,"[11] Feuerbach bases his humanism on the foundation of philosophical materialism. In the third charge, Feuerbach, in the *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy* (1843), says, "*Spinoza* is the originator of speculative philosophy, *Schelling* its restorer, *Hegel* its perfector."[12]

Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's philosophico-religious quest implies the absolute reduction of God to Man, the transformation of theology into anthropology. Feuerbach claims that theological issues would be translated into human issues, and theological criticism would be replaced by social criticism. The question arises : where does Feuerbach get this insight from? Certainly, it comes out from Hegel's general philosophico-religious claim that the reality of God gets its justification from thinking consciousness. Feuerbach concentrates on the nature of human consciousness alone. But where as Spirit or consciousness is the ontology for Hegel, it is simply an attribute to Feuerbach's materialism, simply a product of mechanical interaction in matter. Feuerbach, however, fails to explain how consciousness emerges out of matter. But, for Hegel, Spirit, being the ontology, is capable enough to unify the estranged reality.

Against Feuerbach's charge that Hegel's Spirit is a 'rational mysticism', one may point out that the content of both religion and philosophy is the same, viz., Absolute thought, yet there is no one to one relationship between philosophy and religion. As explained in the Part I of the paper, in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel develops three modes of Absolute Spirit – Art, Religion and Philosophy – and says that each of these modes enables us to know the totality of the Spirit's life in a different way. The content of Spirit is the Absolute which is *thought*. In Art, this absolute thought, the Idea takes the form of sense content. In Philosophy, it takes the form of thought, so that in philosophy content and form are identical. In Religion, the content is the same, viz., Absolute thought, but the form is intermediate. It is partly sensuous and partly rational. It is what Hegel calls *Vorstellung* – the pictorical or figurative thought. Feuerbach has completely ignored this aspect in Hegel that distinguishes philosophy from religion. Consequently Feuerbach identifies religion with philosophy. Even Feuerbach's criticism of religion fails to furnish an ethical systems that can possibly replace the values developed in religion. Hence, Feuerbach's charges against Hegel's philosophico-religious quest have no sound basis to servive for long.

Among the present-day Hegel scholars, there are very few philosophers who are as qualified as Charles Taylor to write a definite study of Hegel. In his two books, *Hegel* (1975) and *Hegel and Modern Society* (1979), Taylor attempts to defend Hegel's philosophy in the changed intellectual climate in Europe. Taylor has a definite way of looking at the emergence and development of Hegel's thoughts and its relevance to the present-day intellectual requirement. In this *Hegel*, Taylor describes the aspirations of the generation of Young Romantics of the 1790s from which Hegel sprang and against whom he defined himself. The central problem for Romanticism was human subjectivity. Says Taylor, "It concerned the nature of human subjectivity and its relation to the world. It was a problem of uniting two seemingly indispensable images of man, which on one level had deep affinities with each other, and yet could not but appear utterly incompatible." However Taylor criticises, "Hegel's central ontological thesis – that the Universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity – is quite dead."[14] And as R.J. Bernstein points out, "It is to Taylor's credit that he does not flinch from taking the notion of self-positing Spirit as Hegel's most central theme. He boldly attempts to show

that we can make sense of what Hegel is saying without succumbing to the temptation of thinking that Spirit is some non-substantial mystical force or simply a mystified way of speaking about species being or humanity."[15]   It is this contention of Taylor that is reflected in the Preface to *Hegel*. Taylor tells that for 'anyone who wants to understand how Hegel's philosophy was authenticated in his own eyes, and, indeed, how this philosophy and its authentication are insepaarable for Hegel, the *Logic* remains indispensable.' In the first two hundred pages of the book, Taylor frequently creates the impression that *Logic* is the only 'real candidate for the role of strict dialectical proof'.

Taylor's later work *Hegel and Modern Society* is, in fact, a condensation of his *Hegel*. In order to make Hegel relevant to contemporary philosophers, Taylor has left out the account of Hegel's *Logic* as well as the interpretation of *Phenomenology*, and the chapters on Art, Religion and Philosophy. Hegel, according to Taylor, is relevant for evolving the terms in which we think. "Hegel has contributed to the formation of concepts and modes of thought which are indispensable if we are to see our way clear through certain modern problems and dilemmas."[16] Taylor tries to show how the problems and aspirations of Hegel's times continue through certain modifications into our time. What is central to these problems is subjectivity and freedom. Taylor says, "Hegel's writing provide one of the most profound and far-reaching attempts to work out a vision of embodied subjectivity, of thought and freedom emerging from the stream of life, finding expression in the forms of social existence, and discovering themselves in relation to nature and history. If the philosophical attempt to situate freedom is the attempt to gain a conception of man in which free action is the response to what we are – or to a call which comes to us, from nature alone or from a God who is also beyond nature – then it will always recur behind Hegel's conclusions to his strenuous and penetrating reflections on embodied spirit."[17]

We come across a critical study of Taylor's works by Richard J. Bernstein in *Phiilosophical Profiles* etc. In chapter5 "Why Hegel Now?", Bernstein takes an occasion to reflect on the resurgence of interest in Hegel among Anglo-American philosophers. The author traces the amount of influence Hegel has exercised on the pragmatic thinkers like William James, John Dewey and others, who sought to clarify and state their own philosophic position over and against Hegel. The author furnishes an exhaustive account of the history

of the influence of and the fight against Hegel in the English-speaking world. The struggle between Hegel's absolute idealism and the analytic Positivistic schools of thought gave rise to certain un-Hegelian and even anti-Hegelian thought. "Hegel's vivid sense of history, and of dialectical struggle by which *Giest* realizes itself, played almost no role for the English idealists. Hegel's *Logic* was considered to be the primary text, not his *Phenomenology* or his writings about Objective Spirit."[18]

The above analysis fits with the contention of Taylor towards his interpretation of Hegel. In addition, one may point out that the rejection of the doctrine of Spirit in Hegel is tantamount to the rejection of subjectivity and freedom. It is also not possible to accept the evolution of concepts in Hegel's philosophico-religious quest by rejecting the doctrine of Spirit in that system. This is so because it is, after all, the *absoluter Geist* from which the concepts and categories are, one and all, deduced. It is therefore a self-contradictory claim on the part of Charles Taylor to appreciate Hegel's contribution to the evolution of concepts, subjectivity and freedom, and to reject Hegel's claim for the Spirit. Fact of the matter is that Hegel could evolve the concepts in the process of Spirit's activity to unify the estranged reality. It is only in the process of unifying the estranged reality that Spirit realizes its freedom. Hence, Hegel's claim for the Spirit is indispensable in order to appreciate his contributions towards the evolution of concepts, subjectivity and freedom.

To bring the paper to a close, it can be said that Hegel's philosophico-religious quest rests on his doctrine of Spirit, and, Spirit is the locus of estrangement and unification, and unification and being are equivalent terms. Any attempt to reject Hegel's claims for the Spirit is bound to result in a philosophical short sightedness and inconsistency, whether it is in the case of Feuerbach or in that of harles Taylor.

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NOTES

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2. Taylor, Charles: *Hegel and Modern Society,* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 26

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13 Taylor, Charles; *Hegel,* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 3.

14 *Ibid.,* p. 538.

15 Bernstein, Richard J., *Philosophical Profiles : Essays in a Pragmatic Mode,* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986), p. 165.

16 Taylor, Charles; *Hegel and Modern Society,* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. xi.

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18 Bernstein, R.: *Philosophical Profiles : Essays in a Pragmatic Mode,* etc., p. 145.

172

DISCUSSION

I

TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY MEETS TRANSCENDENTAL GRAMMAR

In his article "Does Transcendental Subjectivity Meet Transcendental Grammar?" in this journal (July, 1993), Dr. Kanthamani has commented on my paper "Wittgenstein and the Availability of a Transcendental Critique" published in this journal (July, 1992). He has argued that in Wittgenstein's later philosophy a transcendental critique in Kant's sense in not available. He has also suggested that any effort to read Wittgenstein's early transcendental philosophy into his later philosophy will be "only a search for an anonymous Wittgenstein" (p. 320). In this short rejoinder I would like to clarify my position and, if possible, eliminate certain misconceptions about the idea of transcendental critique.

Kanthamani's main arguments can be summarized as follows :

(a) The idea of a critique of reason is different from that of the critique of language, and both are altogether different from the idea of a critique of philosophy (ideology).

(b) The critique of language need not be a transcendental critique, let alone need it take a transcendental turn.

(c) The notion of transcendental turn is just a convenient ploy to ignore the basically linguistic character of Wittgenstein's notion of philosophical grammar.

I would comment on each of the points mentioned here.

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I agree with Kanthamani on the point that the Kantian critique of reason is not exactly the same as Wittgenstein's critique of language. The obvious difference between the two critiques is that whereas Kant plots the structure and limits of the reason under the wider programme of defending the rationalist discourse, Wittgenstein is undertaking a plotting of the structure and limits of the natural (ordinary) language with the aim of dislodging the Cartesian-Kantian Egocentric 'logos'. Wittgenstein is redefining the 'logos' by situating it in the 'human world' disclosed in the natural language of man. Yet, he finds a methodological clue in Kant's critical enquiry into the 'limits' of the 'logos'. The limits have to be placed before the critical understanding. Therefore, philosophy cannot abdicate the responsibility of standing apart from language and seeing it as it were from a transcendental point of view.

Wittgenstein's critique is not at the service of science, since he, unlike Kant, does not aim at transcendental science of synthetic a *priori* laws of Nature. He aims at dissolving the a *priori* science altogether. Wittgenstein's notion of grammar is not the counterpart of an a *priori* linguistic science. Grammar and its rules, though a *priori* and transcendental, represent merely the "scaffolding" of language and the world. They express the "essence" of language and the world. So, it is appropriate to say that Wittgenstein's notion of grammar is "phenomenological" in Husserl's sense rather than "scientific". Kanthamani has been under the impression that I have imposed the idea of an a *priori* linguistics on Wittgenstein's notion of philosophical grammar. I have, in fact, argued for just the opposite. For me, philosophical grammar is not merely "anti-scientific", but also trans-scientific. It is transcendental in its basic approach.

The idea of transcendental turn is inevitable, if Wittgenstein's critique of language has to be properly understood. The critique is so designed that it presents a "perspicuous" view of language and the world. It cannot, however, present a perspicuous grammar without transcending the constraints of the naturalistic world-view. It has to cancel the "naturalistic" urge to transgress the limits of language. So, philosophy has to come back to the "roots" of language, i.e., "proto-phenomena" which can provide an essentially trans-empirical view of language and the world. I have, therefore,

argued that it is the transcendental viewpoint which alone can be the right approach underlying Wittgenstein's critique of language. Kanthamani has not quite appreciated the fact that the transcendental turn is not a mere manoeuvre to be "non-scientific" but to be essentially a trans-scientific understanding of language.

The transcendental turn is also not a turn towards a mythology of rules or *a priori* normativism as Kanthamani supposes. The rule-mythology is precisely the creation of *a priori* linguistics. Wittgenstein's critique is destructive of this mythology. The so-called *a priori* normativism is also the shadow of the *a priori* grammar of rules. Wittgenstein's aim is not to substitute a normative grammar for his transcendental grammar. So, it is not right to say that transcendental grammar ultimately culminates in a "transcendental linguistics of normativity" (p. 321).

What is here taken to be the philosopical account of language is not committed to the availability of syynthetic *a priori* laws of grammar. Kanthamani rightly surmises that I have shown no inclination to prove that such laws are available. All that I leave open is the possibility of necessary rules of grammar which have often been characterized by Wiittgenstein as "arbitrary". I am not worried about the exact iinterpretation of the word 'arbitrary'. It only means, according to one view at least, the unconstrained character of rules themselves. Rules are simply there where they belong, that is, in the language-games. That is to say, they are autonomous. So, where is the necessity of imposing them on language-games?

Kanthamani has further said that I have conflated the critique of language with the critique of philosophy or ideology itself. This, he believes, cannot be done because philosophy cannot be a critique of langurage and of itself simultaneously. If phillosophy is a critique of itself, it reduces itself to non-existence, that is, denies itself and so it is contradictory to suppose that it is a critique of language, at the same time. But this contradiction is an illusion. My supposition is that philosophy is a critique of itself only by being a critique of language. Only by understanding the elimination of the "bewitchment" of human intelligence by language can philosophy destroy the so-called philosophical "houses of cards". Philosophy

evolves a self-critique not by accident but by necessity. Wittgenstein has amply demonstrated that the critical activity of philosophy cannot be compartmentalized. That is to say, philosophy is a single critique, not only of language and thought but also of itself.

I do not, however, have to work with three 'options', i.e., science, philosophy and transcendental enterprise as Kanthamani asserts (p. 320). Transcendental enterprise is not anti-philosophical; it is of course anti-scientific. As I have already argued, philosophy itself is a transcendental enquiry. So, it is the nature of philosophy not to construct theories, or 'hypotheeses' like science. Philosophy only "describes" what is already there. Philosophy, therefore, has no other option than to become transcendental; otherwise, it succumbs to the risk of collapsing into science. Either philosophy adopts the standpoint of transcendental grammar or it ceases to exist. I have argued that philosophy is a transcendental grammar and so the other alternative is ruled out. There is, therefore, no implication that Wittgenstein's later method of philosophy is not philosophical at all according to the transcendental account. Rather, it is the responsibility of those who do not accept the transcendental account to show how they can account for philosophy in the latter Wittgenstein.

It is now abvious that the transcendental account is not a mere search for an anti-scientific standpoint. It is not based on an ill-informed and naive account of science either.

It is a decisive step in the serious pursuit of understanding language and the world as they are "given". It is, therefore, imperative to recognize the autonomy of the philosophical activity. This autonomy is better preserved in the uniqueness of philosophy being transcendental. Philosophy in a way must guard against the false paradigms set by science and mathematics.

The theme that transcendental subjectivity meets transcendental grammar is the constant refrain of Wittgenstein's transcendental philosophy. To allow a gap between them is to go back to the Ego-centric framework of Descartes and Kant. Wittgenstein has abolished the Ego without dissolving the transcendental subjectivity which is built into the transcental grammar. Without the transcendental subjectivity, grammar itself would lose its transcendental character,

and so there would be no standpoint from which grammar can be studied. In that case philosophy itself will be impossible.

It is this theme that is common between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. The later philosophy retains the transcendental framework precisely to understand grammar, i. e. to situate language and meaning in their proper perspective. It is surprising that the continuity thesis has been underestimated by Kanthamani. I suppose that continuity appears not only in the middle period but also in the later period. The continuity lies in the basic framework that lends unity and coherence to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This may appear to be a kind of conservatism But the fact remains that no philosopher, however revolutionary, can afford to shake off his own native mental makeup, i.e., his own genius Wittgenstein is no exception. There may be early Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein of the 'middle' period and 'later' Wittgenstein, but there are not three Wittgensteins. I am, therefore, all the time searching for the 'real' Wittgenstein, not the 'anonymous' Wittgenstein.

Kanthamani's comments, nonetheless, are philosophically insightful and deserve serious attention. My response is precisely to make my position clearer.

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Discussion of the point under consideration through the medium of this journal is closed herewith.

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II

NYĀYA INFERENCE–DEDUCTIVE-INDUCTIVE PATTERN

The purpose of the present paper is to make a review of Dr.Jagat Pal's article "Nyāya inference: Deductive or Inductive" published in the *I.P.Q.,* Vol. XX, No. 3, July, 1993.

At the outset I appreciate Dr. Jagat Pal for rightly pointing out the misconceptions about the notions of deductive and inductive inferences. He is right in saying that 'in deductive inference the premises, if true, provide absolute guarantee for the truth of the conclusion'. This is definitely the main characteristic of a valid deductive inference. But without putting any argument the author simply says that "this given definition of deductive inference cannot be used as the criterion for characterising inferences in *Nyaya* as deductive" (p. 265).

Again, Jagat Pal is right in saying that "in inductive argument the premises, if true, provide a good reason or evidence (but not conclusive) for the truth of their conclusion". This is definitely the main characteristic of an inductive argument. But, once again, without putting any argument the author simply says that "this given definition of inductive inference cannot be used as criterion for characterizing inferences in *Nyāya* as inductive" (p. 266).

In course of his discussion Dr. Jagat Pal rightly says that the premises and conclusion of a valid deductive argument always stand in the relationship of implication or entailment, and it is because of this reason, premises with negation of conclusion always imply contradiction. I do agree with the author in this respect. But I beg to differ from him when he says "the *Nyaya* inference

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is not a deductive inference because the premises of Nyāya valid inference with negation of the conclusion never imply contradiction." (p. 266) It can be shown with the help of rules of formal logic that the premises of *Nyāya* valid inference with the negation of the conclusion do imply contradiction. Let us take the stock example of *Nyāya* valid inference.

> All smoky objects are firy.
>
> This hill is smoky
>
> This hill is firy

To translate the above argument in the language of predicative logic:

1. $(X) (Sx \rightarrow Fx)$

2. $(\exists x) (Hx \cdot Sx)$ $(\exists x) (Hx \cdot Fx)$

3. $\sim(\exists x) (Hx \cdot Fx)$ Negation of conclusion.

4. $(x) \sim (Hx \cdot Fx)$ 3, Q. E

5. $Ha \cdot Sa$ 2, E. I.

6. $\sim(Ha \cdot Fa)$ 4, U. I.

7. $Sa \longrightarrow Fa$ 1, U. I.

8. $\sim Ha \lor \sim Fa$ 6, De. M.

9. $Ha \longrightarrow \sim Fa$ 8, Impl.

10. Ha 5, Simpl.

11. $Sa \cdot Ha$ 5, Com.

12. Sa 11, Simp.

13. Fa 7, 12, M. P.

14. $\sim Fa$ 9, 10, M. P.

Thus, in the above deduction taking the negation of the conclusion as a premise we reach contradictory statement namely, 'Fa' and '∼Fa'. So, it is a gross mistake to think that premises of *Nyāya* valid inference with negation of conclusion never imply contradiction. And as the premises of a *Nyāya* valid inference with negation of its conclusion imply contradiction (what we have seen in the above deduction), the premises and the conclusion of a valid *Nyāya*

inference always stand in the relationship of entailment or implication. So, the *Nyāya* inference is obviously a deductive pattern of argument. In other words, *Nyāya* inference is deductive in the sense that formal consistency is maintained in it.

Though formal consistency is maintained in *Nyāya* valid argument the *Naiyāyikas* are less formal than the western logicians. Because, the *Nyāya* inference does not have to do with abstract relationship among terms, where the abstraction is free from all questions of reference. To a western logician the inference "all animals are horses, all horses are bipeds; therefore, all animals are bipeds" is formally valid, though unsound.

The unsoundness does not, in his view, detract from the logical interest of the example as instantiating a valid form of inference. But to a *Naiyāyika* this example is a *Nyāyābhāsa*, i.e., something which is only apprently an argument but really is not. In other words, it is an ill-formed argument because its members are known to be false. This is why along with formal consistency, the *Naiyāyikas* seek material truth in an argument. To achieve this end they introduce *udāharaṇa Vākya* in the third step of the five membered syllogism which runs as follows :

1.   This mountain is fire-possessing

2.   Because it is smoke-possessing

3.   Whatever is smoke-possessing is fire-possessing, like kitchen and unlike lake.

4.   This mountain, since it possesses smoke, possesses fire.

5.   This mountain is fire-possessing.

The third step "whatever is smoke-possessing is fire-possessing" is a universal synthetic proposition which expressess an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Such a universal synthetic proposition can be established only by the method of induction like agreement in presence, agreement in absence and non-observation of contrary instances. Moreover, when the *Nyāya* method of assessing inferences in practice is carefully studied, it becomes quite apparent that the assessment of validity is a matter of trying to detect

subtle errors in adducing evidence for the constituent judgements and not of comparing the inference with abstract models to see if it instantiates one of the valid forms of inference.

Thus, an the one hand, the *Nyāya* valid inference is deductive because its premises and conclusion always stand in the relationship of entailment, though it does not have to do with abstract relation among terms, and the assessment of the validity of it is not a matter of comparing it with abstract models to see if it instantiates one of the valid forms of inference. On the other hand, a *Nyāya* valid inference is inductive because it seeks material truth of the conclusion by introducing *Udāharaṇa Vākya* as one of the premises which is established by inductive methods and the assessment of validity of it is a matter of trying to detect errors in the adducing of evidence for the constituent judgement.

M. Hiriyanna and C. D. Sharma viewed *Nyāya* inference from the angle considered above and that is why they call it inductive-deductive pattern of argument. In fine, I will ask Dr. Jagat Pal if *Nyāya* argument is neither deductive, nor inductive, not inductive-deductive, then what type of argument is it? Is there any fourth type of argument which is not deductive, not inductive or not inductive-deductive and in which *Nyāya* inference can be categorised ? If there be so, what are its validity conditions ? Dr. Jagat Pal viewed deductive and inductive arguments as diametrically opposite of each other because of their opposite characteristics and because of this reason he thinks that in an inference two inferential processess of opposite character cannot be applied together. I think that though deductive and inductive processes have contrary characteristics, they are not mutually exclusive and one is not independent of the other. J. S. Mill in his *A system of Logic* says that the deductive method cannot work unless it starts with a problematic induction or inductions per simple enumeration. Exactly in the same spirit Braithwaite suggests that every generalisation has to be accommodated within the deductive system. In his *Scientific Explanation* Braithwaite argues that the Hypothetico-deductive method is that of deducing the hypothesis in question from higher-level hypotheses which have themselves been inductively established. This, I think, is strong enough to prove that deduction and induction

are interdependent. So, the *Naiyāyikas* have done nothing wrong in making inference by both the processes of induction and deduction.

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BOOK-REVIEW

Gangadean, (Dr.) Ashok K., *Meditative Reason : Toward a Universal Grammar* : 1993, Peter Lang. New York; pp. xxix+386; Price : US $ 33.95 (sc).

Professor Gangadean's book under review is a collection of essays which he wrote over the past twelve years. It is supposed to be a sequel to his another collection of eassays entitled *Between Worlds : Alterity, Meaning and Truth,* scheduled to appear shortly, Though the essays collected in the present volume were composed for different contexts and occasions, they are collected here taking into account a central concern of great significance running through all of them. The collection contains eleven essays including a post-script, six of which had appeared in their earlier versions in different journals. The book deserves to be studied seriously by everybody concerned, especially in the light of the importance of the central theme it takes up to present and defend, although this in itself does not rule out a difference of opinion along an important line, as will be pointed out below.

It is held that in the world-wide evolution of cultures the intuition, that there is and must be a Primordial Origin which is the source and basis of all that exists, has recurred and manifested itself with considerable diversity. Likewise, there is the perennial quest for Universal Grammar and the Universal Logic of Natural Reason and language. It is similarly held that there is a Universal Law inherent in reality which presides ever various forms of cultural life and manifests in consciousness, language, experience, nature as well as human condition. This Universal Form or Principle is a generative force expressing itself as Universal Unitive Field or Continuum as the foundation of all life and existence. In the evolution of human thought attempts have been made to excavate the deep structure or universal logic of rational consciousness, thought, language, experience and world. Nevertheless, in such attempts certain egological paradigms of logic and reason have resulted into polarization of

great paradigms of philosophical reason. Against them, it is argued that through meditative turn to natural reason we can open the horizon of Universal Logic of natural language. It is shown that Universal Law of Natural Reason or the Principle of Universal Relativity functions as a primordial Unitive Continuum or Unified Field in such a way that all things mutually constitute one another and thus could be said to be co-arising. In the light of this, an attempt is made to develop a Universal Grammatology as a general hermeneutical method for all discourse. This, it is held, is the universal hermeneutical code of decoding not only the structure of rational life, origin of experience and formation of culture, but a grammatical code for world-formation and unlocking the deep structure of the Unified Field of Nature and Existence as well. This is so because all fields are structurally situated in the Unified Field of Universal Grammar, as it is the active and pragmatic foundation of all fields, disciplines and hermeneutical forms of life. Such a shift from egological ontology to maditative Grammatology of Natural Reason can foud and illuminate nature of inter-cultural discourse and open common ground between Philosophy, Religion, Science, Arts as well as cultural life in general. Through such a grand unified field diverse sciences become available complementarily rather than competitively and the so-called Mind-Matter dualism melts into the universal stuff of the universe which is originally psychophysical in character.

It is quite natural to expect that in the foundations of religious life and Theology such themes should 'be captured in their most developed and refined forms. This is because Divine Being must be held to be the universal foundation for all religious worlds and forms of life. However, religious and ideological battles, localizing ethic and provincial forces of diverse religions are seen compromising with Universal Revelation of the Divine Presence in one or the other way, giving rise, in turn, to ideological idiosyncracies of egological religious practices. It is argued that various egological practices of minding give rise to different religious parthologies and bring about cleavage between the Infinite and the Finite.

In the context of application of Meditative Reason to the Logic of Communication it is argued that objectification and literalisation of meaning reverses the existential priorities of discourse.

By contrast, it is attempted to be shown that meditative narrative brings to our notice that primary discourse and meaning are basically metaphoric rather than literally descriptive. Carrying the argument further, the sort of transformations that need to be brought about with a view to opening possibilities of discourse between diverse cultures and life-worlds are discussed, so that healthy and open ethnic orientation and cultural diversity are not arbitrarily eclipsed. On this background, with the help of analytical and hermeneutical tools of grammatology, ontological and hermeneutical pathologies in the existential dynamics of egological life are discussed and it is shown that various rational, religious, moral, hermeneutical, psycho-social, political and other sorts of pathologies have their roots in the malpractices of egological mind. Taking a clue from Nāgārjuna, a sort of inherently transformative, performative and existentially therapeutic and curative alternative is attempted to be articulated within the framework of meditative dialectic and holistic psychotherapy. Such a kind of therapeutic self-awakening of the mind and voice of natural reason is expected to be brought in to overcome prejudices and pathologies of egological modes of thought and practices. The meditative voice, through the inversion and transvaluation in experience and discourse, is designed to be made transperent to the "true origins of common sense, every day experience, natural language and ways of natural reason" (p.xxvi). Emphasing primacy of metaphoric discourse, it is further held against literalist discourse of the ego-practice of abstracted, constructed or derived meaning that the Principle of Universal Relativity as an operative force in natural language together with functional as well as pragmatic principle which makes common sense work is the 'rough ground of every day natural language and natural meaning' (p. xxvii). It is in this that we find the original continuum between the voice of thinker-speaker and the Unified Field of Natural Reason or Universal Grammer. In the natural logic of meditative reason one can see that logic of every day language is in perfect order. Circumventing/avoiding distortions and pathologies of egological mind, natural perfection of Universal Grammar at work in every day language is revealed. In summing up, it is held that an inquiry into global evolution of cultures brings to our notice the clue that the way we conduct our mind is the most important factor in the quality of our rational life. Our being human turns on whether we conduct our mind in accordance with Universal Law of natural

reason or whether our conduct of mind becomes deformed and falls into malpractices and fragmentation of egological habits. In preferring and performing meditative turn to natural reason the human mind is said to blossom to its full natural holistic form and in consequence astaunding transformation in the experience and conduct emerges. In the right conduct of natural reason lies the universal foundation of experience working in every day common sense. In short, closer we naturally are to the unitive and universal foundation, transperantly truth-oriented we remain. Conversely, greater the deviance and departure from the unitive centre, proportionately distortion-prone do we become.

Thus, Professor Gangadean's book attempts to place before us a serious central concern and rise above the narrow confines of regional interests and shallow, superficial and hence misleading clues in the direction of so-called Comparative Philosophy, inviting the concerned to inquire and investigate into the unitive, profounder and univeresal insights. As far as this is concerned Gangadean's book commands concerted attention. There are, however, some points with reference to which a further deeper inquiry seems to be called for. First, it is not clear whether the plurality and global evolution of cultures is supposed to be considered within the framework of the respective civilizations or independently. If the former, one would be required to consider civilizationally unitive and universal features of human life and understanding, rather than stopping presumptively at the level of natural language and natural reason. If the latter, our understanding of cultures, their plurality as well as evolution–regional or global–is likely to be either very superficial or else one-sided. Secondly, philosophical and cultural orientations seem to have very fundamentally differed from one another through their answers to three questions of seminal concern and the mode of interrelationship between them : (a) What is the appropriate conception of good life together with our conception about ourselves, others–human or otherwise–and world at large. (b) What goods do we value in our life, what are our strong preferences concerning them and by what sort of tenable and universalisable rationale they are backed, and (c) if and in so far as we stand committed to (a) and (b) what price are we prepared to pay for our being able to realise them in our life–individual as well as collective? In the light of answers to these questions, different patterns of

ordering our life may arise and their civilizational moorings cannot be wished away or brushed aside.

It would have been better if while publishing the essays in the form of collection certain repetitions which have crept in were avoided. Similarly, extensive indices at the end together with bibliography would have been very helpful from the point of view of future researchers. One may hope that these short-comings would be corrected in the next edition of the book.

In sum, the book amply deserves to be studied seriously for the agenda it keeps before the concerned and the way it has attempted to work on the project. The sort of questions it has raised are a matter of serious concern and can hardly be ignored.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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1.	Place of Publication	Philosophy Department. University of Poona Pune-411 007.
2.	Periodicity of its Publication.	Quarterly.
3.	Printer's Name and Address	Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay. Philosophy Department, University of Poona Pune-411 007.
	Whether Citizen of India	Yes.
4.	Publisher's Name and Address	Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay. Philosophy Department, University of Poona, Pune-411 007.
	Whether Citizen of India	Yes.
5.	Editors' Names and Addresses	(i) Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Pune-411 007.
		(ii) Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Opposite Stadium Main Gate Premchnd path, Rajendra Nagar, Patna-800 016.

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WITH REGRETS

1. In the Current issue of IPQ is published the reaction of Dr. Johannes Bronkhorst, one of the Editors of the Proceedings of The First International Conference on Bhartṛhari.

The Readers of IPQ will recall that in the January 1994 issue of IPQ was published a review of these Proceedings by Dr. J. Ouseparampil. The said review was appended by an Editorial Note and was signed as "Editors" (of IPQ). In the said Editorial Note comments were made on the selection of articles which have gone into the Proceedings edited by Dr. Johannes Bronkhorst and Dr. Saroja Bhate.

2. At the outset, as the founder editor and publisher of IPQ, I express my sincere regrets for the editorial note which was appended to the review by Mr. Ouseparampil. I or anybody on the editorial board have no occassion to exhibit any further knowledge as to which papers were included and which were omitted from the said Proceedings. Dr. Bronkhorst and other editors of the Proceedings may have their own editorial policy on which the Editors of IPQ should not have made any comment and certainly not in the way in which it has been made. I have ascertained that most of the editors of IPQ have similar reaction about the appended comment to the review. The Editorial Board of IPQ consists of five editors and the editor who is looking after the day to day administration should have restrained himself from publishing the said Editorial Note. In publishing the said note, under the signature of all the Editors of IPQ the concerned Editor has also made his view appear as if it was also the view of the other Editors of IPQ. There is no doubt that this is a flagrant violation of the basic norms of editing. It has made other Editors of IPQ susceptible to criticism.

S. S. BARLINGAY

3. In Dr. Bronkhorst's reaction to the editorial note, there is an oblique reference to editor's duty in selecting the raticles, which he must have followed while editing the Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari. As regards the editorial policy of IPQ I may state that the principle objective of IPQ is to provide a forum to students of Philosophy for presenting their thought. I.P.Q. is not committed to any particular opinion or creed. But this does not mean that we do not make any selection. Our criterion for selection is that the articles should have a perspective and a focus. I may add that IPQ has been regularly following the practice of refereeing submitted articles. Unfortunately, the Editor who appended the said editorial note to the review by Dr. Ouseparampil has also departed from this policy of IPQ.

4. All that has happened was without my knowledge or without the prior knowledge of other editors. The Editorial Board of IPQ and other philosophy journals of Poona University are now taking steps to evolve procedure to ensure that such incidents of indiscreetness do not occur in future.

S. S. BARLINGAY

ARE QUINE'S TWO DOGMAS STILL DOGMAS?[1]

1. Is Quine an Anti-individualist?

Recently Richard Creath[2] has proposed that the 'strong dispensability' is open to the *tu quoque* response (Quine too has a dogma) in which there also figures a counter analytical notion of analyticity (Quine's is a dogma even without this). Thus, even if Quine's objections are valid, we need not read it as ruling out an epistemic notion of analyticity such as the one Carnap has advanced in his definition of analyticity as interchangeability *salva confirmatione* (observational as well as inferentially confirmable) and, thus, delivering a final blow to the notion of analyticity. On Creath's view, therefore, Quine's interchangeability *salva veritate* test for synonymy will turn out to be yet another dogma, for the simple reason that Quine's epistemology without it will have its own defects. In what follows, I shall defend the view that Quine can still be understood as pronouncing the death of dogmas even after a review of his sixty-year old counter to the dogmas.

The line of resistance I hope to offer here is drawn out from Quine's attack on essentialism about language and the consequent anti-individualism that is the benchmark of Quine's post-analytic turn in philosophy. The anti-individualistic turn, in my view, has a positive concern too.[3] There is a way of showing that his critique of the analytic-synthetic dualism coheres with both the propositional anti-individualism and the primacy of translation. Anti-individualism in Quine's sense drops the intrinsic nature of propositions (p is analytic/synthetic etc.) Since the argument itself is purely linguistic in character, it works against the essentialistic views of language. Its positive fallout is the primacy it offers to translation.

RECEIVED : 20/11/93

Theoretically, meaning and translation are the two limbs of Quinean semantics. Once the primacy of translation is assumed, then the required conclusion about anti-individualism follows from it. Hence, the endeavour is to draw out a positive lesson form Quine's critique. The primacy, as I argue, is conceptually necessary to sustain a basic stance about Quine's philosophy of language. Nevertheless, such conceptual necessity, in my reading, is not to be explained by means of either a cenceptual assimilation, or by means of a conceptual legislation exercised in an *ad hoc* way, so as to buttress an 'indispensability argument' for translation.[4] Nor is it clear that translation provides a prior condition of the possibility of language itself. What I want to say about the primacy must be understood as part of Quine's meta-reasoning about the (concept of) language itself. The primacy, therefore, does not stand for any one of the above, but only to subserve a conceptual point about language itself. The conclusion about anti-individualism serves only a philosophical point. However, there is yet another, more interesting way of looking at the connective link betweeen translation and language.[5] It is suggested by a formalistic scheme in which the transference of predicates from one language (L_1) to another language (L_2) is seen to provide a logical model of language itself (that is how, predicates are understood homophonically). Looking at this way requires the resolution of the connecting link at three different (interrelated, though independent) levels, namely the epistemic, logical and ontological levels, however overlapping they might be so as to yield a coherent picture of the world. Granting that such a scheme is quite possible, still one theorizes only at a 'possible' level and not at the actual level. I should concede that issues are far too important, but within the framework I interpret Quine, they can be set aside for a moment so as to concentrate on the anti-individualistic strain behind his metareasoning. The primacy may be post-analytical and not logical, nor is it epistemic or ontological.

Quine's retrospect[6] finds no necessity to trace the controversies that surround his critique. Without it, the two dogmas are still dogmas. The reasons are as much revealing as his own views on logic, language, science, and mathematics. If so, then his case against the two dogmas is as strong as ever; so to say, the dogmas are not dead after all. Nevertheless, there is yet another way of looking at it; that is, Quine may be understood as following a sort of anti-individualism about languages. Anti-individualism comes in various

guises. Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam are good examples. One may also mention Davidson and Rorty as well. Burge counters individualism as a method in psychology following Marr's theory of 'visual' anti-individualism. Putnam blends anti-individualism and Quinean untranslatability so as to critique functionalism in psychology. Samuel Wheeler turns the negative aspect of anti-essentialism into a positive message of philosophical recipe about deconstruction and attributes this to Quine, Davidson and Derrida. Following Wheeler, Rorty evokes the negative side as leading towards the narrative account of neo-pragmatism.

Rorty calls this as the contingency of language, (Rorty's anti-individualism is global since it is based on the contingency of language, mind and society), whereas Davidson's and Putnam's are translational for the simple reason they have a Quinean premise about trranslational indeterminacy. Andrew Cutrofello, in yet another context, calls it as a doctrine of inscrutability of languages ('languages are inscrutable') and attributes this to Quine himself; he thereby means first that it is impossible to obtain a unique language to which a particular expresion would belong, and second that it is impossible even to determine with rigour, the boundaries which separate one language from another.[7] Nevertheless, one may say that Quine has not in totality rejected the way we 'individuate' statements as analytic and synthetic (negative thesis), but only they are anti-individualistically/nonindividualstically individuated (positive thesis).[8] This attribution of anti-individualism to Quine leads towards a further consequence for language and languages. In the final showdown, we can know that the dogmas have indentical roots, since their common enemy is only individualism of statements.

It was only Gochet[9] who first challenged Quine with regard to the identity of roots (infra). But for Quine, they are *au fond* identical as both are used primarily to individuate sentences, and *a fortiori*, to individuate language schemes. The streak of anti-individualism is obvious. Davidson's poser lies in his challenge to the very idea of conceptual scheme in which he proved that translatability is the criterion of languagehood, even between radically different languages.[10] Assuming for a moment that Quine has a theory of understanding, one can argue that only a thin wedge divides Quine's theory of understanding, in terms of equivalence between occasion sentences from Dummett's theory of understanding, understood as a proxy for

a theory of meaning. The whole confusion about Dummett's dictum which says that theory of meaning is a theory of understanding is that it is considered in the form of a = a, whereas the right way is to see it as a = b, where a and b stand for the theory of meaning and a theory of understanding respectively. What these theories share is a triat that can be called post-analytical, which dispenses with the view of language called as language *simpliciter* and passes on to one which holds that languages are learnable or understandable. Quine's view of language as an episodic interaction with co-speakers and the environment is an inauguration of this trend in his first ever attempt to domesticate logic, in favour of language as an articulated structure. Such a reading is due to Dummett. If the refutation of Gochet's disproof provides one angular viewpoint, Quine's Dummettian theory of understanding provides yet another viewpoint, towards which I turn now.

2. Quine's Theory of Understanding

Quine's theory of understanding grows out of the following stages of enquiry as expounded in his article on "Mind and Verbal Dispositions".[11] First, what I call, is an affinity thesis, which holds that mind and language are one way independent. That is, one can derive conclusions about the former from the premisses of the latter. Quine's theory of understanding is ascriptivist------ motivated in that it is poised to tell how other-ascriptions (how ascriptions attributed to others) work and hence fall in line with anti-nativism. Ascriptivists, in a sense, constitute a first generation anti-nativists. Anti-realists are anti-nativists only in this sense. Looking at this way, Putnam's attribution of 'sophisticated mentalism', therefore, commits a mistake in attributing something which Quine does not hold.[12] Second is what I call a *combinatorial productivity* thesis which claims that the way sentences are produced is *via* a combinational logic (syntax, so to say) (a kind of manifestation argument). Quine does not have so much as an acquisition argument; what blocks this move is that whereas 'idiosyncracy' of language can be admitted, idiosyncracy of acquisition may not be.[13] Thirdly, with regard to the question about meaning, the thesis invites a dual context; on the one hand, it is supposed to tell us under what conditions expressions are meaningful and, on the other, it is supposed to tell how to obtain synonymy for a given

expression. The latter is, however, much more crucial. There arises what is called a theory of understanding which is more aligned to the second apsect referred to in the above, and it is given in terms of paraphrasing (86ff). Quine's point is to claim that 'synonymy/ paraphrase explains understanding' (first aspect) is no more difficult to maintain than the one which holds that meaning explains understanding. Quine wonders whether grasping meaning is a mentalistic enterprise and if so, it is worst at that (87). Subsequently, Quine develops what can be called a theory of understanding by distinguishing three modes of understanding comparable to later Wittgenstein's sense of *erklaren*, namely the mentalistic, physicalistic and the behaviouristic. Each one requires a different account of causation. In contradistinction to the other two, behavioural explanation helps us to arrive at the understanding of an expression, in the way outlined above.[14]

The next important stage in Quine's theory of understanding defines truth as a great leveller (87-8). The full significance of this point is understood when truth is interpreted as standing for an adjusted standard of understanding. Now, the stage is set for defining meaning in terms of understanding, or what we can call an improvised theory of understanding . Quine's improvised theory of understanding is given in the following dictum :

A understands E (an expression) if he knows its truth-conditions (88).

It is claimed to be applicable both to the domain of occasion as well as standing sentences. Nevertheless, there is a comparision as well as a constrast. The comparison is that occasion sentences are understood in terms of equivalence. The contrast is that standing sentences are understood in terms of interanimation or network of other sentences, which Quine calls as a theory. Ultimately, the holistic outlook determines the way the sentences in other domains are understood. So much to sustain the Dummettian interpretation of language as an articulated structure.

3. Quine's Real Challenge

Contra Davidson, Quine's anti-individualism is poised to disprove a universal trait for all language such as the one Carnap evolved in his true-in-L for a variable language (L).

If Carnap's is an endeavour to read universal grammar of all languages, Tarski's is also yet another pedigree of the same type. As Rorty concedes, the snow-bound regularities *a la* Tarski is a one-way fallout of translation. This follows from saying that his T-sentences will not as much yield a philosophical theory of truth, as a philosophical scheme of translation does. Quine also does not agree with Tarski's conclusion about the closure of natural languages (semantical closure), and this follows from his ecumenical assumption (We shall understand this as saying that there is only one among many) about the translatability of object-language to metalanguage. The former project can be allied to Katz's proof[15] about the 'logical' possibility of translation of languages that is based on the denial of the uniqueness of each language (residual anti-individualism), whereeas the latter passes from a non-individualistic premise to the individuation of language. (I am not as such concerned with truth-definition of all formal languages, as with its manner of proof). A point in my favour here is that Kantz' anti-individualism arises on account of anti-nativism (Katz rejects the classical view of competence that was due to Chomsky) and turns to a platonistic view of grammar. There is an obvious friction between the wto tendencies of platonism and anti-nativism which I overlook here. The point of Quine's refutation about Carnap, in other words, is that it cannot consider analyticity as a universal trait on the basis of the following equivocation, namely analyticity in L_1 = analyticity in L_2. Anti-individualism may be taken as a positive consequence of translatability in Katz's sense, and paraphraseability in Quine's sense.

In a similar vein, Quine's challenge to the Tarski-style truth definition may be said to go through the following steps: his object language-metalanguage distinction cannot presuppose that there is a truth-definition for a unique formal language; further, it cannot also apply uniformly to all languages without begging the question. Tarski's dilemma is seen as: neither can he start from the unique nature of a single language, nor can he attribute the truth definition as a universal trait for all languages. The essence of the above rebuttal must be understood to derive part of its strength from some such conception of language considered as a calculus (*calculus ratiocinator*).[16] More interestingly,

what I am saying here is that Quine's anti-individualism must be seen as the argumentative part of his animadeversions about the thesis of radical indeterminacy of translation. Dummett closes off Quine's outlook by callling attention to the 'picturesque way' Quine was led to theorise about how two speakers speak for which translation provides the necessary model. Nevertheless, Dummett's way of reading the 'significance' leads him in a different direction.[17] In my understanding, the above mentioned premises about Dummett's reading of Quine, and Putnam's use of the untranslability as a premise about his anti-individualism (presented as a critique of functionalism) directly entail a Quinean sort of anti-individualism (I compare Quine's variety with Burge's below). Against Dr. Marathe's contention to change the picturesque model to a logical one (see f.n. 5, *Supra*), I can only say that my post-analytical reading may not as much warrant as we desire (I agree with him in all aspects of his criticism).

Tyler Burge[18] takes Quine's anti-individualism, as a corollary of his critique of analytic-synthetic distinction with which he expresses agreement. But at the same time he wants to draw the conclusion that there are sentences that are both analytic (logically or vacuously true) as well as synthetic (factual). This is too drastic a conclusion to draw. What it misses in Quine's account is that synthetic statements (observation statements) enter holophrastically (now Quine calls this as sensory neural intake; taken thus, it gets the folllowing definition: an observation sentence is holophrastic iff it is a response to or it is anchored in a sensory neutral intake) before they become analytic *via* analystical hypothesis. Rightly understood, holophrastic construals have the potency to demand translational schemes, and a fortiori, biconditionals, so much so that the former is the conceptual analogue of the latter. So, a synthetic statement can become analytic. (This is not, however, to make a claim that synthetic statements *are* analytic and *vice versa*). Thus, Burge's attribution of anti-individualism is not complete for the very reason that it does not invite him to consider this part of the argument which holds that such unique trait cannot be considered to individuate sentences as much as they individuate the languages. For Burge, Quine's anti-individualism no more implies a semantic individualism than an epistemic one. Further, such an imposition prevents him from attributing the following conclusion: one can derive the identical root of the two dogmas from Burger's

argument but at the same time it hardly contributes towards any positive understanding of Quine's own position.

4. Gochet's Point Refuted

But Gochet's point against Quine's claim is that Quine cannot show that the evaluation of the dogma of analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be linked with the evaluation of dogma of reductionism without begging the question. He gives the following scheme of argument.

1.   Let us assume that they are linked, and a fortiori, they support each other.

2.   Prove that either one of them as dispensable will leave the other as an 'unsupported dogma'.

3.   But supposing that this unsupported form of dogma is also seen as one about the distinction, then it leaves the diistinction intact.

4.   Quine's original assumption is that the refutation of one dogma is a refutation of the other.

5.   If (3) is true, (4) cannot be maintained.

6.   Hence, the original assumption cannot be guaranteed.

The above argument given in the form of reduction proves at least one point; namely, that there might be a link, but that it cannot be assumed in the above way, without committing the fallacy of begging the question.

How, then, the link is to be justified? Quine's recent retrospect suggests that a moderate holism can be assumed which consists of clusters of statements that are analytic (logical/mathematical) and synthetic (scientific statements). The links are provided by the inferential relations of the former towards the latter. The cluster of statements provide enough 'semantic mass' so as to yield an 'observation categorical' (whenever P, then Q, where P is an observable condition and Q is a check on this).[19]

It is this aspect that marks it off from the *salva confirmation* account of holism. Pursuing this, we may find that while *salva veritate* holism (Quine claims it to be moderate) is implicational of a unique kind, *salva confirmatione* (at a low-level) in that it is only a reformulation of the verification principle in terms of inferential relations acting both ways. The latter is also definitional (guaranteeing mutual interdeducibility which it owes to Russell's contextual definitions), since it is just on offshoot of the *erleb (erlebnisse)* account of Carnap's *Aufbau* (constitutive definitions). But Quine marks off his holism as based on coordinating definitions (*Zuordnungs definitionen*). Quine has a clear advantage over Carnap in two ways: (1) analytic-synthetic is ordered in terms of implication; and (2) One can specify the revision as striking at either end and accordingly interanimate mutually. Coordinations, in Quine's sense, must be understood as conveying the following ˙ dictum: any drastic enough revision strikes anywhere, even at the interior (analytically true or logically true statements). The link between the above two categories is symbiotic to the link between theory and experiment and the underlying 'logical' relationship is one of implication. Thus, the cluster of theoretical sentences implies (⊃) observation categoricals. Besides implication relation, they are one way independent. Quine claims that the link between analytic and sybthetic statements is one between mathematics (sentences of pure arithmetic and differential calculus, and possibly other fragments of what Quine calls applicable mathematics') and scientific statements. This clearly proves why should one reject Burge's reading.

5. Quine's Model Revisited

The above picture of Quine's model of language[20] replaces the previously known straightforward central-periphery account, which did not talk about the inferential relations in this particular way, nor did it explain the link between logic, mathematics and science in the above way (Fig (i) below). Now, revision can strike anywhere and reverberate to the interior, subject to the constraint that obtains from the maxim of minimum mutilation. Necessity bears an inverse relation to revisibility. As part of the learning of theory/language, it starts with observation sentences (thing-language) and passes on to the scientific clusters (theory) and to the interior mathematical

statements. The scheme is roughly shown as below :-

Fig. (i)

Now, with the semantic clusters, the former negative implications of meaning of the *Word and Object*-model has been kept in a way. Moderate holism looks for a bigger cluster in which 'scientific sentences cannot in general be expected to imply empirical consequences by itself' (272). The right-hand side shows how the schema for one-word sentences ultimately makes way and 'reifies' into semantic clusters of analytic sentences. While the holophrastic construals embody tthe structure of empirical knowledge (by virtue of the way a word enters into different structural formation of theories), holism refers to its form; even so, the semantic clusters stand for the content.

6. A Review

In what follows, I shall review Quine's anti-individualistic argument against the individuation of sentences of a given language, and thenceforward to language scheme itself. The former is obvious and easy to understand, that is, Quine's position is against the uniqueness of the linguistic trait of a sentence being analytic/ synthetic. The original argument, as noted, was due to Tyler Burge.[21] According to this argument, propositional attitudes *vis-a-vis* intentional content are anti-individualistically or non-individualistically individuated.

Burge turns this into a view about anti-individualism in semantics. Burge accepts Quine's denial of the analytic-synthetic distinction, but this point of disagreement with Quine is over calling the class of analytic statement as degenerate, since they are also matters of fact. The mutual exclusion of the two types of statements is refuted by saying that there are analytic statements which are also factual. This leads him ultimately to posit 'translational' rather than literal meaning and treat it as quite independent of the above distinction. Burge also does not accept tthe critique as applicable to the distinction between linguistic and other sorts of truths (Burge accuses critics of Quine's as 'conflating' the above distinction).[22] Burge's positive position can be paraphrased as follows: Individual words and their meanings depend on 'translational meaning' used by others, and language is exactly in this sense 'social'. Anti-individualism implies a 'semantics of idiolects' and, therefore, it is not incompatible with innatism or nativism which postulates innate competence. But the only problem is to give content to the latter idea. Now, the above argument of Burge can be reformulated as: If Quine's anti-individualism is taken for granted, it might fall in line with a Quinean sort of innatism (Burge characterizes it as 'minimal competence').[23] Burge's anti-individualism is, therefore, not totally free from a residual (minimal) competence view, It follows, therefore, on Burge's view, there is no way of doing semantics without matching it with competence.

7. Burge Vs. Quine

Quine may not so much require minimal competence as in Burge's sense for the simple reason that he wants to explain it in terms of 'nerve ending'; if that is explainable in terms of it at all, it is so explainable. Hence, he may be attributed with a view which holds that competence can mismatch semantics.[24] The other differences between the anti-individualism of Burge and Quine are summarised as follows :

1.   Burge concedes that translation is so interwoven with meaning: nevertheless, it does not call for abandoning a view of language, that can be called language *simpliciter*.

2.   Burge's anti-indiviidualism does not extend to languages; that is, the depiction of the relation between two languages (e.g. language and metalanguage).

(1) and (2) force him to grant minimal competence to the speaker.

3. It takes in it the direction of epistemic utility (truth of meaning is dubitable). This is *contra* Quine.

4. Individual semantics is in interaction with social environment including language (language as social meaning has a social character).

For Burge (4) is a logical consequence of the type of anti-individualism he wants to advocate.

His only failure is to read this as a significant point about Quine's anti-individualism. We must also concede, with Dummett, that (4) has never been explained within the existing models of language such as communicative, vehicular, expressionist etc.[25] Quine's is a new one which considers language as an articulated structure with the episodic interaction with its enviornment, and his 'picturesque' way of using translation to explain stimulus synonymy among speakers compliments his open admission to reduce language to a severely regimented variety of logic. Schematically, anti-individualism, thus, becomes an explanans, for the social character of meaning/language. Burge concedes (4) can never bee explained except by bringing in a 'translational meaning'[26] Quine's correspponding position is schematized in figure (ii) as follows:

Fig. (ii)

Perhaps the above cosiderations of language leaves language as a third-world phenomenon along with science and mathematics. Science is a succinct expression of culture.

8. Conclusions

Let us consider Quine's critique of analyticity as aiming to undo a unique linguistic trait that indiviiduates a sentence within a unique language (each language has its own unique trait or traits) by looking at it within a larger scheme, as shown above. Quine's definition of analyticity will end up with the following condition.

1. A sentence is analytic for a native speaker if it is true by virtue of its meaning and its truth is learnt by use of one or more of its words in such a way that it is domestically (homophonically) interdefinable '(intradefinable in a special sense within the parameters of the above schema) so as to yield the following schema (2).

2. Two expressions are (stimulus) - synonymous iff their biconditional or equation is analytic (now Quine replaces this with an input -output model, according to which the input is the neural intake and the output is the assent to a sentence; however, it is parellel in that a class of sensory intake gives rise to the notion of stimulus meaning. The obvious advantage of input-output model is not functional but to secure intersubjective semantics.)

Now we must also see whether (2) is consistent with my attribution of anti-individualism to Quine. Firstly, it is not a functionalistic model because it does not extend the input towards the input to the sttructural representation in the brain; second, it does not make observation statements as giving rise to assent (because it takes the input to cause the assent so much so that observation statements are the in-betweens of neuro-psychological mechanism and the external linguistic manifestation.)

3. The domain in which it is individuated remains somehow redundant.

4. Even if they are individuated as such, they remain mostly

irrelevant.[27] Now, 1-3 can be understood to give a 'generalized' sense of analyticity.

5. Such of those sentences are analytic so long as they are unrevisable. That is to say, the scheme 'P is analytic iff ...' will be thrown away when (3) becomes void. Hence (3) is also to be regarded as another condition.

Having said all these, the last condition (6) would be formulated as follows :- 6. 'If the two expressions equated in (2) and (5) above belong to (two) different language (schemes), then their biconditional is *far from* analytic (emphasis added); this is just to obviate the need to transcend a single (home) language. This is also attuned to warrant (1), especially the clause which holds that they are domestically interdefinable'.

The emphasis laid herein gets further elucidation from Quine, in what is called as UIPM-test, (following his article on "Use and its Place in Meaning" that gives us a notion of congnitive synonymy.[28] But the point of the above test does not as much warrant to invert Quine's argument as to show that this has no bearings on his indeterminacy. But, it may be taken as an argument which proceeds from a major premise about translation (without begging any questions) towards meaning.[29] Quine's point in the above, therefore, is that such a transcendence is 'incoherent' belonging to no language (271). Such a position may be called a 'sectarian', (means that it is one among many) following Quine. The sectarian position with regard to synthetic (occasion) sentence is less bothersome than the sectarian position with regard to analytic (standing) sentences. Quine's critique, therefore, starts from no such premise as the denial of meaning, but from an ecumenial position which serves only as a heuristic. At the same time Quine's anti-individualism does neither take 'sophisticated mentalism', as an option, suggested by H. Putnam, nor does it argue for the uniqueness of conceptual scheme.[30]

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Thanks are due to an audience of the Indian Philosophical Congress (67th session) 1993, where an earlier version of this paper was presented in the section on 'Logic and Scientific Method', for the various responses. Thanks are also due to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, for the grant of Felloship for pursuing research on the major analytical traditions. Thanks are due to the Library of the Academic Centre for reprographic services of the research materials. Special thanks, however, are due to Professor Dr. M.P.Marathe for reading an earlier version and for the numerous suggestions for improvement.

2. Such an argument is found in Richard Creath's article on "Every Dogma has a Day" in *Erkenntnis*, 35 (1991), pp. 347-389.

3. Essentialism is under attack simultaneously from two sides. One from the deconstructive side and the other from the post-analytic side. Anti-individualism belongs more to the latter than to the former. A fusion of these two views is currently understood both from the positive side (e.g. Samuel Wheeler) as well as from a negative point of view (Richard Rorty).

4. See Hans Johann Glock's "The Indispensability of Translation in Quine and Davidson" in the *Philosophical Quarterly* (1993), pp. 194-209 for a similar argument.

5. The particular line of criticism Dr. Marathe adopted is too strong to overcome within the compass of the paper. However, I mention here the chief lines which forced me to reconsider certain points made earlier in the paper. However, I escape the wrath of his critique by taking shelter under a post-analytic interpretation. The primacy in this sense is not indispensability. (see f.n.4 above). I have also given due weight to his questions in the interpretation to the distinction which I make between the 'ecumenical' and 'sectarian' later in the essay. To some extent, this brings alternative systems of translation and alternative systems of logic closer, and this is also warranted by Quine's outlook.

6. Quine 's recent view appears as "Two Dogmas in Retrospect" in *Canadian Journal of Phiilosophy* 21, (1991), pp. 265-274.

7. For a kindred opinion, see Andrew Cutrofello's "Quine and the Inscrutability of Languages" in *International Studies in Philosophy* (1992) pp. 33-46. A more positive label is suggested more recently in R. Rorty's writings. *Pace* Davidson's willingnesss to drop the intrinsic nature of language, Rorty calls this as the contingency, as opposed to the 'necessity' of language, and defines it as follows: 'Davidson's polemic against ...... the scheme content model......... are parts of a larger polemic against the idea that there is a fixed task for language to perform, and an entity called 'Language' or 'the language' or 'our language', which may or may not be performing this task efficiently (p.13). See Rorty's essay on

"Contingency of Language" in his *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge, 1989). See also f.n. 6 below. In my view, Rorty is Quine-coherent or Davidson-coherent on the one-hand and Putnam-coherent on the other (see f.n. 10 below).

8. These contrary ways of stating anti-individualism are due to Tyler Burge (see f.n. 18 below).

9. Such an argument is due to Paul Gochet; see his *Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine's Philosophy.*

   (Munchen, Mein : Philosophia Verlag, 1986); see pp. 20-21. For Gochet, the presupposition concerning unity of the two dogmas amounts to committing the 'fallacy of begging the question', simply because the refutation of one (say reductionism) leaves the other (analytic-synthetic distinction) intact, that is, as an *'unsupported dogma'* (emphasis in the original.) *A fortiori*, contrary to what Quine claims, the refutation of one is *not* a refutation of the other (emphasis added). Gochet finds Quine's 'stronger claim' about their having 'identical roots' is difficult to reconcile with the above, without the above mentioned fallacy (pp.20-21)

10. The interpretation I offer is quite independent of, but at the same time, consistent with Rorty's own (see f.n. 4 above). For Rorty, contingency squarely depends upon the lack of boundaries that 'break up' between languages. It is here the term 'translation' is appropriate. Rorty conflates between language as a medium of expression and language as representation and his thesis about contingency is, thus, simply vulnerable (p.11). Tyler Burge, for example, discusses Quine and H. Puntnam as representatives of anti-individualism. I hasten to add that this marks off what is characterized as 'post-analytic'. I work out this in my *The Major Analytical Traditions* (ICPR Research Project). See Burge's acknowledgements in his article on "Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990" in *Philosophy in Review (Philosophical Review*, 1992) pp.3-52; see esp. f.n. 65 for a remark about Putnam's anti-individualism. Putnam's is clearly post-analytical and is interpreted in another paper titled " H. Putnam's Critique of Functionalism" (Ms.)

11. The *locus classicus* for Quine's theory of understanding (meaning) is "Mind and Verbal Disposition" in *Mind and Language* (Wolfson College Lectures, 1974) Ed. by S. Guttenplan (Clarendon Press, 1975); pp. 83-96. This is the first time Quine's theory of understanding is studied.

12. *Contra* anti-individualissm, H. Putnam's attribution of sophisticated mentalism appears in his assessment on "Quine's Meaning Holism", in the *Philosophy of W.V.Quine*, ed. by P.Schlipp and Hans Hahn (La Salle: Open Court, 1986), PP. 405-426.

13. For Quine, the proper way of explaining (*erklaren* in Wittgenstein's sense) the meaning of a sentence is in terms of understanding which involves the reduction

of this into dispositions of assent/dissent for occasion sentence, but at the same time it involves 'interrelation of sentences' in terms of paraphrasing or translation. For all these, translation provides the necessary heuristic, however complicated it might be. A coincidence of dispositions yields a behavioural theory of understanding, and a satisfactory equivalence gives a behavioural account of equivalence. Meaning and translation are, thus, the two semantical notions that are complimentary to each other (p. 89). For the use of the notion of *erklaren* within Wittgenstein's theory of understanding see P.M.S. Hacker aand G. Baker's *Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's PI* (Vol.I) (Basil Blackwell, 1980\1983). See also f.n. 24 below.

14.   For Quine, behavioural explanation remains the only option, and that too, in his sense

15.   For J. Katz's anti-ondividualism which denies that each one of naturaal languages has a unique property, see his 'Effability and Translation' which explores the logical possibility of translation *Contra* Quine. His 'translational theory of meaning' (Christopher Peacocke's expression) entirely depends on a propositional (sense) paraphrasing. Katz works against the 'rationalist hypothesis' which holds that there is an explanation of the uniqueness of natural language (213) and proposes the principle of effability as a proxy for translation (209). Its residual character is derived from the passage from a theory of meaning towards a logical possibility of translation. Katz's article appears in the anthology on *Meaning and Translation: Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches* (eds.) F. Guenthner and M. Guenthner Reutter (Duckworth, 1978), pp.191-234.

16.   For a study of the significance of the well-established distinction between language as a universal medium (*linguistica characteristica*) and language as calculus (*calculus ratiocinator*), see my "Hintikkas' Game of Language" in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 1993; pp. 145-160; it has roots in the distinction V. Heijenoort makes between logic as languagee and logic as calculus in his 1967 article under the same title, which appeared in *Synthese* 17, pp. 324-30.

17.   M. Dummett's metaphorical attribution is found in his study "The Significance of Quine's Indeterminancy Thesis" in his *Truth and other Enigmas* (Duckworth, 1978), pp. 375-419; see esp. p. 376ff for language as an articulated structure; and p. 389 for a discussion on the 'picturesque' model. Dummett contrasts the 'solipsistic' model of the 'Two Dogmas' with 'Communicative model' of *Word and Object*. For Dummett the significance of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation cannot rest upon a premise about the indeterminacy of meaning.

18.   Tyler Burge's explicit commitment to an anti-individualistic stance, appears in a larger corpus, starting with "Individualism and the Mental" in *Midwest Studies*, 4. pp. 73-121, followed by his 'Other Bodies' in *Thought and Object* (ed) A Woodfield (Oxford, 1982); For a more elaborate argumentation, see his "Individualism and Psychology" in *Philosophical Review*, 125 (1986) pp. 3-45 and the "Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception" in *Subject, Thought*

and Context (eds) P. Petit and J.McDowell (Oxford, 1986). Burge acknowledges his debt to Quine in his "Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind" in *Journal of Philosophy*, 83 (1986), pp. 697-720. See also f.n. 18 below.

19. Translation is related to meaning *via* understanding. In what follows, I summarise Quine's Review; see f.n.3 above. (The pagination refers to his article).

20. For a review of previous central-periphery model, see my "Quine's Model of Language" in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 1979.

21. Burge's argument, without a positive tenor, appears dubious. See his most recent article quoted in f.n. 8 above for the above view.

22. Notwithstanding Burge's debt, Burge accuses critics of conflating the distinction between truths which are true by virtue of meaning and synthetic truths about world, on the one hand, which he accepts, and the distinction between linguistic truths and factual truths on the other which he does not; see esp. f.n. 14 in his contribution in "Wherein is Language Social?" in *Reflections on Chomsky* (ed.) Alexander George (Oxford, 1989), pp. 175-191.

23. For Burge's treatment of 'minimal competence', see his 'Intelllectual Norms' etc. see f.n. 14 above. Quine's model, like Putnam's, in my understanding, assumes neither 'minimal competence' nor a *'lingua mentis'*.

24. For a critical understanding of the relation between competence and semantics, see my review of the debate between Martin Davies and Crispin Wright in "Can Competence Mismatch Semantics?" (Paper presented in the Indian Philosophical Congress (63rd Session); see the abstract (1988), wherein I find fault with Davies for misinterpreting Wright's denial of competence. The issue seems to be a larger one than I had supposed.

25. Dummett's contribution to Alexander Geeorge's volume on *Reflexions of Chomsky* makes the distinction between language as a medium of expression and language as a vehicle of throught sharper than ever. See his article on "Language and Communication" which appears to me as an analysis of fundamental notions of language, and is somewhat more sanguine than the distinction between language as a universal medium and language as claculus, made popular, by Hintikka and others; see f.n. 23 above. The *lingua mentis* is a sophisticated variety of Chomsky's faculty of language, and is due to Hilary Putnam's attack. For his anti-individualism *vis-a-vis* translatability, see his *Representation and Reality* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988). Obviously Puntnam has changed his mind from his earlier reading of Quine (see f.n. 8 above).

26. Burge marks a distinction between two types of meaning namely 'explicational meaning' and 'translational meaning' and explains why one cannot be confused with the other in his article quoted in f.n. 18 above; see also f.n. 14 above.

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27. See Quine's "In a Praise of Observation Sentences" in *Journal of Philosophy* (1993), pp. 107-116. Quine continues to speak about individuation in spite of evidence to the contrary. These evidences are cited in the article referred to in f.n. 4 above. Quine's holophrastic construals provide a stance against any from of individuation.

28. The 'UIPM-test' is discussed in Dorit Bar-On's "Semantic Verificationism, Linguistic Behaviourism and Translation" in *Philosophical Studies*, 16 (1992), pp. 235-259

29. Alston formulates an argument which gives primacy to translation; see his contribution titled as "Quine on Meaning" which appears in *The Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine* (ed) P. Schlipp and Hahn (La Salle: Open Court, 1986). pp. 49-72; see esp. p.65.

30. Putnam's attribution appears in his article noted in f.n.8 above.

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CRITICAL THINKING AND REASONING

The subject of this paper is critical thinking and good reasoning. The problem is: what are the basic principles of critical thinking and good reasoning? Views range from 1) only general principles specifically provided by formal logic to 2) no general principles, only subject-specific ones with a variety of views in between.

Principles of good reasoning, according to the Formal Logic Approach are provided by formal logic only. Formal logicians believe that any principles that are not reducible to logic are not needed at all. There is another group of philosophers who think that no general principle can cover all fields of study and subject-specific principles are required for good reasoning in each field.

Our position is that 1) abstract general principles of logic hold good in all fields; 2) abstract principles of logic are not adequate for good reasoning in all fields; 3) in every fields of study there are unique subject-specific abstract basic principles of reasoning that are good in that particular field only.

We will start the paper with a discussion of formal logic and various ways of defining formal logic. Then we consider how abstract general principles of logic apply in all fields. In order to make our case that there are abstract general principles of good reasoning that hold good *only* in specific subjects, we must develop further the concept of subject-specific principles of reasoning (SSPR) that hold good in specific subject areas or fields.

The Formal Logic Approach claims, and does so correctly in our view, that some principles of reasoning are not subject-specific at all, that they are all objective and independent of the subject matter

or the content of reasoning. These principles of critical thinking may be applied to many subjects irrespective of their subject matter. The applicability of the principles of reasoning, according to the Formal Logic Approach, is not limited to any subject matter in particular. These principles are true not with respect to any context but without reference to any particular subject.

According to our view of critical thinking every subject has its own methodology of correct thinking and some of it may not be applicable in determining the correctnesss of arguments in any other subject. There may be some principles of reasoning that are useful in ethics which may be not very useful or may not even be applicable at all in thinking critically about legal matters. In some cases we do need some subject-specific principles of reasoning to think critically in different subjects over and above the general principles of formal logic. But it should be kept in mind that the pressence of these subject-specific principles of reasoning does not, by any means, weaken the great theoretical and practical value of principles of reasoning within formal logic.

The general principles of formal logic and informal logic and the specific principles of problem solving and decision making are equally important in this view as necessary ingredients of critical thinking. The fact of the matter is that many of the problems in various specialized disciplines and also problems we always face in our concrete real life, such as social, educational, and cultural problems that are roughly called common sense everyday problems, cannot be solved if attention is restricted to the concepts, principles, rules and structures provided by formal logic. Not only are there subject-specific truths------ there are subject-specific rules of reasoning.

Real life problems are not always in ideal logical situations. For example, legal philosophy accepts all fundamental laws of logic; nonetheless, legal reasoning is controlled by legal principles and procedures, the principles and procedures that are not principles of logic as such, in order to achieve the fundamental objectives of a legal order in a given situation. There are many situational and domain specific constraints in various disciplines and in our every day life that may not be considered in formal logical systems because the formal logical rules simply do not apply to them.

Merrillee Salmon expresses her concern about the twentieth century narrow treatment of logic. Salmon maintains that in the past, 17th century Port Royal Logic (The *Art of Thinking*) had only one fourth of the book covering what we now call logic and the rest of the book covered materials that fall under the scope of what we now call reasoning. She is not quite happy with the modern scholarly usage of the term 'logic' which narrowly limits itself to "investigating and framing general principles concerning the relation between premises and conclusions of correct arguments."[1] Logic in this sense, according to Salmon, covers only a part of reasoning. Here is how Salmon describes the scope of reasoning:

> Reasoning consists of many different skills: the abilities to think coherently, to comprehend instructions and advice, to understand the difference between unsupported claims and arguments, to recognize when unsupported claims need support, and to marshall support from general background knowledge or from new investigations. Reasoning also includes formulating problems and figuring out their solutions, drawing conclusions from premises, designing through experiments or reall experiments that can test claims, formulating and using principles to evaluate arguments, seeing the force of counterexamples, making judgements of information's relevance, as well as surveying and assessing possible outcomes of decisions and plans.[2]

Our conception of critical thinking includes logic as well as reasoning in the sense that Salmon uses the term 'reasoning'. In the following pages we would like to address the issue of subject-specific principles of reasonning (SSPR) with some examples from different fields.

Subject-specific Principles of Reasoning (SSPR)

Everyone agrees that there are truths of logic and also, there are truths in other subjects that are not and cannot be deduced from logical truths. But that is not the issue in this study. The issue is whether there are any subject-specific principles of reasoning (SSPR) that are unique to each different field and, do not hold good in general-principles of reasoning that are good in one field and not good in another. This author believes and argues for, throughout this dissertation, the following theses:

1) Logic provides us principles of reasoning that hold good in all fields and all subjects in determining the validity or invalidity of arguments, and the logical truth of statements.

2) Logic does not deal with all the principles of good reasoning in all fields, simply because like all other subjects logic has a subject matter of its own and, it does not include all the principles of good reasoning in all specific subjects. It simply deals with principles of good reasoning that are good across the disciplines or fields. Formal logic deals with syncategorematic terms e.g., 'and', 'not', 'all', 'if.... then....' which are, used in all fields.

3) In every discipline or field, over and above the formal logical principles that are good in all fields equally, there are many subject-specific principles of good reasoning. To say that there are subject-specific principles of reasoning that are not deducible from or reducible to logic is different from saying that the factual truth of premises are subject-specific. There is no disagreement that the factual truth or falsity of premises in different subjects are not determined by logic. Beyond that, it is also true that there are principles of reasoning in each subject that are unique to that subject and, are not deducible from or reducible to logic. Also, those subject-specific principles of reasoning may not be good for reasoning in some other subject or subjects.

Those subject-specific principles of reasoning are provided by the field and these are unique in that subject, and may or may not hold good in other subjects at all. Knowledge of a particular field provides those principles of good reasoning in that particular field, and logic does not and cannot do that.

This is why we have deontic Logic ('It ought to be a voluntary action in order to be a moral action'), Logic of belief and knowledge ('P *knows that* Q iff P believes that Q, Q is true, and P has undefeated justification for Q', 'P *believes that* Q iff Q is true or false'), etc. These extensions of logic have different scope and functions, and are significantly different from formal logic. These logics have their truths about particular facts, and truths about general principles that are clearly different from one another's. But the question is: do these disciplines and, others like them have their own unique subject-

specific rules of reasoning that are neither deducible from nor are they reducible to the principles of reasoning in logic?

In order to answer this question we have to show that activities of reasoning well in a particular discipline are governed by abstract principles other than the principles of logic. It is not merely showing that there are subject-specific truths in those subjects that are unique to those subjects only. True statements about particular entities or about general concepts in a subject are not the principles of reasoning in that subject. In history, for example, it is true that Socrates was not born before Buddha. This statement is a statement of a particular event. On the other hand, there is a factually true general statement in history---"No queen had ever been a cobbler before she became a queen". But, neither of these statements are principles of reasoning, although these statements may be used as premises in arguments.

SSPR in Mathematics

Let us consider a problem from elementary mathematics:

"What number must be added to the numerator and to the denominator of the fraction 1/4 to give the fraction 2/3?"

In order to solve this problem we must first understand that the numerator is the number on the top and denominator is the bumber on the bottom of a fraction. Thus in this fraction 1/4, 1 is the numerator and 4 is the denominator. This is pretty simple truth in mathematics. What is not so simple is to find what is or are the principle(s) of reasoning that will help us in getting to the conclusion, the correct number in this case.

One sort of rule for reasoning in such problems is to represent the unknown number by x. Then: one formulates the problem as $x+1/x+4 = 2/3$ and focuses on trying to find the mathematical value of x. The reasoning proceeds by steps, perhaps as follows:

Step 1) $x+1/x+4 = 2/3$ [from the statement in the problem]

Step 2) $3(x+1) = 2(x+4)$ [from 'a divided by b equals c divided by d' *infer* 'a times d equals b time c']

HARUN RASHID

Step 3) $3x+3 = 2x+8$ [from 2 based on 'if $x(y+z)=w(u+v)$, then $(xy+xz)=(wu+wv)$]

Step 4) $3x-2x =8-3$ [from 3, based on 'if $x+y=z+w$, then $z-x=w-y$']

Step 5) $x = 5$ [from 4, based on $3x-2x=x$ and $8-3=5$]

Notice here that the problem cannot be solved by setting the fractional equation at the beginning of this solution by merely setting $x+1 = 2$ and $x+4 =3$. Clearly, the steps of reasoning by which we arrived at the conclusion are steps of good reasoning that led us to the correct conclusion. Selecting or finding out some correct steps or reasoning as opposed to many others is a matter of judicious choice. Making this judicious choice is an integral and unique characteristic of reasoning.

Let x, y, z, u, v, and w represent some mathematical number. The universal truths of mathematics that have been used here are the following :

   1. $(x) (y) (z) (w)$ (If $x/y = z/w$, then $xXw = yXz$)
                 - [used in step 2)]
   2. $(x) (y) (z) (u) (v) (w)$ (If $x(y+z)=w(u+v)$,   then
                     $(xy+xz)=wu+wv)$ - [used in step 3)]

   3. $(x) (y) (z) (w)$ (If $x+y=z+w$, then $z-x=w-y$) - [used in step 4)]

These postulates that have been used above are unique in mathematics, and are not reducible to any principle of inference in logic. These postulates are universal and general in the sense that they are subject-specific in the sense that they are applicable only in the field of mathematics and are not reducible to principles of logic.

A traditional logician might argue that the above proof simply shows that the above process of reasoning is nothing more than a proof of deductive logic using rules of inferences in the system. She will say that the above proof can be formulated in deductive logic

the following way :

1) x+1/x+4 = 2/3 [*Premise* 1, from the statement of the problem]

   1.1) (x) (y) (z) (if x/y=z/w, then xXw=yXz)
         [*premise* 2, a postulate or universal truth of arithmetic]

   1.2) (if x+1/x+4 = 2/3, then 3(x+1) =2(x+4)
         [from 1.1) by *UI* four times, replacing 'x' by x+1'. 'y'
         by 'x+4', 'z' by '2' and 'w' by '3']

2) 3(x+1) = 2(x+4) [by 1], 1.2) *Modus Ponens*]

   2.1) (x) (y) (z) (w) (v) (if x(y+z)=w(y+v) then xy+xz=wy+wz)
         [*premise* 3, a posstulate of arithmetic]

   2.2) if 3(x+1) = 2(x+4) then 3x+3 = 2x+8
         [from 2.1) by *UI* five times, replacing 'x' by '3', 'y'
         by 'x', 'z' by '1' and 'w' by '2' and 'v' by '4']

3) 3x+3 = 2x+8 [by 2), 2.2) *Modus Ponens*]

   3.1) (x) (y) (z) (w) (if xy+xz=wy+wz then xy-wy=wz-xz)
         [*premise* 4, a postulate of arithmetic]

   3.2) If 3x+3 = 2x+8 then 3x-2x = 8-3
         [from 3.1) *UI* four times, replacing 'x' by '3x', 'y'
         by '3', 'z' by "2x' and 'w' by '8']

4) 3x-2x = 8-3 [by 3), 3.2), *Modus Ponens*]

   4.1) (If (x) (y) (If 3x-2x = y then x=y)
         [*premise* 5, a theorem of arithmetic]

   4.2) If 3x-2x =8-3, then x = 8-3 [from 4.1) *UI* twice, putting
         'x' for 'x', and 8-3 for 'y']

5) x = 8-3 [4), 4.2), *Modus Ponens*]

6) x = 5   [from 5, and the subtraction table : 8-3 =5]

A traditional logician, therefore, will claim that in solving the above problem of mathematics she had to use some postulates of mathematics, the rules of inference *Modus Ponens*, and *UI* (Universal Instantiation), and nothing else. Therefore, she will conclude that reasoning involves nothing else but the rules of logic and postulates in the subject.

This view of reasoning confuses the process of reasoning with the *product* or *by-product* of reasoning.[3] The above logical proof was drawn only as a *by-product* of the reasoning that took place to solve the problem. The steps of reasoning were stated earlier above. Before the reasoner could state the above logical steps she had to reason first to make sure that she has justification for all her steps of proof. Reasoning is an activity to figure out something that is not already known to the reasoner.

Reasoning involves the reasoner's initial ignorance of the solution to the problem or even uncertainty of the way out. It is like the Socratic method of dialectic to find out what is initially unknown. Logic, on the other hand, does deal with the product of the reasoning-----the argument, and analyze to evaluate if it is a good argument.

Good reasoning requires the reasoner to be judicious in choosing the steps of reasoning toward solving the problem—the reasoner must know how to define or figure out the problem, recognize the diversity of choices for trial and error, where to start and how to proceed with the steps of reasoning toward an unknown conclusion. In a formal proof of the validity of an inference we do not have to figure out what the problem is, we already know the given premises and the conclusion, and we have to simply figure out the unknown steps that are to be taken to reach the conclusion. We also have to provide justification for those steps through the rules of inference that are also given in logic. Here is a problem for your consideration :

The plan to open a four-year coeducational college has just been put into operation with a freshman class of 500, mostly females. Each year another class will be added. The Director of Admissions is told that she must raise the ratio of male students in the next two years so there will be no more than three females for every two males; but she must do this without discharging any students, and she must admit men and women in equal numbers. The first freshman class

has 400 female students and 100 male students. What is the minimum number of men and of women the Director of Admissions must admit in the next two years to meet this objective?"

This is essencially the same problem that we have just solved except for the change of numbers from ones to hundreds. The mathematical formulation of this problem will look exactly like the initial step of the previous problem that we have solved----- what is x, if $(x+1)/(x+4) = 2/3$ (where the x this time will be a number in hundreds that will be the number of male students and of female students that must be admitted). But it will be hard if not impossible for most people to formulate the problems. Thus, defining a problem is sometimes much difficult than solving the problem. Solving the problem in this case may seem to be much easier once it has been defined precisely.

Secondly, when the problem has been understood and defined, the reasoner looks for a method to follow to solve this problem. There could be various different methods of reasoning to follow to solve the same problem. In many cases it becomes a matter of trial and error to get to a correct method or the correct method of reasoning. There is no principle or rule of formal logic that will guide the reasoner to adopt one method or the other in the above case, nor can formal logic supply the principles of reasoning that were used in solving this problem. Moreover, these rules of reasoning cannot be deduced from or be reduced to the rules of inference in formal logic.

Thirdly, when we have tried to determine what the steps of reasoning would be in order to get the unknown number x, no theorem or rule of inference of logic determines which one of many possible steps to be taken to make it a good effort (good reasoning) to solve the problem.

Good reasoning involves or consists in choosing the best among many alternative steps to choose from towards solving the problem. For example, in an attempt to solve the algebraic problem on pages 219-20,[5] we have reasoned it out following the definition of the problem in step 1). We found out certain steps of reasoning to get to our goal of finding the value of x when $x+1/x+4 = 2/3$. We tried to derive a sequence of equations which result in an equation of the

form "x = ..." while the dots are being filed by some function of mathematics (in this case '8-3'). But how we get that equation. The reasoner has to make decisions as to what the next best step should be in reaching the goal directly.

We can think of many derived algebraic equations and auxiliary rules of reasoning that could be used as steps of reasoning in this problem. It is essential that the reasoner is aware of those algebraic rules of reasoning. The reasoner must know how to use those rules to do correct reasoning in solving algebraic problems. Some of the algebraic rules of reasoning are as follows :[6]

    a) If you have gotten 'x=y', then infer 'x+z = y+z'
    b) If you have gotten 'x/y = z', then infer 'wXx/wXy =z'
    c) If you have gotten 'x/y = z', then infer 'wXx/y = wXz'
    d) If you have gotten '(x+y = z+w)', then infer 'xXw = yXz'
    e) If you have gotten '(x+y = z+w)' then infer '(z-x = w-y)
    f) If you have gotten 'x(y+z) = w(u+v)',

                  then infer (xy+xz = wu+wv)

and many others. These are auxiliary hypothetical imperatives. All of these are backed up by, but not the same as, certain universal mathematical truths, e.g., f) is backed up by the universal mathematical truths numbered 2. on page 220.

In each step of the problem solving in this case the reasoner could use any one of these rules of reasoning a) through f). All would be sufficient to arrive at a logically valid or mathematically sound conclusion. But what we are looking for here is not *any* or *a* valid conclusion, but *the* correct solution to the problem. Therefore, the reasoner has to pick the most appropriate rule of reasoning at every step of reasoning to get to the goal. In solving the problem on pages 219-20, a decision to use a) or c) or e) or f) in moving to the next step would have been a poor choice because that would take the reasoner off the track, indicating that the reasoner has poor knowledge of and/or poor ability to reasoning well in algebra.

The result actuallly given as step 2) of the reasoning process on page 219, 3(x+1) = 2(x+4), was not merely a logically valid or mathematically sound step, it was the result of making a good choice

(as well as mathematically sound, of course) among many alternatives at hand, in achieving the goal. In algebra classes it is the duty of instructors to teach people how to choose the best rule of reasoning at a given time toward achieving a given goal. Thus, algebraic reasoning is very much goal-oriented, and not just a matter of following mechanical algorithms leading to some sound mathematical or valid logical conclusions.

Thus, good reasoning in algebra consists of inculcating the major over-all strategic rules and methods, together with awareness of auxiliary rules and suggestions about how and when to use them. The subject-specific rules of reasoning involve much more than theorems or rules of logic alone.

It is not logic that is the best guidance towards making the best choices among many alternative ways to solve a problem. The rules of reasoning are chosen by the reasoner, and are not dictated by logic. Rules of reasoning are not *categorical imperatives,* they are *hypothetical imperatives.* They are not forced upon the reasoner as required rules or principles, they are simply suggested or presented to the reasoner as possible steps of reasoning.

Fourthly, in reasoning we do not have any actual truth to begin with. We only have assumptions or premises to start the reasoning towards problem-solving. The equation "$(x+1)/(x+4) = 2/3$" that we began with the previous problem is not a truth, it is a sentential function. Each step of equations following this equation was also a sentential function. Sentences are either true or false, sentential functions are neither true nor false. If we replace 'x' by the same number at every step of our reasoning then that would make each step of reasoning true.

It is true that while doing reasoning we use some rules of logic, but reasoning itself or the processes of reasoning is not logic. Principles of reasoning are different in nature from the principles of logic. Principles of reasoning are rules or principles that help find reasons for claims. Reasoning is a process that usually leads to a conclusion from some premise or premises. But reasoning is not always good or successful. Logic provides some rules or principles to justify only some steps of reasoning that are good and answer questions as to

whether an argument is valid or a set of statements is logically consistent. The reasoning process, on the other hand, begins with a problem, the answer or solution of which is still unknown. Reasoning process leads to a conclusion and also tells us if the resultant argument it leads to is a deductive argument or not.

Thus, a rule of reasoning (SSPR) may be said to have the following form :

If you have a problem----- i.e. (i) there is some unknown property, or relation, or subject, x, and (ii) you want to know, or find out, what that property, relation or subject, x, is, and (iii) you have available only information of sort z about the unknown property, relation or subject x, as you start *then* do A!

Angell gives a precise illustration of an SSPR of algebra in the following words. He analyzes SSPRs as 'hypothetical imperatives.' Here is a 'hypothetical imperative' that he considers a basic subject-specific rule of reasoning in algebra:

If you are trying to solve a problem of arithmetic, a problem in which (i) a number is unknown and (ii) you want to find out what it is, and (iii) the statement of the problem gives you some characterization of the unknown number,

then try to find the answer by finding a sequence of true equations, the first equation being gotten from the statement of the problem, each of the others derived from the equation preceding it, and the last one being an equation in which the unknown, x, is on one side and an arithmetic function of constant number is on the other side.[7]

This is an SSPR because it is *abstract* in that it uses terms like 'number' and 'equation', but is not tied to any specific number or particular equation and it is *general* in that it can be used for reasoning about an infinite number of possible algebraic problems of the sort presented in maths texts as well as in our practical life. It is also *subject-specific* in that it uses abstract concepts e.g. 'number', 'equation' that are specifically and precisely mathematical concepts. Also, it is a *principle* and not a universal truth (not a *categorical*

impperative), because it is one of the many suggestions for reasoning out a solution to a mathematical problem of the above sort. A problem solver is expected to find a solution to the problem stated in the antecedent by producing a sequence of mathematical equations to be produced in the consequent.

But, it is still a basic principle of mathematical reasoning for solving problems. All principles of reasoning, regardless of their grammatical variations, are goal-conditioned 'hypothetical imperatives'[8]. But not all goal- conditioned 'hypothetical imperatives' are principles of reasoning. Many hypothetical imperatives are simply guides to overt, physical action. For example, if you want to cook some Mexican food, *then* pick up a Mexican cook book, get all the ingredients and follow the recipe and directions in it.

Also, hypothetical imperatives that suggest solving a problem directly from an authority or some other source, e.g., computer programms, books are not to be treated as principles of reasoning. Principles of reasoning must be usable by the individual who is doing the reasoning to solve a problem without reliance on outside sources. Thus, many mechanical rules are not to be treated as rules of reasoning. It must be remembered SSPRs are rules of reasoning that are abstract and general, but yet subject-specific, and not reducible to the subject-specific theorems or postulates or mechanical algorithms or to the principles inference of formal logic.

Many traditional logicians confuse reasoning with logic, and thus confuse the principles of reasoning with the principles of logic. They confuse, as John Dewey mentions in many of his writings,[9] the process with the product of reasoning. Not all reasoning lead to logic although all logic is a result of reasoning. In our examples of mathematical problem solving we used some principles of reasoning that are neither derived from logic nor reducible to logic. SSPRs are not principles of logic, they are principlles of reasoning. SSPRs are used not so much to evaluate arguments, but to initiate and guide one in solving specific kinds of problems.

In the algebraic example above, when we formulate the problem, the formulation of the problems does not yield a logically valid structure, how well we formulate it does not depend upon logic, it depends

upon the subject-specific knowledge of the principles of mathematics. Thus, logic does not supply all the general, abstract principles of reasoning in all subjects----- subject-specific knowledge contributes to a lot of those general principles in the subjects that are peculiar to those subjects only.

One might say that these are examples of SSPRs, and ask for a description or a schema of an SSPR. In response to that it can be said that an SSPR is not simply a subject-specific descriptive general statement of fact which is true of elementary entities in the field. Since, according to our definition, reasoning is a kind of activity, a principle of reasoning is also a dynamic rule of action. Principles of reasoning facilitate transition from one assertion to another.

Thus, an SSPRs is a fundamental principle of reasoning in a field which is a general statement (not at all tied to particular entities or facts in the field) and which involves basic concepts in the field and which help reasoners draw new conclusions from some known or given statements. An SSPR in a particular subject is based upon the fundamental concepts of the field which differentiates it from other subjects. SSPRs are not necessarily derived rules of a subject matter, although they may be. They are neither deducible from nor reducible to principles of pure formal logic.

There are SSPRs even in formal logic. For example, statements of the form "If P, then Q" are not necessarily principles of reasoning. They are simply conditional statements. On the other hand, *Modus Ponens* is a principle of reasoning which goes as follows : "Given a statement P which is true, and a statement (If P then Q) which is true, infer Q is true". Thus, an indicative statement is static, an SSPR is not — an SSPR is dynamic __ it helps make moves from something known to some unknown facts.

We have given some examples of SSPRs in mathematics. But, some people, following Russell and Frege, might want to hold that maths *is* deducible from purely formal logic. They might say that Russell and Whitehead wrote all of the three volumes of *Principia Mathematica* to show that. Contrary to this view of Russell and others, our view is that Mathematics *is not* logic. Following Quine, we hold that theorems of formal logic are statements that are true solely by virtue of their logical structures.[10]

Strictly speaking, Quine in his *Elementary Logic* holds, and we think he does so rightly, that formal logic is quantification theory.[11] Following Quine, we hold that strictly speaking, formal logic is nothing else but sentential logic and qualification logic. Set theory is not part of formal logic, it is subject-specific discipline that is beyond logic.[12]

Pure formal logic deals with statements that cannot possibly be false. Like many other people, Quine in his early writings (*Mathematical Logic*, 1940) shows a great fascination for Russell's theory. Later on, Quine realized that he had made a mistake and revised his theory on the scope of logic (in *Elementary Logic*, revised in 1965) and held that logic does not include relations of identity and class membership (set theory). Mathematics is not reducible to set theory; rather set theory is used to develop mmodels for mathematical statements.

Since it is obvious that set theory is a requirement for the development of mathematics from logic, and since set theory is not part of formal logic, it follows logically that mathematics cannot be deduced from pure logic. One might wonder what then is the relationship between mathematics and set theory. According to many, set theory does not really yield mathematics. It simply provides some complicated set—theoretic models, a set of true statements which can be made to stand in one-to-one correspondence with true statements in mathematics.[13]

It is at least highly debatable, if not absolutely false, that the complicated definitions and concepts of logic that are offered as definitions of natural numbers were created before people started counting numbers, or adding and subtracting numbers. The truth is that long before the invention of these definitions and concepts, people started using natural numbers to count, add, etc. Set theory *does not* analyze what is really contained in the notion of numbers. Mathematics cannot be deduced from pure logic since the development of mathematics from logic requires set theory and, set theory is not part of logic.

It must also be noted that in order to solve many mathematical problems like the one on algebra earlier in this essay it is not necessary

that we use the rules of reasoning used in developing the set-theoretic models of mathematics. Can someone who has the mastery only in the methods and proofs of set theory solve the problem ? The answer seems to be far away from a "yes". It is not at all clear if there is any necessary connection between the rules of reasoning in algebra and the rules of reasoning in formal logic in the sense in which the principles of reasoning in algebra could be derived from the principles of reasoning in formal logic. Mathematics is related to logic onlly when 'and', 'all', 'not', and 'if........then....'.are involved.

Moreover, set theory is not *all* of mathematics. Mathematics cannot be reduced to set theory. Set theory is used only to depict some system of set theoretical models which are analogous to mathematical theorems. But that must not lead us to believe that mathematics is all set theory. Mathematics is much more than mere set-theoretical models. In order to show any correspondence between mathematical truths like '(2+2) = 4' and theorems of logic in set theory, one must first understand what '2' and '+' and '=' mean and how and why '2+2 = 4'. Primitive notations of set theory which contains *no* mention of numbers would not help at all in solving the understanding *why* and *how* this is the case that '2+2 = 4'. This analysis could be extended to other disciplines.

SSPR in Chemistry

Speaking of the distinction between logical equivalence and mathematical equality reminds us that there are still other kinds of equalities, an equation in chemistry, for example, gives us information about chemical reaction between two or more simple or compound chemical elements. In a chemical equation, on the left hand side of the "=" (equal) sign we put the *reactants* (elements that disappear at a result of the chemical reaction) and, on the right hand side of the equation sign we put the *products* (elements that appear as a result of the chemical reaction).

While in a mathematical equation we are dealing with equal numbers on both sides of the equation, and in logical equivalence we are concerned with the same truth value on both sides, in chemistry, however, we have to look out for the satisfaction of three conditions.[14] A chemical equation is valid iff: 1) it is consistent with the relevant

experimental facts and also, gives a precise statement of the elements that disappear (reactants) and the elements that appear (products); 2) no element in the mass gets destroyed and we can account for *every* atom in order to maintain the law of indestructibility of mass; and 3) the equation is consistent with the conservation of energy.

In order to have a *balanced* equation in this case we must fulfill the second and third conditons mentioned above. A balanced equation must have the same number of atoms of different kinds on both sides of the sign of equation "=". Moreover, a balanced equation has to have equal amount of net charge on both sides. A chemical equation shows that the reactant and the product are in a state of equilibrium. For example, to show the equality of the *reactants*, one molecule of gas S(g) with one molecule of gas T(g) to form the *products*, molecules of gases V(g) and W(g), chemists use the following equation :

$$S(g) + T(g) = V(g) + W(g)$$

It is important to note here that this chemical equality is very different from mathematical equality on the one hand, and logical equivalence or even identity on the other. '(5 X 6)' is mathematically equal to '(15 X 2)'. But it does not make sense to say that '(5 X 6)' or (5 groups of 6) and '(15 X 2)' or (15 groups of 2) are one and the same thing. Chemical equality is still another kind of equality different from mathematical equality, logical equivalence or identity.

The chemical equality in the above case demonstrates that the molecules of gases S and T react to form molecules of gases V and W. So long as these two gases S and T are present, this reaction continues. As soon as an appreciable number of V and W molecules form, they react with each other to produce S and T. This process goes on as long as the molecules are present.

The scientific method that use in critical thinking or reasoning in chemistry contains the following steps: (1) empirical observation; (2) classification and analysis of the empirical date to formulate a generalization from those observed facts; (3) verifying or checking the rules or patterns to which the observed facts conform; and (4) checking the generalization by setting up new experiments, and refine it or change it in the light of further evidences.

The process of checking and rechecking generalizations (scientific generalizations are commonly called *hypotheses*) in a wide variety of ways in order to refine or reject them goes on indefinitely. It must be noted here that there is no strict uniformity among scientists in using these steps in the process of checking and rechecking hypotheses. Although there is no single way of interpreting the data collected through scientific observation, the observations themselves should be beyond dispute.

It is not only the methodology that is unique and different in chemistry than in logic, the general principles of reasoning in chemistry are also unique in chemistry and may not be reduced to logic. These are not general principles that can be deduced from or reduced to mathematical equality or logical equivalence, yet they are general principles, subject-specific general principles of chemistry.

There are other general principles of reasoning specific to individual subjects that are not reducible to logical principles in the narrow sense of logic. For example, the so-called logic of knowledge and belief has to do with the subject-specific knowledge of epistemology ----what exactly is meant by 'knowledge', what exactly is meant by 'belief', what is the difference between knowledge and belief----- these are questions that are to be answered not by logic (in the strict sense of *formal logic*), but they are to be answered by epistemology. The so-called logic of probability and statistics has to do with the subject-specific knowledge of the relationship between events and their possibility of occurrence.

The bottom line is : in solving many problems in various disciplines and in daily life, we cannot simply ignore the semantic content of the question which poses the problem. This does not, by any means, weaken the value of formal principles to determine the validity of arguments. Of course, the rigorous principles of logic are useful in seeing if it is possible to have a counter example to a particular logical form of an argument. Logic also offers strong techniques to determine the logical truth of statement forms. The very important point that we want to make here is that, although very useful for our purposes of reasoning, it simply does not provide sufficient tools for reasoning with a view to solving any problem other than purely logical ones completely.

Critical thinking, the way we understand it, goes beyond logic in that it not only evaluates the logical validity of arguments or the logical truth of statement forms, it also helps us to get into the issue raised by the argument. Critical thinking has as its goal the analysis of actual arguments, not just the logical structures of arguments.

SSPR in Euclidean Geometry

Now, let us switch to another subject, Euclidean Geometry where we can make use of subject-specific principles of reasoning to solve a problem (or answer a typical mathematical question that may appear in Euclidean Geonmetry).[15] *Problems:* 1) How many regular convex solids are there? and 2) Why is it that there are five, and only five, regular convex solids? In order to answer these questions we must first ask ourselves if we have the background knowledge in Euclidean Geometry. Suppose we have the background knowledge of the axioms, postulates, and definitions of the three dimensional Euclidean Geometry. So, we know that a regular convex solid, by definition, has equilateral plane figures as its faces, and the angles at any vertex will add up to less than three hundred and sixty degrees.

From the background knowledge of the system of three-dimensional Euclidean Geometry that we have, along with the help of a set of reasons or *grounds*[16], as Toulmin calls them, *with strict geometrical necessity*, we can draw the conclusion that there are five and only five regular convex solids. This conclusion (which is a theorem in the three-dimensional Euclidean Geometry) holds true because of the whole system of Euclidean geometry. No general principles of logic will help us to draw this conclusion.

What is required of us to think critically about this problem is the knowledge of the subject-specific abstract principles of reasoning unique to solid geometry. Since we do not have any specific knowledge about solid geometry, we do not know exactly what those general principles of inference in solid geometry are, but someone who does know the subject would know what those general principles of inference are that are essential for formulating arguments in solid geometry that are valid and, perhaps, sound as well. What this example demonstrates is that in order to develop the ability to think critically in a subject, one needs to know the relevant subject-specific principles.

Our examples of subject-specific principles of reasoning in various fields, e.g. chemistry, geometry, ancestor-relationships, and algebra do indicate that there are principles of reasoning which are subject-specific yet abstract and general in their own subjects. These principles are neither universal truths themselves nor are they theorems or rules of inference from formal logic. These examples also demonstrate that there are rules of reasoning that must be used appropriately in order to lead reasoning in a good way.

However, this discussion by no means indicates that principles of logic are not applicable in those fields at all. Of course, in addition to the subject-specific abstract principles of different fields, there are general principles of logic that provide techniques of good reasoning in all disciplines. This account has been an attempt to remove some of the basic and very important conceptual confusions that traditional logicians have as to the principles of reasoning and the principles of logic.

In conclusion, our claim is that this account clearly shows that (i) there are subject-specific rules or principles of reasoning (SSPR) that are abstract and general in the given field; (ii) SSPRs are not in themselves universal truths although sometimes their acceptability might depend upon the support of general truths; (iii) SSPRs are neither theorems of logic nor are they principles of inference of formal logic; (iv) good reasoning in a field depends upon choosing the best rule (hypothetical imperative) among many available alternatives; and (iv) good reasoning involves choosing rules of reasoning that are appropriate and relevant to the objective of the problem solving.

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NOTES

1. Salmon, Merrillee H., "Informal Logic and Informal Reasoning" in James F. Voss et al. edited *Informal Reasoning and Education*, p. 153.

2. *Ibid.*

3. This distinction between the *process* and *product* of reasoning was first made by Dewey in his *How We Think* published in 1933.

4. I am grateful to Angell for bringing this problem to my attention.

5. Angell helped me on this in our private conversation while I was revising this essay. I am grateful to him for that.

6. Angell helped me on remembering these rules of algebraic reasoning that I used in solving algebraic problems in high school.

7. Angell, *Philosophical Thoughts*, 11/7/1991.

8. I took this term from Angell's *Philosophical Thoughts*, 11/7/1991. This term was originally used by Kant.

9. John Dewey makes frequent mention of this process/product distinction in his *How We Think* and other philosophical writings.

10. Quine says that "... a sentence is logically true if all sentences are true which share its logical structure and "what I mean by the logical structure of a sentence at this stage is its composition in respect of truth functions, quantifiers and variables." (*Philosophy of Logic*, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 49)

11. We must note here that Quine revised or even changed his position on the scope of formal logic over the years. In 1940 when he wrote *Mathematical Logic* he followed Russell and Whitehead in holding the position that set theory is part of formal logic. But later in his *Elementary Logic* (Revised edition, 1965), Quine does not consider set theory as part of logic. He says, "Logic in its strictest sense is quantification theory, and a logical deduction in its strictest sense consists in establishing a quantificational implication." (p.116)

12. Quine recognizes this fact in the "Preface" of his 1981 revised eddition of *Mathematical Logic* (p.iii) where he writes about the 1940 edition of the same book that, "Like *Principia* it subsumes set theory under logic instead of recognizing it a mathematical discipline beyond logic". Quine acknowledges that he changed his view on the scope of logic in the "Preface" to the revised edition of his *Mathematical Logic* (1981).

13. Angell pointed this out to me. He gave me some examples from Quine's *Mathematical Logic* where Quine deals with the concepts of the numbers 0, 1, 2, etc. to demonstrate that.

14. A pretty old college textbook on chemistry, *Chemistry* by Mïchell J. Sienko and Robert A. Plane, Second Edition, (McGraw-Hill, 1961) was helpful in formulating these principles.

15. Stephen Toulmin cited this example on p. 126 of An *Introduction of Reasoning*.

We decided simply to analyze and comment on his example.

16. As grounds, Toulmin mentions the following: In the *tetrahedron*, the faces joining at each vertex are three equilateral triangles, with angles totalling 3×60 degrees=180 degrees; in the (eight-faced) *octahedron*, 4 equilateral triangles, totalling 4×60 degrees=240 degrees; in the (20-faced) *eicosahedron*, 5, totalling 5×60 degrees =300 degrees. In the *cube*, they are three squares, with angles totalling 3×90 degrees=270 degrees, and in the (12-faced) *dodecahedron*, they are three pentagons 3×108 degrees= 324 degrees. No other set of equal angles at the vertex of a solid adds up to less than 360 degrees. (p. 126).

236

KARMA, CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM

Is man bound by his *Karma?* Can he transcend his *Karma Phala?* These are some of the important questions that will be examined in the present paper.

The doctrine of *Karma* is peculiar to Indian tradition. Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy with the exception of the Carvakas accept the doctrine. Even the Buddhist and the Jainas do not lag behind. The doctrine has percolated so much to the grass root that the common man in India is greatly influenced by it. In fact, whenever he faces difficulty in life he reconciles himself with the concrete realities by invoking and resorting to the law of *Karma.* Many sociologists, both Eastern and Western, attribute general sluggishness and the consequent poverty in India to a strong and unshakable belief in the law of *Karma* by its common masses.

The doctrine has been variously formulated. But the most important formulation of it is as follows : (i) Any *Karma* or action that a man performs must give rise to some effect, and (ii) this effect must be enjoyed by the agent; if not in this life then in the lives to come in future. As you sow, so shall you reap; - runs the doctrine in nutshell. Let us examine these one by one.

Thesis (i) *Every action must give rise to effect:* The understanding of this thesis depends upon what exactly we mean by an action. An action is ordinarily distinguished from an event in that the former has an agent, whereas the latter cannot be said to have any agent at all. As for instance, teaching is an act whereas, raining is an event. To teach we need a teacher, whereas, there is no such agent who creates rains. Raining is a physical phenomenon that takes place in nature and can be adequately explained in causal terms without any reference to intention, desire or will. On the other hand, the act of

teaching cannot be explained without reference to intention, will, desire, and such other concepts. Seen in this light, whatever a man does with intention turns out to be an action. But now the question is what about pure mental acts like thinking, feeling and willing? Are they acts at all? Is physical manifestation a necessary ingredient of action? If this is so, then thinking, feeling and willing cannot be treated as acts for the simple reason that there may be cases when one thinks but may not manifest it physically. If intention constitutes the basis of an act, then thinking cannot be excluded from its domain for the simple reason that it (intention) does enter into thinking in a very intimate way. There cannot be thinking which is unintentional. In other words, mental acts which do not manifest physically cannot be excluded from the domain of acts. What distinguishes an act from a non act or event is the conscious decision, choice or intention. An event does not come into existence through conscious decision or choice, whereas an act comes into being only through conscious decision. That is why we hold a person accountable or responsible for his actions for the simple reason that it is he who takes a decision to perform a peculiar action in lieu of another.

But now the question is what is it to take a conscious decision or to perform an action? When an agent chooses one action in lieu of another, he gives reasons. One is said to have taken conscious decision only when one can give reasons why did one choose a particular action. It is said that freedom lies in choosing a particular action. But what does really happen when one chooses? One's desires, convictions, hopes, ambitions and even the world view come into picture. That is to say, in choosing an action, one's desires and convictions. play a very important role and accordingly one weaves out reasons. Reasons for an action are really the external manifestation of one's desires, convictions, hopes, ambitions and even ideologies. As a matter of fact, there is a very close and intimate relationship between one's actions and ideologies and hopes. Actions for which sophisticated reasons are given may be termed as higher-order actions like taking part in revolution, fighting against alien rules, protection of civil liberties and so on. But actions like eating, sleeping, walking and running for which a chain of sophisticated reasons are not usually called for, may be termed as lower-order actions. But at the same time, even in the case of lower-order actions, one may ask, as for example, why does one eat one type of food in lieu of another or

why does one walk in one particular route instead of another? All these show that reasons constitute the basis and the criterion of an action. It is on this basis that we distinguish action from events. It is altogether a separate issue if reasons are also a species of causes. An action is that which a human individual does with a reason. Seen in this light, it can be questioned if other non-human creatures can be said to be performing actions. If reasons constitute the basic ingredient of actions, then animals cannot be said to be performing action at all. To apply reasons means to think of alternative mode of acting. As a matter of fact, animals do not exhibit any sign of performing actions with reasons. Now the questions is : how to characterize the so called actions of the animals? In answer, it can be said that they are event-like rather than action like. The weaving of nest by the weaver bird at the approach of rainy season is more of an event than of an action for the simple reason that the male weaver bird starts weaving the nest because of certain hormonal change in its body at a particular period of the year.

Keeping this view of action in mind let us examine the relationship between *Karma* and *Karma phala* or action and its results or consequences. What does it exactly mean to say that every action must have some effect? The physical theory of Newton tells us that every action has opposite and equal reaction. This principle may be applicable to physical or natural events which can be measured and presented in mathematical terms. The entire Newtonian mechanics is based upon certain basic principles of rest, motion, action and reaction and they form a system. Does this principle apply to actions performed by human beings? It is true that certain actions like playing teaching, running and walking, have a physical base in that one cannot play, teach, run and walk without making use of some limbs or organs of the body. Teaching cannot be done without speaking and consequently making use of the mouth. Opening the mouth and then to speak is a physical act. As for example, opening the mouth involves the expansion of the muscles in the mouth. Similarly, speaking involves production of vocal sounds. Which one is to be treated as the effect of teaching that the agent or the teacher shall reap? It is true that by teaching one seeks to transmit knowledge and this transmission is impossible without opening the mouth and speaking. Teaching or transmission of knowledge has impact on others. That is to say, it is likely to produce some effect on others. Any action that one performs is likely

to produce some effect in the neighbourhood or on others. But this is not what the *Karma* theorists mean by *Karma Phala*. *Karma Phala* is not that type of effect which is produced on others, but the one which is meant to be reaped and enjoyed by the doer or the agent. How to specify this effect? Let us name the effect of the action which is produced on others as E and the one which is meant to be reaped and enjoyed by the agent or the doer as E_1. The relationship between an action and E is causal, whereas the relationship between an action and E_1 is not causal. The effect E_1 which has to be reaped and enjoyed by the agent is the corresponding moral desert of the action concerned. Any action that an individual performs, besides having a concrete and empirical effect, has a moral desert attached to it. It is this moral desert that the agent or the doer has to reap and enjoy. But difficulties arise in specifying the moral effects of actions. How to specify the moral effect, say for instance, of teaching? What one is likely to get if one teaches well? One answer may be that one gets appreciation from students and other colleagues. But it may not happen like that. One may teach well yet may not be appreciated. Suppose someone murders somebody. What is the moral effect of this act which is to be reaped by the murderer? The instant response may be that the murderer will be murdered by somebody. If the principle of retribution is accepted, then it can be said that one who teaches well will also be taught well either in this life or in lives to come. Again, take for instance, what is the moral desert of self-sacrifice? In the Buddhist *Jātaka* stories, the past lives of the Buddha have been portrayed wherein it has been shown that he (the Buddha) sacrificed his life for other creatures and this ultimately helped him coming up in the ladder of *Nirvāṇa*. But this does not show that if you sacrifice for others, they will also sacrifice for you in turn. Rather, it means that good actions bring good results and bad actions bad ones. Seen in this light, the *Karma* theorist seems to be laying down a very general principle that good actions breed good results and bad actions bad ones. In this sense only mental acts like thingking, feeling and willing can be said to have good or bad effect. The *Karma* theorists generalize this principle to such an extent that for them a moral consequence either good or bad is attached to every piece of action. Further, for them, actions are either good or bad and the agent or the doer has to reap these consequences. The relationship between the agent, action and its moral consequences is necessary. That is to say, moral consequence is built into the very

fabric of every action and the agent simply cannot escape them. But at the same time, transcendence of agency and action has also been visualized in the Indian tradition and it will be discussed later on in the subsequent sections.

Is the moral consequence of an action like any other natural consequence? Can it be measured? Can it be concretized in mathematical terms? The answer to these questions can be given only in negative terms. The moral consequence ought to follow from the actions performed by men. But a man during his life-time performs innumerable types of actions, good and bad as the case may be. How to individuate the moral consequences of different actions? We simply know good actions produce good results but unless the so-called 'good consequence' is specified we cannot know which good action produced which good result. The doctrine of *Karma* in this sense, appears to be saying something which is casually operative but, as a matter of fact, it invokes a moral principle and seeks to generalize it so much that it brings the agent, action and its moral consequence to one inseparable nexus.

Let us now examine the second thesis that the effect of the action must be enjoyed by the agent if not in this life, then in lives to come. This doctrine is based upon the presupposition that even after the action has been performed its effect, if not enjoyed by its agent, continues to be there. Now the question is how and where the effect is stored to be enjoyed by its doer in subsequent of time? If the effect is natural and empirical it may continue for sometime after the event has taken place. As for example, when we kick a ball its effects, i. e. rolling continues for sometime. By effect, the natural consequence E is meant here but not the moral consequence E_1. It is impossible to find out a locus where the so-called moral consequences of an action can be said to reside. There are three possibilities : (i) Either the consequences reside in the agent, (ii) or they reside in another object outside the agent, or (iii) an invisible and almighty person like God possesses these consequences for future disbursement. The first alternative is not acceptable for the simple reason that if the consequences are not enjoyed by the doer during his life, after his death the consequences also will be destroyed. If it is insisted that the consequences cannot be destroyed unless they are enjoyed by the agent, then the consequences are being treated imperishable and

indestructible by definition. In another sense, the impact of the actions may have an impact on the mind and personality of the agent. A murderer, for example, may suffer in the manner of Macbeth. But the hardened criminal may not suffer any type of mental agony at all. Further, the mental agony of a murderer is the psychological consequences and not the moral ones of the act of murder. Let us examine the second alternative that the consequences are preserved in another person or object and in due course of time are transferred to its agent. This position also is not acceptable for the simple reason that it treats moral consequences as if they are a kind of things which are preserved for the time being in order to be given away at proper time. The so-called moral consequences involve moral judgements or adjudication. To maintain that moral consequences can be preserved in another person apart from the doer or the agent is to presuppose that the preserver is a superior moral agent or else how can he give reward or punishment to its doer? This position is also not acceptable for the simple reason that after the death of the preserver the moral consequences also disappear. Let us now examine the third alternative, i.e., the moral consequences are preserved in the invisible and almighty God who dispenses these to its doer in due course of time. Even if we provisionally accept this position yet it cannot satisfactorily explain the disbursement of consequences in future life of the agent or the doer. Suppose, a particular person performs a particular action in his present life and somehow he does not reap or enjoy its consequences and dies. What will happen to the moral consequences of his actions? As per the tradition, the consequences will be preserved in a powerful being to be given to its doer. This doctrine takes for granted that life does not come to an end with death. Something that counts as the human person survives the bodily death. Now, let us examine this point. The key to the knotty problem rests on what do we mean by a human person? A human person who performs acts is a psycho-physical complex. In short, it is the human person in the form of psychophysical complex who performs actions of different types. Death brings an end at this psychophysical complex. It is argued that the soul is immaterial and it survives all types of bodily destruction. This account of soul is incompatible with the concept of enjoyment of consequences for the simple reason that it is not touched by any activity of the body. Let us imagine for the moment that there is life after death. That is to say, the same soul is reborn but with a different psychophysical complex. The previous body, say B, of the soul did

something and the present body say B₁ has to reap the consequences. If these consequences are not exhausted then B₂ and B₃ and etc., may reap the consequences or will be rewarded or punished for actions which they have not performed at all on any point of time. If this happens, then it is highly immoral. Somebody does something; he does not get either reward or punishment on this count. Rather one who has not performed a particular action gets reward or punishment, whatever the case my be, on this count. The *Karma* theorist would escape this paradoxical position by positing a subtle body (*Suksma Sarira*). A human person consists of three ingredients viz., the immaterial soul, a gross body and a subtle body. Death brings end to the gross body but the subtle body which is also material in nature does not die with the so-called death of the person. The Buddhists term this as *Samskaras* and the *Vedanta* and the allied systems of thought characterize it as the *Jivatman*. As a conceptual device it plays its limited role as the repository of moral consequences of various actions performed by the agent or the doer. But the subtle body also comes to an end. Otherwise, the cycle of *Karma* will not come to an end. The Buddhists also believe in the twelve-linked cycle of birth and death. This is otherwise known as the *Jaramarana cakra*. These are the escape routes provided by the Indian thinkers to get rid of the cycle of *Karma* and rebirth.

In one of its extreme formulations, the *Karma* doctrine tells us that whatever a person has including his body and mind is determined by his *Karma*. Not only that an individual performs *Karma* in the present life but he has *Karmas* to his credit from his past lives. Therefore, the never ending cycle of *karma* comes to no end. In this context, certain concepts such as *Karma*, rebirth and past life stand in need of explication. If birth is determined by *Karma* then it must be accepted that a particular individual before birth had performed some *Karma* which is absurd. Further, if the individual's first birth was not determined by his *Karmas*, the *Karma* doctrine is not ubiquitous. This means at least there are certain cases where the doctrine of *Karma* does not operate at all. How to get rid of this circle? Whether *Karma* determines a particular birth or an unconditioned birth afterwards gives rise to *Karmas?* If *Karma* and birth are treated on the cause effect model, the question of first cause may be raised. In a causal series, it is not possible to specify which one is the cause without being the effect of any other preceding cause. In fact, cause and effect are relative to one another. That which is a

cause in one context, may be an effect in another context and so on. Therefore, to treat something as absolute cause or absolute effect is to violate the rules of conceptual operation. Concepts operate being related to one another. Cause and effect are such concepts. The same thing may be a cause in one context but effect in another context. The seemingly paradoxical situation that arises in the context of birth and *Karma* is the result of the attempt to absolutize cause and effect. It is as follows: If *Karma* is the cause of birth, then it cannot be treated as an effect at all. Similarly, if birth is the result or effect of *Karma*, it cannot be the cause of *Karma* at all.

Sometimes it is argued that the doctrine of *Karma* demolishes the freedom of man for the simple reason that whatever a man does is determined by his *Karmas*. Even the present *Karma* of the individual is determined by his past *Karmas*. Therefore, there is no scope for free choice and free action. Further, the pool of past actions causally determines the present ones and the present ones determine the future ones and so on. So, it has been argued that *Karma* and Causality are incompatible with freedom. In short, the doctrine of *Karma* is a causal doctrine and causality cannot go with freedom.

Let us now examine this thesis. Is *Karma* a causal concept? Can we say that the actions that we perform can be treated as effects of previous actions and causes of future ones? Take for instance, the act of teaching or playing football. What could conceivably be treated as the cause of teaching? One might say that in order to teach a subject one must have studied the subject in question quite for some years. Further, he must have learnt the elementary art of teaching. But these are not causes of teaching but conditions of teaching. Similarly, playing football depends upon certain conditions such as knowledge of the trick of how to kick the ball and run swiftly and so on. One might know all the tricks and yet may not play football at all. Similarly, one may know mathematics or philosophy very well and yet may not teach the subject at all. In this sense, one action cannot be treated as the cause of another action. Causality does not operate among actions. But at the same time, one can discern a kind of homogeneity among the actions of a particular person. If a person is methodical, his methodical nature is likely to be exhibited in different types of functions that he performs. But sometimes we also discover a strange man. As for instance, a person may be very

methodical, organized and meticulous in study and research and very unorganized and unmethodical in household affairs.

In the *Bhagvad Gita* (II.63) arguments have been advanced to the effect that there is a causal chain among different mental dispositions. It runs as follows: Anger leads to infatuation, infatuation leads to failure of memory, failure of memory leads to extirpation of intellect and this ultimately leads to death and destruction of man. In nutshell, anger in man leads to his destruction. Destruction is the consequence that man reaps out of his anger. Even if we take for granted that there is a causal chain among various psychological states, yet it does not prove the general thesis that the present actions of a man are caused by his past actions. In short, it cannot be proved that causality operates among actions.

It is argued by the *Karma* theorist that every action gives rise to its effect and the doer or the agent cannot escape but enjoy it. Let us provisionally accept the thesis that every action produces certain result. But what does it mean to say that the doer "enjoys" the fruit of his action? What does this enjoyment consist in? One of the core meanings of "enjoy" is to consume. The agent, in this sense, has to consume the fruit of his actions. Even if this thesis is accepted, it does not mean that all the actions of the agent, nay, even his whole personality is determined by his past actions. From the fact that the agent enjoys the fruit of his actions, it does not follow that all his actions, including his personality, are determined by his past actions. The supposed causal connection between an action, its consequences and its enjoyability by the agent cannot be extended to the agent including his present and future action. In other words, it is one thing to accept the thesis that there is a causal connection between an action, its consequences and enjoyability and another thing to say that a person is what he is because of his past *Karmas*. The second thesis does not follow from the first one. This shows that the *Karma* doctrine is not as ubiquitous as it is supposed to be. The doctrine does not say that a man's existence is determined by his past *Karmas*; it simply says that a man must enjoy the fruit of his actions. In other words, the doctrine makes room for the freedom of the individual.

It might be argued that whatever a man does, thinks, feels,

or wills, is causally linked. There is a kind of causal necessity between actions. Therefore, man cannot be said to be performing free action any time at all. The causal chain is interminable. So, an individual can never come out of the causal nexus. This question can be answered in two ways: (i) By giving an analysis of casuality relating to actions, (ii) and referring to the tradition. Let us present the second point first. The *Karma* theorist claims that it is possible to transcend the *Karma* nexus. That is to say, by performing good *Karmas*, the evil influence of the past *Karmas* can be nullified. One can always improve upon one's past *Karmas*. This shows that there is scope of performing good *Karmas* which are not conditioned by the past ones. Let us now present an analysis of causality relating to actions. Those who argue that all actions are causally linked, must admit that there are no singular and independent actions. Further, one cannot perform any action outside the causal nexus. The following questions can be raised in this connection. Is the initial action responsible for all the subsequent actions or the successive actions in their turn give rise to further actions? If the first alternative is accepted then man cannot perform any fresh action for the simple reason that to perform any action one must have committed another action prior to it and so on *ad infinitum*. If the second alternative is accepted, then the successive actions either will be redundant or will have the independent power to cause fresh actions. That is to say, if the initial action has the potency to give rise to successive actions, then these actions turn out to be mere modifications of the action in question. Therefore, in a sense, it can be said that there is only one action, i.e., the initial action. If the successive actions are said to have independent power to cause fresh actions, then causality cannot be said to be operating in the sphere of actions at all. This shows that at least there are some actions which can be termed as free in nature.

It is sometimes argued that freedom is incompatible with the law of *Karma*. That is to say, if we accept the inexorability of the law of *Karma*, then we cannot accept the thesis that there is possibility of free actions. Those who claim that the doctrine of *Karma* is incompatible with freedom, treat the former as a causal doctrine and further maintain that causality is incompatible with freedom. Let us now examine the contention. What does it mean to say that two things are causally connected? Is causal relation a necessary relation at all? When we say that two things

are causally connected we do not mean that they are necessarily related. But at the same time, there is a kind of necessity relating to cause and effect on which the entire scientific knowledge is built. There is a difference between causal necessity and logical necessity. But causal necessity cannot be said to have a kind of force or compulsiveness with it. When we say that man is free to perform any action it does not mean that causality does not operate in the case of man. Rather, it will be extremely difficult to imagine a world without causality. If it is being argued that to have freedom means to have a world where causality does not operate at all, an impossible thing is being invoked. The idea of an uncaused event is impossible. In this sense, freedom and causality are not incompatible. Rather, the sphere of operation of the concepts of cause and freedom is the same world of events and actions. To say that somebody is free, is to say that he does not succumb to pressure or does not act out of compulsion. In this sense, freedom is opposed to compulsion. To be free means not to act under any kind of compulsion. When many alternatives are left before an agent but he chooses one in lieu of another, he is said to be free. In fact, he is said to be doing something without any compulsion. In short, to accept one out of many alternatives is to act freely. To act freely means to act with reasons and choice. But Davidson points out that reasons are also a kind of causes. As such, they (causes) necessitate action. He says:

> Central to the relation between a reason and an action what it explains
> is the idea that the agent performed the action *because* he had
> the reason. Of course, we can include this idea too in justification;
> but then the notion of justification becomes as dark as the notion
> of reason until we can account for the force of that *because*.[1]

By treating reasons as causes, Davidson is inclined to accept the thesis that actions cannot be free from the grip of causal necessity. For him, every reason is a kind of cause for the simple reason that it originates from the agent and as such must have intimate connection with his emotions, sentiments and ideology. This argument of Davidson's is defective. It rules out the possibility of transcending one's sentiments and emotions. The main thrust of his argument is this: Any action that a man does is bound to be coloured by his inclinations and sentiments. If this argument is accepted, then only agentless actions

can be treated as non-causal. But to ask for this type of actions is to ask for actions which are not performed by any agent at all.

To the extent an individual exercises his choice in performing an action, to that extent he can be said to be free. In this sense, freedom is not incompatible with causality. To conclude, it can be said that the doctrine of *Karma* is not a causal doctrine. In short, it is an ethical doctrine relating to reward and punishment. The doctrine may be formulated as follows: One ought to get the reward or punishment as the case may be, for one's own actions. But the doctrine has been generalized so as to include not only the present but past and future life. Reward and punishment will be unintelligible without reference to freedom. So, action, freedom, responsibility, reward and punishment go together. It is one thing to say that any action that we perform causally determines our subsequent actions and thereby our entire being and personality and another thing to say that we ought to get reward or punishment for our actions. The first one is a causal doctrine and I have argued that the doctrine of *Karma* cannot be regarded as a causal one. But it can very well be interpreted as an ethical one.

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MIRROR OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Suppose I have a certain experience which I articulate by means of the judgement 'Dynastic rule is bad'. Then there is a view of truth, which is generally called the Correspondence theory of truth, according to which this judgement is true, if it corresponds, concords, agrees, with the reality which it claims to be about or which it judges. To put it briefly, one may say that the judgemnt 'Dynastic rule is bad' is true, if the dynastic rule *is* bad, if it is indeed the case that the dynastic rule is bad. I may express myself differently also, by means of a metaphor, by saying that the judgement 'Dynastic rule is bad' is true, if the experience which this judgement articulates mirrors, simply mirrors, the reality which it claims to be an experience of, or if my consciousness which lies at the base of this judgement is wholly mirror like, or if this experience is such that I am a completely passive sufferer in its reception. As a result, the Correspondence theory of truth may also be called the Mirror theory of truth.

I have taken above a moral example to illustrate the Correspondence or Mirror theory of truth. I may now take a physical example to illustrate this theory. Suppose I have the experience of the sky being clouded, and articulate it by means of the judgement 'The sky is clouded'. Then, according to the Correspondence or Mirror theory of truth, to put it very briefly for the time being, this judgement is true, if the sky is clouded, or if the experience which this judgement articulates mirrors, simply mirrors, the reality which it is an experience of.

2. I am quite sure that this theory is not faced with just one difficulty, the one which I am going to mention and which I find insuperable. Thus, for example, there is also the difficulty of explaining the exact meaning of correspondence, concordance,

agreement, mirroring. But at present I am concerned with just one difficulty, the one which I find insuperable. And the difficulty is this: how do we find out that my judgement 'Dynastic rule is bad' or my judgement 'The sky is clouded', Corresponds, concords, agrees, with the reality which it claims to be about, which it judges? Or, how do we find out that the experience which the judgement 'Dynastic rule is bad' articulates or the experience which the judgement 'The sky is clouded' articulates, mirrors, simply mirrors, the reality which it is said to be an experience of? For the time being, in order to elucidate this criticism, let me concentrate on just one mode of expressing it and on just one of the two examples which I have mentioned. The point is this: I have, say, the experience of the sky being clouded. In order to find out whether this experience mirrors, simply mirrors, the reality which it is said to be an experience of, I must have before me both this *experience* and the *reality* which it is said to be an experience of, I must have before me both *experience* of the sky being clouded and the *fact* of the sky being clouded. But each time I try to have the fact of the sky being clouded before me, I succeed in having just another experience of the sky being clouded. As a result, I can never find out whether my experience of the sky being clouded mirrors, simply mirrors, the fact of the sky being clouded.

This difficulty obviously applies as much to the example of the experience of the dynastic rule being bad as to the example of the experience of the sky being clouded; and it can be expressed without any difficulty in terms of the other modes of formulating the correspondence theory as well.

3. This insuperable difficulty of the Correspondence theory of truth which I have mentioned above, has a grave corollary. And it is this, (i) it is now generally admitted that knowledge by definition must be true;

(ii) we have seen that, on the basis of the Correspondence theory of truth, we cannot ultimately find out whether the judgement which articulates an experience is true; and

(iii) consequently, we find that knowledge, at least in respect of judgement which articulates experience, is not possible.

This argument, in fact, gives us a clue to a good deal of scepticism about knowledge that there is in philosophy. Generally, and somewhat differently speaking, the argument is; (a) we have such and such experiences; (b) we have ultimately no means of going beyond or outside these experiences; and (c) therefore, we have ultimately no knowledge of the objects of which these experiences are said to be experiences. Specifically speaking, this argument may relate to our knowledge of particular classes of objects, like material objects, other minds, the past, in the following way; (a) we have experiences, say, of material objects; (b) we have ultimately no means of going beyond outside these experiences; and (c) therefore, we have ultimately no knowledge of material objects of which these experiences are said to be experiences.

4. There is a sense of truth, such that if we wish to find out whether our judgement 'The sky is clouded' is true, we have to find out whether it is the case that the sky is clouded. In this sense of truth, the judgement "The judgement 'The sky is clouded' is true" entails the judgement "It is the case that the sky is clouded".

But, as we have seen, although in this sense of truth, the Correspondence theory of truth is logically inevitable, there is an insuperable difficulty with which this theory is faced when we wish to apply it, with the corollary that, in the ultimate sense, a good deal of our knowledge is rendered impossible.

But although this is so, there is a further thought which I have on the subject. And it is this: when we say that, in the ultimate analysis, we cannot go beyond or outside our experiences to the objects themselves, then we assume that, in the ultimate analysis, our mind is not like a mirror. And indeed this assumption may be justified, for, *in the ultimate analysis*, our mind may not be like a mirror; *in the ultimate analysis*, there is no way of finding out that it is. But although this is so, the question which has been worrying me, and a question which I consider of the utmost importance from the point of scientific methodology, methodology of knowledge, is this: may we not, *in the non-ultimate*

analysis, be able to render our mind as much like a mirror as possible? And I find that there are certain well-known steps which one may. and hopefully does, take in that direction.

5. To repeat: in the ultimate analysis, we cannot be sure that our mind is like a mirror. But, in the non-ultimate analysis, there could be, and indeed often are, various distortions for which we are ourselves responsible and which we could avoid or get rid of. I would be satisfied with mentioning here just one or two of these distortions, these being well-known.

Suppose somebody maintains that within a particular society a member of a particular family alone should rule, because in that family there has been an ancestor who has rendered the greatest possible service to that society.

Now, suppose that, on investigation, we find that, in maintaining this, (1) this person has exaggerated, for whatever reason, the contribution which the ancestor in the said family has made to the said society, and/or (2) this person has gone wrong about there being a logical connection between the *fact,* if it be a fact, of the contribution which the ancestor in the said family has made to the said society and the *right* which a member of the said family has to rule the said society, and (3) this person is emotionally attached to the said family.

Then it is quite evident that if these distortions, intellectual or moral, are removed, then this person's mind or consciousness would have a greater innocence of a mirror than it would have in the presence of these distortions. In fact, if these distortions are removed, particularly the last one, then this person may no longer maintain what he does. He may no longer have anything like that before him to mirror, to passively suffer an experience of.

Let me take one more example, yet one more moral example.

Suppose the person A, in whose society pre-marital sexual

relationship is forbidden, maintains that there should be no pre-marital sexual relationship; and the person B, in whose society pre-marital sexual relationship is permitted, maintains that he has nothing against pre-marital sexual relationship. Then, suppose, on investigation, we find that the persons A and B say what they say on the basis of their social conditioning, on the basis of an emotional or moral bias ingrained in them. Then, there can be no doubt that, if this bias is removed, then the minds or consciousnesses of A and B would be more like a mirror than they would be in their presence. And as a matter of fact, if it is removed, then the persons concerned may no longer say that they do, they may no longer have anything like that before them to mirror, to purely passively suffer an experience of.

Let me not mention any more examples. But on the basis of these examples and other examples which one could go on to give, we may say the following:-

In the non-ultimate analysis, our mind or consciousness would be more like a mirror, if the following conditions were fulfilled;

(1) the conditions of intellectual clarity, exactitude and discrimination, and (2) the conditions of moral impartiality. It will be noted without any difficulty that these conditions are some of the most essential conditions or prerequisites of the acquisition of knowledge, some of the most essential ingredients of scientific methodology, methodology of knowledge. In the acquisition of knowledge, in the application of the scientific method, make our mind must be like a mirror. But although, in the ultimate analysis, we cannot be sure of this fact, in the non-ultimate analysis, we can take certain moral and intellectual steps which would our mind more like a mirror. Ancient wisdom is 'Trust in God and do the right'. For the purpose of our present problem of the pursuit of knowledge, let me somewhat amend this wisdom and say 'Do the right and trust in God (for the rest)'.

The thesis that our mind would be more like a mirror if the various distortions for which we are ourselves responsible and which we could avoid or get rid of are removed may be represented figuratively in the following way:

I	Subject	a		b	object

The screen due to us which may be there and which is irremoveable

The Screen due to us which is there and which is removeable

II	Subject	a		object

The screen due to us which may be there and which is irremoveable

It is evident that our mind would be more like a mirror in case II where b is no more there.

6. There is another point which I would like to make here. I have maintained that there are various distortions, intellectual and moral, for which we are ourselves responsible and which we can avoid or get rid of. And evidently if we can do so, our mind is rendered more like a mirror. I have said that this is what we can do in non-ultimate analysis. Further, I have maintained that, even after we have done whatever we can do in the non-ultimate analysis, we cannot be sure that our mind is now like a mirror. That is, there may still be some distortions for which we are ourselves responsible and which we cannnot avoid or get rid of. I have said that this is what we cannot do in the ultimate analysis. Now, the point which I would like to make is this: from the point of view of what is ultimately given to us in experience, it does not matter whether it is given to us through distortions

for which we are ourselves responsible and which we cannot avoid or get rid of, or it is given to us without any distortions whatsoever. For, in either case we are a helpless recipient of what is given to us.

I may express my point differently through a technical distinction. This will also enable me to say what is not my point. There is a distinction between epistemological realism and epistemological idealism. The former can be defined as the view that we can be given an object in experience as it is in itself. The latter can be defined as the view that we can only be given an object in experience through distortions for which we are ourselves responsible and which are contingent (avoidable) or necessary (unavoidable). The point which I have wanted to make is that, from the point of view of what is ultimately given to us in experience, it does not matter whether we take the position of epistemological realism or that of epistemological idealism of the second variety. For, in either case we are a helpless recipient of what is given to us. I have not wanted to make the point that there is no distinction between epistemological realism and epistemological idealism in any of its two varities.

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RATIONALITY AND THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

As Bertrand Russell notes in his Introduction to the lectures on logical atomism, "[t]he process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consists mainly in passing from those obvious, vague ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from ...".[1] Russell's sentiments on this point would seem to be particularly appropriate to the present topic, because the role of reason and rationality in the humanities and social sciences is the sort of thing of which we all are more or less conscious, but something that is also rather vague and ambiguous. The challenge to scholars who work in these disciplines, then, is how to arrive at a precise and clear understanding of that role that does not do violence to our initial certainties.

Discussion of the relation between reason or rationality and what might broadly be called 'the human sciences' is certainly nothing new, but it has been brought to a head in disciplines like philosophy, history and literature through the influence of so-called 'post-modernism'. To pursue this discussion in a non-didactic and non-technical way, I shall begin with a brief sketch of what is, arguably, the traditional view of the subject matter and goals of the humanities and social sciences. In the process, we shall see the role played by 'reason'. I shall suggest---- and I do not think this especially controversial-----that 'reason' has long been considered to be the fundamental element in these disciplines, and that it is commonly viewed as providing, or allowing a general methodology that is common to them all. In short, 'reason' is seen as determining the methodology of the humanities and social sciences *par excellence.*

I would like, however, to suggest some problems with viewing the function of 'reason' in this way and with the belief that these disciplines have or should have a single methodology based on it. These comments, I hope, will clarify what we mean by 'reason' and what----as students of the humanities and social sciences----we might reasonably expect of these disciplines. In the end, we should see that the conclusions arrived at are, in fact, implicit in (though are also much more precise than) our initial vague and ambiguous view of the relation of 'reason' and the human sciences.

I. The humanities and social sciences as focused on the human person

To begin almost pleonastically, the study of literature, art, history, philosophy----indeed, the study of anything----presupposes a mind at work. The mind somehow establishes criteria by which it isolates certain elements of experience, and in this way distinguishes specific 'subject matters' or academic disciplines. The lines separating these disciplines are, however, never rigidly drawn because of the open-ended character of experience, and many of the items of our experience admit of inclusion in several distinct subject areas. Is Plato's *Apology*, for example, philosophy, literature, or history? Thus, there need be a certain degree of flexibility in placing a text within a specific discipline, but this does not count against our skill having an understanding of what is involved when we consider the *Apology* as philosophy, or as literature, or as history.

In the humanities (and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the social sciences) the subject matter is the human person. Admittedly, even animal life is studied, not simply as an unexplored vista in our knowledge of the world, but as a way of understanding more about human beings in relation (and in reaction) to the world they live in (e.g., to the flora and fauna, and to other human beings, singly or in community). Still, it is humanity——its art, history, philosophy— in which human beings are primarily interested and, hence, one sees the centrality of the humanities and the social sciences in most academic institutions.

II. The 'internal criteria' which define a discipline

Within each of these disciplines which comprise the humanities

and the social sciences, there is, however, an attempt to isolate and focus on certain distinctive and fundamental elements---these reflect the 'internal criteria' which define that discipline. But how are such criteria arrived at? What is the role of reason in this process? To suggest what, concretely, is involved, consider the example of the academic study of history which reflects many of the issues that one finds in both the humanities and the social sciences.

What is it that historians attempt to do? There are at least four kinds of things with which they might be concerned: First, historians are interested in the isolation and identification of certain phenomena which are necessary in order to make accurate general statements about history itself. Thus, historians will examine particular 'events' (an admittedly vague word) in order to assert something about the essence of history (i.e., human behaviour of the past), or to note trends or streams of thought which will illuminate the nature of individual and collective human behaviour, or simply to attempt a comparison between past events and current events or trends. Second, historians may attempt causal explanations of certain events (e.g., the Second World War or the decline and the disintegration of the Soviet Union). Third, some historians are concerned with the separation of so-called 'factual' from 'value' judgements, and with attempting to construct a 'value free' account of the past. Finally—through it may be pervasive through all of the preceding—historians are sometimes concerned with reflecting critically on events as a means to settling on some specific policy of action relevant to the present or future.

III. The modern view of the role of reason

Obviously, not all historians do all of the above, but it does seem that, as historians, they must be undertaking some of them. But the definition or description of a discipline does not stop with a list of these internal criteria. For example, philosophers, though 'outsiders', have traditionally demanded of historians—as they would of any scholar in the humanities and social sciences— that, in each of the activities mentioned above, they apply certain rational procedures. That is, it is not simply enough that the intellect or mind—or whatever one wishes to call this capacity—makes

distinctions, but it need make them in accord with certain rules. And these rules must in principle be public and universal in character. In other words, these disciplines must meet certain general standards of rationality.

In general, then, how has 'reason' operated in these disciplines? Minimally, it has distinguished questions of fact from those of value, ensured that the questions of fact are relevant to the subject matter, and has led us to (or allowed us to make) explanations, generalizations (if only rules of thumb) and predictions (with an 'acceptable' amount of accuracy)—-in short, it has attempted to ensure that the discipline achieves the aim of the humanities and social sciences in general.

Clearly, though, these objectives are not without problems. For example, how do we determine what is a factual statement and what is value laden? The emotivity of language can lead to a different sense of what is being said, depending on the audience. (Is Yassar Arafat a terrorist, a freedom fighter or a head of state? These terms may refer to the same activities, but clearly reflect a wide range in sense.) Here, we cannot simply appeal to a distinction which claims that what is 'factual' is substantiated by 'objective' reasons, whereas what is value laden is only subjective opinion. Such a distinction is rejected by many and, even where it is not, what counts as 'objective' and 'subjective' is itself problematic.

The question of what is relevant to a discipline is also no easy matter to resolve. This does not simply concern how to settle borderline cases, but also involves the problems of the different conceptions of a discipline. As noted above, not all historians and philosophers of history (indeed, perhaps not many) are of the same mind as to what the academic study of history involves.[2] Indeed, even if we take just one answer—for example, that of history as providing an explanation of events—we will see that there is still far from unanimity in determining what 'doing history' is. Wilhelm Dilthey and R. G. Collingwood argue that the historian must have *Verstehen* or an "empathic understanding" of persons in history in order to understand them (and, consequently, understand history) better. Hence, there is an important role played by introspection in one's attempts at historical explanation. Carl Hempel has attempted

to provide a method of historical explanation, based on either a "deductive nomological" or a statistical inductive method. According to Peter McClelland, William Dray views history as involving an understanding of historical action as "a calculation which the agent would have made if the agent had attempted to make such a calculation"[3] —whether or not such a calculation was actually made.[4] And each of these approaches to the study of history has met with significant criticism.

Even once the historian settles on how to go about determining what will be examined in order to arrive at an explanation, there are other difficulties—difficulties with parallels in other disciplines—of constructing explanations, and making predictions and generalizations. For example, if , in history, as in many of the social sciences, we attempt to make generalizations about human behaviour of the form 'similar stimuli, experienced by people with similar dispositions, will result in similar actions', we are confronted with a number of questions: first, what is meant by 'similar'? second, is the generalization that the historian arrives at, something that in intended to be necessarily, possibly or simply always true?[5] Finally, is explanation, in the sense of 'causal explanation', possible at all? As Hume pointed out, facts are conjoined, never connected.[6]

Despite (or, arguably, because of) these problems, McClelland notes the tendency (in historians, at any rate) to leave the reader to supply most of the relevant generalizations that are needed for causal explanation to work.[7] There is, moreover, a tendency to allow a certain vagueness in historical explanation by claiming that it is acceptable within the general conventions accepted by historians. Here, however, we stumble onto the phenomenon that "no two people are likely to have exactly the same set of generalizations concerning human behaviour"[8], and disagreements, therefore, concerning the adequacy of such generalizations seem unavoidable. Arguably, the reason why so many of the problems raised here do, in fact, seem to be often avoided is simply because they are never fully articulated.[9]

But, in any event, in describing these possible objectives of the historian, and in the comments that we make about them,

the guide to which scholars and critics turn to make the appropriate delineations and cautions seems to be an 'external' criterion of rationality—though they also evidently include 'internal' conventions accepted on the whole by practicing historians. In short, then, not only is reason apparently involved with the distinguishing and the differentiation of disciplines, but it requires that this be done according to certain general rules, and that these rules be applied according to certain general norms.

IV. 'Reason' and convention

This, then, seems to be how reason----along with, as I have just suggested, conventions--functions in the writing of history. However, a reader might at this point raise the question whether there is, or mightn't be, a conflict between the two. Indeed, convention could simply be a prejudice or be 'outgrown' by an increase in knowledge. For example, a conception of history as involving in some significant respect a teleological principle---— say 'humanity's journey towards the New Jerusalem'—may be regarded merely as a mould into which events have been fitted without due respect for their complexity. More generally, then, the convention of 'unity' of a discipline may no longer be helpful in pursuing that study, and it may even provide an impediment to an accurate representation of the facts.

The question of whether a convention still 'works' is a recurring one in all of the humanities and social sciences. As long as it 'works' (and it seems that we 'check' this through our reason), it is used; when it doesn't (and this too seems to be determined by our reason), it is discarded. So, are we to conclude that we should subject all of our conventions to the critical scrutiny of reason—and, particularly, those norms provided by what we call 'rationality'? In the modern era at least, philosophy's response seems that we must answer in the affirmative. For, if we do not, there would apparently be no protection against inaccurate understanding of those things which, as students of the humanities and social sciences, we seek to understand.

In these disciplines, therefore, human reason—specifically, reason so far as it reflects a model of (instrumental) rationality[10] -—is

taken as the relevant arbiter, because it appears to be the only sure guide to knowledge. In addition, it, too,'works'.

But before accepting this analysis of the role of reason, it is important to realize that one important question has been over-looked. What precisely 'reason' is, has yet to be explained. At this point, all that has been said is that 'reason' has been identified with the general capability of human beings to think, and it involves a certain type of rule-governed behaviour. But is this approach to the human and social sciences too'rationalistic'? Not necessarily. There is no obvious conflict between this and, for example, the empirical character of many disciplines. In fact, the way in which reason is employed here suggests that it has a predominantly experimental character. Within each discipline, one conducts 'thought experiments' by which one is able to clarify certain concepts, explain events, state facts, and make predictions.[11] It is, one might argue, this process taken as a whole that we are referring to when we talk about the human sciences as based on 'reason'.

For example, as McClelland points out, in the academic study of history, we often find generalizations made or implied, and in such generalizations one commonly finds reference to dispositions (of the agent or the subject). But how do we acquire knowledge about dispositions? Well, we consider such things as: statements of the agent, statements by others about the agent, observed action of the agent, and the sum total of *our* knowledge about human behaviour, including introspection (i.e., knowledge of how we would have behaved).[12] In short, common to this seems to be an emphasis on *experimentation*—one asks "*How* do I know this to be so?"

Yet, despite this concern with the empirical and the particular, the modern approach to the academic study of history seems to presuppose, first, the rationalist canon that, if one does not or cannot 'know' something to be so through reason, it is not relevant,[13] and, second, that there is in principle, a single right view of the world and all of its elements that can be arrived at by proper use of the right rational method. And this view can be found in all academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. In short, the modern view of the role of reason in the humanities and social sciences is that it provides a method for establishing

and working within the various disciplines, and that this is ultimately something that is universal. This method—what we call 'rationality' —then, claims to function as an external control on how we think about and pursue the humanities and social sciences.

IV. Criticisms

The assertion that reason----particularly, the method of 'instrumental rationality" that it employs—is reliable as an arbiter in the humanities and social sciences, however, ignores the obvious. It begs the question of how we know that it is reliable. Why does one say that human reason is the relevant arbiter in the human sciences? Because it is reliable. But how do we know that it is reliable? No external criterion for 'reliability' seems available to us. Earlier we saw some reasons to disallow past convention as being, in some sense, an absolute guide through which, for example, we can categorize historical events and construct generalizations. So what else, one may ask, is left?

But still, it seems that our sole ground for saying that reason is reliable is that its products accord with reason. Thus, the argument comes full circle. (What is, perhaps, ignored is the possibility of 'unreasoned' data or convention that, *together* with the products of reason, provide a complete account of historical events, and in terms of which the historian is able to make generalizations and give explanations.)

There is a second difficulty with assigning reason the role of 'arbiter' in these disciplines. As noted earlier, one justification of the role of reason is simply that it 'works'. But such a justification is problematic for two reasons. First, it is, in a sense, all the modern 'has, for without it one rooted in modernity cannot attempt any of the tasks with which the various disciplines are concerned. So, to use fact that reason 'works' is to give very little justification indeed. It gives us simply what it says it will give us, but it excludes, by definition, anything which cannot be put into this mould. Second, in a sense, it doesn't always work. What 'occurs' or 'does work' may sometimes be at variance with what our most rational estimations and predictions say should occur or should work.

Consider the collapse of the regime of the Shah of Iran or, more recently, the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even the most careful predictions of observers of the political scene were simply wrong in the light of the turn of these events. Are we to conclude in cases such as these simply that our 'reason' has made an inference on the basis of too little evidence, but that it can in principle still make accurate inferences? Or is this not, rather, simply *ad hoc*? Why believe that the best account of an event is, in some way, the causal and the 'rational' one—particularly when passions and emotions are involved? Surely to assume that some 'rational' account is in principle possible is to assume that passions and emotions can be quantified and can be used in some kind of rational calculus. (And the only obvious ground for that presumption is that one insists that there must be a certain consistency between what 'reason' predicts and what occurs). If these criticisms hold, the modern conception of reason and rationality, then, simply cannot have a controlling role in the humanities and, arguably, the social sciences.

Let us approach these criticisms in another way. From the modern perspective, there is a presumption in favour of reason as fundamental in the social sciences and in the humanities. The role of reason appears to be that of a blueprint. One has a clear (or, more or less clear) idea of what reason is and will do and then one applies it to experience. But surely it is questionable whether this approach is a correct way of carrying out studies in the humanities and social science. Do we impose rules on the discipline, or might there not be an internal reflective process where rules grow out of practices, and within the context of various aspects of life? Just as we run the risk of misunderstanding religion by imposing external criteria of meaningfulness on it[14], do we also not commit a similar mispresentation by taking different academic disciplines and arguing that there is, fundamentally, a single method of analysis and understanding common to them?

As an illustration of the inadequacy of using 'reason' in this sense, as providing a paradigm for understanding the social sciences, consider the case of an anthropologist studying a different culture —say, that of a pre-technological Indian ethnic group. Here, she notices an important role played by a feminine symbol—the "Earth

Mother"—and that, prior to planting, this is invoked through a series of ritual practices. The anthropologist might be tempted to comment that the tendency in this culture to invoke the help of this being is an irrational practice borne of a lack of scientific understanding.

But what 'irrationality' has occurred here? The invocation of the feminine does not obviously have (merely) a causal role.[15] Is it plausible, indeed, to suggest that the 'reason' certain individuals pray or engage in ritual is simply because they thought it would bring about some desired effect? In fact, one might well ask why the anthropologist should attempt to understand such practices in this way, as if prayer, for example, were in some sense a cause. Moreover, in terms of other activities and practices, actions like the invocation of the Earth Mother might well be quite consistent with a whole set of beliefs. And if coherence with one's other beliefs counts as a criterion for 'rationality' then surely their actions are 'rational'. That we in the technologically advanced world would not act in such a way is immaterial, because in our case such behaviour would (likely) be quite inconsistent with the rest of what we believe. In short, assessment of what is 'rational' in a culture cannot be made from without and we must be receptive to the possibility that what counts as 'rational' may differ.

This is not something that should concern only historians and those who study past human behaviour. The rigid requirements for inductive sampling in the natural, or deductive explanation in the pure sciences could not be imposed upon historical accounts unless we already supposed that the objective of history is to do just that—that is, provide quasi-scientific explanations.[16] Of course, some historians do yearn for a natural scientific method, but whether such a yearning can be satisfied is doubtful. Consequently, it is not surprising to see that many historians are content with describing and working the limits apparently imposed by the nature of historical events.

VI. Towards a post-modern view of the humanities and social sciences

Is there, then, a single method, common to the humanities and social sciences, which is foundational and rational in character?

Arguably not; for example, we surely distinguish between how to settle questions of fact (e.g., "Is it the 14th of February?") and those of value (e.g. "should you give beloved a valentine?"), and the different ways in which we answer these questions clearly introduce different standards of what is appropriate as a reason and what is not. Clearly, the guidelines, criteria and procedures to which we appeal in arriving at an answer, do not have an external justification, but an internal one. In short, what counts as 'reason' is relative to a specific conceptual framework. In as much as 'reason' deals with rules and rule making, just as different games have different rules, so also the specific disciplines in which one makes 'an appeal to reason' will, in fact, understand and employ 'reason' differently. And what counts as 'reasonable' will likely be distinct or different for each distinct and different 'conceptual epoch'. For example, our view of the world is not Homer's, and what Homer would allow as a perfectly 'reasonable' view, is likely not our own

But there is no way of settling which view is better or more 'reasonable'. What justification is possible for insisting that Homer did not appeal to the gods, who were just as much a part of nature as the Trojans and the Greeks? There is no need for external justification here any more than we need an external justification for why, in chess, the bishop moves on the diagonal. Indeed, the imposition of the external criteria represented by the demands of 'rationality' need to be justified; these criteria are not *a priori* or obviously true. And if one simply tries to deny this strategy, is one not guilty of a conceptual chauvinism, not to mention begging the question of whether there is a single method common to the humanities and social sciences? It is for this reason that it is appropriate to speak of different aims or purposes in the academic study of history and that one cannot choose among them by appealing to some canon of 'rationality'. The 'nature' of reason and its role is derived from what is required by the content—e.g., the reality it attempts to describe. Thus, there is no fundamentally normative role for reason in the study of history. Rather, we attempt to derive what 'doing history' is from the practice of those who engage in it. What we seek in history, as in all academic disciplines, is an internal norm.

There is, however, no warrant to describe this view as 'irrationalist;' it simply does not subscribe to a view of reason as providing a single, universal model or method of investigation. As one's objectives differ, one's criteria differ, but so long as there are specific rules which are, in principle, open to observation of their regularity, the apparently central aspect of rules being meaningful appears to be met. Why *not* allow for different models of rationality?

The danger of social studies rooted in the approach to rationality that is paradigmatic of modernity is that what is studied is often studied according to the external criteria of the observer, which may not take account of the inner coherence and rule-governed behaviour of the subject or subjects. Admittedly, some disciplines, as some games, have rules that are similar (e.g., they follow the same strategies and have the same function.) But not all games should be judged according to one set of rules. In fact, in spite of this commitment to 'rationality' and rational justification, most researchers are more than ready to abandon it when it comes into conflict with certain basic beliefs. Thus, philosophical puzzles notwithstanding, historians do not feel compelled to worry about whether the material world exists----it is part and parcel of our living that it does exist but, if it doesn't, the academic study of history is clearly irrelevant. But it is important to note that some of these beliefs are simply 'groundless'. And it is equally important to note that this is no fault or weakness, for some beliefs simply have no ground. Similarly, perhaps, some theists err when they attempt to construct demonstrative proofs that God exists. What is more to the point is that Christians show by their actions that God exists. In short, to understand an object of study, we must look for an internal, as distinct from an external 'rationalist', justification.

VII. Conclusion

So where does this leave us? I have suggested that there is, in fact, no single method that the human mind employs in the humanities and social sciences, though I have not said specifically what these different methods are, nor what this implies when it comes to identifying (or distinguishing different) disciplines. I have said that the role of reason within a discipline is to make distinctions.

to formulate or discover rules and to apply them. (whether one considers this sufficient to call this process 'rationality' is, however, not the point; what is important is that one is engaged in a procedure that attempts to uncover, rather than prescribe, the norms of the discipline.) And this allows that the sorts of norms or rules that may be found in one discipline may differ significantly from those found in others. An external criterion of rationality is not the sole or most reliable guide to action or to the appropriate activities within a discipline; the demands of 'reason' are not exhausted by the model of 'instrumental rationality' and conventions also play an important role. There is, in short, no question of the *a priori* legitimacy of an appeal to 'external' assessment or correction.

But will such an approach leave academic specialists in conceptual ghettos, each in different and incommensurable worlds, as it were, where 'reason' is purely equivocal? Clearly, not everything will be as the modern model of rationality would have it. But it does not follow that there is no room for overlap or for fruitful elaboration about what one is doing. It simply recognizes that different conceptual epochs and different disciplines may have different rules. What some amount to may be similar to others, but then again they may not. Of course, one will still expect to find a certain coherence of 'truths' in what is said within any particular field, but what this entails is a matter determined internally by that discipline, and research is not, incidentally, any easier for that

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NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918)* in *Russell's Logical Atomism*, ed. David Pears (Bungay: Fontana/Collins, 1972), p.33

2. In the next three paragraphs, I draw on the description (though not the conclusion) of the nature of historical explanation found in chapter 2 of Peter D. McClelland,

Causal Explanation and Model Building in History, Economics and the New Economic History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1975)

3. McClelland, p. 98

4. See McClelland, p. 98

5. McClelland, pp. 22, 73.

6. See McClelland, pp. 22, 73.

7. McClelland, p. 84.

8. MCClelland, p. 79.

9. See McClelland, p. 79.

10. The term "instrumental reason" was coined by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their 1944 volume, *Philosophische Fragmente* (later published as *Dialektik der Aufklärung [Dialectic of Enlightenment]*).

11. See Peter Winch's discussion of this point in his *The Idea of a social Science and its Relation to Philosophy,* revised edition (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 17.

12. See McClelland, pp. 66 and 68.

13. This statement here is, admittedly, somewhat ambiguous. The ambiguity is, is it that if I do not know it to be so, it is not relevant, or is it if it cannot be known by anyone, that it is not relevant?

14. This response has been given by a number of 'post-modern' defenders of religious belief, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, D.Z. Phillips, Hendrik Hart and Alvin Plantinga.

15. See, for example, D.Z. Phillips's discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on pre-technological religion, in *Religion without Explanation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), pp. 34 ff.

16. See McClelland, chapter 2.

270

RESPONSE TO AN EDITORIAL NOTE

A recent issue of this journal (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 21)(1), 1994, pp. 87-96) contains a review of the *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari*, which constitutes vol. 47 part 1 of the Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques. This review is followed by a most curious editorial note, in which the editors, or some of them (the note is signed 'editors') complain about the fact that some papers that were read at the conference and submitted for publication in the *Proceedings*, were not included in the volume.

This note creates the impression that the editorial policy of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly is to accept everything that is submitted for publication. Not all journals follow this policy. Many editors see it rather as their task to apply more or less strict criteria of selection to the articles that are submitted to them, and to reject those articles which they consider unsuitable for publication in the volume concerned. Since the quality of a journal depends on its editorial decisions, editors have, and must have, a rather free hand in such matters. They should certainly not be called to task by editors of other journals who apply other criteria of selection, or none at all.

As it so happens, the editors of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* have appended their note to a *review* which illustrates the extent to which the quality of a journal can be compromised when its ediotors fail to keep an eye on what they publish. The review, which is written by a certain Mr. J. Ouseparampil, can hardly be called a *review*. It is an accusation of the most unusual kind. Mr. Ouseparampil blames the organizers of the Bhartṛhari conference for not structuring the conference around his (i.e., Mr. Ouseparampil's) views on the *Vākyapadīya*. Without reference to his over-all interpretation of the *Vākyapadīya*, Mr. Ouseparampil claims, the contributions to the conference are "out of context". Mr. Ouseparampil fails to explain how the organizers and participants of the conference could have

used his views as "context", given that no published presentation of these views seems to exit. The idea that other Bhartrhari scholars might not agree with his overall interpretation, does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Ouseparampil.

The less said about the "review", the better for all concerned. This episode may or may not influence the editors of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* to change their policy and to introduce some measure of editorial control and responsibility. It should at least stop them from preaching to editors of other journals about how to run their business.

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BOOK-REVIEW

Nayak, G. C.; *Evil and Retributive Hypothesis*; 1993, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass; pp. viii + 204, Price Rs.225/-(HC)

The present book is a revised version of Professor Nayak's earlier book entitled *Evil, Karma and Reincarnation* published in 1973. Apart from other revisions and modifications, the book under review has two features distinguishing it from the earlier version : (a) it has an appendix dealing with the nature and importance of subtle body *(Suksma Sarira)* connected with possibility of survival after death. (b) The author's 'philosophical position has undergone drastic changes' (Preface) since the publication of the earlier book. Holding retributive hypothesis to be 'the most satisfactory or least unsatisfactory of all the explanations offered to solve the problem of evil' the book seeks to critically examine its simultaneous coherent satisfiability with the theistic belief in omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent God 'who alone is both creator and sustainer of the world-process and whose will is what prevails everywhere' (p.6). This sort of investigation is designed to be undertaken within the framework of 'critical or rational theism distinguished from the dogmatic theism'(p.12). In the process, the author also takes into consideration such issues as retributive justice, survival after death, personal identity etc. The principal task has been to show that theistic world-view is not incoherent with retributive hypothesis. The book has succeeded on the whole in its main concern. It is written in a readable style and it would be profitable to study it, although it amounts to be a contemporary elaboration and defence of an age-old thesis.

Inspite of such merits of the book we wish humbly to draw attention of the concerned to the following points of seminal significance which have not been paid due attention to in the entire book. Had it been done so, the focus and the main line

of argument presented in the book might have undergone a drastic change. First, it seems to be presumed in continuation with the earlier book that retribution hypothesis is very closely connected with the theory of *Karma* and that its main concern is to satisfactorily account for evil. This seems to be questionable for two reasons. On the one hand, retribution hypothesis is basically brought in, both in the west as well as in the east, to make sense of reward and punishment i.e. with a view to satisfactorily accounting for allocation of responsibility. Its extension with regard to solving the problem of evil is a derivative issue. On the other hand, in the west the retribution hypothesis has been put forth independently of the theory of *Karma*. Secondly, even if it may not be disputed that retribution hypothesis in the form of theory of *Karma* and theistic world-view are non-incoherent with each other, yet two important points cannot be ignored: (a) Adherents of Jainism and *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* accepted theory of *Karma* without in any way subscribing to theistic world-view, and (b) even if *Nyāya* became explicitly theistic in its orientation, it was almost from, if not after, tenth century A.D. Thus considered, it was in some of the post tenth century trends of the Indian philosophical thought that the issue of reconciliation between theistic world-view and retributive hypothesis in the form of the theory of *Karma* became prominent. But the book seems to be silent about such developments and instead draws heavily upon the western discussion of the question of reconciliation between the problem of evil and belief in theistic world-view. Thirdly, two questions of considerable significance need to be distinguished and considered separately : (a) Relation between *Karma* on the one hand and its results and consequences on the other. Connected with it is an equally important issue: whether this sort of chain between *Karma* and its results and consequences is terminable or otherwise, (b) The question of allocation of responsibility of *Karma* and whether this necessarily presupposes a permanent or quasi-permanent doer (*Kartā*) and further whether such a doer must be the knower (*Jñātā*) and/or enjoyer (*Bhoktā*) as well. In this context, too, it needs to be understood that consideration of none of these problems necessarily presupposes subscription to a theistic world-view. Quite outside the framework of such a world-view these problems were discussed by adherents of Jainism, Buddhism and *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* in this country, although

later on, as observed above, they were discussed within theistic framework as well. However, the book nowhere makes reference to any of these questions. Nor does it tell us about the theistic world-view of any Indian philosopher/s it is drawing upon. Under such circumstances author's attempt to coherently reconcile theistic world-view with retributive hypothesis seems more to be hypothetical in character so far as Indian philosophy is concerned. Fourthly, considerations of internal coherence, adequacy etc.. are certainly methodologically important. But so too is that of non-counter intuitivity. And subscription or otherwise to the latter is one of the most decisive point of controversy between adherents of Buddhism on the one hand and those of various non-Buddhist trends of Indian philosophical thought on the other so far as satisfactory explanation of *Karma* is concerned. The book, again, is silent on the issue presuming that internal coherence and adequacy are the only methodological concerns which played a decisive role in the matter with adherent of any trend of Indian philosophical thought. This is neither tenable nor factually true. Lastly, survival after death is not merely a matter of entertaining a coherent logical possibility. It is also connected with the discussion of the respectable and appropriate sort of parameters of trans-world or trans-life identification, re-identification and recognition of self or agent. The book, except bringing to the notice of the concerned coherent possibility of life after death, is, again, largely silent on such issues of enormously complicated ontological and epistemological implications.

The book has a bibliography and an index at the end for the convenience of the prospective renders and researchers.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

On the occasion of completing seventy five years of his age and on account of indifferent health Prof. S. S. Barlingay requested the authorities of the University of Poona to relieve him of the responsibility of Editorship of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*. The authorities of the University have very reluctantly accepted his request. Right from the inception of the journal till the last issue of it he was actively associated with the Quarterly. Inspite of his relinquishment of the Editorship of the journal he would continue to be available for consultation, as and when necessary, as the Founder Editor of the journal. However, with this issue he would not be involved in Editorship or management of the journal. We earnestly hope that the concerned would take this change in proper spirit and continue to extend their valued cooperation to the journal in years to come in the same way as they did uptill now.

EDITOR

PROFESSOR RAJNARAIN GUPTA

We are sorry to report sad demise of Professor Rajnarain Gupta on 24-04-1994. Born in 1913 at Lakhimpur-Kheri (U.P.), he earned his M.A., LL.B. Degrees from Lucknow University and Ph.D. from Columbia University, U.S.A. He started his career as a Tutor in 1941-42 and retired from Lucknow University in 1971 as Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology. Apart from teaching Philosophy and Psychology for number of years in Lucknow University, he participated in number of conferences, seminars and discussions, making them lively. His publications include *Directory of Indian Psychologists, Education for Literacy, Falling Educational Standards, Pratīkātmaka, Tarka-Śāstra* (Hindi), *Military Psychology etc.* He also contributed essays to philosophical, psychological and educational journals. He was a Government Overseas Scholar (1948-50), Sectional President of Psychology Section of the Indian Science Congress (1955), Sectional President of Logic and Metaphysics section of the Indian Philosophical Congress (1963), General President, Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad, Founder-President of the Indian Academy of Experimental Psychology (1973), President, U.P. Darshan, Parishad (1981), President of the Psychology Section of the Indian Social Science Congress (1985), and Visiting Professor in number of Indian Universities from U.P., Orissa and M.P. He was Life Member of such organizations as All India Federation of Educational Associations, Indian Philosophical Congress, Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad, U.P. Psychological Association etc. He was given to simple habits and upholding traditioanl values. In his passing away we have lost a person of intellecual and personal integrity.

EDITOR

IS THERE A BREAK IN SARTRE'S THOUGHT ?

I

Philosophically, it is quite plausible to be concerned with the ways of being of consciousness *qua* consciousness alone. With such a concern in view it is also possible to view consciousness as an absolute in so far as the relation of consciousness with itself is concerned. In itself, such an undertaking does not necessarily commit one to any individualistic or suprahistorical view of consciousne, though it does not rule out such a possibility either. In this context, Sartre, who, in his phenomenological ontology of *Being and Nothingness*[1], was primarily, if not altogether, concerned with the being of consciousness *qua* itself, has, however, been, often, accused by his critics of expounding a suprahistorical of consciousness— a charge to which Sartre should be least susceptible, if his often repeated existentialist principle that existence precedes essence is adhered to.[2] Added to this problematic existentialist principle is the itinerary of Sartre's post-1946 thought which is historical, if not altogether "Marxist", in its approach and method. Has Sartre, therefore, changed after *Being and Nothingness* to accommodate the social and historical into his thought? Has he given up his so rich insights of *Being and Nothingness* concerning human situations, as Mary Warnock so often moaned? Is there any, of that all too famous, "epistemological break" in his thought as well ?[3] Or, has he after all succeeded, as Sartre has so often claimed[4], in bringing together the fruitful insights of both existentialism and Marxism?

II

As has been so often pointed out by many of Sartre's critics[5], Sartre's conception of consciousness as outlined in *Being and Nothingness* seems to lack the required passivity to explain any social

involvement. For, while it is one thing to maintain that the realms of meanings, values, etc., come into being with the upsurge of the for-itself, it is quite another to overlook sociohistorical conditions that facilitate such creations, especially when we desire to situate the for-itself as a being-in-the-world.[6] Because introduction of any passive structures into consciousness amounted to depriving Satrean consciousness of its translucency and freedom, a theory of consciousness that allowed habitualities to reside in consciousness amounted to committing an act of bad faith and thus denial to consciousness of its agonizing freedom. The in-itself in *Being and Nothingness*, therefore, had almost no 'signifying force of its own'.[7]

Furthermore, as freedom, for Sartre, 'was not an essence hiding behind the manifest structure of human reality[8], a paradox seems to arise between 'Sartre's phenomenological description of human reality as free and the "unfree" mode in which human reality inhabited its freedom'[9]. Freedom, indeed, for Sartre was human in its essence and not natural, or natural only to the extent everything human is natural. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre, therefore, spoke of freedom only in relation to that aspect of human reality which is not yet, i.e., the future.[10] He viewed it as "surpassing of the given".[11] For Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness* and other fictional works that exemplified the ontological thesis of *Being and Nothingness*[12], to be human is to be free, though freedom was also never considered as that which was bestowed on the for-itself as some divine grace from above by our benevolent gods in heaven. Gods in fact were never permitted any role in the Sartrean. scheme of things. The very being of human reality, thus, consisted in making free choices in concrete situations, i.e., all choices are choices-in-the-world.

Furthermore, having participated in the Second World War, Sartre's early thesis of ontologized freedom, especially in fictional works, seems to be coloured by certain ethical overtones. Because freedom, for Sartre, 'was not available only to an elite because it possessed some special quality, whether it was reason or the prerogatives of birth.... (But) freedom.... enveloped every human being at every moment of existence'.[13] Any denial or restriction of freedom, for example, by a Nazi, a colonist, a racist, a patriarch, etc., was, therefore, nothing less than a denial of our humanity to us. To deny freedom is to *eo ipso* deny us our humanity through reduction of our being

to the status of an in-itself. Sartre, thus, having 'erased the specificity and historicity of freedom' freedom in his framework of *Being and Nothingness,* came to be universalized 'as a natural aspect of the human condition'.[14] But such a viewing of freedom left unanswered questions that are so central to the human condition. For example, 'if freedom did indeed define consciousness, how was it possible that it was so absent from human experience? Why was it so difficult for human beings to be human beings'?[15]

While attempting to understand the implications of these questions we need to consider the importance of consciousness' relation with the given, for 'freedom is originally a relation to the given'.[16] And, what exactly is this relation? The relation, says Sartre, is such that 'the given does not cause freedom (since it can produce only the given), nor is it the *reason* of freedom (since all "reason" comes into the world through freedom). Neither is it the necessary condition of freedom, since we are on the level of pure contingency'.[17] And 'contingency and facticity are really one'.[18] It is, indeed, true that a for-itself is 'never free except in situation'[19] or 'within a condition'[20], but for-itself's relation with its situation or condition in *Being and Nothingness's* framework appears to be quite one sided. This is so because in articulating freedom-situation relation Sartre 'marginalizes situatedness in favour of autonomous freedom'.[21] The following passages clearly bring out this problem :

(i)   Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free.[22]

(ii) I am absolutely free and absolutely responsible for my situation.[23]

(iii) Each for-itself, in fact, is a for-itself only by choosing itself beyond nationality and race just as it speaks only by choosing the designation beyond the syntax and morphemes. This "beyond" is enough to assure its total indepedence in relation to the structures which it surpasses; but the fact remaing that it constitutes itself as beyond in relation to these particular structures.[24]

'The paradox of freedom' is, thus, that 'there is freedom only in a situation and there is a situation only through freedom. Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it has not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only

in and through the free choice which human-reality is'.[25] And this paradox, indeed, was not without far-reaching consequences for the philosophy of *Being and Nothingness*. It is, in fact, Sartre's over-emphasis on surpassing the given *vis-a-vis* situatedness that *Being and Nothingness* could provide no examples of authentic freedom, even the term "authenticity" appeared just once and that also as a footnote. Sartre states___

> It is indifferent whether one is in good or in bad faith, because bad faith reapprehends good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good faith, that does not mean that we cannot radically escape bad faith. But this supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This self-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which has no place here.[26]

Does description of authenticity, therefore, have no place in *Being and Nothingness?* It appears that *Being and Nothingness* lacked any description of authenticity because here freedom was characterized by Sartre as "a constantly renewed obligation to rename the Self which designates the free being".[27] Any discourse on authenticity is barred from *Being and Nothingness* because 'my freedom is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values'.[28] And because this freedom was necessarily pinned with a feeling of anxiety, Sartre became an easy target of Marxists who argued that through anxiety burdned freedom Sartre merely universalized the specific experience of his class; that Sartrean freedom 'typified the despair of living in bourgeois civilization at the time of its "crisis".[29] And didn't Sartre himself state in *What is Literature?-* 'Ourselves bourgeois, we have known (only) bourgeois anxiety'.[30]

Before reaching any final judgement on limitations of Sartre's ideas of freedom, authenticity, inauthenticity (or bad faith), etc, etc., it may perhaps be useful to first situate Sartre's ideas in their intellectual context. In this regard, it would be relevant to see how Frederic Jameson has tried to define authenticity in contradistinction with inauthenticity and how his attempt to see both authenicity and inauthenticity through their dialectical relationship contributes to our understanding of the human situation. Jameson, thus, asserts that inauthenticity, for both Heidegger and Sartre, was viewed as temporally prior to authenticity

(not necessarily but factically) because it is over and against the former that the latter constitutes itself as 'the primary mode of being of human life. Genuine authenticity is, therefore, not a state.... but rather something precariously wrested from inauthenticity, reclaimed and reconquered from it, and in perpetual danger of collapsing back into the older form.... For this reason we would do well.... to consider the idea of authenticity a critical one : for it cannot be defined in itself but only against some preexisting situation and state of inauthenticity which it is designed to correct or remove. We are, thus, led to explore the idea of authenticity through its opposite'.[31] Furthermore, not everything concerning anxiety (i.e., the eternal pairing of freedom with anxiety), as stated by Sartre, was negative because the idea of anxiety did express at least some truth concering the possibilities of transformation of a decadent society by trying to spell out the meaning of anxiety. But 'because Sartre in 1943 did not present his own concept of freedom in relation to a historical situation, much of the specificity of his ideas was lost'.[32] What Sartre, therefore, seems to be guilty of, in *Being and Nothingness*, is ontologization of a situation-bound experience of a specific historical period, namely, of our contemporary decadent society. It is, indeed, in context of these problems with Sartre's notion of freedom that Lukács in his *Existentialisme ou marxisme*, a work chiefly directed against Sartre with short sections on Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir, had charged Sartre for hypostasizing the 'discontents of bourgeois society as universal dilemmas of man'.[34] Similar opinions were voiced against Sartre among others by Henri Lefebvre, Henri Mougin, Jean Kanapa, Roger Garaudy, and Herbet . Marcuse.[34]

Furthermore, while Sartre might not have entirely succeeded in making clear the paradox of freedom and facticity in *Being and Nothingness,* his attempt did still reveal, as Lukacs was to recognize in his otherwise polemical work, "the importance of the individual's decision, which bourgeois determinism and Marxism habitually underestimate.... At the moment of making a decision the individual always finds himself confronted by a certain degree of freedom".[35] That the element of individual decision is not to be dispensed with is further evident from Marxism's viewing of "all social activity" as being "composed of individual acts".[36] Even according to Marxism, the infleunce of material conditions is "realised" as Engels said only "in the last instance".[37] The

question of prime importance is thus : if Marxists themselves could assign some positive role to subjectivity (Lukács, for example)[38], then, why was it that even for most celebrated Marxists (Henri Lafebvre, for example) 'no tactics were too low' in their struggle against Sartre? Why was it that Sartre's philosophy for them was at best "neurosis of interiority, a schizophrenia"?[39]

Keeping in view the attack that was launched against Sartre after publication, in 1943, of *Being and Nothingness*, it appears that the difference between Sartre and Marxism was sharpened more because of the manner in which two philosophies expressed their ideas than due to any inherent incompatibility between their principles, a fact which increasingly comes to the fore with Sartre's incorporating of the historical side of human existence in his later works without entirely giving up his concern for individual freedom. While discussing the possibilities of coming together of Sartrean existentialism and Marxism, it is important to note that in the French context both existentialism and Marxism began their individual journeys through rethinking of Hegel's *Phenomenololy*. 'Both accepted Hegel's early attempt to define human reality as unfolding in time, as an essentially temporal phenomenon'.[40] Was it, therefore, all that impossible to reconcile Sartre's existentialism which stated that the existence preceded essence and Marx's predominently materialistic interpretation of history according to which 'it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness'?[41] Isn't it true that both philosophies give primacy to life over thought? It is, indeed, true that Marx's approach with its emphasis on economy can very well be termed as collectivist, but collectivism is not all that there is in Marxism. Similarly, while Sartre in his early philosophy was primarily concerned with probing man's relation to himself, the social was not altogether missing in his philosophy. The latter point, however, requires some further elaboration.

Firstly, we need to note that Sartre's refusal to permit inclusion of any socially and historically acquired structures into consciousness has been quite problematic. But we need to place this problematic in its proper intellectual context, for the basic thrust of the philosophy of *Being and Nothingness* is of refuting determinism and dispelling of the essentialist "illusion".[42] That, in this exercise, Sartre overstated his case cannot undermine the importance of his attempt. It is in

the light of such an attempt that we can understand why consciousness could encounter the world only passively. If consciousness was allowed to constitute the world in any deeper way by getting involved in it, then it would have become like world, 'passive, rigorously ordered, unfree'.[43] Accordingly, the aspect of historicity of human relations seems to be especially missing in Sartre's analysis, 'perhaps from an undefined fear that this would impinge on the total freedom of the individual'.[44] The problem of accounting for concrete social determinations of the for-itself— (the relations of production), 'the family of his childhood, the historical past, the contemporary institutions',[45] etc. - thus remained unresolved. Within the framework of *Being and Nothingness*, it, therefore, became quite problematic to understand how consciousness could be 'colored by its social involvement'.[46]

Furthermore, the Other, in *Being and Nothingness*, appears either as a being-looked-at or as a being-looking-at, i.e., the famous looking/ looked at dyads.[47] In the former case I objectify the Other and in the latter it is me who is being objectified by the Other. 'Le regard is', therefore, 'the foundation of all interpersonal relations'[48] in *Being and Nothingness* because sadomasochistic circularity lies at the heart of all interpersonal relations.

However, from the perspective of social ontology, what is important is the fact that Sartre recognizes two centres, the "Us" and the "We", as collective aspects of the Other, though Sartre admits no plural look—an aspect which is of considerable importance for Sartre's developing of philosophical Marxism in his *Critique* project.[49] For, it is in the *Critique* that the static interpersonal relations of his early philosophy are set in motion through their grounding in human history. However, while inclusion of the Us and the We seems to fulfil a great gap in social ontology of *Being and Nothingness*, the ontological asymmetry which Sartre maintained between the Us and the We became a final obstacle in facilitating any fruitfull dialogue between Sartre of 1943 and Marxism. Sartre, in this regard, states :

There is no symmetry between the making proof of the Us-object and the experience of the We-subject. The first is the revelation of a dimension of real existence and corresponds to a simple enrichment of the original proof of the for-others. The second is a psychological experience realized by an historic man immersed

RAVINDRA M. SINGH

in a working universe and in a society of a definite economic order. It reveals nothing particular; it is a purely subjective *Erlebnis*....

....The We-subject... supposes one way or another that the Other's existence as such has been already revealed to us. It is, therefore, useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma : one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousness is not the *Mitsein*; it is conflict.[50]

<div align="center">III</div>

The social model of *Being and Nothingness*, therefore, seems to break down for the conflicts find no synthesis in this work.[51] In *Being and Nothingness,* as Merleau-Ponty remarked, 'the antithesis of the for itself and in itself often seem to be alternatives instead of being described as the living bond and communication between one term and the other'.[52] The dialectic of *Being and Nothingness* is, thus, "truncated"[53] to the extent its "social space" is 'merely an extension of the self-other relationship that obtains between any two for-itselfs'.[54] What was in short left out in *Being and Nothingness* was how consciousness could be involved in the world without totally losing itself into it. What it lacked was 'the moment when the subjective and objective conditions of history become bound together... *L'Etre et le neant* does not yet offer this social theory'.[55] But, while *Being and Nothingness* may lack any explicit social theory, it does still 'pose the problem of the reciprocal relations between consciousness and the social world as vigorously as possible by refusing to admit of freedom outside of a situation and by making the subject in no sense a reflection... but a "reflecting reflection" in accordance with Marxism'.[56] If such was the case, then, why was this work received with so much of hostility by Marxists? An answer to such a question can perhaps be attempted if we have a look at what according to Marxists is Marxism, for this alone can help us in assessing whether Marxism can be syntesized with Sartre's existentialism or not.[57]

Regarding the question of Marxism, however, there are problems about Marx's own position, for while some Marxists argue for a collectivist and economic determinist Marx, some others stress Marx's humanist side. Both groups, however, find support for their inter-

pretations in Marx's early and later writings alike.[58] The supporters of the former interpretation have generally cited Marx's Preface to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Capital, Marginal Notes on Wagner,* etc.[59] Similarly, the latter interpretation has been supported by having recourse to Marx's manucripts of 1844 which were not available to Marxist scholarship earlier than the fourth decade of the twentieth century. This radicalized and revolutionized understanding of Marxism, because number of references appeared in these manuscripts concerning what constitutes human essence and man's alienation and estrangement from the same. Some other works which supported such a reading of Marxism were Marx's early political writings on Frace, *Grundrisse*, and certain remarks in *Capital* on "The Fetishism of Commodities".[60]

In what follows, I shall be taking up only determinist readings of Marxism because most of Sartre's leading critics did subscribe to some kind of determinist reading of Marxism or other. It appears that the orthodox reading of Marxism generally sought to find 'necessary connections between apparently disparate conditions in the economic and in the cultural spheres'.[61] For orthodox Marxism, there was a causal link between economic conditions and the sphere of ideologies. Roger Garaudy, one of the leading philosophers of the French Communist Party, for example, considered true Marxist perspective as one that subordinated individual project to situation 'as superstructure to base'.[62] Similarly, contrary to Sartre's understanding of human reality, the subject for Marxism, according to Henri Lefebvre, 'is always social man, the individual viewed in his actual relationships with groups, classes, society as a whole'.[63] For Georg Lukács, Marxism distinguished itself from other approaches to society not through the thesis of economic determinism but through its conception of "concrete totality", i.e., the view that particular things and events have to be seen as parts of a whole, a whole which is concrete and not an abstraction'.[64] It is the category of "concrete totality" that, for Lukács, governed reality. For Lucien Goldmann, however, the defining characteristic of Marxism is the collective subject, where by collective subject Goldmann means 'a cretatin number of individuals (who) find themselves enaged in an ensemble of mutual relations and of relations with the surrounding world, such that their behaviour and their psychic lives constitute a structure that renders intelligible certain transformations of this world".[65] The fundamental charge of Goldmann on Sartre is, therefore,

that Sartre 'cannot consistently maintain a theory of collective responsibility because he lacks a concept of collective subject'.[66]

Such approaches, according to Sartre, however, amounted to collapsing of 'individual praxis into impersonal process or statistical generalization'.[67] Dialectical materialism, for Sartre, by ascribing dialectic to Nature reduced human reality to things. But such an attempted reduction by itself can never produce class consciousness, for it is absurd to speak of class consciousness or revolution with respect to things. Sartre could, therefore, argue that while idealism deprived man of his freedom by tying him to *the given,* materialism robbed him of his freedom as well by reducing him to the status of a thing, by denying him 'the possibility of *rising* above a situation in order to get a perspective on it.'[68] There is, thus, not much difference between what idealism and materialism offer to a revolutionary. Sartre sums up the entire gamut of things as follows :

> Materialism offers the revolutionary more than he asks for. For the revolutionary does not insist upon being a things, but upon mastering things...[69]

> Both idealism and materialism cause the real to disappear in like manner, the one because it eliminates the object, the other because it eliminates subjectivity.[70]

Both the approaches, according to Sartre, lead us to idealism because 'there are two ways to fall into idealism : The one consists in dissolving the real in subjectivity; the other in denying all real subjectivity in the interests of objectivity.'[71]

Sartre's aim through these criticisms was, however, not of refuting Marxism in favour of some kind of positivism or idealism because Sartre firmly believed that Marxism is the only living 'philosophy of our time'.[72] A philosophy beyond which we cannot move by rejecting or surpassing it because we have not yet gone 'beyond the circumstances which engendered it'.[73] Such is the case, because we can never have more than one *living* philosophy at a time. Because a living philosophy gives expression to the general movement of society that engendered it, it is the mirror through which the rising class of society becomes self-conscious.[74] 'A philosophy remains efficacious so long as the

praxis which has engendered it, which supports it, and which is clarified by it, is still alive'.[75] There is no going beyond *a* philosophy so far as society has not gone beyond that historical moment which a *living* philosophy of the time expresses. Sartre is, thus, not against Marxism *per se*. What he is against is a particular rendering of Marxism, namely orthodox Marxism.[76]

The Marxism of his day, according to Sartre, was in the grip of "sclerosis", "sclerosis" that is not indicative of normal aging.[77] Contrasting the Marxists' approach to society *vis-a-vis* Marx, Sartre states that while Marx never sacrificed the uniqueness of the event while subsuming it under a whole, Marxists' approach is, on the contrary, characterized by getting rid of the concrete meaning of the event for some pre-established ideas or aphorisms. In this regard what we, therefore, need to note is that it is one thing not to treat facts as isolated happenings but to see them as bound together through relations of *interiority* to a larger whole, and quite another thing to throw 'over to the side of chance all the concrete determinations of human life'[78] for the sake of some abstract universality. In Marx, there is not only a move from concrete to the universal but from universal to concrete as well. When Marx subordinates the concretes to a larger whole then he does it not to lose it but to discover the latter by means of the former. With Marx concepts always remain open and thus serve as convenient tools for understanding social reality. With Marxists, however, 'they are posited for themselves as an already totalized knowledge.'[79] Through their aphorisms they force the event to yield to 'the *a priori* analyses of the situation... In the Stalinist world the event is an edifying myth... A worker is not a real being who changes with the world; he is a Platonic idea'.[80]

Therefore, while contemporary Marxism embraces all human activity, 'it no longer *knows* anything'. Its concepts are *dictates*; its goal is no longer to increase what it knows but to be itself constituted *a priori* as an absolute knowledge. In view of this twofold ignorance, existentialism has been able to return and maintain itself because it affirms 'the specificity of the historical *event;* it seeks to restore to the event its function and its multiple dimensions'.[81] Marxism and existentialism do not, however, aim at two different things but their object is one and same. The only difference is that while 'Marxism has reabsorbed man into the idea.... existentialism seeks him everywhere

Where he is, at his work, in his home, in the street'.[82] And in so doing existentialism is not seeking either to go beyond Marxism or to rejecting it, for Marxism is the only *living* philosophy of our times beyond which we cannot go without going beyond the conditions that engendered it. Existentialism, on the contrary, is 'an enclave inside Marxism, which simultaneously .engenders it and rejects it... historical materialism furnishes the only valid interpretation of history and existentialism remains the only concrete approach to reality.'[83]

IV

Sartre's philosophy, thus, does not aim to be unfaithful to the general principles of Marxism, but as an ideology of existence with its "comprehensive" method, it seeks to bring to Marxism that which the latter lacks, i.e., the 'hierarchy of mediations which would permit it (i.e. Marxism) to grasp the process which produces the person and his product inside a class and within a given society at a given historical memont'.[84] Unlike Marxism, Sartre with his "progressive-regressive method" is able to locate the point of insertion of an individual into his class, nationality, race, etc.[85] Every individual's being, for Sartre, is constituted in and through the general movement of history, though every moment of this generality is lived by an individual 'as an absolute in the depth and opaqueness of childhood.'[86] The mediations which every individual effects in living his life, therefore, refer 'on the one side to objective structures, to material conditions, and on the other to the action upon our adult life of the childhood we never wholly surpass'.[87] Sartre's aim is, thus, not to sacrifice subjectivity for the world or *vice-versa,* but to establish 'such a correlation of the one with the other that neither a subjectivity outside the world nor a world which would not be illuminated by an effort on the part of a subjectivity can be conceived of'.[88]

While agreeing with Marx that 'men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past'[89], Sartre asserts that it is men who make their history and not prior conditions, for if conditions were to create men then 'men would be merely the vehicles of inhuman forces which through them would govern the social world.'[90] The concrete material conditions do exist for Sartre

as well and give direction to the general movement of history, but human *praxis* 'goes beyond them while conserving them'.[91] Thus, men in making their history both objectify themselves in it and are also alienated through such objectification through loss of intentionality of their individul project(s). And to the extent individuals are alienated from the total objective result of their *praxis*, history appears to them as a foreign force. For Sartre, it is only through the concept of *project* as that which is not yet that *praxis* as a mediation between two moments of objectivity can be accounted for.[92]

Through assigning of such a mediating role to *praxis*, Sartre does not, however, deny a "determining" role to material conditions but merely establishes functional autonomy for his existential studies. And Sartre is able to argue for such an autonomy in and through his concept of *project* because project 'as the subjective surpassing of objectivity towards objectivity... represents *in itself* the moving unity of subjectivity and objectivity'.[93] It, however, needs to be noted that the autonomy of Sartre's existentialism emanates from the negative qualities of Marxists and not from Marxism itself. Accordingly, so far as 'orthodox Marxism does not recognize its anemia, so long as it founds its knowledge upon a dogmatic metaphysics (a dialectic of Nature) instead of seeking its support in the comprehension of the living man, so long as it rejects as irrational those ideologies which wish, as Marx did, to separate being from knowledge and, in anthropology, to found the knowing of man on human existence, existentialism will follow its path of study.. (But) from the day that Marxist thought will have taken on the human dimension (that is, the existential project) as the foundation of anthropological knowledge, existentialism will no longer have any reason for being. Absorbed, surpassed and conserved by the totalizing movement of philosophy, it will cease to be a particular inquiry and become the foundation of all inquiry'.[94]

The idea that there is a break in Sartre's thought cannot, thus, be sustuined because Sartre's basic ontological position of *Being and Nothingness* does not really change in *Critique I*. Such a reading of Sartre's works is possible because even in the *Critique I* Sartre bases his philosophy of history on the individual *praxis* rather than on the collective/group *praxis*. In fact the *Critique I* seems to offer us what was missing in Sartre's early philosophy, namely, a way

of understanding individual's relations with larger social formations. 'It is (therefore) unjustified to speak of a break if one surveys Sartre's overall philosophical development. There is, rather, a continuity within his thought'.[95] There is no break in Sartre's thought, in spite of changes and deviations, because every change is not a break. Furthermore, such a reading is further supported by Sartre's own reflections on the matter in the posthumously published second volume of the *Critique*.[96]

It is important to take cognizance of *Critique II* because it is in this work that Sartre takes up the thorny issue of the structural unity of his thought through both rethinking of his ontology of *Being and Nothingness* and by providing the hitherto lacking ontological basis for *Critique I*. Through *Critique II* Sartre, thus, not only seems to perform his all too famous synthesizing activity on his own thought, but his new reflections also remove negative tonality of his philosophy.[97]

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4.   Jean-Paul Sartre, *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, tr. Annette Michelson, London, Rider and Co., 1955; pp. 185-239; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, tr. John Mathews, New York, Pantheon Books, 1983 pp. 33-64; *Search for Method*, tr. Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Vintage Books, 1968. This work is hereafter cited as SM.

5.   See *infra* notes 34, 35, 62 and 65

6.   According to Thomas Busch, 'the central weakness of *Being and Nothingness*

was its inability to offer an intelligible relationship between freedom and situation/ facticity. Sartre *claimed* that human reality was both free and situated, but his debt to the *cogito* tradition (Descartes/Husserl) in developing the former conflicted with his debt to Heidegger's historicity in developing the latter', "Sartre on Surpassing the Given", *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 35, 1991, p. 26.

7.   Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Post War France : From Sartre to Althusser*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 285.

8.   *Ibid.*, p. 80.

9.   *Ibid.*, p. 86.

10. *BM*, pp. 559-711; Thomas R. Flynn, *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 13 ff. and p. 213, n. 30.

11. Busch, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

12. See for example, the following works of Sartre : (i) *In Camera*, London, Penguin, 1958, (ii) *The Age of Reason*, London Penguin, 1961; (iii) *The Flies*, London, Penguin, 1962.

13   Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

15. Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 89. Also see, Herbet Marcuse, *Studies in Critical Philosophy*, London, New Left Books, 1972. pp. 172 f.

16. *BN*, p. 625.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, p. 653.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 666.

21. Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

22. *BN*, p. 60.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 653.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 666.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 629.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 116, In *War Diaries*, written just before *BN* and generally treated as a rough draft of *BN*, the theme of authenticity was given considerable more attention by Sartre than it acquired in *BN*, though the role of situatedness was undermined by Sartre in *War Diaries* as well.

     See, Jean-Paul Sartre, *War Diaries*, tr. Quintin Hoare, London, Verso, 1984, pp. 54 f.

27. *BN*, p. 72; Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

29. Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

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32. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

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43. Ronald Aronson, "The Roots of Sartre's Thought", *TELOS*, no. 13, Fall 1972, p. 53.

44. Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

45. Sartre (1983), *op. cit.*, p. 35.

46. Dreyfus & Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

47. Cf. *BN*, pp. 471 ff.

48. Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 19.

49. *Ibid.*, See, Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. I, tr. Alan Sheridan-Smith, London, New Left Books, 1976. This work is hereafter cited as *Critique I.*

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69. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

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71. *SM*, p. 33.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. Similarly in the *Critique I* Sartre stated that 'Marxism is History itself becoming conscious of itself', *Critique I*, p. 40.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

76. By orthodox Marxism, following Flynn, we mean 'dialectical and historical materialism as interpreted by Communist Party of the USSR and diffused through out the world by the party apparatus', Flynn (1984) *op. cit.*, p. 235, n. 27.

77. *SM*, p. 30.

78. *Ibid.*, 82.

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80. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.

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82. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

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84. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

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87. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

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90. *SM*, p. 87.

91. *Ibid.*

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93. *Ibid.*

94. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

95. Fretz, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

96. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. II, ed. Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, tr. Quintin Hoare, London, Verso, 1991

97. I am indebted to Prof. Bhuvan Chandel & Prof. Rekha Jhanji for going through earlier versions of this paper and for helping me shape many of my ideas.

VALUE NEUTRALITY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Natural sciences struggled very hard to free themselves from the clutches of Aristotelian logic and in due course of time, they achieved it. Further, the Aristotelian philosophers were so very averse to inductive method that when Galileo, after designing the telescope, invited his colleagues to look through it. a professor of Aristotelian philosophy refused to do that on the plea that it was not sanctioned by Aristotle. But astounding success of natural sciences in the preceding centuries has led social scientist to emulate the concepts, categories and the methods of the former. Moreover, as the natural scientists tried their best to free themselves from the clutches of Aristotelian logic, the social scientist too, tried to free themselves from the clutches of religion and ethics. The impetus for such an attempt owes its origin to various sources. In fact, there are causal factors to such a shift in attitude of social science investigation. But enlisting the causal factors do not explain the nature of social science, let alone its value-neutrality. It simply tells us as to how value-neutrality came to have a grip on social sciences. But it does not tell us if the value-neutrality is compatible with the concept of social science.

The Concept of Social Science

The concept of social science depends very much on the concept of human society. So, the basic questions in this connection are : What is a society? What is the nature of human society? Let us examine the view of society advanced by the naturalist and the evolutionist. For them, society is a natural object like any other physical object. It has grown or evolved in a natural process in course of time. It is true that human beings are endowed with bodies which are material in nature. In short,

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the bodies of human beings are amenable to various laws of nature. They are part of the physical objects. The body of every human person, in this sense, has a history in space and in time. But the coming together of such bodies in space and in time does not give rise to a society. The combination of various pieces of rocks, for example, cannot be said to form a society, nor does the assemblage of animals, say, goats, results in one. It may be argued that not to extend the term 'society' to certain aggregate is just a matter of convention. There can be n valid reasons for this. Further, the convention can be changed and the use of the term society in the context of animals may not be considered out of the way. But this argument cannot sustain for the following reasons :

(i) Though language is a creation of man yet it is not arbitrary in nature in the sense that we can legislate to use any word to stand for anything. It is true that language is a system of symbols and the symbols are created by man. But once they are created, a kind of fixity gets attached to them. That is to say, in due course of time, the symbols acquire a kind of meaning reflective of the characteristics of the objects which they stand for. A large majority of words in human language are of this type. It is only in this sense that words are a kind of short-hand description of things or objects. 'Society' is such a word. It has acquired connotation by being used in the context of human beings. It is not just an arbitrary symbol; rather, it is a word which reflects the nature of man and society. Society is subject to evaluation. Further, conscious changes can be initiated in society by those who form it; whereas, it does not happen in the case of natural objects. Seen in this light, it turns out that the term society cannot be applied to animals; it can only be used with reference to groups of human beings. In fact, if we look to the way in which the term 'society' is used, it tells us a different story altogether. Sometimes, the ordinary use of a term contains the key to its understanding.

The naturalist and the evolutionist do not make any distinction between a natural object and human society. For them, there is no qualitative difference between the two. There might be difference in degree. In short, human society is a kind of natural

object. This type of thinking inspired Durkheim to advance the view that there are social facts and they are prior to individuals. Further, the social facts are a species of natural facts. But this view of society and social facts suffers from the following defects. It fails to take note of the fact that social facts are not as impersonal as they are supposed to be. The rock bottom of it is created by man at different period of time. But, now, the question is : How are they created? Are they created like any other manufactured object? An object whether uncreated or manufactured is visible. But social · facts, though created by men, are not visible. This means that though social facts can be said to have an existence of their own, yet are neither visible nor tangible. But how do social facts come to acquire such an existential status? In answer to this, it can be said that it is the use of concepts that creates social facts. Take for instance, how do we explain social facts like marriage or prayer? Can marriage be explained in terms of movements or coming together of two persons; — a bride and a bridegroom on the altar, or in a mosque or in a church? Similar is the case with any other social facts. A social fact may involve physical movements, but it cannot explain the concerned social fact. The Hindu way of greeting by saying *Namaste* cannot be explained in terms of folding both the palms and bending the body a little bit. When somebody says *Namaste* to us we do not say that so and so bent his body and folded his palms. This shows that even if the so called facts involve physical movements, yet they are not constituted by it. What constituted or goes into making a social fact is the meaning that we ascribe to it. Whether meaning is explained in terms of use or the Platonic archetypes, the point remains that it is they (the meanings) that go into making of a social fact. Take away meanings, there are no social facts'. To use Searl's words, 'social facts are a kind of institutional facts distinct from the brute facts'. To understand the social fact of two persons marrying, one has to understand the institution of marriage. Similarly, to understand the social fact of prayer, one has to understand the institution of religion. Seen in this light, social facts turn out to be normative in nature for the simple reason that norms are built into the very nature of institutions. I short, institutions are subject to evaluation, whereas natural or physical facts are not subject to evaluation.

To sum up, social facts constitute a system of meanings which
are subject to evaluation or value judgements; Society is a
concatenation of social facts and social facts are value-based;
ipso facto, society turns out be a value-object. Now the question
is : Can the study of a value-object be value-neutral?

In other words, can social sciences be value-free? The
term 'social science' stands for a plethora of a loosely grouped
subjects like history, economics, political science, sociology and
such others with diverse methods and techniques. As for example,
history does not employ the same method as the one employed
in economics and so on. In other words, there is no such subject
as a unified social science though sometimes it is claimed that
sociology is such a discipline. Sociology, like any other discipline,
studies society and employs methods of its own. Every social-
science discipline has two main aspects and this is how they
differ from natural sciences. It is thus : Social Sciences like
political science, sociology, social anthropology, law and even
economics have something known as theory and a method; —
very often empirical or hypothetico-deductive in nature. The natural
sciences also contain theories but their theories have to be verified
in the light of hard facts. On the other hand, this is not the
case in the domian of so called social sciences. The social
science theories are very often broad generalizations based on
the supposedly basic nature of man in general. Take for instance,
the theories of social contract, sovereignty, political obligation
and even natural and fundamental rights. These theories are not
the result of empirical generalization of what happens in society;
they sometimes reflect our preference of one value in lieu of
another as in the case of political obligation and sometimes
present an alternative picture or model of society as in the
case of functionalist and structuralist theories. Even the science
of economics is not free from this type of preference. All the
so called laws and theories in classical economics relating to
wants, consumption, diminishing and equimarginal utility are based
on a particlar picture of man. It is this : Basically, man is
a utility-calculating animal. The legal theories including the one
relating to positive laws cannot be thought of without an implicit
or explicit value system. In short, all the core theories of social
sciences are value-laden. Even the discipline of history is not

free from such value considerations. History is not just record of events. It collects evidences and on the basis of such evidences, it seeks to understand and interpret human past. To the extent it involves interpretation, it involves preferences, norms and values.

Attempts have been made by the social scientists from time to time to eliminate the so called normative theories from the domain of social enquiry. As for instance, it is argued that normative political theory belongs to political philosophy rather than to political science. Detached from the normative elements, political science turns out to be purely a descriptive or empirical discipline. Like any other empirical science, political science aims at making causal correlation between phenomena characterized as political ones in nature. Similarly, it is argued, albeit in a different tone, that the social theories like functionalism and structuralism have relevance to sociology and social anthropology to the extent they aim at explaining certain social phenomena. Or else, they have no importance for a social scientist.

Is it possible to have social sciences without any theory? This question can be answered in two ways. They are as follows :

i) The empirical method employed in social sciences does not call for any theory about man and society at all. Like any other science, social science aims at causal correlation.

ii) Social sciences cannot be detached from theories about man and society.

Let us concentrate on the first answer. Even the pure empirical method of causal correlation is not free from the use of concepts. When we make causal correlation, we earmark certain phenomena as cause and certain others as effect. But this cannot be done without application of concepts. By this method, the raw phenomenon becomes a meaningful category and a group of them forms the cause-effect nexus. Causality in the social domain is used in a different sense from its counterpart in the domain of nature for the simple reason that in the case of the former, cause and effect cannot be generalised. That is to say, that the one

wihch works as cause of a particular effect in a particular context, may not produce the same effect in all other contexts. Whereas, in the domain of nature, it is not the case. In short, the relationship between cause and effect in the social domain is very loose. Further, in the social sphere, cause and effect cannot be separated and treated in impersonal terms. This shows that to a very great extent, it is our decision or choice that enters into treating separate phenomena as cause and effect and it is determined by our interest and attitude. In short, interest and attitude of the observer decide what items should be treated as cause or effect. Even at the stage of making the so called causal correlation values do enter into it.

Let us now concentrate on the second answer that social sciences cannot be detached from theories about man and society. As has been urged in the preceding sections, theories about man and society are not empirical. In short, they are neither confirmed nor rejected in the light of facts; rather, facts have to conform to them. Seen in this light, theories about man and society turn out to be preference-laden. Physical theories contain a major ingredient of experimental findings. As a result, any fresh discovery in the realm of nature is bound to change the concerned theory, whereas, social theories about man and society do not contain that type of empirical findings which can alter the concerned theory, if fresh facts are met with. As for example, no amount of fact can either prove or disprove the indivisible theory of sovereignty or the social contract theory relating to political and social obligation. The so called theories about man and society are really disguised value premises presented in the form of definitions. The definitions of society as a bunch of functions, a concatenation of structures or a sophisticated system, turn out to be instances of preference. No fact can decide the issue between, say, functionalism and structuralism. It is our preference or interest that decides the issue in favour of one rather than another. If this is accepted, then study of society which draws its sustenance from any one of such theories cannot be treated as value-free.

Further, it is argued that like any other scientific theorizing, study of society is kind of dispassionate understanding and it emerges out of the urge to understand society for its own sake. In this context, it is pointed out that history of natural science stands testimony

to it. It is doutful if there could be any urge that is free from all kinds of interests and preference. In human world, one kind of thing is preferred to another. An urge is not something which comes to man on its own. An urge is natural and so many factors may be responsible for it. Seen in this light, understanding in natural sciences cannot be treated as dispassionate. But, then, the question arises : In what sense, is 'dispassionate understanding' used in the context of natural science? In answer, it can be said that 'dispassionate' does not stand for bereft of any kind of interest or preference; rather it stnads for absence of any kind of prejudiced and misconceived interpretation. If this is the case concerning understanding in natural sciences, it is more so in the case of social sciences. The choice of a particular segment of social reality for study and investigation is dictated by individual interest and choice. This tendency is reflected most in study of other societies and cultures by an outsider. When somebody studies an alien society he is likely to use the concepts and categories prevalent in his society. So, at this stage, preference and value elements are likely to enter into the body of investigation process. Even in the study of one's own society, the preferences and values are not kept at bay. Certain categories such as 'anomie', 'functional' and 'dysfunctional' are not free from a particular value-orientation. Even the term 'system' is not free from value-connotation. That is to say, the characterisation of society in any term is bound to be laden with preferences and values. On the other hand, the caterories and concepts in terms of which we characterize nature can be made value-free for the simple reason that they are, to a very large extent, observational in nature. On the other hand, the basic catergories or concepts in terms of which we think about society are non-observational in nature. The categories and concepts used in mathematics are also non-observational in nature but they cannot be said to be value-laden for the simple reason that they are meant to characterize 'form' of a different sort; whereas, the categories that are used to characterize human society are concerned with phenomena of altogether different sort. These are hopes, ambitions and aspirations of human life. In this sense, the categories and concepts cannot be made value-free at all.

Further, social policy making is intimately connected with social theorizing. This shows that pure discursive and theoretical investigation without any contact with action is not possible at

all. A thought without any action is not a thought at all. The so called pure thought gives guidelines to action. Even a simple informative sentence like "it is raining", is not free from action-guiding elements. When some-body comes to know that it is raining, accordingly, he plans his course of action. If it is the rain before the sowing season and a farmer comes to know it, he plans sowing seeds in the land. If this is true of singular informative sentences, it is more so of well developed and sophisticated theories. This is how technology is built into the very structure of theoretical sciences. Technology and engineering grew out of the so called dispassionate understanding of nature. At present, no theoretical understanding of nature is respected on its own unless it has something to do with practice. In a way, practice dictates and determines a theory. Seen in this light, even natural sciences cannot be treated as value-free enquiries. In short, it is our preferences and interests that determine scientific enquiry. Of course, social sciences have not been able to produce any such thing as social technology or engineering in a systematic manner like their counterparts in natural sciences. That is to say, the so called social engineering, if there is any, is not the result of experimental research in social sciences. But at the same time social-science theories are great attitude moulders. Theories of democracy, sovereignty, political and social obligation have not only created awareness among people but have brought about changes in the management of public affairs. Even understanding of past history has made its impact felt. Economic theories, to a very great extent, have guided planning . at different levels. All these show that social sciences cannot get rid of values, preferences and interests. We accept and implement something in society only when we are convinced that these things will prove valuable in the end. The social policies are the direct outcome of the social theories in the sense that the latter provide justification for the former. In this sense, social policies cannot be detached from social theories. Irrespective of empirical or normative nature of the social theories, they continue to influence and mould social actions.

All the human sciences centre around man; that is to say, it is man that constitutes the main thrust of all social and human sciences. Though the concept of human person cannot

be visualised without the concept of body, yet the body is not investigated in the human sciences. It is the ideas, hopes, ambitions, aspirations and etc. which are created by man and become the subject matter of social and human sciences. In this sense, social sciences study entities which do not belong to the physical world. Further, all the questions about man and society basically and ultimately relate to his fate and destiny. In other words, even if a question about man and society may appear non-normative on the surface, at the base, it is value-centric. Max Weber and other social scientists claim that their task is not to recommend any value, though they can study value purely in causal terms. According to them, man might be creating values but it is not the task of social scientists to create values. Study of values is different from creation and propagation of values. In this sense only Max Weber visualized value-neutral social science. But at the same time, his conception of meaningful behaviour comes in conflict with value-neutrality. A piece of behaviour is not just any happening. In this sense, human behaviour is distinguished from an event or incident. We understand what an event is, but the type of meaning human behaviour is said to have is absent in the case of natural events. An action to be meaningful means to be significant. But what is it to be significant? When we say that an action is significant it means that it carries with it the values or preferences that we have created. To be meaningful means to be recognised as having meaning or significance. In this sense, the sum total of human behaviour forms a cluster of meanings and these are created by men. To accept the thesis that human behaviour is meaningful is to distinguish it from raw events and to treat it as value-laden.

Further, Weber treats culture as a value concept. He says :

"The concept of culture is a value concept. Empirical reality becomes 'Culture' to us because and in so far as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is coloured by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships

which are important to us due to their connection with our values. Only because and to the extent that this is the case is it worth while for us to know it in its individual features. We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its .becoming an object of investigation".[1]

The quotation proves that Weber is making contradictory statements. On the one hand, he pleads for value-neutral social science and at the same time, he also argues that culture is a value concept and no human behaviour will be intelligible without relating to certain values. How to account for this type of contradiction? One way is to accept the contradiction and point out that Weber was not very careful in what he said. The other way to go about it is to reinterpret the concept of 'value-neutrality'. It is thus : value-neutrality does not mean that human behaviour is vlaue-free at the base. But when we study human society we whould not extrapolate any value to it. But this position is self-defeating for the simple reason that it does not controvert the position that human actions are basically value-centric. Rather, it exhorts the social scientists to refrain from recommending any value-system to the people. But Weber's arguments do not prove that social sciences can really be value-free. To conclude, the concepts of society and social action are value-laden for the simple reason that the basic concept of society, i.e., man is a value-concept. To attempt to free social sciences from the consideration of values and bring them on par with natural sciences is a misadventure.

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ACT—UTILITARIANISM AND COORDINATION : A CRITIQUE OF ALLAN GIBBARD'S VIEW

Roughly speaking, act-utilitarianism is the view that always perform an act which has at least as good overall consequences under that particular occasion as any other act open to you. Act-utilitarian J. J. C. Smart (1956) believes that the rational policy for a purely benevolent person (who is interested to further the general good) is act-utilitarianism. But Allan Gibbard (1990) disagrees with Smart. Gibbard argued that the universal satisfaction of act-utilitarianism cannot guarantee the greatest possible good. The reason is, according to Gibbard, that there is conflict between act-utilitarianism and coordination.

Gibbard mentions three kinds of coordinating problem. These are non-cooperation, surplus cooperation and diffuse cooperation. He calls the three kinds of cases to distinguish cases of non-cooperation, cases of surplus cooperation and cases of diffuse cooperation and says that in regards to the first two he sees real conflict between act-utilitarianism and coordination; but in regards to the third sort he sees only bogus conflict.

Now the project of this paper is tow-fold. First, I will argue that the reason or ground on which Gibbard bases his claim that in an act-utilitarian community there is non-cooperation and surplus cooperation is ill-founded. Second, I will argue that there is a real conflict between act-utilitarianism and coordination in the case where Gibbard sees only bogus conflict.

Non—cooperation

Gibbard uses the boulder example as a case of non-cooperation. This example is stated as follows :

A boulder perches on the hill above a village of act-utilitarians, and threathens soon to hurtle down the hill and destroy the village. Together the villagers could push the boulder down the opposite slope of the hill, where it would fall harmlessly into the ocean. Instead, they go about removing their children and possessions, each freely helping his neighbours when it is the most useful thing to do.

A visiting sociologist interviews the villagers about what is going on, and since they are convinced of the utility of accurate social science, they answer him truthfully.

Q :   Why don't you get together with the others and push the boulder down the other side of the hill?

A :   The other's won't help. I can't save the village myself, and if I tried, it would take me away from saving children and possessions, with no good results at all.

Q :   Why won't the others help?

A :   Because each knows the others won't, and wants to do something useful.

Q :   Why won't you organize them to remove the boulder?

A :   They won't cooperate.

Q :   Why not?

A :   Each knows the other won't.

Q :   If someone else tried to organize people to remove the boulder, would you join in?

A :   No.

Q :   Why not?

A :   I know no one else would.

The visiting sociologist is disgusted with their behaviour, but being an act utilitarian himself, he can find fault with neither the ethical nor the factual beliefs of the villagers. They are act-utilitarians, and each one, given his belief that the others will not help remove the boulder

even if he tries to organize them, does the best thing he can in the circumstances. Moreover, as the sociologist has discovered to his disgust, each is correct in believing that the others would not help remove the boulder even if someone tries to organize them. From the act utilitarian point of view, each is correctly acting on correct beliefs. The sociologist sets about helping to remove the villagers' children and possession.

By the boulder example Gibbard tries to argue that a group of act-utilitarians will not cooperate with each other to maximize their utility. But we do not think that he has been able to show that in the boulder example the group of people (villagers) are act-utilitarians. In order to show that they are act-utilitarian, Gibbard needs to argue that when none of them cooperates with others, everyone has followed act-utilitarian principle. But no such reason is provided by him.

The conversation between the sociologist and the villagers suggests that each villager has acted, that is, has not cooperated with others on his knowledge that others will not cooperate. Now, in order to say that everyone is act-utilitarian, it must be shown that everyone's knowledge is grounded on act-utilitarian reason. But no such reason is provided by any of the villagers. So, what Gibbard has been able to show is that all the villagers are non-cooperative, but has not been able to show that they are act-utilitarins.

Surplus cooperation

A case of surplus cooperation is discussed by Gibbard with reference to R.F. Harrod's following remark :

It may well happen that the loss of confidence due to a million lies uttered within certain limits of time and space is much more than a million times as great as the loss due to any one in particular. Consequently, even if on each and every occasion taken separately, it can be shown that there is gain of advantage, (the avoidance of direct pain, let us say, exceeding the disadvantage due to the consequential loss of confidence), yet in the sum of all cases the disadvantage due to the aggregate loss of confidence might be far greater than the sum of pain caused by truth-telling (Harrod, 1936, p. 148).

By the above phrase Harrod suggests that an act-utilitarian will tell a lie whenever his/her lying has a gain of advantage over loss of

confidence in a particular occasion; but if everyone does the same, that is, if act-utilitarianism is universally satisfied, then the total loss of confidence will be greater than the total gain of advantage and hence a great consequential harm will take place.

David Lyons (1965) rightly wonders how a series of lies, each of which taken separately has an advantage over loss of confidence, together can produce a total loss of confidence greater than the total gain of advantage? In order to grasp that defect of Harrod's argument, let us consider the following set or series of lies : [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6...n]. Harrod argues that even though each of the lies of this set, eg. lie 1 or lie 2... or lie n, has an advantage over loss of confidence, yet the set of lies as a whole, that is n lies, produces loss of confidence greater than the total gain of confidence. But how one can consistenly hold that in a set of n lies, up to lie n has a gain of advantage over the loss of confidence but n lies as a whole has a loss of confidence over the gain of advantage? In order to say that the set of n lies produces a loss of confidence over that gain of advantage we must recognize that there is a point on the set, which is called threshold, where the particular lie does not have the gain of advantage over the loss of confidence. Hence Harrod's argument that the universal satisfaction of act-utilitarainism, that is, each person's telling a lie when his/her lying has a gain of advantage over the loss of confidence, together can produce the loss of confidence greater that the total gain of advantage does fail. Hence, in an act-utilitarian community there can have no surplus cooperation. This shows that the ground on which Gibbard bases his claim that the universal satisfaction of act-utilitarianism leads to surplus cooperation is wrong.

Bogus conflict?

A case of bogus conflict between act-utilitarianism and cooperation is discussed by Gibbard with reference to an example used by Richard. B. Brandt in his *Ethical Theory* (1959). Brandt developed this example to show the conflict between act-utilitarianism and cooperation. In this example Brandt tells us to consider the position of an act-utilitarian Frenchman living in war-time England who has to take decision as to whether to obey the government request to conserve gas and electricity by having a maximum temperature of 50 degree Fahrenheit in his home,

or to use more gas and electricity to raise the temperature up to 70 degree Fahrenheit to keep his home warm.

Under the above circumstances, Brandt believes, the Frenchman will not cooperate with the government, that is, the Frenchman will not help to win the war by conserving gas, since as an act-utilitarian he will reason as follows :

All the good moral British obviously will pay scrupulous attention to conforming with this request. The war effect is sure not to suffer from a shortage of electricity and gas. Now, it will make no difference to the war effort whether I personally use a bit more gas, but it will make a great deal of difference to my comfort. So, since the public welfare will be maximized by my using gas to keep the temperature up to 70 degree F. in my home, it is my duty to use the gas (pp. 389-90).

Brandt goes on to say that the Frenchman can also reason in a different way. This reasoning is phrased by R. E Bales as follows :

If enough other people decide to use gas and electricity, so that the war is lost, my abstaining won't have made any difference to the war effort, but it will have made a lot difference in my comfort. Thus, the general harm will be decreased if I use enough gas and electricity to keep my home warm. Therefore, I ought to keep my home warm (1971, p. 259).

Brandt now asks us to suppose that every Englishman reasons just like the Frenchman. If so, then the war will be lost. So he concludes :

If everybody follows this act-utilitarian reasoning, the war will be lost, with disastrous effects for everybody. Thus, universal obedience of the act-utilitarian directive to seek the public good may well cause the public harm (p. 390).

J. J. C. Smart (1973), however, rejects Brandt's argument from universal act-utilitarian reasoning, namely, that if every Englishman follows the Frenchman's reasoning, disastrous result will follow. Smart writes :

This objection fails to recognize that the Frenchman would have used as an empirical premise in his calculation the proposition that very few

people would be likely to reason as he does. They would very likely be adherents of a traditional, non-utilitarian morality (p. 58).

Smart believes that the basis of the Frenchman's reasoning is that most of the Englishmen will comply with the government request to conserve gas and electricity. So, it is wrong to say that most of the Englishmen will follow the Frenchman's reasoning.

But if we analyze Brandt's argument carefully, we shall see that the Frenchman adopted a different line of reasoning. Actually, the Frenchman's reasoning takes the following form. Either enough of the vast Englishmen will probably conform to the government directive, or enough of them will probably decide not to conform with the government directive. In the former case, the war effort will probably not suffer, if the Frenchman uses enough gas and electricity to keep his home warm, but it will make a lot of difference in his comfort. Thus, general good will be increased if the Frenchman uses more gas and electricity to keep his home warm. In the latter case, Frenchman's abstaining from using gas and electricity probably will not make any difference to the war effort but it will make a lot of difference in his comfort. Thus, the general harm will be decreased, if the Frenchman uses enough gas and electricity to keep his home warm.

Hence, the Frenchman's reasoning is not based on, as Smart thought, only the premise that most of the Englishmen will comply with the government directive. He also considers the possibility that most of them may not comply with the government directive. What Brandt's argument suggests is that for the Frenchman using gas and electricity is a dominant strategy from the act-utilitarian point of view. For, if the war is won because of the participation of enough other Englishmen, he can maximize general good by using more gas and electricity. Again, if war is lost because of the non-participation of enough other Englishmen, he can minimize the general harm by using more gas and electricity. Thus, given either alternative——lose or win——he should use more gas and electricity. In other words, as an act-utilitarian using gas is the dominant strategy for the Frenchman. If this is the correct interpretation of the Frenchman's reasoning, and I believe

it is, then there is no reason why all the Englishmen cannot reason the way the Frenchman does. So, Smart's objection against Brandt's argument from universal act-utilitarian reasoning does not stand.

We have seen why does Brandt believe that there is conflict between act-utilitarianism and cooperation? Now, let us see why does Gibbard find only a bogus or no canflict between act-utilitarianism and coopeartion in the example we are dealing with.

According to Gibbard the argument Brandt gives regarding why the Frenchman will not cooperate with the government to win the war by conserving gas is that the Frenchman will reason as follows : one agent's using gas has no effect on the total gas supply (or that an individual's cooperation is too diffuse to be noticeable); even though if everyone did the same, the result would be dire.

On the basis of his analysis of Brandt's argument Gibbard disagrees with Brandt that in the gas example act-utilitarianism prescribes non-cooperation. In order to defend this claim Gibbard challenges the validation of the reasoning of the Frenchman. He argues :

...the net value of what n gas cheats accomplish is the sum of the values of n effects individual gas cheats could have. It is the sum of the net benefit from one gas cheat in a world with no other, the net benefit from one gas cheat in a world of two others, and so up to a world with n-1 others. If the effect of n gas cheat is calamitous, at least one of these net benefits from an individual gas cheat must be negative. Hence, it is possible for an individual to produce a bad result by helping to strain the gas system, no matter how uncertain and diffuse that result may be. If the system is likely to be under strain even with everyone cooperating, an act-utilitarian will cooperate. He will calculate the average expectable net benefit from an act of gas cheating by dividing the likely effect of a large number of gas cheats by n.

Gibbard is right to reject the reasoning that one individual's gas cheating has unnoticeable or no effect on the total gas supply. For, if one individual's gas cheating has unnoticeable or no effect, then we can reasonably ask how a series of gas cheating make a noticeable effect?

But the problem is that Gibbard misunderstood Brandt's argument. Brandt does not argue that the reason why the Frenchman will not conserve gas is that his using gas has, as Gibbard thought, a negligible or diffuse effect on the total consumption of gas. Rather, Brandt says that the Frenchman will not cooperate to win the war by conserving gas, since this course of action is the dominant strategy for him in order to promote the interest of the community by his own action.

Again, Gibbard is wrong to believe that the Frenchman will cooperate to conserve gas. The reason why the frenchman will conserve gas is, according to Gibbard, that he will calculate the average expectable net benefit from his act of gas cheating by dividing the likely effect of a large number of gas cheats by all Englishmen (p. 27).

But I do not believe that as an act-utilitarian the Frenchman will follow the course of action suggested by Gibbard. For, a) the Frenchman has no reason to believe that all Englishmen will cheat gas and b) if all Englishmen cheat gas then as an act-utilitarian the Frenchman's rational policy is to cheat gas also because in this way, as we have seen earlier, he can minimize the general harm of the community.

Indeed, in the gas and electricity example there is no clear direction for the Frenchman unless he has the premise how each of the Englishmen will do. Under this circumstance, the rational course of action for him is to follow the dominant strategy, that is, not to cooperate with the government directive.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Life Member (Individual)

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LANGUAGE AND WORLD : SOME CLASSICAL INDIAN APPROACHES *VIS-A-VIS* ANALYTICAL WESTERN APPROACHES

Prologue

In this paper I am going to deal with some classical Indian approaches to language and the world, to their nature and relationship. I have particularly selected those approaches which, I thought, are most relevant to some of the approaches that were presented or discussed in analytical philosophy of the west. Behind this exercise I have a special purpose in my mind. Analytical movement in the west marks an important turning point in the history of western philosophy. It opens up new ways of justifying science as against religion and metaphysics, common sense as against scepticism and justification of ordinary language and of special technical languages as the vehicle of philosophising as against each other. It would be rather ambitious to claim that classical Indian philosophy marks any such movement. But if analytical movement in the west happens to be important for the students of Indian philosophy, it connot be studied and developed by them without relativising it in any way to Indian philosophical tradition. For doing this we need not equate modern western with the classical Indian tradition. But it should be possible to point out, in howsoever sketchy manner, the ways in which the two traditions come close to each other and those in which they fall apart. Such an exercise could also help us in developing analytical studies which have their roots in classical Indian philosophy.

In what follows I will sketch out four broad approaches to language and the world as I found them in the four philosophical systems viz., *Vaiśeṣika*, Buddhist, Jaina and Cārvāka. Side by side, I will indicate some comparable aspects of western analytical movement.

(1)   Coextensiveness of the real, the knowable and the nameable : The Vaiśeṣika approach

Praśastapāda, the Vaiśeṣika commentator, said that the characteristics common to all the six *padārthas* are realness (or being, *astitva*), knowability *(prameyatva)* and nameability (or expressibility in language, *abhidheyatva*). When later on absence *(abhāva)* was added to the original list of *padārthas*, the same common characteristics were ascribed to absence too. Vaiśeṣikas held that whatever is expressible in language is knowable and *vice-versa.* Similarly, whatever is knowable is real and *vice versa.* This view of language, knowledge and reality seems to have led Vaiśeṣikas to present a 'crowded' picture of the universe. Their universe contains Time, Space and Selves as ubiquitous substances, the numbers, the relative qualities like proximity and remotenesss etc. as objective qualities and universals, peculiarities *(Viśeṣa)*, the internal relations like *samavāya* and what more, absences too as the entities in this universe. Behind this, it seems, Vaiśeṣikas are having a picture theory of language according to which corresponding to every meaningful expression in our language there must be something real in the world. But this 'picture theory' is much more crude and unsophisticated than that of Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus.* Because Vaiśeṣikas do not seem to think, as Wittgenstein does, that the surface structure of our language often misleads us as to the structure of the world expressed through it[1]. They do not try to isolate some working sentences from language as non-sensical or senseless[2], and restrict the view of significant sentences to the remaining sentences as Wittgenstein does. Similarly, Vaiśeṣikas seem to understand linguistic knowledge of the reality as almost the mirror-impression of pre-linguistic knowledge. Therefore, there is almost one-to-one correspondence between objects perceived in non-judgemental perception and those in judgemental perception and similarly between the steps in *Svārthānumāna* and those in *Parārthānumāna* according to them.

It is true that from Gaṅgeśa onwards there is found a growing tendency of dissatisfaction amongst Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, with ordinary language as the vehicle of philosophising. But it was not because ordinary language was found to be distorting the true nature of reality but because it was found to be full of vagueness and ambiguities. In any case, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika attitude of dissatisfaction with ordinary languages led them to develop many tools and devices of clarifying

any given statement or definition and making it more and more precise. This resulted in devicing a special technical language as the proper language of philosophical inquiry. This approach of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers may be compared with Bertrand Russell's attempt to device an ideal language to describe the world precisely and clearly. But the structural differences between their proposed technical languages should not be underestimated which are partly due to the radical differences between their world-views.

The Vaiśeṣika view of language and the world seems to come very close to that of Alexius Meinong. Meinong's world contains every object that one can know or talk aobut. Similar is the world of Vaiśeṣikas, the only major difference being that the non-entities like golden mountain, square circle, horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman have no place in the Vaiśeṣikas' world of *padārthas* which they have in Meinong's world of objects. For Meinong the statement "The horn of a hare does not exist" will be about the horn of a hare. And hence the horn of a hare for him must be subsistent, though not existent. For Vaiśeṣikas, however, such a statement is not about horn of a hare but it is better understood as the one about hares, predicating the absolute absence of horns to them. In this respect the world of Vaiśeṣikas is less populated than that of Meinong. But it is certainly more populated than that of Cārvākas and Buddhists in India or Wittegenstein, Russell and Logical positivists in the West. Curiously enough the credit of developing the technique of *lāghava* and *gaurava,* which closely resembles that of Okham's razor, in India, goes to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers themselves. But they seem to have used this technique more in order to criticise over-population in the ontologies of their opponents than to reduce the population of their own ontology.

One more point of similarity between the world of Vaiśeṣikas and that of Meinong may be noted here. Meinong had to accept different degrees of realness in order to avoid inconsistency and disorder in his overpopulated world of objects. Hence, for Meinong horses exist but the being of horses subsists; similarly, non-being of the non-existent entities subsists, does not exist.[3] Similarly, for Vaiśeṣikas substances, qualities and motions exist in the sense that they are the proper substrata of Existence *(sattā)* which is a *jāti.* But the Existence, i.e. *sattā-jāti,* though real, does not 'exist' in this technical sense

of 'existence'. Similarly, *jātis* other than *sattā, viśeṣas, samavāya* and *abhāva* too are real, but they do not exist.

We considered above the Vaiśeṣika approach to language and the world. In the next two sections we will deal with two rival approaches viz. those of Buddhists and Jainas.

(2) Language consists of universals. But universals are not there in reality : the Buddhist approach

Buddhism consists of many schools of thought, with some common perspective of individual and social life but with varied but mutually overlapping understandings of ontology and the way we come to know it. Here I am mainly concerned with the view of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, the famous Buddhist logicians. The approach of these logicians to language and world differs radically from that of Vaiśeṣikas. These logicians would not accept co-extensiveness of the real, the knowable and the nameable as Vaiśeṣikas do.

According to Dharmakīrti, for instance, *svalakṣaṇas*, i.e., the basic particulars are real (*sat*) in the true sense of the term (*paramārthataḥ*). These basic particulars are given to us here and now, in an immediate direct consiousness i.e. in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.*[4] But when we judge these objects to be so-and-so, our cognition gets mixed up with mental constructs or linguistic constructs which are of universal character[5] (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). What we are given in the knowledge that we acaquire through language or inference are universals. Thus, both particulars and universals are objects of knowledge. But out of them only particulars are real. Universals are objects of language and of inference[6], but they are not real. They are mental constructs (*kalpita*). They do not 'refer' to anything that is there but relate to it by excluding from it what it is not (*anyavyāvṛtti*). *Apohavāda* of these Buddhists logicians refers to this function of language involving a sort of negative ontological commitment[7].

This Buddhist approach to language and world indicates that the Buddhist world is not as populated or burdened with 'entities' as that of Vaisesikas. The eternal substances including Self, Time, Space and internal Sense Organ, the qualities apart from sensible qualities, universals, peculiarities of eternal substances, Inherence and

absences which have a respectable place in the world of Vaiśeṣikas have no place in this Buddhist world. Buddhist logicians seem to have applied Ockham's razor much more rigorously than Vaiśeṣikas.

This brings us to a point of comparison between Buddhist logicians and western analytical thinkers like Russell and Early Wittgenstein. The Buddhist view may be presented in terms of logical grammar by saying that for Buddhist logicians all expressions in our language behave like common nouns. There are no logically proper names in our language. This is perhaps a case of nominalism stricter than that of Russell who thought that 'this' is a logically proper name or early Wittgenstein who talked of names that stand for objects in the world. Within Indian tradition it sharply distinguishes itself from the Nyāya view that every word has as its meaning the particular object, the form theirof and the universal of which it is an instance *(vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārthaḥ)*[8]. It also distinguishes itself from Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and Vyākaraṇa views according to which a non-transitory character was attributed to words and other linguistic units and also to meanings theirof. We need not discuss the details of the matter here. The interesting point, however, seems to be that just as the nominalism of Russell and Wittgenstein was a rejoinder to the traditional western forms of Platonism and realism with regard to meaning and universals, the nominalism of Buddhist logicians in India was a rejoinder to the quasi-platonistic and realistic theories of meanings and universals found in the systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Vyākaraṇa.

Let us now discuss in brief another antithesis of the Nyāya-approach to language and world, viz. the Jaina approach.

(3). Our language has some basic limitations. It cannot depict the world clearly and exactly : The jaina approach

The world as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers conceived it and the one as Jainas conceived it may be diifferent from each other in many points of details. But the two worlds are also similar in an important respect. Both are complex wholes crowded with entities. All the 'entities' which constitute these worlds are not ontologically real, but many of them are in fact impositions or projections of language. They are full of substances and their characteristics, some of them being permanent and others transitory. The world of Jainas is in a sense far more

PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

crowded than that of Vaiśeṣikas, because everthing in it is possessed with innumerable qualities (anantadharmatmaka) some of them being even apparently contradictory. The apparently contradictory characteristics projected upon things by Jainas seem to be following complete non-violence and hence staying together without harming each other. Jainas give an impression that even the law of noncontradiction is relaxed in their world and this relaxation seems to result into the thesis of infinitely over-populated universe (because anything and everything follows from a contradiction !) But this is not my main point for discussion here.

The point that I want to make here is rather this. Although the worlds of both, Vaiśeṣikas and Jainas, are more or less equally overcrowded, their responses to the question whether we can grasp its true nature through knowledge and language, move in opposite directions. (Both the systems believe in the existence of an Omniscient being, whether divine or human. But here the main question is about the knowledge and language that ordinary men have an access to). Nyāya Vaiśeṣika thinkers seem to suggest that the true nature of reality can be encompassed within the frame of our knowledge and language. Navya-Naiyāyikas use various techniques like avacchedakatā and pratiyogitā in order to define terms and describe the reality clearly and exactly. Jainas, on the contrary, seem to suggest in their doctrine of syādvāda, that our language has some basic limitations so that any description of any reality is bound to be incomplete, vague and would be acceptable. only in a limited frame of reference, under a certain interpretation. We can say : 'In a way (syāt) pot exists, in a way it doesn't. This technique of syāt helps Jainas to point out the limits of ordinary language but does not suggest any way to overcome them.

We use indicative sentences for describing reality in a variety of logico-linguistic forms and with a variety of meanings. The variety of ways in which such sentences are used and the different logico-linguistic forms that they assume are discussed and classified by Jainas in their another doctrine called nayavāda. The nature of language that Jainas present before us through their doctrines of syādvāda and nayavāda is not rigid, but elastic and flexible, not closed but open. The meanings of expressions according to

this view are not fixed and absolute but flexible and relative to certain contexts or frames of reference. This flexible and relative character of our language though useful for expressing a variety of view-points concering reality, indicates some serious limitations to the power of language to draw accurate and absolutely true pictures of reality. These limits seem to Jainas to be an essential feature of language. That is why transgressing these limits amounts to comitting a fallacy called *nayābhāsa* according to them. Philosophers, more than common men, are accustomed to transgress the limits of language and to advance absolute claims about Reality, It is no wonder, therefore, that the examples of *nayābhāsa* that Jainas give are nothing but rival philosophical positions. Through the doctrine of *nayabhasa* Jainas suggest that many absolute philosophical positions are the results of transgressing the limits of language[9].

The Jaina approach to language that becomes manifest through their doctrines of *syat, naya* and *nayābhāsa* is comparable with that of later Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle. Comparably with the former, Jainas seem to be suggesting that seemingly contradictory expressions become meaningful and acceptable if they correspond to different forms of life. They are suggesting that we would be confused and mistaken in our approach if we seek for descriptions meaningful and true independently of any form of life. Comparably with the latter, Jainas seem to be suggesting that men in their ordinary discourse employ certain expressions that mislead philosophers who are in search of 'real' meanings of these expresssions. These expressions, according to Ryle "are perfectly clearly understood by those who use them". But they systematically mislead philosophers because they are "couched in grammatical or syntactical forms which are in a demonstrable way improper to the states of affairs which they record".

Here Jainas would say that the syntactical or what may be called apparent logico-linguistic forms represent *nayas*, i.e. modes of expression. They throw some light on the structure of the reality when the sentences having those forms are used for describing it. But they do it partially and vaguely. *Nayas* do not give a complete and clear picture of reality. Philosophers, however, overestimate the role of *nayas* and fall in the trap of *nayābhāsa.*

This point of similarity between Jainas and Ryle is also qualified by a difference. Ryle believes that the misleading character of a systematically misleading expression can be removed by restating the same content in a syntactical form adequate to it. Ryle in fact undertakes the programme of restating the contents of such . misleading sentences in such a way that they are no more misleading. In terms of *naya* Ryle's position amounts to saying that some *nayas* happen to be inappropriate to the view they try to convey and in such cases the proper way to avoid *nayābhāsa* is to replace the given inapproprite *naya* by an appropriate one. This position, I believe, will not be accepted by Jainas. Becuase all *nayas* for them are appropriate though partially so. *Nayas* are partly *pramāṇa (pramāṇāṁśa)*. They can be used for giving partially true-pictures of reality. This also relates with the Jaina world-view according to which everything is possessed with infinite properties, many of which are apparently contradictory. This world-view, I believe, may not be in tune with Ryle's position. Both will agree that philosophers commit fallacies (*nayābhāsas*) when they extend the modes of linguistic forms (*nayas*) beyond their logical limit. But their ways of evading the fallacies will be different, Ryle will try to replace inadequate modes by adequate ones. Jainas, on the other hand, will propose an all-inclusive mode of *syādvada* in which even contradictory expressions can be accommodated as perfectly in order.

Though these approaches are different in this way, one similarity remains namely both of them try to dissolve the issues created by vague, ambiguous and misleading nature of ordinary language within the frame of ordinary language itself. They do not try to device any special technical language which is supposedly free from any defects that ordinary language is possessed with. This creates an image of Jainas as the defendens of ordinary language.

When we are concerned with ancient Indian approaches relevant to the analytical tradition of the west, it would not perhaps be proper to conclude the discussion without refering to the lokāyata approach. One observes that the Lokāyata approaach can be correlated with two dominent trends in the western analytical tradition : positivism and the defence of common sense. Let us try to see how it can be so relevant.

(4) *Criticism of Metaphysics and a defence of common sense : Cārvāka approach*

Cārvāka or Lokāyata ·thinkers are not known for any systematic position on language in general, but if the Cārvāka criticism of the Vedic statements and the statements pertaining to God, Heaven, Soul etc. is taken to be an off-shoot of what could have been their general view of language, perhaps some conjectures can be made about their approach to language in general.

Carvakas' complaint against the Vedic statements is not very much that they give us some wrong information but rather that they are mostly meaningless or absurd. Cārvākas, for instance, ridicule Vedic pandits by saying "*Jarphari, Turphari* etc. are supposed to be scholarly expressions (amongst Vedic pandits)." Similarly, some of the arguments that Cārvākas advance against the metaphysical dogmas clearly indicate that Cārvākas are interested in pointing out non-sensical character of transcendent-metaphysical utterences, and not simply their falsehood.

The Cārvākas' argument against the belief in the Śraddha ritual, for instance, can be restated as follows : (1) the belief in the Śrāddha-ritual assumes the form of the statement (A) : the oblation eaten in Śrāddha ritual really passes into the body of the ancestors for whom the ritual is performed. (2) If (A) makes sense, then it equally makes sense to say that (B) Śrāddha could be fruitfully offered to a man who is travelling abroad so that his hunger is automatically satisfied while in journey. (3) But B is absurd. (4) Hence, A must be absurd.

While making such arguments Cārvākas seem to be having in their mind the distination between statements which presuppose empirical or worldly framework and those which transcend it. The former were supposed to be significant and the latter non-sensical. This indicates vaguely the criterion of meaningfulness that Cārvākas had in their mind, although they did not state it explicitly.

In fact the question of the criterion of meaningfulness (i.e., cognitive meaningfulness) is the question of the criterion of a statement being *pramāṇa* in some minimal sense, in the sense of being an instrument

PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

of cognition. One can, therefore, try to draw some implications regarding Cārvākas' views on the oriterion of meaningfulness from their theory of *pramāṇas*. There, however, we have to take seriously two different models attributed severally to *suśikṣita cārvākas*. Let us call them the model of empirical testability and the model of the defence of common sense respectively.

I. The model of empirical testability

According to this model, perception is accepted as one means to cognition, but inference is clasified into two kinds : *Utpannapratīti* (empirically tested or testable) and *Utpadyapratīti* (transcendent)[10]. Inference of the former kind is accepted as *pramāṇa* (a means to cognition) but that of the latter kind is not. This position implies that a statement has to be either an observation statement or a conclusion of an inference of an empirically testable kind, in order to be a cognitively meaningful statement at all. This position is akin to that of logical positivism in the west. It helped Cārvākas to counter many metaphysical dogmas like that of soul, God and transmigration. But the position, when stretched a little further, led to solipsism and put some commonsense beliefs into question. At least this was the line on which the rival schools advanced their criticism of Carvaka epistemology.

II. The Model of the defence of common sense

According to this model, too, perception is accepted as a *pramāṇa*. But inference now is classified differently. It is classified into *lokaprasiddha* (the one which does not exceed the bounds of common sense) and other *anumāna* (which exceeds the bounds of common sense)[11]. Agian the inferences of the former kind are accepted as *pramāṇa* and the latter are not. This model is more inclusive than the first one. It can be used to counter the metaphysical dogmas like soul, transmigration and God; yet it does not lead to solipsism or scepticism as the first model does. This model is akin to the Moorian way of the defence of common sense, another dominant trend in the modern analytical movement.

Epilogue

So far we discussed a few approaches to language and the world from classical Indian philosophy and their relevance to some of the

trends in western analytical tradition. The discussion reveals, I believe, that there is enough scope to do 'analytical philosophy' which has its roots in classical Indian philosophy. I, however, do not intend to suggest even indirectly that classical Indian philosophy was nothing but analytical philosophy in its true essence.

The Late Professor G. Mishra and his followers belonging mainly to Utkal University seem to have held that classical Indian philosophy does not consist of speculative metaphysics essentially but it is essentially logico-linguistic analysis. I do not think this is a correct estimate of Indian philosophy. The more puzzling thing is that they brand Śaṅkara's Advaitism too as an exercise in analytical philosophy and treat it as on par with the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Strawson.

According to a standard interpretation of Śaṅkara's *Advaita-Vedānta*, it is an Idealism par excellence. But unlike Western Idealism it does not depend upon the Berkeleyan thesis *'Esse est percipii'*. Now as metaphysical idealism it may be better treated as the *pūrvapakṣa* of an analytical exercise rather than as a specimen of it. The prospective analytical philosophy of Indian origin, therefore, should involve a critical assessment of *Advaitism*, comparable with the refutation of Idealism as G.E. Moore attempted in the west. But many a scholar of Indian philosophy are so much overwhelmed with the philosophical personality of Śaṁkarācārya that they tend to see each and every peak of western philosophy into the mirror of Samkara's philosophy. This is a misleading attitude and needs to be considered cautiously.

In Indian philosophy we have to deal with a paradoxical situation. The uneconomic realism of Nyāya and the idealistic metaphysics of *Advaita-Vedānta*, which are in need of an analytical treatment are actually responsible for the development of various tools and devices of analytical thinking. But these tools and devices were used by them only for justifying their metaphysical dogmas, and not for transcending them. *Navya-nyāya and Nyāya-ghaṭita-vedānta* in this sense are the specimens of pseudo-analysis than of analysis proper[13].

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NOTES

1. Ludwing Wittgenstein distinguishes in the *Tractatus* (propositions 5.32 to 3.328) between *sign* and symbol. Accorrdingly, the surface structure of propositions consists of signs, whereas the deep structure is made up of *symbols*. Wittgenstein also talks of a sign-language which adequately expresses the deep structure of propositions.

2. In this connection the following propositions from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* are relevant : 4.121, 4.1212, 4.126, 4.12721, 5.632, 5.641, 6.421, 6.522, etc.

3. "Meinong, Alexius", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, Vol. 5, p. 261.

4. *"Tasya viṣavaḥ svalakṣaṇam... tadeva paramārthasat"*, *Nyāyabindu.*

5. *"Anyat sāmānyalakṣaṇam. So' numānasya viṣayaḥ"* *Nyāyabindu*, Op.cit, *Śabdārthaḥ kalpanā jñānaviṣayatvena kalpitāḥ*, *Pramāṇavārtika*, *Svārthānumāna*, 212.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Tasmād apohaviṣayam iti liṅgam prakīrtitam*, *Pramāṇavārtika*, Op. cit., 45; *Tasmāt mithyāvikalpo'yam artheṣvekātmatagrahaḥ/Itaretarabhedo'sya bījam saṁjñā yadarthikā Ibid.*, 72.

8. *Nyayasutra*, 2.2.68.

9. I have discussed the point in some more details in my paper "The Jaina doctrine of *Nayābhāsa*", *Sambhāṣā*, Nagoya University, Japan, Vol. 11 (1989).

10. Jayantabhaṭṭa attributes this model to *suśikṣita*-tara (sophisticated Cārvākas) in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. I have discussed this model and also the next one in some more details in an unpublished article "Cārvāka Theory of *Pramāṇas; a* restatement" (presented in a session of the Indian Philosophical Association, Bombay, 1990).

11. This model has been attributed to Cārvākas by Purandara as quoted by Kamalaśila in his *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*. Also see supra Note 10.

12. For my criticism of some of the claims made by the advocates of the G. Mishra school, see my reviews of the two books : -

    1. *The Theories of Error by* B. Kar (Review published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 3, April, 1980).

    2. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā : An Analytical Study*, by G. P. Das (review published in Ibid, Vol. XV, No. 2, April, 1988).

13. This paper was presented in the All India Seminar on Language, Thought and Reality organised by the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona in February 1991.

KNOWLEDGE OF VALUE

The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the nature of knowledge of value and to show that there is no fundamental difference between knowledge of value and creation of value i.e., knowing a value is constituting it. There is no sense in saying that I know a value, yet I do not want to actualise it. Knowledge of value at the same time means choice of value. Knowledge of value is not propositional, it does not uncover what it is but has got illocutionary force (to use Austin's language) of transforming the very being of the individual. Here, it is important to distinguish the knowledge and the content of value in *oratio-obliqua* and *oratio-recta* i.e., mentioning the concept of value and using the concept of value. One might refer to value in the third person which is mentioning the concept of value in *oratio-obliqua*. The primary use of value is only in the first person (based on the content of consciousness of the person), other uses are only parasitical on it. In the present paper we are not interested to analyse value in *oratio-obliqua* which concerns value at the second remove i.e., value as commodity of social transaction. We propose to discuss value in *oratio-recta* which delineates creative innovation in value experience.

In the first place, it is important to distinguish knowledge of value from knowledge of fact and knowledge of possessing a skill i.e., in which sense 'knowing an ideal' is different from 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The three kinds of knowledge are interlinked without being identified with one another. 'Knowing an ideal' presupposes information and skill but it is not exhausted or defined in terms of them. This highlights the supervenient character of an ideal. 'Knowing that' refers to or comprises of factual propositions which can be true of false. Such propositions refer to state of affairs

which are either affirmed or denied. Factual propositions can be of past or present but they are not future-oriented (unless they are predictions). 'Knowing how' involves skill which is a capacity to control and regulate the objects or their clusters and their processes of change. Skill is the ability on the part of the agent to identify, fabricate and implement the relevant steps to secure the product sought. Any skill entails judging suitability of some means to realise acknowledged ends. For example, the skill of the doctor is in bringing optimal results, it is in his therapeutic performance— by his expertise based on evaluation of the pathological condition of the patient as well as his medical competence in implementing the relevant course of the treatment. In other words, the doctor adheres to a pre-set paradigm of good health, as an objectively determined norm, in view of specifics of the each case which is in distinction to his 'professional value' of removing afflictions of mankind.

Skill is about the present and anticipated future. 'Knowing that' is the assertion of discrete states, in 'knowing how' there is succession of states which can be regulated and controlled (if there is genuine capacity) by conduct which amounts to an intended project. Value refers indifferently to past, present and future. The apprehension of value is not only at present moment but it serves as a paradigm for evaluating (past actions) and guiding future actions.

A great deal of philosophical reflection has been done in the past on exact manner of formulating ideals on the grounds of appropriate locutionary information and dependable understanding of the relationship of means to ends. Is there or is there no determination of ends on the basis of knowledge of fact relevant to human activities and adequacy of some activities to produce certain consequences? So, philosophers have argued to establish that truly basic to any ideal are facts (of course even among themselves they make different levels of givenness) which are not impervious to human intentions, needs, goals and even the latter are reflections of one's own body as well as mental dispositions. As such there is double dependence of values both in terms of (1) feasibilities of value and its realization in the world (2) articulations of values from the matrix of one's attitudinal dispositions, body states, stock of mental images and verbal sequences. Against such naturalism, it is maintained in the present note that values are neither equivalent nor derivable from determinate set of

either some facts or by introduction of some constitutive definitions. Ends are recognised independently and are not accumulated from sheer accretions of means. In fact the appropriateness of means is judged through ends. Value is not to be derived from any stock of conditions. Stock of knowledge is only an enabling condition but no set of such conditions can be a determining condition. What determines a value is reflective appraisal that goes beyond the enabling conditions. The individual can hold a value which might be in conflict with the demands of his own nature, inclinations, habits or society. Value can arrest, check or reverse the normal anticipations of hitherto gathered stock of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The same fact can be apprehended in alternative value and the same value may manifest in alternative facts. For example, a techer's giving lenient marks to a weak child may be interpreted as an act of generosity or an act of achieving the ideal of equlity by giving the beneficiary the essential and desirable confidence that he is like other children. We can also see this assessment as embodying on the part of the teacher his excessive devotion to the balanced growth of the child as intrinsic part of his vocation. Similarly, different means can be adopted to attain the same value. Justice can be achieved by various means i.e., by punishing the law-breakers, by removing the procedural delay etc. All these instances are designed to make the point that knowledge of norms does not entail any particular specific strategy.

It is often argued that there can be various perspectives even in 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The nature of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' is not simple or unproblematic. There is immediacy even among objects of 'knowing that', which are alternatively appropriated later by our different cognitive judgements. One does acknowledge the contribution of mind in appropriating perceptual judgements and that goes contrary to the simplistic notion of knowing that as basically revelatory of the external object (naive realism). The same fact can be interpreted in alternative ways. One can intergrate and assimilate the object in different ways. Sometimes, the two propositions may refer to the same information. For instance, the propositions (1) The number four is greater than three, (2) number three is smaller than four refer to the same information. But in the paradigm of 'knowing that', subject is determined by the external object in terms of the content of the representation. The implications of 'Knowing that' depend upon a certain state of affairs. 'Knowing

that' is asserted with truth-claims and truth-claims of 'Knowing that' are nothing if they do not implicate some particular fact. In case of 'knowing that', act, content and object are distinguishable. Likewise, in 'knowing how' the relationship of means and ends sought is not simple and call for knowledge conditions in terms of 'knowing that'. Besides that, in 'knowing how', one can adopt different skills to get the same thing. There can be different stages as warranted by alternative means referring to the same end. But each alternative will have its own constraints. One may adopt different means for swimming, there can be different types of physical movements i.e., movements of hands, breast etc. But keeping oneself aloft on the surface of water is one of the determining conditions. Further, 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' are affirmed or refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. 'Knowing that' is subject to improvement and revision by the appropriate evidence, there are rules and criteria of accepting evidence that could have alternatives. 'Knowing how' is appraised in terms of efficiency to bring about a certain state of affairs.

Value autonomy, on the other hand, is of a different order. One should not mix up immediacy of knowing 'that' and 'how' with valuational immediacy. The former set of immediacy is passive as against what we call constitutive 'experience of value' which both in form and content seems to fuse in subjectivity and does not merely represent an 'external presentation'. Value is not determined by any finite set of conditions. It is contra-factual and occasions the freedom of the individual. Value experience, accordingly, is transcendent of the historic conditions of life of the person as well as the natural order of things. The biographical antecedents of the individual are to be distinguished from valuational constituents that are reflected upon by the individual. The historical facts of the agent are not determinants of the valuational cognitions. The relationship between values and their opposite conditions of adequate realisations is not pre-determined and any coincidence between the life of the individual and his values, need not be thought to be mutually interdependent. The life conditions do not have symmetrical role in articulations of value experience. The same pattern of desires, needs and their backdrop of realization could present to human awareness drastically incompatible values. A great failure may bring about to a person to realise the value of renunciation of material possessions. While another similar

experience on a historic occasion may arouse the same person to the value of courage under adversity and struggle against odds. The reverse might happen to another person. He may learn renunciation in victory and courage in ordinary circumstances. The third person may see the vanity of all hope either in failure or victory. Here, the important philosophical issue could only be the question whether on the ground of psychological correlates and unique sequence of each individual memory, the so-called 'same person' is really the same person. In other words, underlying the great rigmarole of finitude, truth is that we are genuinely in depth 'different being'— a saint, a poet, a lover, a philosopher, a criminal, articulated by collaterally 'defined values', often peopling the same bodily location.

What the above contrary instance of correlation of different types of intentions and their realisations or frustrations demostrates is that a man can realise a value independent of any particular specific scenario, though some scenario is always called for as it is not possible to think of value in vacuum. The agent sidesteps his own historicity or could transfigure and transform 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' which constitute the scenarios of the subject in specific historic episode. This reveals the dimension of value, though rooted in temporality and historicity (even in plurality), is, however, timeless. It helps human awareness to transform finitude into unconditioned imperatives as universals. This awareness does not disregard the basic concrete conditions or reject those as of no consequence but assimilates in our intense revelatory values. These varied conditions are not incompatible with the positing of these revelations of not yet realised possibilities of human subjectivity. It is in reorganising and reconstituting the given world that value reveals their dynamic potential. Once a value is recognised, it is not vitiated by the external conditions; the hostile consequences in no way could disvalue it. Values cannot, thus, be supported or repudiated by empirical evidence. It is not the material success or failure which defines value. If one has not succeeded in actualising the value, the failure would be taken to be of means and not of value by one who has experienced it. By others it is only through *oratio-obliqua* or 'mentioning of values' which never possesses value experience itself, but disputes its externalisation. If charity producess bad

consequences, there is nothing wrong with the value of charity, but with the modes of realising it. This is what we mean by intrinsicity and autonomy of value and freedom and creativity of the agent. To say that I cognise goodness in x means I apprehend x to be good. The judgement is neither on mental facts, nor on objective state of affairs but on the intentionality of the cognising subject. The statement is about the way of constituting a value on the basis of entertaining the good reasons for value and judging them as sufficient to be universal.

Value depends upon the appropriation of consciousness. The relationship between consciousness and the object of value is internal. In cases of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' the relationship between consciousness and the object is external. My subjective self is distinguishable from my information and skill whereas my value is not different from my own being. Value does not make one more informed or efficient but transforms the very being of the individual. It is in this sense we can say that knowing a value is ideal self-formulation. Value and person are coeval i.e., self-revelation and axiogenesis are interdependent. Here, person is not to be understood in terms of psycho-physical reality but as slef-positing subjectivity. The concept of person is non-naturalistic, it is neither determined by internal states of the body nor by external objective facts, but is characterised by a free transcending act which is to be explained in terms of creative acts. The person is in terms of his value-profiles and value is dependent upon the constitutive activity of consciousness. As person is defined in terms of values, there is no genuine perception of incompatibility of any intrinsic value by the person. Once a value is recognized, it does not remain my value but is held to be the value. Therein lies universalisability of value. Values are not chimeras and psychic events having compulsive praxiological determinations. The realm of value is the realm of objective uncertainty, creativity and freedom. Further, knowing a value commits oneself to a distinct praxis. This is the difference between axiological formulation and theoretical construction. Value is not an abstract ideal, it must press for its realization. Knowing an ideal is knowing its function as guiding conduct. In other words, knowing a value commits oneself to make choices and perform actions.

Thus, one of the contentions of the present paper, as I would like to reiterate, is that our philosophical analysis of value and understanding of subjectivity have not been recognized to be as close as in fact they are. The process of constituting intrinsic value by subjectvity does not presuppose any metaphysical conception of self. The twin conditions of creativity and universal obligatoriness are fused in human freedom. Conceptually, self (person) and value are different, the former is ontic, the latter is normative but the experiential content is identical.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF NICOLAS BERDYAEV

Berdyaev's thought, at first glance, seems to be a complex combination of Existentialism, Romanticism, Marxism, Christianity, and certain strands of Russian thought. However, his philosophy can be said to be organised between two axes, namely, Existentialism and Christianity. Indeed, Berdyaev himself claimed that his philosophy went beyond the accepted limits of philosophy and represented a confession of faith. In other words, it was a philosophy born of spiritual experience, rather that deduced from ascertained and assured premises.

Berdyaev's thought represents, like that of all Existentialism, a reaction against the speculative idealism of Hegel. Berdyaev rejects the 'logic' of starting from 'pure being' and of moving from it to existence as absurd. Reality seen through Hegelian bifocals was a 'dying' of the infinite into the finite and of the eternal into the temporal. Then, what was central to Existential philosophy was a clear perception of the distinction between fact and value (here fact is neither the sense-perception of St. Thomas, or 'subjective' impresions of Hume). Man is presented with a reality; he is unwillingly flung into it. Values are created only by the free act of a human agent, who takes this or that to be good or bad. It is the human agent who freely makes a world of the 'reality' given to him. Just as Kant does not see any good or evil apart from will, the Existentialist does not recognise any will apart from freedom. Thus, existence is not to be associated with the 'dream-world' of speculation; existence for the Existentialist is always a very particular existence.[1] Thus, freedom itself is the source of ultimate value.

Berdyaev regards Existentialist philosophy as the knowledge of reality through human existence and its concrete manifestations. Thus, the individual existence, according to Berdyaev, is the most existential

of all. In knowing himself man is initiated into the mysteries unknown to him through his knowledge of others. Here, Berdyaev shares the idea of man the Microcosm, which was a variant of the Renaissance idea of man, drawing particularly from the ideas of Herder and Goethe. Man's personality was infinitely more mysterious and unique than the world he lived in. This was why there arose, according to Berdyaev, a conflict between history, with its complex movements and agencies, and man, with his unique and irreducible personal destiny. History and historical processes to Berdyaev were hostile and merciless to man because they arose and grew for the sake of inhuman and personal aims. But if man was a microcosm as pointed above, then there was another fundamental aspect of the conflict. This was the aspect of man's self-identification with history :

"At the deepest mystical level everything that has happened to the world happened to me... Events of my age and the destiny of the world in which I live as events happening to me as my own destiny."[2]

A philosophy of existence, then, according to Berdyaev, gives expression to the problems and conflicts of man and in this sense is very close to life. Berdyaev shares with the Existentialists, a commitment to freedom as the ultimate value. What marks him apart from Existentialists like Nietzsche, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus, and to some extent Heidegger, is precisely that which is unique to his thought and philosophic system.

In Fear and Trembling, what Kierkegaard was aiming at, and trying to solve, was the paradox of faith. Faith in the light of public morality was absurd, and yet in the story of Abraham and Isaac faith seemed to have had a 'secret' victory. Kierkegaard here was alluding to a fundamental issue. To him moral acts can not be explained and understood through general, rational communicable principles. This is where the problems of speculation in general and Hegelian speculation in particular lay. Kierkegaard considers the central problem to be that of the individual and his personal or subjective existence. But this existence is also existence as 'inwardness'. This is what speculation overlooks or radically misinterprets. Thus the 'secret' victory mentioned above is that of the supreme value, which only religious life can claim. This lies beyond reason, beyond speech, in the decisive moment when the will submits itself to God. All intellectual and moral processes,

thus, do not begin from 'pure being' (or even a universal subjectivity), but from a sudden flash of understanding, which Kierkegaard describes as a 'leap'. The modern Existentialists reject any domain of the ethical. The temptation of Abraham becomes the symbool not of man before God, but of man before himself, the tragic ambiguity of the human situation.

What Kierkegaard and Berdyaev seem to be pointing towards is that faith is not necessarily a banishment of all 'understanding'. Like St. Augustine, they seem to be positing that faith could merely be a mode of understanding. The need is for man to recognise himself as 'created'. His consciousness of selfhood as in some mysterious sense is forever dependent upon an inexhaustible and unconditioned source of Being, Wisdom, and Power in whose image he is made. To this mystery no rational explanation was possible. What Augustine seems to be pointing quite correctly is the primacy of some sort of inner knowledge which does not require or admit external verification. It is to Augustine, as well to Kierkegaard and Berdyaev, undemonstrable. To achieve this inwardness man needs to overcome the deficiency of thinking in terms of bodily images, which gives rise to a crude anthropomorphism. The need, thus, was to recognise the creative principle as pure spirit.

Kierkegaard's conception of Christianity, however, breaks decisively from all Christian orthodoxy, in the sense of the elimination in his thought of any conception of the notion of an objective truth of Christianity. Rather, the problem of every Christian was, according to Kierkegaard, on the subjective side. It was the riddle of his own path to faith. It could also be called the paradox of the 'God-man' (a concept we would return to in detail while discussing Berdyaeev). It was a call to return to the life of intensive introspection.

What is central to Kierkegaard as an Existentialist is the fact of the necessity of free beings to be 'just this and not that'. It is a conflict between the sheer givenness of each person's history versus his aspiration as an individual. What Kierkegaard wants to interpret are these very variations of human personality as they felt to the person himself. Two points regarding Kierkegaard in particular, and Existentialists in general, need to be pointed out before proceeding to situate Berdyaev, however partially, in a particular tradition of

thought. One, Kierkegaard would believe that the immediate temporal flux of our experience is the sphere of quality, and is often misunderstood by the quantifying abstractions of the intellect. Two, the emphasis on the meaninglessness that continually underlies human life, or the contingency of human life, death being the most dramatic and the ultimately determining example of such contingency (*Geworfenheit*, as Heidegger calls it).

<center>II</center>

Berdyaev views man's self as an intersection between two worlds. The first he calls 'this world' or 'life' alternately; and this world, which is the world of actual living, is unauthentic and untrue. The world, thus, was limited and finite. The folly of classicism was to create the illusion of the possibility of perfection in finite, whereas, in reality, perfection can only be attained in the infinite (this is strikingly similar to Heidegger's concept of 'Das Man', existence as a formless theyness). The second he calls 'another world'. This is a more authentic and more true world, and one to which man's deepest self belongs. The revulsion towards 'life' was purely spiritual in nature, and comprised of a rejetion of sexual love and the struggle for power, both of which were constitutive of 'life'. Berdyaev in rejecting sexual love can be seen to belong to the Gnostic tradition, which places emphasis on the greatest attainable purity and a going back to the basic truth.

The critique of the struggle for power forms the basis of his theory of freedom, and the resolution he attains in connection with the conflict is the one between freedom and pity. This would be discussed in the following pages in greater detail. It would suffice to point out that Berdyaev sees his thought as conflict between the Tolstoyan and Nietzschean impulses; he resolves it for himself by choosing the Tolstoyan. Berdyaev is sympathetic to Nietzsche's analysis of the advent of the superman and for his passionate thirst for the immortality of man. What he distrusts is the sliding of freedom into tyranny and cruelty in some form or the other of the will to power.

Berdyaev, thus, 'invents' the term 'objectification' in order to express what he terms as his fundamental philisophic intuition. The critique of 'objectification' stemmed from an inability to believe in and rely on the firmness and stability of the objective world— the

world of our natural and historical environment as real. Berdyaev believes that the subject begets the object. Only the subject is ultimately real, 'existential', and only the subject was capable of knowing reality. It is important to note that Berdyaev believed that reality as nature was already in a state of 'objectification'. Indeed, scientific knowledge was evidence of man's attempt to overcome the alien power of nature and to humanise it. This raises the question of the success of Berdyaev to abandon Hegelian influences, or at least Hegelian categories. It also points to Berdyaev's departure from classical Christianity. St. Augustine felt that man may realise that he embodies a spark or the divine essence. Thus possessed, he may mistake it to be *prima-facie* claim to divinity and consider himself to be above the natural order of which he forms a part. Berdyaev in this respect seems to retain the Enlightenment faith in progress and the gifts of science.

The critique of 'life' or 'this world' brings us to perhaps Berdyaev's central theme, which is that of freedom. The question of freedom is posed in terms of the extent to which 'life' denies or does violence to freedom. Freedom gives birth to suffering, while the refusal to be free diminishes suffering. Before going substantially into what Berdyaev means by freedom, it would be worth considering what it does not mean for him.

Freedom was not a creation of necessity as it was for Hegel. It was not 'free-will' either. Free-will seen as choice or possibility of choice leads to man's confrontation with a norm. It is the norm which determines a distinction between good and evil. This view of freedom in the least can guarantee man's accountability to law. True freedom cannot be thought of in psychological or moral terms. but only in metaphysical terms. In other words, what Berdyaev is attempting, in the fashion of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, is a total critique of morality, and the foundations of Western philosophic tradition. Philosophy, according to Berdyaev, does not take into account the mysterious element of inspiration. Neitzsche, Berdyaev feels, was right in asking about the place of creative ecstasy, vision and prophecy in man's effort to comprehend reality. Freedom, then, for Berdyaev is, firstly, the agent or subject's own independence, determination from within and creative initiative. Secondly, it does not depend on any norm and its exercise is not a mere choice between a good and an evil. Thirdly, freedom

is agent's own and his own creation of good and evil. Berdyaev's own conception of freedom at first glance is entirely Kantian— freedom as determination from within. But the free-will for Kant was a rational will since the content of obligation was determined purely from will, i.e., it was done by applying purely formal criterion to prospective action. Rationality here involved thinking in universal terms and thinking consistently. The acid test of the will being truly free was that it was not determined by nature. Thus, the moral subject was free in a radical sense, since he obeyed the dictates of his will only. Where Berdyaev, like Kierkegaard, departs from Kant is his conception of universality of formal criterion of human rational free-will, and thus, the fact that the totality of human nature could be described formally and systematically. Freedom to Berdyaev remains at a fundamental level 'inwardness' and complete self-isolation.

Berdyaev is not averse to talking about the dialectic of freedom duly being revealed in the destiny of man and the world. The Hegelian vocabulary is self-evident; moresoever, it is the fact that Berdyaev begins with replacing Being with freedom and then seems to turn full circle by replacing the Geist with freedom (nor can the fact escape us that Geist chose his own nature in radical freedom from anything merely given; what, however, distinguishes him from the freedom of the Existentialists is his being bound by rational necessity.)

The above arguments raise the question whether Berdyaev's notion of freedom is merely a variation of the Kantian and the Kierkegaardian notions, or does it stand on its own merit. For answering this we must look at two of Berdyaev's fundamental conceptions; uncreated freedom and God-man.

III

Uncreated freedom, according to Berdyaev, is a limiting notion which describes symbolically a reality and does not lend itself to logical definition. For St. Augustine, freedom was a part of God's creation. It was born out of faith, gaining significance by exhibiting its dependence upon a principle which being at once beyond the subject, and in him— cosmic and personal, is put forward as genuinely creative. Berdyaev's uncreated freedom,

however, is rooted in the 'non-being' which preceded creation, relieving God from the responsibility of its existence (though his notion goes back to the Augustinian creation 'out of nothing' for its formal expression). At the same time by creating the 'nothing' into 'something' endowed with definite qualities, Berdyaev at one level remains fundamentally Manichean, though he considers himself opposed to both ontological dualism and monism. One wonders if Berdyaev's state of uncreated freedom is any different from Kierkegaard's third state of his existential dialectic, which is the religious stage. Briefly, this stage is one in which the individual, totally isolated from his fellow-men, stands in the shattering realization of his unworthiness before his God. Subjectivity can be truly subjective only in the confrontation of the individual with God, since only the absolute is completely indescribable. Only before God is a man really himself, because it is only before God that he is finally and irretrievably alone. To Berdyaev the antithesis between uncreated freedom and God is alone discripting of the relationship between God and man as experienced in this world. It is the realm of the divine, transcendent mystery, in which all antitheses and all contradictions are removed, and attempts at expressing it in logical propositions becomes superfluous. Thus, as opposed to the Augustinian view mentioned above, Berdyaev imparts supreme importance to the human person in opposition to all the impersonal and supra-personal manifestations of the objective world and beyond, which constantly threaten to crush and engulf man.

Thus, the uncreated freedom tends to be complete and wholly isolated inwardness, with the only really private and incommunicable which was the absolute, for content. This gives rise to what Berdyaev calls 'anguish', which was the point of the greatest conflict between personal existence in the world and the transcendent. It awakens in the subject his awareness of God, but at the same time signifies his God-forsakenness.

Berdyaev is uncomfortable with the focus on one's self in total isolation. The paradox of freedom and pity confronts his notion of freedom. Human life, to Berdyaev, comprises of two movements. Ascent, when man dares to transcend himself and his environment and rise to God. Ths spiritual strength he

gains in the process leads him to recreate the natural configuration
of life and create new life and new values. Descent signifies
those left below, who are weak of spirit and incapable of reaching
out to the heights of creative knowledge and vision. To Berdyaev
freedom could never spell irresponsibility; it is pity and compassion
that renders freedom possible. In order to substantiate his argument,
Berdyaev undertakes a major revision of the notion of God (It
must be noted that · here Berdyaev is diametrically opposed to
Nietzsche, who in the *Genealogy of Morals*, undertakes a thorough-
going critique of the notion of 'pity')

Berdyaev saw the image of God, not as a punitive deity beholding
the suffering world, but rather that of a loving suffering, crucified
God. He sought to accept God through his Son, who took upon himself
and bore the sufferings of mankind. Thus, God to Berdyaev is neither
Plato's idea of the good nor Aristotle's concept of the pure act. Rather,
he is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; the God who is made
man with whom man enters into personal relations. In surrendering
to the 'impulses' of creativity, ecstasy, vision and prophecy, Nietzsche
had come to the conclusion that God was dead. But the death of
God to Nietzsche also marked the death of man and the advent of
the superman. To Berdyaev ecstasy, vision and inspiration were a
pledge of the living reality of God and man. This is the essence
of the notion of God-man. It was to Berdyaev, the greatest revolution
brought by Christianity in the sense of the revelation of the humanity
of God. Berdyaev, however, warns against a debased God-manhood,
whereby God is pedagogically adapted to the requirements of fallen
nature. Pedagogy suited to one age may be unsuitable and even harmful
in another. What Berdyaev stresses is the fact that this world had
contained the supreme manifestation of divine truth— its crucifixion
in and by the world. All this may not prove God, but it proclaims
him in his divine humanity.

Berdyaev's philosophy, thus, centres around the Existentialist
theme of freedom and the primacy of the subject. In an age which
shares a general pessimism about man and his nature, Berdyaev's
thought could be seen as situating man in a place of primacy; a
lack of faith in man would mean similar lack in the divine image
and the divine idea of man. "The meaning of life", says Berdyaev,
"lies in a return to the mysteries of the spirit in which God is born

in man and man is born in God."[3] This return is not a return to a state of primal innocence, but a process of creation, incorporating all experience which attend the destiny of man and, significantly the human condition.

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NOTES

1. Heidegger does not deny that an Existentialist must not take into account the limits of stituation. What, however, he is trying to explain is facticity as well as freedom, which he terms as freedom-in-facticity.

2. Nicolas Berdyaev, *Dream and Reality*, Geoffrey Bles, London 1950, p. xi.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

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DISCUSSION

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANALYSIS AND INSIGHT [PRAJÑĀ] IN MĀDHYAMIKA BUDDHISM : SOME WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS

This article sets out for the first time what Western scholars say is the relationship between analysis and insight, or wisdom in Madhyamika Buddhism. This article shows that there is a wide range of opinion amongst Western scholars on this point. Theses are different for views regarding Nāgārjuna's[1] *Chandrakīrti's* and the Geluk-ba *Prāsaṅgika*[2] ideas about the relationship, as seen by certain Western scholars. This article both brings the issue of the relationship to the attention of a wider readership and shows the danger of making universalistic generalisations about the Mādhyamika.

SITUATION

In regard to whether analysis is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the arising of insight, an after text exegesis of some Western scholars' opinions in Dean's work *The Relationship between analysis and Insight in Mādhyamika Buddhism*[3]—Dean showed that there is a diversity of opinion amongst Western scholars[4] about the relationship between analysis and insight. With the exception of Inada, and perhaps Murti, those scholars who have dealt with the Prāsaṅgika agree by and large, that analysis has some bearing upon the attainment of insight. Where these scholars diverge in is in regard to the centrality that the analysis has in the relationship. More specifically, the issue is the degree to which consequential analysis *(prasaṅga)* influences the structuring of thought in such a way that insight is achieved.

It could be concluded from the writings of Inada and Murti, who considered the wirtings of Nāgārjuna, that they reagard analysis as neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for the arising of insight. From the work of Stcherbatsky, Schayer, Streng, who also considered Nāgārijuna and perhaps, the ambivalent Murti, it could be concluded that analysis is at least a necessary condition for the arising of insight. When it comes to the scholars like Fenner, Gangadean, Hopkins, Thurman and Napper, it could be conclued that analysis is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the arising of insight.

The view of Western scholarship regarding the function of analysis are quite varied. Western scholars such as Schayer, Stcherbatsky, de Jong and possibly Streng, Murti and Fenner, it could be argued, maintain that analysis has the function of preparing the ground, or conditions such that insight may arise. Inada and Murti argue that intuitive insight is not caused by analysis. Stcherbatsky, Schayer and de Jong argue that insight is an intuition and comes about by analysis preparing the ground. Streng argues that analysis prepares the ground for a conceptual insight. On the other hand, Fenner, who considered Chandrakīrti, and the Geluk-ba (as described by Thurman, Hopkins and Napper) argue, in opposition to Nagarjuna and Chandrakīrti, that intuitive insight is directly caused by analysis; though it could also be said that Fenner advocates a preparatory model.

As there are divergences of opinion regarding : 1) the relationship between analysis and insight; and 2) whether analysis prepares the ground for insight to arise or is a direct cause of insight, there is also disagreement over the nature of the insight for the Mādhyamika. Fenner argues that in the case of the Prāsaṅgika as represented by Chandrakīrti, insight is non-conceptual, or intuitive. Napper, Thurman and Hopkins maintain that in the case of the Geluk-ba, insight is both conceptual and intuitive. Inada, Murti and Streng argue that in the case of the Mādhyamika, as represented by Nāgārjuna, insight is intuitive. These divergences of opinion, it was argued, caution us against making universalist claim for the Mādhyamika based upon the exegesis of one tradition or a limited number of Mādhyamika texts.

A summary of Dean's interpretation of how the western scholars view the relationship between analysis and insight is given in Fig.

1. It must be emphasized that many of these scholars did not consider the question of the relationship between analysis and insight. Consequently this table is only an interpretation based upon an exegesis of their writings.

AN INTERPRETATION OF WESTERN SCHOLARS' POSITON

	Pr	D	I	C	NECE	SUFF
@ F	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
# H	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y?
# T	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
# N	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y?
*S	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	?
*D	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?
*Mu	Y?	Y?	Y	N	Y?	?
*I	N	N	Y	N	Y?	?
*St	Y	N	Y	N	?	?
*Sc	Y	N	Y	N	?	?

KEY

Y : YES   N : NO

Pr : Analysis Preparatiory, D : Analysis Direct, I : Intuitive insight, C : Conceptual insight, NECE : Necesary condition, SUFF : Sufficient condition, F : Fenner, M : Murti, I : Inada, St: Stcherbatsky, Sc: Schayer @: Chandrakīrti

* : Nāgārjuna, # : Geluk-ba

FIG 1

This chart can be summerised in the following way :

Dean's work has shown that the debate on how the Prasangika regard the relationship between analysis and insight, as delineated by the above scholars, centres around four viewpoints — namely :

1) Analysis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the arising of insight, as there is no causal relationship between analysis and insight. Nāgārjuna (Inada, Murti?).

2) Analysis is at least a necessary condition for the arising of insight, as it prepares the ground for an intuitive insight. Thus, there is a weak relationship between analysis and insight — i.e., analysis is only a preparatory stage for an intuitive apprehension of ultimate (paramārtha) truth ie NĀGĀRJUNA (de Jong, Murti, Schayer, Stcherbatsky, Streng and Gangadean).

3) Analysis is a necessary and sufficient condition for the arising of a intuitive insight. There is a strong relationship— ie analysis is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of the arising of insight i.e. Chandrakīrti (Fenner).

4) Analysis is a necessary and sufficient conditon for the generation of a conceptual and intuitive realisation of the ultimate (paramārtha) Geluk-ba [Hopkins, Thurman and Napper]).

It can be seen that there is a wide range of opinion regarding whether the Mādhyamika used analysis in generating insight. From the above even amongst scholars of Nāgārjuna's writing there are differing opinions regarding this question. As we can see, Western scholars have asked this question regarding the relationship between analysis and insight (prajñā) for the Prasangika i.e. Chandrakīrti and the Geluk-ba as well as for Nāgārjuna. As a consequence, what role analysis played for the Svātantrika on the other hand is unanswered. If we could answer this question we might be better able to see how the early Mādhyamika saw this relationship.

SVĀTANTRIKA

It should be emphasised, as Huntington points out, that "from the time of Bhāvaviveka (the founder of the Svātantrika) on, the Mādhyamika became more and more preoccupied with logical and epistemological problems and much less concerned with pragmatics."[5] Thus, it is not certain how the pre-Svātantika Mādhyamika regarded the relationship between ayslysis and insight. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Svātantrika used analysis to induce insight. Kamalaśila argues

that "...without correct analysis there is no means of attaining liberation [insight]...".[6] Nevertheless, though analysis is used to induce the conceptual and non-conceptual realizations of emptiness *(śūnyatā)* it is not sure whether this Svātantṛika used consequential analysis *(prasaṅga)* and/or the automous syllogism to induce insight. It would appear from certain verses of Bhāvaviveka that consequential analysis *(prasaṅga)* did play an important part. Bhāvaviveka states :

"while analyzing (vicarya) with (his) intelligence [he ponders) How is this [possible] from the ultimate point of view."[7]

"After a yogin generates concentration of intelligence, he should investigate (vicarya) with his insight these natures, i.e. solidity, wetness, heat, etc....[8]"

P. Fenner maintains that "vicara is a technical term in all schools of Buddhism... in the Mādyamika "vicara" means a rational or ratiocinative investigation, a conceptual analysis... [it is a type of analysis which] result[s] in the complete attrition of conceptuality prasanga..."[9] and more importantly, "analysis employs the prasanga..."[10]

Consequently, from Bhāvaviveka and Fenner's account of analysis *(vicāra)*, it could be argued that consequential analysis *(prasaṅga)* played an important part in the arising of insight. Nevertheless, this claim must be viewed with caution, since the information from the Svātantrika is very uncertain. As it is not clear whether the syllogism *(svatntra)* or consequential analysis *(prasanga)* was used by the Svātantrika to induce insight. Though from the work of Hopkins on the Geluk-ba Prāsaṅgika the Svātantrika could have used both.

Hopkins points out, in his book *Meditation on Emptiness*, that the Prāsaṅgika themselves used the syllogism. According to Hopkins the Prāsaṅgika considered that "...once the view of emptiness is aobut to be entered, syllogisms about the final nature of phenomean are appropriate : however, when debating with those who are not yet about to generate the view in their continuum consequences may be used."[11] Similarly Hopkins notes that "the case is the same in meditation. Consequences are stated in order to break down one's own adherence to the wrong view: then, syllogisms may be stated if necessary."[12]

352

COLIN DEAN

Thus, this article shows that there is a wide range of opinion amongst Western scholars on the QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANALISIS AND INSIGHT. These opinions are different for views regarding Nāgārjuna's, Chandrakīrti's and the Geluk-ba Prāsaṅgika, ideas about the relationship, as seen by certain Western scholars. If we accept Bhāvaviveka's arguments regarding the role of vicāra and Fenner's account of what vicara comprised of then it could be possible that the prasaṅga as well as the svatantra [syllogism] was used by the Svātantrika in the generation of insight or wisdom [prajñā]. This article, thus, brings both the issue of the relationship to the attention of a wider readership and shows the danger of making universalistic generalisations about the Mādhyamika.

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NOTES

1.   Fenner *The Ontology of the Middle Way*, Kluwer Academic Press, 1990. p. 100.

2.   *Ibid.*, p. 100

3.   C. Dean *The Relationship between Analysis and Insight*, MA Thesis, School of Humanitites, Deakin University, Geelong Victoria, Australia, 1993.

4.   de Jong, 'Emptiness', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 2, 1972, pp. 7-15. Fenner. P. *The Ontology of the Middel Way*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

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5.   C. W. Huntington, Jr.; *Emptiness of Emptiness*, Motilal, 1992, p. 206, note 49.

6.   N. Katz; "An Appraisal of Svātantrika- Prāsaṅgika Debate", *Philosophy East and West* Vol. 26, no 3, p. 264.

7.   S. Iida; *Reason and Emptiness*, Hokuseido Press 1980. p. 77

8.   *Ibid.*, p. 77

9.   P. Fenner; *op. cit.*, p. 103

10.   *Ibid.*, p. 104.

11.   J. *Hopkins; Meditation on Emptiness*, Wisdom Publications, 1983, p. 451.

12.   *Ibid.*, p. 451

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PROFESSOR K. J. SHAH

We are extremely sorry to report the sad and sudden demise of Professor K. J. Shah (b. 1920), former Head of the Department of Philosophy, Karnatak University, Dharwad (Karnatak), on 17th September, 1994. After his M. A. in three subjects from Bombay University he went to Cambridge University, England, to do his M. A. in Philosophy from that University and attended Wittgenstein's lectures on Philosophical Psychology during the period. He taught Philosophy for many years in Karnatak College and Karnatak University, Dharwad. Through his teaching, lectures, research, enlightening participation in seminars and conferences, and illuminating discussions he sought to give direction to the consideration of points at stake and insisted on adopting a proper focus and perspective. He never shirked from encouraging young teachers and researchers in their legitimate enterprises. Many teachers and students of Philosophy and other disciplines as well in this country profitted from discussions with him, an exercise in which he was never sloth, tired or reluctant. His publications include *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology- 1945-46* (with P. T. Geach and A. C. Jackson) and several essays which he contributed to different journals, Felicitation Volumes and anthologies. He was Life Member of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Akhil Bhāratīya Darśana Parişad, Mahārāṣtra Tattvajñāna Parişad, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Indian Philosophical Association etc. as also of many philosophical journals published from India. He was a Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Indian Council of Social Science Research, and a National Lecturer of the University Grants Commission. He was Sectional President of the Indian Philosophical Congress, General President of the Indian Philosophical Association, and was designated to be the General President of the former in its forthcoming annual session. He was associated with the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly and Parāmarśa (Hindi)* as a member of the Board of Consulting Editors right from their commencement. Equally importantly, he was also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly Trust. In his passing away we have lost a friend, a well-wisher, a guide and above all a keen and serious thinker.

EDITOR

PROFESSOR KARL POPPER

Very recently Professor Karl Popper (b. 28/07/1902), a leading Philosopher of the 20th century, expired at the age of 92. Although Austrian by birth, initially he migrated to New Zealand, later settled in and became naturalised citizen of the U. K. He studied Mathematics, Physics and Philosophy in Vienna and became actively engaged in research from 1927, remaining so till the end of his life. He served as a Senior Lecturer (1937-45) at the Canturbury University College, New Zealand, and later on as Reader (1945-49) in and Professor of Logic and Scientific Method (1949-69) in London University. He became Professor Emeritus in the London School of Economics from 1969, while he was Knighted in 1964. His very well-known publications include *The Logic of Scientific Discovery (original in German), The Open Society and its Enmies (two Volumes), Poverty of Historicism, Objective Knowledge, Conjectures and Refutations, Philosophy and Physics : Essays in Defence of Objectivity of Physical Science, The Self and its Brain : An Argument for Interactionism etc.* Besides, he contributed numerous essays to different journals. The two volumes in the Library of Living Philosophers Series devoted to his philosophy have been held in high esteem throughout the world. Some of the issues which engaged his continued attention were : demarcation between science and non-science, opposition to inductivism and verifiability criterion upheld by logical positivists, insistance on adoption of the approach of critical rationalism together with falsifiability as mark of scientific statements, defence of democracy against totalitarians' approach and repudiation of the dogma of historical necessity, as well as the problem of conceptual growth. He was Visiting Professor in many Universities like California, Minnesota, New York, MIT, Denver Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna etc. He was Annual Philosophy Lecturer of the British Academy since 1960, Herbert Spencer Lecturer (1961), Shearman Lecturer (1963), A. H. Compton Lecturer (1965), Tarner Lecturer (1978), Doubleday Lecturer (1979), to name some of them. He was Member of the Council of the Association of Symbolic Logic (1951-55), President of the Aristotelian Society (1958-59), President, British Society of Philosophy of Science (1959-61). Honorary Membership or Fellowship of many institutions and associations was conferred on him. He was recipient of many Prizes, Awards and Medals such as Prize of the City of Vienna (1965), James Scott Prize (1970), Sonning Prize (1973), Reuner Prize (1978), Gold Medal from the American Museum of Natural History (1979), Lucas Prize (1980), the Grand Decoration of Honor in Gold, Austria (1976) etc. Likewise, Honorary Doctorate was conferred on him by many Universities like London, Chicago, Denver, Vienna, Salzburg, Cambridge etc. In his passing away the world has lost a sustained critic of logical empiricism and opponent of totalitarianism and communism.

EDITOR

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Volume XXI

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

[Formerly *The Philosophical Quarterly* of the Indian Institute of Philosophy (Tattvajñāna Mandira), Amalner.]

STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

Journal of the Department of Philosophy
University of Poona, Pune.

University of Poona

OBJECTIVITY AND PHYSICAL THEORY

The discoveries of theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are land marks in the history of physical science. These discoveries have far reaching consequences over the philosophical assessment in respect of aims, methodology and nature of physical science. Developments which took place in the Golden Age of physics (i.e., first thirsty years of 20th century) have shaken traditional views on science based on classical physics. The objective character of physical laws and theories is not any longer considered unchallangeable. This paper is an effort to evaluate meaning of objectivity in the light of changed world views of physicists and philosophers of science.

'Objectivity' is one of the key concepts of philosophy that is used to characterise scientific theories and scientific knowledge. Belief in science is derived mostly on the basis of the assumption that its theories are 'objective'. The idea of objectivity is "an essentially technical conception attached to philosophy most influencially since Kant".[1] Kantian conception of objectivity has been endorsed by classical physics. The idea of objectivity viewed from this foundationalist angle has both ontological and epistemological aspects of it. The ontological aspects of objectivity is concerned with the "'objects' or particular bodies, entities, complexes or states of affairs existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time"[2]; and the epistemologicaal aspect is concerned with the "beliefs, judgements, propositions or products of thought about what is really the case"[3]. This technical conception of objectivity presupposes independent and impersonal existence of physical world. This view of objectivity presumes that presence or absence of our consciousness makes no difference to the mode of being of things. Thus, classical physics assumes the externality and impersonality of objectivity. Dogmatic realism that endorses this view, accounts for the classical physical science. "Dogmatic realism claims that there are no statements concerning the material world that cannot be objectivated"[4].

With the advent of quantum revolution, the calssical world view underwent a monumental convulsion. The question about words and concepts such as space, time and qualities of material objects such as position etc., which appear to be entirely resonable in daily life, lose their sense in the context of quantum universe. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is an important component of quantum mechanics. Werner Heisenberg in his *Physics and Philosophy* expounded philosophical implications of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, which have bearing upon the meaning of objectivity in scientific domain. The principle of uncertainty invented by him exposes that precise values of momentum and position of a quantum particle, such as electron, cannot be determined simultaneously. This uncertainty cannot be over-simplified as a technological limitation, for it is inherent in the quantum world. The inherent character of uncertainty has deeper philosophical implications. Eventhough quantum systems are unpredictable they "enable the relative probabilities of the alternatives to be specified precisely"[5]. Heisenberg expounds the copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics in order to pursue its philosophical implications. According to this, any experiment or observation that refers to the phenomena of atomic event "is to be described in terms of classical physics"[6]. The language that is used to describe the arrangement of experiments and to state the results is borrowed from the concepts of classical physics. In case of atomic events observational results obtained thus are translated into the mathematical scheme of quantum theory. A probability function is derived from this mathematical scheme and it represents the experimental situation at the time of the measurement. Heisenberg explains "this probability function represents two things, partly a fact and partly our knowledge of a fact"[7]. This mathematical expression combines statements about possibilities or tendencies with statements about out knowledge of facts. So, it is not possible to objectivate the result of an experiment completely. It is impossible to describe what 'happens' between two successive observations. Heisenberg states that: "Now, this is a very strange result, since it seems to indicate that the observation plays a decisive role in the event and that the reality varies, depending upon whether we observe it or not"[8]. He argues that the probability function contains statements about possibilities or tendencies which are completely objective and also contains statements about our knowledge of the system which of course are subjective in so

far as they may be different for different observers. Thus "the probability function combines objective and subjective elements"[9].

This analysis of quantum theeory has far reaching philosophical implications for the traditional characterisation of physical theory as objective one. However, quantum mechanics does not rule out the possible objective character of physical theory. Heisenberg argues that words and concepts do not possess absolute and sharply defined meaning in the context of quantum universe. Most fundamental changes with respect to the concept of reality have been affected in quantum theory. He states that : "the change in the concept of reality manifesting itself in quantum theory is not simply a continuation of the past; it seems to be a real break in the structure of modern science"[10]. Thus, the developments in modern science have shaken the foundations of traditional conception of objectivity which is characterised as external and impersonal. This refuted the dogmatic realism which provides the basis for classical physics.

In order to acccount for the objective character of scientific knowledge, Karl Popper postulates three world thesis: According to this his first world or world 1 is the world of physical objects qr states; second world or world 2 is the world of states of consciousness or mental states or the behavioural dispositions to act; the third world or world 3 comprises of theoretical systems, problems, problem-situations, critical arguments and so on. He proposes that the first world and the third world interact with each other *via* the second world. Popper makes a distinction between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge. He argues that subjective knowledge suggests the 'knowing' as an activity and assumes the existence of 'knowing subject'. For Popper, objective knowledge is the 'knowledge without a knowing subject'. He considers that subjective knowledge belongs to the second world and objective knowledge belongs to the third world.

According to Popper epistemology is the theory of scientific knowledge. In his view, the "Traditional epistemology has studied knowledge or thought in a subjective sense--in the sense of the ordinary usage of the words 'I know' or 'I am thinking'"[11]. He argues that scientific knowledge cannot be expressed by means of the usage of words such as 'I know', for these words belong

to the second world--the world of subjects. He claims that "scientific knowledge belongs to the third world, to the world of objective theories, objective problems and objective arguments"[12]. In Popper's view "knowledge in this objective sense is totally independent of anybody's claim to know; it is also independent of anybody's belief, or disposition to assert, or to act"[13]. While arguing for the autonomy of scientific knowledge Popper states that : "The third world of mathematical and scientific theories exerts immense influence upon the first world"[14]. He intends to prove this by stating the instances of technological impact over the physical and social environments. Sometimes scientists who discover theories are not fully aware of the technological possibilities inherent in them. It is the technologist who *understands* the hidden possibilities and objective ideas in theories themselves brings about change in the physical world by learning to grasp the *'objective thought contents'*. He contends that the third world is autonomous and hence the scientific theories, since they belong to the third world, are also autonomous, eventhough they are products of our critical and creative thinking. "This explains why the third world which in its origin, is our product, is *autonomous* in what may be called its ontological status".[15]

Popperian account of objectivity of scientific theories does not comply with the philosophical implications suggested by quantum mechanics. Popper presupposes that existence of physicasl world with a determinate structure within itself, independent of our thought about it, "is a necessary condition of the possibility of rationality and objectivity in science"[16]. However, quantum mechanics challenges this presupposition. In contrast with the Heisenberg's interpretation of quantum mechanics, Popper argues that "quantum mechanics is a statistical theory because the problems it tries to solve--spectral intensities, for example--are statistical problems"[17]. He concludes that "the role played by the observing subject in modern physics is in no way different from the role played in Newtonian dynamics or in Maxwell's theory of the electric field"[18]. However, as a matter of fact, eventhough quantum mechanics is a statistical theory, it differs from other statistical theories, since "the chance element is inherent in the nature of quantum system"[19]. Ultimately it shows that the Popperian conception of objectivity of scientific theories may be supported by classical physics, but cannot be endorsed by quantum mechanics.

In contraposition to Popper, Paul Feyerabend rules out the possibility of objective grounding and rationality of scientific knowledge. Arguing from the historical point of view, he contends that 'any progress descernible in science is the result of scientists having broken every conceivable rule of rationality'. He continues to argue that methodological anarchism "is certainly excellent medicine for *epistemology* and for the *philosophy of science*"[20]. He views that "On closer analysis we even find that science knows no 'bare facts' at all but that the 'facts' that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, ideational"[21]. History of science does not warrant us to ascribe 'law-and-order' character to science. It is full of mistakes, complex and chaotic. He characterises science as an anarchic enterprise. He violently denies that "there is or ever has been *an* objective scientific method"[22]. Feyerabend contends that "there is only *one* principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in *all* stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes"[23].

Arguing for the culturally, socially and traditionally dependent character of science, Feyerabend contends that entities postulated by science are shaped by special groups, cultures and civilizations. Scientific entities, he views, do not constitute objective state for all cultures and all stages of history. He argues that *"scientific entities (and for that matter, all entities) are projections and thus tied to the theory, the ideology, the culture that postulates and projects them"*[24]. Thus Feyerabend's historical analysis of scientific knowledge implies that there cannot be any objective grounding for it. All standards or methods, whether scientific or otherwise, are culture-relative. He rejects the distinction between acquisition of scientific knowledge and religio-mystical insight. For Feyerabend whole scientific enterprise rests on a chimera and is incapable of acquiring objective knowledge of the physical world.

Feyerabend's rejection of objectivity and rationality of scientific knowledge is based on the presupposition that the 'rational subject' (the discoverer), who is formed by his cultural-setting, is unable to transcend it. However, in order to acquire the objective knowledge of physical world, a scientist must view himself and his actions from the point of view of others. This subjective precondition for the acquisition of objective knowledge confers mental autonomy.

M. SEETHARAMULU

"Mental autonomy and its conscious recognition by the self-conscious, reflective subject is important, for in this autonomy lies the germ of transcendence of culture and hence of the possibility of grounding a conception of objectivity which is not culture-bound"[25]. Inspite of his vehement disapproval of rational and objective character of physical theories, Feyerabend could not succeed in his endeavour. His treatment of Galileo in *Against Method* suggests that, he is only objecting to the sacrosanct nature of scientific rationality. Eventhough it is not stated explicitly, "it seems that he thinks that science is also run by 'ordinary reason'"[26].

Quantum mechanics does not rule out the objectivity as a criterion for the values of any scientific result. In Heisenberg's words "quantum theory corresponds to this ideal as far as possible"[27]. Quantum theory, as a matter of fact, does not introduce the physicist's mind into the atomic event. It signifies the observer's contribution in the interpretation of experimental results of quantum world. It is not possible to disregard the fact that science is the product of human intellectual intercourse with the physical universe. There are no bare facts in science. All facts are theory-laden. The phenomena studied by modern physicist are the products of rational experimental methods which cannot be seperated from theoretical embedment. In the present day physical science the observational activity has become more complex. Aspects of empirical investigation contributed by the object are inseparable. Quantum mechanics and relativity theory rules out "the assumption that knowing subject is clearly separable from the object of his knowledge"[28]. This suggests the requirement of alternative account of scientific objectivity. The standards of scientific objectivity involve both theory and experiment. Empirical and rational standards are to be taken into account. "The structure imposed on the epistemological field constituting the physical and biological sciences by their goal-objective knowledge-- is that of a continuing dialogue, or a dialectical play, between theory and experience"[29].

Thus, in the context of modern physical science the concept of objectivity underwent a semantic mutation. Total separation of human contribution in the acquisition of objective scientific knowledge is untenable. Objectivity in this sense is an inter-subjective notion shared by a community of scientists by virtue of their scientific practice

contrary to the foundationalist conception of objectivity. In the light of modern physical science "the problem of objectivity ceases to be the problem of identifying what lies beyond us, and becomes the problem of identifying the human actions which ensure objectiveness"[30]. According to this view, objectivity of a physical theory has to be assessed in the light of wider scientific practice of the discursive rational subjects. This is possible to those who share certain common standards and possess similar discursive rational structure. There is an "essential link between rationality and objectivity; claims to objective knowledge are required to be rationally justifiable"[31]. Objective knowledge is the product of critical rationality. Scientifically, objective knowledge is not mere immediate, intuitive or purely experimental knowledge. It is always a reflective, discursive knowledge.

The most significant contribution of quantum mechanics and theory of relativity is that they proved the objective grounding of physical theory through the appropriation of rationality inherent in the physical universe. They also indicate that theoretical knowledge is more objective than the mere crude sensual or empirical knowledge. Michael Polanyi in his *Personal Knowledge* argues for the rationality impregnated objective character of physical theory. Taking the instances of Geocentric theory of Ptolemy and Heleocentric theory of Copernicus he states : "This would imply that, of two forms of knowledge, we should consider as more objective that which relies to a greater measure on thoery rather than on more immediate sensory experience"[32]. Theory stands as a screen between our senses and the things that are experienced by them. Theoretical guidance is necessary for the interpretation of sensual experience. Polanyi contends that human mind has the "capacity to formulate ideas which command respect in their own right, by their own rationality, and which have in this sense an objective standing"[33].

A Scientific theory which is rational in itself is accredited with predictive powers and is accepted with the expectation that it makes contact with reality. Newtonian mechanical conception of universe (classical physics) is theoretical and objective, for it replaces the evidence of our senses by a formal space-time map. The space-time structure of mechanistic world view predicted the motions of the material particles that underlie all experience. The developments in modern physics restored bridge between mathematical

8   M. SEETHARAMULU

knowledge and empirical knowledge, which was broken by positivism. "Relativity, and subsequently quantum mechanics and modern physics generally, have moved back towards a mathematical conception of reality"[34]. Reimann, while developing his non-Euclidean geometry, anticipated the features of theory of relativity. Polanyi views that "modern physics has demonstrated the power of the human mind to discover and exhibit a rationality which governs nature, before ever approaching the field of experience in which previously discovered mathematical harmonies were to be revealed as empirical facts"[35].

Foundationalist conception of science is based on the disjunction of subjectivity and objectivity. It seeks to eliminate passionate, personal human appraisals of theories. This conception of science has deep roots in our culture. For a modern man, science is objective in the sense that the substance of science is determined by observation and its presentation is shaped by convention. Polanyi views that this conception of science "would be shattered if the intuition of rationality in nature had to be acknowledged as a justifiable and indeed essential part of scientific theory"[36].

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.   See Newell, R.W., *Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth,* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1986), p.16

2.   *Ibid.,*

3.   *Ibid.,*

4.   See Heisenberg, Werner, *Physics and Philosophy,* (Penguin Books, London, 1990) p. 70

5.   Davies, Paul, "Introduction" to Werner Heisenberg's *Physics and Philosophy* (Penguin Books, London, 1990) p. 5.

6.   Heisenberg, W., *op. cit.,* p. 32.

7.   Heisenberg, W., *op. cit.,* p. 33.

8.   Heisenberg, W., *op. cit.,* p. 40.

9.   Heisenberg, W., *op. cit.,* p. 41.

10. Heisenberg, W., *op. cit.* p. 17.

11. Popper, Karl R., *Objective Knowledge,* (The clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972) p. 108.

12. *Ibid.,*

13. *Ibid.,* p. 109.

14. *Ibid.,* p. 155.

15. *Ibid.,* p. 161.

16. See Tiles, Mary, *Bachelard: Science and Objectivity,* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,, 1984), p. 42.

17. Karl R. Popper, *op. cit.,* pp. 303-4

18. Karl R. Popper, *op, cit.,* p. 304

19. Paul Davies, *op. cit.,* p. 304

20. See Feyarabend, P., *Against Method* (Verso, London, 1990),p.9.

21. *Ibid.,* p. 11

22. See Chaudhury, Mahasweta, "Scientific Rationality - A Rethinking" in the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* Vol. VII, No. 1, 1989, p. 102

23. Feyerabend, P., *op. cit.,* p. 19.

24. Feyerabend, P., *op. cit., p.* 265

25. Mary Tiles, *op. cit.,* p. 63

26. Mahasweta Chaudhury. *op. cit.,* p. 104

27. Heisenberg, W. *op. cit.,* p. 43

28. Mary Tiles, *op. cit.,* p. 42

29. Mary Tiles, *op. cit.,* pp. 47, 48

30. R. W. Newell, *op. cit.,* p. 23

31. Marry Tiles. *op. cit.,* p. 49

32. See Polanyi Michael. *Personal Knowledge,* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983,) p. 4

33. *Ibid.,* p. 5

34. *Ibid.,* p. 14

35. *Ibid.,* p. 15

36. *Ibid.,* p. 16

An earlier version of this paper was presented in the 67th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, in January, 1993.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
PUBLICATIONS

ON THE CONDITIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS *QUA* THE MINIMAL UNITS OF COMMUNICATION

If I say something and, in that very saying, I do what I say, then, I perform an illocutionary act. When I say "I request you to go through this paper", I perform the act of requesting in my very saying "I request you to go through this paper". So also, the utterances "I warn ....", "I promise....", "I order...", "I name...", etc. produced by a speaker in appropriate conditions can be counted as the illocutionary acts performed by that spaker. However, although the illocutionary acts are explicitly expressed through such performative sentences of present-indicative verbs and first person singular subject, such performative sentences are neither sufficient nor necessary for an illocutionary act.

Suppose I know that you go through all articles of this journal's every issue. I have no point in requesting to go through my paper. Or, suppose as a matter of fact, I don't intend you to go through my paper. Neverthless, for the sake of showing my sincerity, I can utter "I request you to go through this paper".Here I do not perform an illocutionary act because I am not requesting you even if I say "I request you.....". Appropriate conditions are needed for their production to be illocutionary acts. These sentences are not also necessary for illocutionary acts. "Please, go through this paper" can be uttered in order to request you the same I do in "I request you to go through this paper". Moreover, utterances like "Hurrah", "Ouch", and "Damn" are bereft of *propositional content* and yet they can be produced to perform illocutionary acts (See Searle (1985),p.9). The illocutionary act I perform in "I request you to through this paper" can be considered as having two components: the *force* of request and the *propositional content* of "you go through this paper". If we sumbolise such illocutionary acts to be F(P), and illocutions of the "Hurrash" kind to be

of the form F, We cannot find any illocutionary act without an illocutionary force, f, and in general, most of the elementary (non-complex) illocutionary acts are in the form of F(P). Illocutionary acts can be of the form f_1 (p) f_2 (p) as well as $f(p_1)$ and $f(p_2)$. That is, we can have illocutionary acts of different forces with one propositional content as well as illocutionary acts of one force with different propositional contents. For examples, "Please go through this paper" and "You must go through this paper" have the same propositional content, i.e., "Go through this paper", but the former is a request, whereas the latter is an order. "Please, go through this paper" and Please, open the window" are of the same force (viz., requesting) with different propositionall contents.

Austin (1962) distinguishes locutionary acts from illocutionary acts. Searle (1968) refutes this distinction. We can rightly consider it for Austin that locutionary and illocutionary acts exhaustively characterize all the uses of sentences in our language. That is, any use of any sentence is either a locutionary act or an illocutionary act. Now, if the locutionary- illocutionary distinction is abolished in favour of illocutionary acts, then, every use of language is to be considered as an illocutionary act. In other words, illocutionary act becomes the minimal unit of linguistic communication. That is what, after Searle, I mean by illocutionary act *qua* the minimal unit of communication.

According to Austin, a locutionary act is an act of uttering a sentence with a particular sense and reference for the terms of a sentence. It is an act *of* saying something, distinguished from an act performed *in* saying something. A locutionary act has three parts: phonetic, phatic and rhetic. Production of certain sounds comes under the phonetic act. When the sounds are produced in confirmation to certain vocabularly and grammar, it comes under the phatic act. The act of using those vocables with a more or less definite sense and reference is called the rhetic act. A locutionary act is performed when certain literal meaning is conveyed. On the other hand, along with that literal meaning certain force is conveyed when an illocutionary act is performed. Again, since a force is expressed in an illocutionary act, certain conditions over and above the obtaining of literal meaning are fulfilled in order to secure the uptaking of the illocutionary force. If, for example, you cannot

read English, then you cannot keep my request, "Please, go through this paper". That is, uptaking of .my request is not secured here. But a locutionary act needs no such security because it has nothing to be uptaken. Just the force-neutral meaning is all that a locutionary act is supposed to accomplish.

According to Searle, illocutionary acts are the "minimal units of human commuunication". "Whenever a speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate context with certain intentions, he performs one or more illocutionary acts". (Searle (1985), p.1). Hence a locutionary act cannot be considered a separable unit of human communication. We can briefly note down the arguments Searlle (1968) makes in order to refute Austin's distinction between locutionary acts and illocutionary acts.

a. The force of many sentences like "I hereby promise that I am going to do it" and "With humbleness, I would request you to go through this paper", are uniquely determined by the meaning of the sentences themselves. "I hereby promise that I am going to do it" must be a promise in its serious and literal utterance. Thus, as classes of acts, locutionary and illocutionary are not mutually exclusive. They differ like unmarried men and bachelors, as two different descriptions of the same. That is, they are not two different acts but two different labels: meaning-label and force-label of the same kind of act. Aabstraction of meaning from force is as much meaningless, due to the emptiness we get thereby, as the abstraction of the class of unmarried men from the class of bachelors.

b. The notion of 'securing uptake' cannot come to rescue either. Even if we distinguish an utterance having secured condition for its uptaking from its not having that, we cannot claim on this ground that locutionary acts are distinguished from illocutionary acts. Because, this will reduce the locutionary-illocutionary distinction to a distinction between trying and succeeding parts of an illocutionary act. Without 'securing uptake', the utterance is the trying part. With 'securing uptake', the utterance is the succeeding part. Both parts belong to the same illocutionary act. The distinction between the two parts of an illocutionary act is less interesting than the locutionary-illocutionary distinction. Above all, the distinction between

trying and succeeding parts is different from the original distinction between an utterance with a particular meaning and an utterance with a particular force.

c. in Austin's analysis, rhetic act is a vital part of locutionary act. It renders completeness to the literal meaning of a locution. Searle observes that this vital part of locutionary act can be assimilated to illocutionary act and hence locutionary act cannot be separated from illocutionary act. A rhetic act, in the utterance of a complete sentence, is an act of using the sentence-components with sense and reference. But this act of using sentence-components witth sense and reference is tantamount to illocutionary act. In "I request you to go through this paper", "I", "you" and "this paper" refer to me, you and this paper respectively. The meaning of the sentence is brought about when, besides the references, the sence of "request to go through" is obtained. This sense is obtained only when the force of request is expressed in the sentence. Now, if we see as a whole, as an accomplishment of both the sense and references of the complete sentence, the rhetic act of "I request you to go through this paper" is accomplished only when I request you to go through this paper. But the illocutionary act is also performed in uttering "I request you to go through this paper" when I request you to go through this paper. In this way, by quoting a sentence in order to identify its utterance (as a phatic act) as well as the locution and disquoting to identify the rhetic act as well as illocutionary act, we can find that every rhetic act, an hence every locutionary act, is an illocutionary act.

d. Apart from objecting to certain criterial grounds on which Austin draws the distinction, Searle shows certain 'linguistic principles' (see Searles (1968, pp. 415-419) to justify his refutation.

The Principle of expressibility : Whatever can be meant can be said. It ensures every force f to be expressible in some utterance. That is, if one wishes to make an utterance with force f, it is possible to utter a sentence which expresses f. Because, if it is possible to mean (intend) that force, it is also possible to say that force literally. This principle justifies the inclusion of rhetic act into illocutionary act. Every illocutionary act has an illocutionary force and every rhetic act accomplishes the literal meaning of

an utterance. Therefore, as every illocutionary force can be expressed in the rhetic act by the principle of expressibility, we cannot separate the rhetic act, and hence the locutionary act, from illocutionary act as much as we cannot separate the illocutionary force from illocutionary act. (See Searle (1970) pp. 19-20 for a more elaborate explanation of the principle of expressibility)

The meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaanings of all its meaningful components. This is the *second principle.* The meaningful components are the words, words-order, stresses, intonation contour etc. Stresses and intonation contour, no less important than the words and word-order, are the crucial determinants of illocutionary force. Hence, if accomplishing the meaning is supposed to be the characteristic feature of a rhetic act, crucial determinants of illocutionary force are also vital for rhetic act. Thus, rhetic act, and hence locutionary act, cannot be separated from illocutionary act.

The third principle : The illocutionary forces of utterances may be more or less specific; and there are several different principles of distinction for distinguishing different types of illocutionary acts. For example, "I ask you to go through this paper" is less specific than "I request you to go through this paper". Neglecting this point, one may be misled to identify the undertaking of less specific forces with the so-called locutionary acts. In other words, one may fail to consider that the so-called llocutionaryy verb phrases like "tell someone to do something", "say that", "ask whether" serve for illocutionary acts as much as the phrases like "ordered that", "state that" and "promise someone that" do. The point of purpose of the act (can determine whether it is a question or a statement), the relative status of a speaker and hearer (differentiates commands from requests), the degree of commitment undertaken (determines promises and intent), the conversational placing and role of the act (discriminates replies from objections) are the four examples of the principles of distinction (See Searle (1979) pp. 1-8, and for a formal characterization of the illocutionary points, see Searle (1985) pp. 51-63). There is nothing mutually exclusive about all the members of the list of illocutionary verbs nor is the total list exhaustive.

So far we discussed illocutionary acts *qua* the minimal units of communication. In fact, we used Searle's refutation of Austin's

locutionary--illocutionary distinction in order to justify that every use of language is one or more of illocutionary acts. Now we turn to the conditions necessary and sufficient, for an illlocutionary act. Searle analyzes the illocutionary act of promise with the view that the correct analysis of this act can establish the possibility of the analysis of other illocutionary acts. He offers nine conditions (Seaarle (1971) pp. 48-51), each of which is a necessary condition and taken together the set of nine conditions is a sufficient conddition for the performance of the act of promise.

(i) *The normal input and output conditions* being satisfied ensures that the speaker and the hearer are in a normal situation for communication. None of them are physically obstacled for communication, both are conscious, not acting under duress, threat or in a play. This is not only peculiar to the illocutionary act of promising but is also applicable in general to every illocu-tionary act.

(ii) The conddition that the speaker *S expresses that proposition* P in the utterance of the sentence T, makes it clear that, in uttering a sentence, the speaker expresses a proposition and not that the sentence itself expresses a proposition. According to Searle, the important job of this condition is that it severs the proposition from the rest of the speech act and enables to concentrate on the peculiarities of promosing as a kind of illocutionary act in the rest of the analysis.

(iii) In expressing p, *S predicates a future act A of S.* It ensures that the speaker promises to do something in future and he himself will do. That is, S cannot promise to do something already done, not can he promise that someone else will do that.

(iv) *The hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A and that the same is believed by S.* In other words, a promise is neither a threat nor a warning. A non-defective promise is never against the will of the hearer or the speaker.

(v) The condition that *it is not obvious to both* S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events ensures the point

of a promise. It is out of order for me to promise to do something that I am going to do it, obviously, any how.

(vi) *S intends to do A* is the sincerity condition. A promise is not a promise if S intends not to do what he promises. S intends to do A entails that S believes that it is possible on his part to do A.

(vii) *The essential condition* for promise is that S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do it. It distinguishes promises from other kind of illocutionary acts. If a speaker can demonstrate that he has no such intention in his utterance then he can claim that he has not made a promise.

(viii) *S intends that the utterance of the sentence T will produce in H a belief that condition (vi) and (vii) obtain.* S intends to produce this belief in a Gricean line that S intends (a) to produce a particular illocutionary effect; (b) the hearer to recognize (a); and (c) the effect is to be produced by means of getting the hearer fulfilling (b). But more importantly, for Searle, S intends that H's recognition is to be achieved by virtue of the fact that the lexical and syntactical character of the item S utters, conventionally associates it with producing that effect. Meaning is more than a matter of intention: it is also a matter of rules and conventions.

(ix) *The semantical rules of the dialectic spoken* by S and H are that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions (i)-(viii) obtain. This condition makes it clear that the sentence uttered is one which is used, by semantical rules of the language, to make a promise.

Condition (i) and conditions of the form (viii) and (ix) are applicable in general to all kinds of normal illocutionary acts. They are not peculiar to the illocutionary act of promising. Hence, as Searle abstracts the rules of illocutionary act from the above conditions, rules for the function-indicating device for promising (Searle (1971) p.52) are to be found corresponding to condditions (ii) - (vii).

The proposition rule is derived from the propositional content condition, that is, from conditions (ii) and (iii). The rule reads

"p is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S".

The second rule is that p is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A.

The third rule is that p is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events. The second and the third rules are derived from the preparatory conditions, (iv) and (v).

The sincerity rule, that p is to be uttered only if S intends to do A, is extracted from the sincerity condition, (vi).

The essencial rule, that the utterance of p counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A, is derived from the essential condition (vii).

It can be shown that the conditions (iii), (v), (vi) and (vii), are not necessary for the illocutionary act of promising. And, since the rules are derived from the conditions, if the conditions are objectionable, then the rules are objectionable too.

All promises are not necessarily made by the utterer to do something in future. To say before a sick child "I promise that you will get better" is not to say that I shall perform some act A in future. The child trusts my adult knowledge of illness, not any further performance of some action. Thus, the third condition (i.e., Speaker S who makes a promise says that he will perform some act A in the future) is not a necessary condition for promising (See, Harrison (1979), p. 174).

It may be obvious to me and my financee that, in the ordinary course of events, we will see each other tomorrow as we do in the evening everyday. It is known to both of us that I have no special appointments anywhere else in the evening tomorrow. Still, when she utters "Will you come tomorrow?", the obvious but no less promising answer I give by uttering "Yes, I will come - promise". Here Searle's fifth condition is objectionable.

The sixth and seventh conditions are also not necessary for the illocutionary act of promise. For example (see, Harrison (1979)

p. 174), a doctor says in the morning "I will come again at neight" to a seriously ill patient. The doctor knows that the patient is going to die within two to three hours. He does not intend his words to be taken as a promise, nor does he undertake any obligation to keep any promise. But, given the patient's anxiety and his fear of death, the doctor's utterance can hardly be taken as anything but a promise to attend the patient at night.

Not only that the conditions are objectionable, but also that the manner in which Searle derives the rules from those conditions makes his stand-point internally inconsistent. From his derivation of the rules it appears that speakers's intention is either unsuitable for a definition in formal terms or unnecessary for the quintessence of an illocutionary act, the illocutionary force. It appears so because, he does not derive any rule corresponding to the condition [i.e., condition (viii)] associated to speaker's intention. Along with desire and belief, intention has been cosidered by Searle and Vandervaken(1985) as a psychological state. And, since psychological states have certain role to play in the sincerity conditions of illocutionary force, speaker's intention enters into the formal characterization of sincerity condition (*Ibid*, pp. 102-105). But speaker's intention accounted in condition (viii) is not a plausible psychological state of the speaker. Because, whereas different psychological states are pertinent to different illocutionary act's sincerity conditions, condition (viii), and hence the account of speaker's intention in that condition, is admittedly a general condition for all types of illocutionary acts. Thus, speaker's intention, related to condition (viii), has not been formally characterised in illocutionary logic.

It is interesting to note that Searle is very particular on the rule-governedness of language and yet he overlooks this features of language with respect to the geeneral conditions of illocutionary acts (including the condition associated to speaker's intention). That is, for him, rule-governedness is confined to the illocutionary force so as to determine the meaning of a sentence. Accordingly, speaker's intention is necessary neither for the determination of illocutionary force, and hence of the meaning of a sentence, nor for the rule-governedness of language. Because, it is only the illocutionary force which is rule-governed and speaker's intention plays no role for the determination of illocutionary force in so far as speaker's intention is not merely a psychological state.

If the above note holds good, it is not only that Searle's stand-point is incoherent, because he claims that language is rule-goverened and yet overlooks the role of speaker's intention in the rule-governedness of language, but also that he is trapped into a distinction parallel to Austin's locutionary-illocutionary distinction. Because, illocutionary force has been distinguiished from the other parts of illocutionary act on the ground that the former component plays a role in the rule-governedness of language, whereas the latter does not. In other words, parallel to Austin's distinction of force-neutral meaning (i.e., locutionary act) and force -freighted meaning (illoctionary act), we find a distinction between the rule-governed part of meaning and the rule-lacking part of meaning of a sentence uttered for the performance of an illocutionary act to be available in Searle's enterprise as well.

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HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND WITTGENSTEIN : A CRUSADE AGAINST SCIENTISM

Basically, the brief argument which I want to develop in this paper is the suggestion that the thematic of the life-world in Husserlian Phenomenology has more or less similar philosophical functions within the tradition of phenomenology as the concept of 'forms of life' has in the philosophy of later Wittgenstein and the concept of 'Everydayness' in the Heideggerian Existential epistemology.

It is sometimes said that in Husserlian studies there is a radical break in the development of Husserl's phenomenology marked by the apppearance of *Crisis*.[1] There have been different interpretations of the supposed rupture in the development of Husserlian thought but all such interpretations also directly or indirectly make a similar point. In Husserl's study, it is said that, the thematic of life-world is what distinguishes the later phenomenology of *Crisis* from the earllier orientation of *Ideas*.[2] Not only commentators and interpreters but also phenomenologists like M. Mearleau Ponty see the concept of life-world as making a new threshold in the development of phenomenology. But what we would suggest is that this thesis of discountinuity in the development of Husserl's thought is over simplified and exaggerated, for when one compares the formulation of the problem of natural standpoint in *Ideas* with the new thematic of the life-world in *Crisis* one sees that there is a difference in the surface level of the two discussions, which, however, does not negate a fundamental continuity at a deeper level. Since we would argue that there is an element of difference and continuity we would have a brief discussion of Husserl's statement of natural standpoint in *Ideas* in the context of the description of the life-world in *Crisis*.

It may be noted that the formulation of the natural stand point in *Ideas*,[3] is folllowed in section 31 abruptly by a seeming rejection

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of the same, for Husserl begins this section by stating that instead of remaining in this natural attitude he proposes to alter it radically and again, he argues that such a radical alteration of natural standpoint is possible and necessary for the phenomenological standpoint.[4] In fact, much later in the *Ideas* Husserl develops more elaborately the contrast betweeen the natural standpoint and the phenomenological standpoint. This radical controversy of two styles of thinking and experience seems to suggest that the phenomenological experience as well as phenomenological reflection, depends upon the overcoming of the earlier standpoint. Superficially, the *Crisis* seems to be saying exactly the opposite, for there, we are repeatedly enjoined to recover the sense of the life world; we are told to return to the pre-theoretical life-world from all the objectifications and constructions, of thought. Hence one might begin to misunderstand the contrast between the Ideas and the Crisis by holding that the former moves awaay from what later on, Husserl would call the 'life-world' and hence it is precisely this movement of transcendence which is the distinguishing feature of the trranscendental phenomenology of the *Ideas*. In such a spirit, the re-opening of the theme of the life-world would appear to be an expression of failure to carry through the programme of transcendental philosophy. The return to the life-world, therefore, would be understood as a fresh beginning after the unsurmountable problems in the way of the earlier programme of the *Ideas*. But what complicates this sort of interpretation is the repeated claim of Husserl that the discovery of life-world in particular and the *Crisis* in general is itself a way into transcendental phenomenology.[5] Husserl does not give the impression of giving up the transcendental programme or even the necessity of transcendental reduction; rather he is here more emphatic about it.

Hence we must see the difference between the formulations in the *Ideas* and the *Crisis* in a more sensitive manner. For this purpose, we can consider two suggestions. One must distinguish the immediately given natural world and the natural standpoint or the thesis about it. The former is what is described in the passage of *Ideas* itself. But the thesis about the natural standpoint is a certain way of understanding one's own position in the natural world and it is this attitude that is to be overcome.

In the thesis of the natural standpoint a consciousness regards

itself as an entity among other entities, as a part of the objective world and is determined by it. The inadequacies of this improperly reflective attitude is two-fold. On the one hand, it misunderstands the nature of consciousness itself as the attribute of a psycho-physical organism. More importantly, it also falls short of the proper accounting of the natural world itself. In the above description Husserl emphasises two features of the natural world, that in it I perceive objects which have apsects and attributes not given in my particular acts of perception. In other words, physical objects are perceived as transcendent. Not only physical objects but also ideal objectivities such as logical and mathematical entities, values etc. are transcendent in the Husserlian sense. These objectivities are given in different complexes of intentional acts. But while experiences in which these are given are many yet in the manifold of such experiences these objects are perceived as identical e.g. every time I enunciate a statement, it is the same statement that is given in all different acts. This objectivity of entities is what marks the world as a world. Secondly, in the natural world I also perceive the other as a fellow subject and not simply as an object like other objects. The other too is transcendent but its transcendency is that of an alter ego and not that of an object. It is because of this that the natural world is an inter-subjective or shared world and precisely this is what is emphasised by Husserl himself in *Ideas* (the passage on natural standpoint).

Given these two above mentioned characteristics of the natural world any conception of consciousness as an entity within the natural world would prove itself inadequate to the very comprehension of what is given in the natural world. It is this realization that motivates Husserl in section 31 of *Ideas* to alter the thesis of natural stand point. The motivation here is not to deny or cancel the world of immediate experience but on the contrary to understand the transcendency of the objects. Understood in this sense, the passage in the *Ideas* suggests that the real task of phenomenology is not to go beyond the natural world but to understand it. This is precisely the underlying motivation of *Crisis* also.

In the *Crisis*, however, the description of the life-world serves the purpose of discovering a-priori and more fundamental activity of consciousness which is the foundation for all other constitutive

acts. It is this intention of opening up a more original achievement of the constitution of the pre-theoretical life-world itself which is the basic aim of the exploration in the *Crisis*. And also, here, Husserl works out an altogether different approach to the problem of scientific conceptualization i.e. a phenomenological clarification of the grounds of scientific knowledge; Husserl develops a theme of *Crisis* in sciences. His idea is that in the course of its abstract theorizing the sciences of nature represented by the Galilean tradition have obscured their own foundations in a pre-theoretical immediate experience of the world and hence lost sight of their own grounds. It is this concealment of their own origins that has led to the *Crisis* of the sciences and also to the crisis of general human culture.

The overcoming of the crisis is predicated upon the return to the life-world setting aside all the abstractions, mathematizations and idealizations involved in the scientific project. Therefore. the theme of life-world is central and salient in *Crisis*. In fact, here, Husserl tells us that a phenomenology of the life world is itself an important and urgent task of phenomenology and requires to be perceived independently of a phenomenological theory of science. In this connection, it is to be noted that unlike Kant's transcendental philosophy the *Crisis* is concerned with an issue which cannot be described as a mere Prolegomena to a theory of science. The life-world becomes an important and genuine topic of phenomenology by itself and not merely a prelude to the sciences. From this point of view, one can argue that life-world in the *Crisis* is absolute in comparion to the other possible modes of experience, other perspectives and interests. The life-world is prior and more original than all of them. In other words, all particular interests, the scientific as well as the philosophical, are possible only on the basis of the all embracing life-world itself. The life-world itself is not one perspective among oothers ; rather it is that what grounds all perspectives and all interests and even when, at a particular point of time, we occupy a certain vocation or have a certain interest, we, as human beings, live in the life-world and we return, necessarily to the life-world. Husserl clearly emphasises that the scientist also belongs to the life-world and it is because of this that he can function as a scientist. What is equally necessary is to note that same consideration applies to philosophy also, for even the articulations

of philosophy are possible only as a vocation and among others it cannot, therefore, displace the primacy of the life-world.

Like in the case of Husserl in the case of Wittgenstein also there is a complex relation of continuity in difference between the earlier and later stages of his reflections. There have been over-simplified and unacceptable interpretations of the *Tractatus*[6] especially by certain hostile critics who have held that in the *Tractatus* language is the only reality recognised and that Wittgenstein replaces philosophy by linguistic analysis. However, this would be an absurd interpretation of the chief concern of the *Tractatus,* for it is obvious that the central insight of the *Tractatus* is the relationship between language and the world. Wittgenstein sees this relationship under the form of pictorical relation, an elementary sentence, in his sense, is said to represent a state of affairs by its very form of representation. In it the expressions are combined in a certain form and it is this form of combinations in the elementary sentence which is said to represent the combinations of objects in the fact. This correspondence between the form of an elementary sentence and the form of the fact represented by it, is said to be the pictorial relations. This picture theory of *Tractatus* can be said to be the clue to the whole structure, for on the one hand it leads to a certain conception of language and on the other to a certain conception of the world. Meaningful language is based on elementary sentences and the truth functional possibilities – it is in this sense that Wittgenstein claims that the limits of my language are the limits of the world which I could understand. On the other hand, the picture theory also leads to a certain conception of the world as a combination of objects in his sense.

The difference between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*[7] is not in terms of the idea of a relationship between language and reality but in terms of different formulations of this relationship. The *Tractatus* saw this relationship in a narrow manner as a pictorial relationship, but in the *Philosophical Investigations* besides the pictorial relation there are other ways in which our language is connected with the world. Here, Wittgenstein does not deny the pictorial relation; rather he holds that the pictorial relation is only one possible relation among a multiplicity of others. These various forms of language in which meaning and understanding

are possible, Wittgenstein, now, calls language games. A language game is a certain use of language which is natural to human beings in their various activities and which involves both linguistic and non-linguistic components. Also, a language game is essentially a form of communication and mutural understanding between subjects who are partners in a certain on-going activity. There are diffferent language games, each with its own particular mode of meaning and involving particular uses of language and in each such language games, there is a specific type of inter-subjective relation. The logical represention of facts by descriptive propositions recognised by the conception of language in the *Tractatus* is only such language game besides which there are other modes of meaing also.These different language games express, what Wittgenstein calls, forms of life. The conception of form of life is, as it were, a construction and further extension of the concept of reality or the world in *Tractatus*. In the *Tractatus,* since only one mode of language, namely the representative use of language was recognised , the construction of world, was also restricted to a certain type.But in the *Philosophical Investigations* just as the conception of language so also the conception of reality is 'pluralized'. Just as there are different language games so also there are different orders of reality now called forms of life and the relation between the two is one of expression. A form of life is understood by the way of the language game which is its natural expression. This is what is ment by saying that to understand a language is to understand a form of life.

If one approaches the Wittgensteinian idea of forms of life from the broader perspective of Husserlian phenomenology, one might begin to explore certain broad affinities between the two.The most important feature they have in common is that the world which is revealed in a form of life by way of its proper language game is the world as lived by subjects in their natural context. It is not the world of an abstract contemplative ontology or metaphysics; rather it is the immediate pre-theoretical world of natural life. Putting it in Husserlian forms, the different language games give expressions to different aspects of the life world. Secondly, the understanding of these forms of life requires that we describe them as they are given in our natural experience without the theoretical and abstract conceptualizations of sciences or even of philosophy. The forms of life require a phenomenological rather than an abstract mode of description. In Husserlian terms the

forms of life are accessible only after the technique of reduction. Thirdly, in a form of life there is necessarily a form of inter-subjectivity. Each one of these forms of life is a representation of a particular type of inter-subjective association. In this way the Wittgenstenian conception of form of life seems very close to that of the life-world of the *Crisis*.

In a sense the above Wittgensteinian idea is very similar to that of Heidegger of *Being and Time*[8] fame, for like Wittgenstein, the latter holds that the only ground for the intelligibility of thought and action is possible only by way of every day practices not by way of some hidden process of thinking. Heidegger grounds himself on average everyday practices, not on everyday concepts; not in what people say they do, but in what they really do. This way of thinking leads Heidegger to breakaway from the cartesian tradition where human beings as subjects represent objects to themselves. This 'everydayness' in Heidegger forms a sort of base condition in which human beings intially find themselves and in which mainly remain. All other philosophical projects in *Being and Time* are secondary to everydayness (we can say that topics like epistemology and phenomenology are responses to deficiencies intrinsic to everydayness).

More importantly, everydayness provides an introduction to the Heideggerian system of concepts and claims. Secondly, it portrays, one's everyday relationship to the entities one finds around himself i. e. every day way of encountering them. In a third and very subtle sense, the primary concern of everydayness is with the background understanding which is a condition of possibility for one's every day experience.

In *Being and Time* the prime occupation of Heidegger was to work out completely the question of meaning of 'Being'. 'Being' of an entity (any thing that is in any way or sense whatsoever) is the most general way in which this entity is most basically like or distinct from others. While examining the question of meaning of being another crucial term is introduced by Heidegger i.e. Dasein. "This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term Dasein."[9] Dasein in common parlance refers to human beings.

So, in *Being and Time* Heidegger works out the Being of Dasein and here, he, first of all, looks into the 'averageness' or 'Everydayness' of the Dasein, which is the everyday undifferentiated character of the Dasein. This Everydayness is the point of departure of *Being and Time* because of the provisional assumption that Being is more visible and accessible only in that ordinary and pre-scientific condition in which, quite often, we find ourselves. For Heidegger, unless we work out the idea of a natural conception of the world,[10] we cannot have a proper analysis of Dasein. No traditional philosophizations could achieve this task because all of them have, erroneously enough, treated our relation to entities, basically as 'theoretical' whereas truely it is practical or 'pragmatic'. Therefore, tradition, if at all has done anything, only has distorted the whole programme. Heidegger would successfully steer his enterprize out and away from such problems because of his 'breaking away' from the traditional way of interpreting ourselves.

As we have hinted at earlier, Everydayness is nothing but an elaboration of the way in which all human beings are essentially 'Beings in the world'. Further more, this basic everyday relation lies in our employment of tools or equipments i.e. those things of which we make use to realize our purposes. In other words, what he suggests is that Being in its essential relations i.e. ontological and ontical, can be discovered only in the context of Everydayness. Translating this idea into the language of Husserlian phenomenology one could say that 'subject' can be grasped with all explicitness only in the world of Everydayness. Once we accept this phenomenological translation of Heideggerian project of Everydayness to be correct, immediately it follows, barring certain other implications that Heidegger's Everydayness is nothing but Husserlian version of life-world; for (i) as in the latter, in Heidegger also we find that epistemology without a proper grounding of Everydayness would not be a satisfactory descipline. (ii) In Husserl, no other perspective, except that of life-world, could successfully establish the inter-subjectivity among the subjects. In other words, life-world is a way of access to the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity. Equally in Heidegger also, Dasein understands itself and its relation with other entities (ontical) and with other Daseins (ontological) only in the context of Everydayness; 'Discloseness' and 'Discovery' i. e. prior familiarity with the world and encountering of the entities

within the world have their possibilities by adoption of the attitude of Everydayness.

However, in such an interpretation the immediate problem, which draws one's attention towards it, is that to some of the readers Heideggerian characterization of Everydayness may appear to be much more closer to the Husserlian statement of the world of natural stand point of *Ideas*, rather than to the life-world of *Crisis*. But such a confusion can be clarified easily if we recall the remarks which we have made earlier on a relevant point at the beginning of our exercise i. e. the distinction between the immediately given natural world and the natural standpoint – the thesis on the natural world. It is the latter, as Husserl evisages, is to be overcome because it presents a distorted picture of the consciousness and a distorted picture of the world as well; it is in the life-world the recovery from such a double distortion becomes possible and more positively life-world grounds all perspectives and all interests of human consciousness. Hence, Heidegger's 'Everydayness' is the Husserlian version of 'Life-world', not the world of natural standpoint.

We could conclude this study with certain remarks on the justification of undertaking such a comparative investigation. Immediately, at least one point seems obvious that once we study all the three thinkers from such a suggested point of view we discover that in a very implicit manner, in all the three in their respective styles, there is a protest against the traditional rather much accepted view that science is the foundation of knowledge. In other words, they univocally vouchsafe the claim that prior to any theorization, linguisticality or scientific abstraction there is a pre-theoretical world on which all these are grounded and the ultimate bed-rock from which all philosophy must proceed is the pure ego or consciousness which is grasped in its totality either in the context of life-world, forms of life or Everydayness, Moreover although in somewhat different way but very relevantly we can suggest that this study may give rise to certain possible ways of preparing a very pertinent and prominent critique of Husserl's phenomenology e.g. the whole of Husserlian project was directed at one point viz. establishing philosophy as a strict science in the sense of bringing upon philosophy a sort of rigour and clarity

as to the basic principles and methodology which would provide it with a new but strong foundation free from all 'unexamined' presuppositions. Towards serving this purpose, his quest ends at the 'Ego / cogito', 'pure consciousness' or subjectivity (the wonder of all wonders) on which, as he says, a rationally grounded autonomous system of philosophical knowledge can be built. But despite of the alleged claim of being radical, as Heidgger would claim, Husserl was not radical enough in his treatment of pure consciousness; he does not inquite into the mode of Being of consciousness-subjectivity of the subject. Understood in this sense, Heidegger pushes phenomenology into its logical limit as started with a promise by Edmund Husserl.

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Notes

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5. Husserl, Edmund : *Crisis,* Part III A.

6. Wittgenstein , Ludwig : *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* trans. by McGuinness Brian F. and Peaars, David (Routledge and Kegan Paul), (London, 1947).

7. Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967).

8. Heidegger, Martin: *Being and Time* trans. by J. Macquarie and E Robinson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972.

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10. *Ibid.,* p. 76.

AN ENQUIRY INTO KANT'S CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTION

Immanuel Kant created revolution in the realm of philosophy as Copernicus did in the field of astronomy. The nature of Kant's Copernican revolution has baffled his interpreters because some treat it as copernican, while others maintain that it is anticopernican in spirit. I would like to discuss in the article whether there is genuine similarity between the two revolutions or it is merely an analogy. Kant's Copernican revolution is directed to the knowledge situation— How knowledge is generated? What is the relation between consciousness and the object? In Kantian philosophy we find primacy of consciousness over object as opposed to realist stand in which objects exist independently of knowing mind. He played the role of critical mediator between dogmatism and empiricism. Kant steers clear between scylla of rationalism and charybdis of empiricism. Percept without concept is blind and concept without percept is empty. Knowledge is product of sensibility and understanding. Thing in itself is the source of chaotic manifold sensations which are arranged in space and time (Sensibility) and Categories of Understanding synthesize our experience. Kant's critical philosophy consists of an anlysis of the power of human reason, by which he meant "a critical enquiry into the faculty of reason with reference to all the knowledge which it may strive to attendd independently of all experience". Kant affirmed that we possess a faculty that is capable of giving us knowledge without an appeal to experience. He maintained that "A our knowledge begins with experience, but it does not follow that it arises out of experience". This was the point that Hume had missed, for Hume had said that all our knowledge consist of a series of impressions, which we derive through our senses. Experience cannot give us knowledge about necessary connections or about the universality of propositions. Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgement - the analytic and synthetic. In analytic judgement the predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject. A synthetic judgement differs from

the analytic in that its predicate is not contained in the subject. All analytic judgements are *a priori,* their meaning does not depend upon our experience of any particular case as in case of mathematics, as necessity and universality are sure marks of *a priori* knowledge. Synthetic judgements are for the most part *a posteriori,* that is they occur after an experience of observation. There is, however, another kind of judgement besides the analytic *a priori* and synthetic *a posteriori* and this is the synthetic *a priori.* In Mathematics judgement like $7 + 5 = 12$ is synthetic *a priori* because it contains the mark of universality and necessity (*a priori*). At the same time, this judgement is synthetic and not analytic because 12 cannot be merely derived by analysis of the number $7 + 5$. Similarly, in Physics and Geometry we find synthetic *a priori* judgements. Kant formulated universality, necessity and novelty as criteria of knowledge and on this basis only synthetic *a priori* judgement constitutes knowledge proper.

Kant solved the problem of synthetic *a priori* by substituting a new hypothesis concerning the relation between mind and its objects. It was clear to him that if we assume, as Hume did, that the mind in forming its concept, must conform to its objects, there could be no solution to the problem. Hume's theory would work for our ideas of things we have actually experienced – these are *a posteriori* judgements. But synthetic *a priori* judgement can be validated by experience. If, as Hume believed, the mind is passive and simply receives its information from the objects, it follows that the mind would have information only about that particular objects, but the mind makes judgement about all objects and even those it has not yet experienced, and objects do in fact behave in the future according to these judgements we make about them.

Kant's new hypothesis was that it is the objects that conform to operation of the mind and not the other way round. Kant says that "hither to it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all our attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something into them *a priori* means of cconcepts have on this assumption ended in failure. We must therefore, make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge ....If intuition must conform to the constitution

of the objects and does not see how we could know anything of the latter *a priori*, but if the objects (as the objects of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility."[1]

Kant did not mean to say that the mind creates objects; nor did he mean that mind has innate ideas. His copernican revolution consisted rather in his saying that mind brings something to the objects it experiences. The mind, says Kant, is structured in such a way that it imposes its way of knowing upon its objects. By its very nature the mind actively organises our experiences. That is, thinking involves not only receiving impressions to our senses but also making judgements about what we experience. Kant says that ''There are two sources of human knowledge–sensibility and understanding. Through the former objects are given to us, through the latter they are thought''. Knowledge is, therefore, co-operative affair between the knower and the thing known. The distinctive activity of the mind is to synthesize and to unify our experience. It achieves this synthesis first by imposing on our various experiences in the sensible manifold certain forms of intuition of space and time. In addition to space and time, there are certain categories of thought, which deal more specifically with the way mind unifies or synthesizes our experience. The manifold of experience is judged by us through certain fixed concepts or categories such as quantity, quality, relation and modality etc. Kant maintains that the unity of our experience must imply unity of the self, for unless there was unity between the several operations of the mind there could be no knowledge of experience. Kant calls such self as transcendental unity of apperception. Thus, the idea of the self as *a priori* is a necessary condition for the experience we do have of having knowledge of a unified world of nature.

Kantian philosophy is revolutionary in spirit as compared to prevailing philosophies – people before Kant thought and most people even today think that our knowledge of the object is determined by the nature of the object as like claim of a realist. The commonsense believes that objects exist prior to our knowledge and is in a sense cause of it. But Kant argued that this would make *a priori* knowledge impossible, because it is impossible to know it before hand. Since Kant was convinced that we have *a priori* knowledge,

he tried the opposite hypothesis that object instead of determining our knowledge is really determined by it, that our knowledge is in a sense cause of the object. Thus, through a reply to Ptolemian like belief in the field of epistemology that it is object which is the centre of knowledge, Kant created a Copernican revolution that it is our mind which is the origin and centre or in more famous Kantian terminology understanding maketh naturue.

Prior to Copernicus, there was a scientist called Ptolemy who propounded the Geocentric theory, according to which earth is the centre of this universe and the sun revolves round the earth. This theory remained unchallanged for many centuries. But Copernicus stated that instead of earth the sun is the centre of this universe and earth revolves around the sun and this is known as Heliocentric hypothesis. This has been proved true by subsequent works of Keppler, Galileo and Newton. Similarly, prior to Kant, Locke stated mind is at birth *tabula rasa* or empty. Locke held that, if my ideas correspond to external object only then my ideas are true. According to Kant it is not our ideas that should corespond to external object, but external objects should correspond to our ideas. This is known as copernican revolution in philosophy. In the early times, the direction of knowledge was from object to ideas; but later on it was changed from ideas to objects. So, philosophers before Kant had been going on the assumption that our perceptions correspond to the characteristics of the external world. Kant, on the contrary, maintains that all objects, in order to be known, must conform to the constitution of our mind. So, Kant attributes to human mind the characterstics which had been previously assigned to external world.

Professor C. D. Broad explains the genuine similarity between two revolutions, that of Copernicus and Kant, is their respective fields of astronomy and epistemology. Upto Copernicus' time, it was commonly assumed that earth did not itself move, and so long as this was assumed no simplification or unification could be made in the movements of the planets. But Copernicus suggested that earth is also moving, and the apparent movement of the planets are compounded out of their own proper movements and the movements of the observer who is carried with the earth. It was then found that all appearences could be explained by supposing

that the earth and the planets move around the sun in orbits. Now Kant maintains that the older precritical metaphysics is like preCopernian astronomy. It regards our mind as merely mirrors which passively reflect things in themselves, just as old astronomer thought that earth was at rest and the apparent movements of the planets were identical with their own proper motions. Kant's own view is that objects of our knowledge are not things in themselves but are manufactured products, in making of which our mind plays a part. Some of the properties which we ascribe to external object are really due to mental processes by which we unconsciously construct crude sense data. So, there is real analogy between Kant's step in metaphysics and Copernicus' step in astronmy.

A good deal of discussioon has arisen out of Kant's claim to parallel Copernicus. Its appropriateness was first questioned by Betrand Russell, who said that Kant would have been more accurate if he had spoken of a Ptolemic counter revolution, since he puts man back at the centre from which Copernicus had dethroned him[2]. Russell blames Kant for such anthropocentrism, because he wanted philosophy to be cosmocentric. But Pringle Pattison has praised Kant for the same philosophic outlook. "Kant", he said, "did not hesitate to subordinate the starry heavens above and the moral law within and to restore man's intelligence to the central position in the scheme of things, from which Copernicus had dethroned him as an animal creature[3]". C. J. Friendrich maintains "Kant's reference to Copernicus serves only to indicate Kant's dissatifaction with the chaos of existing theories and his decision to make trial of another[4]". F. L. Cross, in one of his article contributed to *Mind* (1937) denied the fact that Kant himself has used this phrase. But, however, by Copernicus Cross "appears to mean that Kant asserts a similarity between himself and Copernicus only in one respect, namely that each of them made trial of an alternative hypothesis when an earlier hypothesis proved unsatisfactory[5]". Later, Norwood R. Hansen drew attention to the fact that "Kant limits his analogy to the first thought of Copernicus whereby apparently restricting its scope to the motion of the earth about its own axis[6]". So, rotation of earth on its axis was seen to be purely kinematic effect relative to the stars, while Kant totally ignored the rotation of the earth around the sun and took dynamic consequences relative to the other planets of the solar system. It seems that the label Copernican revolution has become a way of describing Kant's

originality rather than way of characterising his own thought. Like
Copernicus Kant sought to explain the properties of observed phenomena
by postulating a kind of activity in the observer. Nowhere in either
addition of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernuft* does the phrase the "Copernican
revolution" occur. Nor does the expression "Copernican hypothesis"
occur either. H. J. Paton writes: "Kant compares his own philosophical
revolution with that initiated by Copernicus". "The analogy", says
Professor Paton, "lies in the fact that they are both revolutions–
they seek in the spectator what others have supposed to be merely
in the object. This is what we mean when we refer to Kant's Copernican
revolution, and it seems to me we have ample warrent for doing
so"". Lindsay writes "This new way of conceiving the possibility of
a priori knowledge Kant compares to the revolution brought about
in astronomy be Copernicus." Lindsay then goes on to quote Kant
as saying "Copernicus' primarily hypothesis[8]". When Copernicus found
he could not achieve satisfactory results by assuming one hypothesis,
made trial of another. In metaphysics, it is possible to make analogous
trial. The term "Copernican" is brought here only to illustrate the
propriety of making trial of untested hypothesis, particularly when
existent theories seem fruitless.

Thus, like Copernicus, Kant shifted the centre of gravity of
knowledge and believed firmly in the theory, although it appeared
to be apparently contradictory. "Copernicus dared, in a manner
contradictory of the sense, but true, to seek the observed movements,
not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator[9]". According to
Locke ideas are mere copies of things and mind is only secondary
in the knowledge situation. The mind is only passive in its role,
and what is active is the object. The object as the external world
can exist independently of its being known. The centre of gravity
of knowledge situation is, therefore, not the mind but the object
there in the external world. Kant introduced a radical change in
the interpretation of the knowledge situation. He put mind or
understanding in the centre of the epistemological situation and
said that it is not the object that determines the understanding
but understanding that determines the object and is expressed by
statement understanding maketh nature.

The understanding is law giver of nature. The principles of
the pure understanding are the most universal law of nature and

empirical laws of nature are the only particular determination of these. All order and regularity take their origin in spirit and are put into object by it. Our understanding is the law giver within the limits of its knowledge; no doubt it knows the limit of its legislative authority. The nature to which it dicates laws is nothing but a totality of phenomena; beyond the limit of phenomena— in the noumenal realm, it is inoperative. Knowledge is limited to appearances only.

Kant's so-called Copernican revolution has a double significance. Against empiricism he argued that the mind is not to conform to objects but rather objects should conform to mind. And against rationalism, he argued that it is not God but self that is responsible for the unity of experience. Against cosmocentric view and theocentric view, Kant establishes an egocentric view of knowledge. Kant maintains that object must be viewed as conforming to human thought, not the human thought to the independently real. This is the hypothesis to which Kant has given misleading title Copernican. Kant develops phenomenalism on rationalist lines as he professes to prove that our knowledge is only an appearance and is conditioned by *a priori* principles. Kant's comparison of his new hypothesis with that of Copernicus has generally been misunderstood. T.H. Green commenting upon Copernican revolution says "The reader is probably acquainted with Kant's dictum that the understanding mekes nature. It no doubt gives somewhat startling expression to the revolution in philosophy which Kant himself has introduced, and which he compared to the changes effected by Copernican theory in men's conception of the relative positions of the earth and the sun"[10].

B. Alexander referring to Kant's Copernican revolution says "It is very ironical that Kant himself has signalised the revolution which he believed himself to be effecting a Copernican revolution. But there is nothing Copernican in it except that he believed it to be a revolution. If every change is Copernican which reverses the order of the term with which it deals, which declares A to depend upon B, when B had before been declared to depend upon A, then Kant who believed that he reversed order of dependence of mind and thing, was right in saying that he effected Copernican revolution. But he was not right in any other sense. For, his revolution,

18   SANJAY KUMAR SHUKLA

so for as it was one, was accurately anti-Copernican[11]". Dr. S.
Morris Engel has attempted a re-examination of Kant's Copernican
analogy. He "confines his attention to the part of a Copernican
astronomy which deals with the motions of the planets. This is
of course a departure from the working in the *Critique*[12]". It is
gratuitous attribution to Kant on the part of Dr. Engel that Copernicus
was from Kant's point of view the ideal practitioner of the scientific
method. If one, says J.W. Oliver, as a rejoinder to Dr. Engel's
aforesaid remark, ignores the disproportion in the analogy, he may
conclude that just as Rembrandt portrayed an imaginary Aristotle
contemplating the best of an imaginary. However, Dr. Engel has
portrayed an imaginary Kant admiring the method of an imaginary
Copernican[13]".

Compared critically, both the revolution of Copernicus
(Astronomy) and of Kant (Epistemology) had different themes and
objects, but their impulse was the same. Both had the tradition
as challenge and both succeeded in changing the course towards
illuminating trace of truth. The reader may very naturally conceive
the Copernican revolution in terms of its main consequences, the
reduction of earth from its proud position of central preeminence.
But that does not bear the least analogy to the intended concequences
of the critical philosophy which is inspired by the avowed purpose
of neutralising the naturalastic implication of the Copernican astonomy.
"His aim", says Prof. N. K. Smith, "is nothing less than the
firm establishment of what may be perhap, described as Copernican,
but the critical philosophy, as humanistic, has genuine kinship with
the Greak standpoints[14]".

So, in the light of different views mentioned above we can
uphold that it is a conceptual revolution. His so-called Copernican
revolution is confined not only in the realm of epistemology
but we find its ramification in the field of morality and metaphysics
as well. Kant maintains that understanding is the Lawgiver of morality
and thereby refutes the view that god or scripture can be the
source of morality. He was a votary of autonomy of will and
gave the doctrine of selfdeterminism. The denial of metaphysics
is the logical culmination of Kant's conceptual revolution. Prior
to Kant, Hume also denied the metaphysics but the ground was
different as Hume denied it on the ground of experience, while

Kant denied it on reason. The sense of limit is the soul of Kantian philosophy. Kant proves the futility of metaphsics by antinomies in Rational Cosmology, denies the speculative role of reason concerning soul by Paralogisms of reason in Rational psychology. In similar fashion, Kant refutes the claim of reason to prove the existence of God in Rational theology.

So, in the concluding we can safely admit that Copernican revolution is only a method of trying the untested hypothesis for intended results. There is no genuine similarity between the Copernican revolution in astronomy and the so-called Copernican revolution of Kant in epistemology. It can only be said to be merely an analogy. Kant's Copernican revolution consisted in giving more positive note to philosophy by placing the ego at the centre of knowledge and existence instead of placing God in centre. The enduring contribution of Kant consists in advancing the egocentric view of knowledge instead of cosmocentric or theocentric view. In discovering the self to be central entity, Kant laid the foundation of a deeper and truer idealism, which found its culmination in Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet and McTaggart.

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# INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

[Formerly *The Philosophical Quarterly* of the
Indian Institute of Philosophy (Tattvajñāna
Mandira), Amalner.]

STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

Journal of the Department of Philosophy
University of Poona, Pune.

Volume XXI,
No. 3
July, 1994

Editors :

S.S. Barlingay,   Rajendra Prasad,   M.P. Marathe,
            Mrinal Miri   S.S. Deshpande

University of Poona

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

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OTHER MINDS – THE SARTREAN SOLUTION

The epistemological question regarding the existence of other minds has always been an intriguing one. Since nobody can be sceptic about one's own self, there is no logical problem in accepting self existence. But what can be said about the Other? On principle, the Other is the self other than me. But how do I know that he exists at the consciousness level--that he thinks, feels, judges etc? Are there any proofs? Are these proofs acceptable?

Traditionally the existence of this Other mind has been proved indirectly through inference. Both inductive and deductive arguments have been given. I infer about the body in front of me as having the same state of mind if it moves or behaves in the manner I do when I am under that mental condition. Since I have a particular behaviour or body movements and behind that have a mind and since the Other body also has the same behaviour or movements. It is, by analogy, likely for that body to have a similar mind too. To Ayer, the behaviour, language, physical working, all the physical expressions of feelings and thoughts of the Other's body reflect his consciousness as they do mine.

Some find the solution in deductive inference. To them physical expressions, movements and behaviour are either logically equivalent to--as for the behaviourists e.g. G. Ryle---- or at least necessarily related to mental state as for the criteriological theory e.g. Malcolm and for Wittegenstein for that matter. Therefore, the body as having a mind can be deduced by mere perception of its behaviour.

A lot has been said in favour of and against these arguments. The situation is that a satisfactory solution has been eluding us so far. Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* discusses the problem

of others at length from ontological as well as epistemological points of view as both are interlinked and cannot be totally separated from each other, therefore, in spite of my emphasis being on the question of the knowledge of the Other, I have, at places, taken metaphysical analysis into consideration too. Before putting forward the Sartrean view in this context, I must state that it seems to me to be the most satisfactory theory. Though it has not, so far, been very much recognised as such. Therefore, the sole aim of this article is to present his theory, so that a discussion on the merits or demerits of it can be initiated.

Regarding the question of the knowledge of the Other minds, Sartre examines his predecessors' stand-points. For most of the realists the existence of every thing is given and this includes the Other too. Their emphasis is on how to know this existence. And they found recourse in argument by analogy. But from it what we get is only probable knowledge. Realists justify themselves by saying that the existence of the Other is certain but its knowledge is probable. Sartre argues that "if the Other is accessible to us only by means of the knowledge which we have of him and if this knowledge is only conjectural, then the existence of the Other is only conjectural."[1]

Kant and the majority of post-Kantians continue to affirm the existence of the Other "but they can refer only to common sense or to our deep rooted tendencies to justify this affirmation."[2]

In order to establish internal relation between me and the Other, 19th and 20th century philosophers bring about a change in the ontological structure of the Other. For Husserl the existence of the Other is necessary for me because without him my world lacks meaning. It is his existence which confers significance on my world which becomes a world in common.[3] But Sartre holds that the knowledge of this Other is impossible because the nature of his self like my self is transcendental. The connection of two transcendental subjects is actually a problem.[4] My knowledge of him is impossible as he is beyond experience. This is a dive into solipsism.

Hegel, though a predecessor to Husserl, scores over him when

he successfully relates the two subjects internally by making me directly dependent on him in my being. The Other's appearance is necessary not to the constitution of the world but to the very existence of my consciousness as self-consciousness. In its dialectical progress towards self-identity consciousness necessarily implies the being of the Other. Therefore, I cannot doubt him without doubting my self. So my knowledge of the Other is as certain as the knowledge of my self. But the problem here is that this relation of dependence is not equal. Hegel holds it as a Master-Slave relation. He is the Slave; I am the Master. Though he is necessary for my knowledge of my self, but for him it is I who am an essence. Hence Sartre finds this unequal relation insufficient.[5]

With the help of his concept of 'Mit-sein' or 'being-with' the relation between me and the Other is achieved on an equal footing by Heidegger. The characteristic of the being of human reality is its 'being-with-Others'. But it is, again, not satisfactory as this 'being-with' does not establish the Other as a being in its own right,[6] though now we get a being which in its own being implies the Other's being.

Ontologically Sartre picks up from here and gets benefitted from all of them. He not only establishes my self and the Other self as same type of being who do not wish to communicate with the mediation of their respective bodies (like Hussurl), but makes their wish of this direct relation possible (like Hegel) in such a way that my being necessarily implies the Other's being (like Heidegger). This relation between me and the Other is that of mutual negation i.e., I am not he and he is not me; he is the self whose appearance affects me into my being and *vice versa*. So, now in Sartre the Other becomes a being in his own right. He argues that the knowledge of this Other mind is not possible through ordinary and traditional means of perception and inference, for they involve subject-object duality. Therefore, if the Other is known through them he would become an object of my knowledge. This would destroy the very nature of the Other, for "the Other is not an object. In his connection with me he remains a human reality."[7]

This situation concerns us to say that either the knowledge

of the other in impossible which ultimately leads to solipsism or that it is a *priori*. As for solipsim, Sartre says "it amounts to saying that outside me nothing exists and so it goes beyond the limits of the fields of my experience".[8] How do I know what is and what is not outside the limits of my experience?" ——if his existence is not as sure as my own, all conjecture about him is entirely lacking in meaning".[9] And as we all would agree, the reality is that "I have always known that the Other existed, that I have always had a total, though implicit, comprehension of his existence".[10] So, saying that the Other does not exist is actually not possible. Does this mean that the knowledge of the Other is *a priori*? But it cannot be so as he is a real, concrete, particular, contingent being as I myself am. He is not abstract, universal or eternal.

Now, what is left to say? Are we left with any mysitc or ineffable experience? No, says Sartre. The Other is immediately present to my being. He is given to me and is beyond doubt. "It is in reality of everyday life that the Other appears to us".[11] It is not a mystic experience in which the Other appears to me. The knowledge of the Other is as real, direct and clear as the experience of the self. It is simulteneously with the knowledge of the self that the knowledge of the Other as a subject, as a self is attained. In order to know certain aspects of my self I come to have a direct apprehension of the Other. But this does not mean that my self is the mediator. On the contrary, the Other is the mediator who introduces my self to me. On the ground of his existence I come to know my self. Therefore, I do not need any proof to know the Other. He exists and this knowledge is always there without doubt along with the knowledge of the self.

The question, here is on what grounds does Sartre say so? On examining human reality Sartre establishes it as pure existence or, being. It is pure consciousness, pure subject. This pure consciousness is qualified by Sartre with nothing; it is nothingness, or pure negation. So it has immense possibilities to be anything. It is a 'being-for-itself' *(pour-soi)*; it can not become an object of knowledge of itself because to be so, it should have some qualities and should be at a distance from itself which it is

not. It is non-positional. Because it is qualityless, it is not ditermined. And this is to say that it is totally free. This consciousness reveals itself while revealing an object. But this is not all about man. On analysing further Sartre finds some modes of human reality which are totally different in their structure from this pure subjectivity *(pour soi)*. "It is in relation to myself as subject that I am concerned about my self and yet this concern (for myself) reveals to me a being which is my being without being for me."[12]

This being which is mine without being for me, which is my 'being-for-Others *(pour autrui)* comes to the surface in the feelings of either shame, fear or pride. Since these feelings ultimately will solve the epistemological problem regarding the Other, therefore they should be analysed elaborately. And for this Sartre chooses shame among all these and examines its structure. He establishes it, at first, having the structure of a 'for-itself', meaning it is pre-reflective and non-positional. It cannnot become an object of itself. But it must have another object because it is intentional, "so it is always a shameful apprehension. of something and this something is me".[13] I am ashamed of myself; I myself become an object of my shameful apprehension. Hence in shame I discover a new structure of my being--my being as an object of myself--which is completely different from the structure of my 'being-for-itself'. I realise, as Sartre puts it, a new but intimate relation of my self to myself.

And at the same time shame's primary structure is such that it refers to some one other than me. For, "it in its primary structure, shame is *before some body*".[14] This means it not only has an object (me) but it makes me an object before someone else. It realises a self other than me before whom I am an object. This Other is an indispensable mediator between myself and me. Through this mediator objectification of my being is realised. It can be further understood by a simple example of an awkward gesture. Suppose I have made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture is me, I simply live it, it is for-itself. But suddenly when I raise my head, I find somebody looking at me. All of a sudden I realise the vulgarity of my gesture and am ashamed of it. It is because "shame is by nature

recognition. I recognise that I am as the Other sees me".[15]

By the mere apprearance of the Other I am put in the position of passing judgement on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other. It should be noted here that to experience my objectivity it need not be the actual presence of the Other, for even "my conviction of his presence operates this mediation and yields me to my self as object. ——We may suppose ourselves to be looked at, and have the appropriate reactions of shame, fear and the like——, and yet my conviction of the reality the Other was just as strong as in the actual presence of another person".[16] So, shame which is a part of my structure, is immediate doubtless recognition of the Other. This way I come to encounter him.

The question, here, is how do we know that this Other which is revealed to me in shame, whom I encounter in it, is a 'for-it-self' just as I myself am? Why is he not a body ---- an 'in-itself' *(en soi)* like a table or a chair? In his famous chapter of *Being and Nothingness* titled "The Look" Sartre provides an answer to this question. Suppose I am in a park and I come across many things like benches, trees, siones etc. A man passes by the bench. I see this man along with many other things. I apprehend him as an object of my perception. So, in the midst of the world I can perceive him as 'man reading' as I could say 'cold stone', 'fine rain' etc. But at the same time I apprehend him as a man, as a subject too. "My apprehension of the Other as an object essentially refers me to a fundamental apprehension of the Other in which he will not be revealed to me as an object but as a 'presence in person'".[17]

If I take him as an object, like if I take him only as a puppet, I will apply to him all the catgories which I normally apply to all other things. He will be an object of my world whic is at a distance with me and which belongs to me. His relations with all other things of my world will be purely external. His appearance in and disappearance from my world will not bring perceptible change in it. But the fact is that this is not true. When he appears I apprehend the body coming towards me as not only a body but actually brings about

a total change in me and in my world. Actually this change enables me to apprehenend the presence of his being as a subject.

It is through the look of the Other in the feeling of shame that I experience this change as well as his subjectivity. Shame in which I realise my objectivity cannot arise in front of a chair or a table. I have observed, time and again, that it is aroused only in front of a body which can direct a look towards me. This means this body or object is not an ordinary type. Its intense, live, piersing eyes generate a shudder in me from head to foot which makes me realise the difference of this object from the rest. Its look gives me this uncomfortable feeling that this object can judge me, anticipate my actions, give own meaning to my gestures, steal my world from me and reduce and fix me as an object. Under the discomfort of its look I learn this object is actually a subject for whom I am an object. Being seen and seeing is the form of the relation between me and the Other.[18]

Now what is this 'look? How do we define it? A look is fastened upon me by the two ocular globes i. e. eyes. But Sartre holds it is neither the quality, not the form of the eyes, nor is it a wordly relation of them with me. In fact, when I apprehend the look which the eyes manifest, I stop apprehending eyes. The look hides the eyes. In principle, "we cannot perceive the world and at the same time apprehend a look fastened upon us; it must be either one or the other. This is because to perceive is to look at and to apprehend a look is ....to be conscious of being looked at".[19]

Therefore, the look which eyes manifest, is a pure reference to my self. Now, we can define the look as the awareness of being looked at. It is an intermediary which refers from me to my self. Take the famous keyhole example.[20] Suppose out of jealousy, curiosity or vice I try to evesdrop and peep through the keyhole of a closed room. I am alone and at the level of non-positional consciousness. I am not aware of my self as an object, but am a pure subject. I do not see my self, nor do I judge my self I am my self, my act, I live my act. But all of a sudden I hear foot steps behind me. Instantly I become aware that I

am being looked at. Before that, there were walls, chairs, pots, plants (any object for that matter) behind and around me. But I did not have that feeling of discomfort. But with the emergence of a particular type of object or body, suddenly I am conscious of being looked at; suddenly I am at a distance from my self. I see my self peeping and evesdropping. I am conscious and ashamed of my self. In this shame, now I realise that my act was improper, now I start judging my self objectively. I realise that the look of the Other has made me an object and I am this object for this Other. I am not my free self but am enslaved. "My subjective reactions to the Other's look which are fear, pride or shame, are the recognition of my slavery".[21] And as I know I cannot become object for another object. Therefore, this Other who is directing a look towards me is a subject. The summary of the whole situation can be found in the famous quote "My original fall (fall from subjectivity) is the existence of the Other".[22] So, to Sartre, the knowledge of the Other does not pose any problem. The Other is directly known wihtout any mediator and I do not need any proof for this knowledge. My objectivity realised in shame, pride or fear refers to his subjectivity which is expressed by his look. This way, the Other's existence is both evident and certain for us.[23]

Satre has been held guilty of straining relations between me and the Other, for if the knowledge of the Other's subjectivity reduces me to an object, then I cannot have harmoneous relations with him. "Hell is Other people" (No Exit) is the expression of this bitterness between us. On the other hand, because of this theory of Other mind, says Peter Caws,[24] Sartre, though saves his man from solipsism, but at the same time his uniqueness and significance get destroyed. Discovering that a subject is an object in front of another subject is actually discovering that one is 'just any body' (n' importe qui)

These problems notwithstanding, the virtue of this Sartrean solution, in my opinion, lies in the facts (i) that no mediation is required for the knowledge of the Other as my feelings, my mental state or my own self so to say, immediately refers to him; (ii) this knowledge is as certain as the knowledge of my own self; (iii) and at the same time the Other's self is

apprehended not as an object of knowledge but as a subject or self. Hence, this theory leaves no space for the difficulties faced by the other established ones. In the light of these facts I want to draw attention towards this Sartrean solution to the problem of Other minds so that a more critical evalution can be possible.

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3. *Sartre*-Caws, Peter, 98.

4. BN -p. 317

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9. *Ibid,* p. 338

10 *Ibid,* p. 338

11. *Ibid,* p. 341

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13. *Ibid,* p. 301

14. *Ibid,* p. 302

15. *Ibid,* p. 302

16. *Sartre,* Caws, Peter, p. 99

17. BN, p. 340

18. *Sartre,* Caws, Peter, p. 99

19. BN., p. 347

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A. J. AYER'S NOTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS[1]

Ayer agrees that philosophy understood as logical analysis of language should indeed provide the starting point. Nevertheless, his complaint is that analytic philosophers have not gone beyond a level. In order to establish his point, he catalogues each of them under two types; he calls them as *formal analyses* and *informal analyses*. Under *formal* analyses, he includes the logical system which is nothing but an axiomatic programme for philosophy. This was lying at the basis of Ramsey's account of philosophy as a system of definitions (Ramsey's step). Under *informal* analyses, he includes the analysis of ordinary language which was inaugurated by later Wittgenstein.[2] Nevertheless, in contrast to formal analysis, this may also be understood to dispense with logical symbolism. G.E. Moore's analysis of propositions of common sense, Gilbert Ryle's analysis of the concept of mind, together with his attack on the Cartesian dualism as involving the acceptance of the ghost in the machine, J.L. Austin's theory of speech acts, Wittgenstein's own therapeutic approach to philosophy all fall under this approach. The defect of ordinary language analysis, according to Ayer's reading, is that they 'suffer too much from attention paid to the niceties of English Usage'.[3] Moore, for example, missed the centrality of the problem of perception and failed to attack with the linguistic means. So also Ryle. Wittgenstein's own analyses of therapy stops exactly at a place where it is supposed to offer curative analysis. Wittgenstein's idea of therapy exhorts to us to stop at philosophizing, whereas Ayer's pleads us to go further than this. The benchmark of Ayer's therapy is reflected in his oft-quoted remark: a philosopher is a patient who must be cured of his illness. Ayer accepts that philosophical problems are at the root problems of language. If so, linguistic analyses must throw light (illuminate) on the central problems of philosophy.

Besides, Ayer includes what he calls logical grammar.

According to him the problem it raises are nor merely philosophical problems within logic. But they devetail into the very understanding of science and epistemology. Ayer's logical empiricist's position, reminds us of Carnap's own but it takes us in a slightly different direction. That is, like Carnap's, there is a neo-Kantian unification of empiricism and rationalism within Ayer's outlook also. This forces us to attribute a Carnapian step to Ayer's reasoning, while Carnap takes us in direction of 'Hilbertization of science', that is to say, that it takes us in the direction of the logical syntax of science.[4] Ayer takes us right into the problems of epistemology. Ayer's position is akin to Strawson's own position, as revealed in his recent *Analysis and Metaphysics*. Ayer distinguishes at least *three* strands of such reasoning as found under logical grammar. First, the truth-functional analysis which is simply based on extensional analysis of language and second, the intentional analysis of language which is supposed to illuminate the analysis of modalities that we attribute to propositions, namely necessity, possibility and impossibility (Quine thinks that modal logic is conceived in sin). Besides, we have the non-truth functional analysis of proposition, especially the proposition of the form 'I believe p, I know p. etc...' How can one hope to throw light on perceiving, believing etc. without making use of intensional expression, Ayer asks.[5] That is, there is a particular way of understanding the difficulty about the second and third variety; that is, they cannot be shown to satisfy the condition of extensionality. It is only from this Ayer passes on to consider informal analysis which is based on analysis of ordinary usage. He already rejected all the three types of ordinary language analysis which are stated as follows:-

1.   Speech act philosophy of language originating from J.L.Austin;

2.   Commonsensical analysis of G.E. Moore; and

3.   To some extent both of the above depended on Wittgenstein's analysis of ordinary language.

Ayer's comment is that all these types of analysis suffer from too much attention paid to the niceties of English language as already stated.

Ayer's own brand of analysis of language starts with the dictum that '.....there should not be any sharp distinction between investigating the structure of language and investigating the structure of the world. This is because the very notion of the belief that the world of such and such a character only makes sense within the framework of some system of concepts which language embodies.[7] Ayer characteristically remarks that our experiences are articulated in language. To quote Ayer: "The idea that we could prize the world of our concepts is incoherent for with what conception of the world should we then be left."[8]

According to Ayer, the purpose of the analysis was not just to elucidate the meaning of a particular class of proposition (proposition of perception) but to account for the knowledge which we were supposed to have of their truth. Whether or not it is counted as a form of analysis, this type of enquiry has a long philosophical history. It is one of the principal parts of what is traditionally called the theory of knowledge.[9]

It is in this context, Ayer makes a distinction between two types of definition; they are called explicit definition, and definition in use. An explicit definition is stated as follows:-

"We define a symbol explicitly when we put forward another symbol or symbolic expression which is synonymous with it. And the word 'synonymous' is here used in such a way that two symbols belonging to the same language can be said to be synonymous if. and only if. the simple substitution of one symbol for the other, in any sentence which either can significantly occur. always yields a new sentence which is equivalent to the old."[10]

And the second variety, called 'definition in use' is stated as:

"We define a symbol in use. not by saying that it is synonymous with some other symbol. but by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences which contain neither the definiendum itself nor any of its synonyms."[11]

Like Carnap, Ayer also does not follow explicit definition. According to Coffa, Carnap wavers between them. On the other

hand, he favours definitions in use, which are nothing but contextual definitions.[12] Contextual definitions are part and parcel of Russell's famous theory of descriptions. Ayer eulogizes this as the paradigm of philosophical analysis. It is here Ayer takes the *Russellian step* (Step 2) by favouring this type of definition. What Ayer needs is only a condition of equivalence (translation or interdeducibility) between them. Ayer states the conditions of equivalence for two sentences as follows:-

> "Two sentences p and q belonging to the same language (homophonic) are equivalent if and only if every sentence which is entailed by a group of sentences together with p is entailed by the same truth together with q".[12]

This may be taken as a clear pointer towards a distinct mode of philosophical analysis, which Ayer pursues in his outlook.

From this, Ayer takes the next step (third step) which may be called 'Quinean step'. The Quinean step uses Quine's emendation of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. This involves elimination of singular terms. So, the above equivalent condition can be stated in a slightly modified form to suit the Quinean step. This becomes very much apparent in his interpretation of the ontology of what there is within Russell's atomistic metaphysics as seen in his book on *The Analytical Heritage.*[14] In the *Central Questions of Philosophy*, Ayer grants that such Quinising minimises one's ontological commitment especially over classes. Nevertheless, Ayer favours that this technique provides the interdeducibility of sentences, and so translation is a genuine case of analysis.[15] Surprisingly, this gives a distinct dimention to Ayer's notion of philosophical analysis, as it has been argued in the above.

It is only in the light of the above, Ayer's linguistic account of phenomenalism becomes a legitimate pursuit. It states that the statement about material objects and statements about sense-data are inter-deducible. With a slight exaggeration, one may hold that Ayer's analysis of physical objects involves two types of biconditionals, one for the above type and other for counterfactuals. One can react against the pronouncement of death of phenomenalism by involving the following argument: When such bi-conditionals

perform a miracle of Tarskian-type of bi-conditionals, and thereby fail to be 'phenomenalistic' in character, we can modify it to prove that such bi-conditionals depend upon the one who makes it (in recent years Philip Petit sees the need for such bi-conditionals together with reference dependence, for yielding a realism of the type he advocates).[16] Following Petit, one can put forward the claim that the 'sophistication' in Ayer's realism needs such a step in order to sustain his empiricist's point of view. However, a major objection is in order. The objection is that the above formulation will only make his empiricism as rationalism-oriented. That this itself is no objection can be seen, if one considers Strawson's restatement of the relation between rationalism and empiricism in his synthetic account of metaphysics and analysis.[17] Such an account can be proved to be not very far from Ayer's own reasoning (Strawson analyses it under a new term called as 'Conceptual Atomism' which reduces complex concepts to simple concepts and prefers to call his own position as conceptual connectionism which finds concepts are related). Moreover, Ayer's linguistic phenomenalism has a Carnapian dimension in that it is expressed in his formal mode of speech (e.g. 'five' is a number word), that is in terms of equivalence of statements. From this, he concludes that the logical construction and the problem of perception are somehow complementary. Ayer's version of linguistic phenomenalism, therefore, is stated in the following two theses:

(1) It eliminates the need for physical objects,

(2) Physical object is logically constructed.

Now (1) and (2) are complementary.

From this, Ayer wants to consider that this phenomenalism is a species of realism in Ayer's sense. Phenomenalism is not to be constructed as making any reference to the external world of objects. If so, this may be called a species of anti-realism. For Dummett, to call it as anti-realism is simply innocuous.[18] But, for others, phenomenolism is a species of idealism, simply because phenomenalism reduces the materiality of the external objects to the sensuality of the given in the mental.[19] The innocuous

nature of this stand may be seen in the way idealism and nativism/imagism (is a doctrine which lays emphasis on concepts) are interpreted as lying closer to each other.[20] However, Foster's critique offers an opportunity to level a stronger argument against Ayer's version phenomenalism. Ayer may not be as much willing to take either of these routes. The only option that remains before him is to make it a species of realism. It may become clear from what is stated in the above paragraph that this route is not very undesirable, as it was understood by many others.[21]

Acceptance of this as a species of realism demands that he accepts both the sides of the A-vocabulary (*definiendum*) and the B-vocabulary (*definiens*). This is exactly what is entailed both by Ayer's translation rule and the equivalence condition stated as above. Nevertheless, a question remains: how this realism could be understood in the most qualified way. It is here that Ayer calls it as a *sophisticated realism*. Now, a sophisticated realism is one which accepts the statements of material object and the statements about sense-data as translationally equivalent under certain circumstances. We suggest that Ayer's final position may be understood to reconcile phenomenalism with his account of sophisticated realism. It is remarked that Ayer himself has abandoned phenomenalism, but even if this is so, Ayer has not rejected his brand of realism. So long as he accepts it, he is advancing a logical empiricists' position that is coherent.

Ayer adduces a proof for the above in his *Central Questions of Philosophy*. I shall give the proof of Ayer's reconciliation of 'phenomenalism with sophisticated realism' which runs into the following steps as shown below:

(1)   Ayer admits that his position regarding phenomenalism has only certain affinities to Mill's position. Therefore, it is simply a reconstruction of Mill's view (Mill's Step);

(2)   If what Ayer says is true in (1) then Ayer gives a new meaning to phenomenalism. This is elucidated as follows:

(3)   The new sense must account not only for the way the statements of physical objects are translatable or the way

translation must work, but also it must not preclude the reality of external objects (language-ontology integrated step);

(4) Takes into consideration actual as well as possible experience or percepts that could be captured by linguistic analysis, that is the way we talk about the world. This seems to be more sophisticated step than the language-ontology interface that is found in Russell's atomistic metaphysics.

(5) The counterfactual step: indicates that statements are analysable in terms of unfulfilled conditionals (Counterfactual conditionals).

(6) Now, Ayer introduces another key device. It is these unfulfilled conditionals that will form the secondary system (its corresponding primary system consists of purely factual proposition);

(7) The secondary system has an explanatory function. Therefore, it is not factual.

(8) Primary system is a set of factual statements. But it has no explanatory function. We can take (7) and (8) as the pragmatic step after C.I. Lewis who equates the sense of all statements with a set of hypotheticals.[17]

(9) Ayer does not go from percepts to physical objects in a logical way, but in a way that can be shown to be neutral towards realism and the modern day anti-realism. This is both the strength and weakness of Ayer's account of phenomenalism.

(10) As a final step Ayer introduces Hume's idea of imagination. This is just to aid the process of logical construction of physical objects in Ayer's sense. We can call (10) as a nativist step.

The above steps give us a proof of the reconciliation of phenomenalism with sophisticated realism. If this is acceptable, this goes a long way in rebutting arguments which want to show that Ayer's position about analysis keeps his empiricism null and void.

According to Lenn E. Goodman, Ayer's proof may be regarded as the culmination of the dialectic between realism, scepticism, anti-realism, idealism, nativism, etc.[18]

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. A.J. Ayer's Notion of Philosophical Analysis. I am grateful to Prof. Dr. M. P. Marathe for reading an earlier draft of the paper and suggesting improvements. I am also indebted to Dr. A Kanthamani for the numerous discussions I had with him on the content of the paper.

2. According to some critics, this is a misnomer. The reason that goes against this interpretation is that ordinary language was regarded as alright even in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. For a remark of this persuasion see Baker and Haker, *Language, Sense and Nonsense.*

3. A. J. Ayer's *The Central Questions of Philosophy* (hereafter *(CQP)* MacMillan 1973' especially Chapter III, see p.50

4. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. M.P. Marathe for this point.

5. P.F. Strawson: *Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy* (Oxford, 1992).

6. *CQP*, Chapter III, p. 47.

7. *CQP*,

8. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

9. *Ibid.*, p.58. Ayer may be understood here to inaugurate tradition taking the cue from Carnap (Infra). The tradition runs through 'Strawson and even among post Strawsonian thinkers (I support this point by generalisations drawn from Philip Petit and Peter Carruther below) see f.n. 15. Strawson (1992) takes logic, epistemology and ontology, (metaphysics) as a unified field of inquiry (see f.n. 12 below).

10.   *Language, Truth and Logic* 2nd edition (Gollanez, 1936).

11.   *Ibid.,* p. 60.

12.   A. Coffa charges Carnap of confusing between explicit definition and definition in use especially in his *Aufbau* model (see Alberto Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: Transition to the Vienna Circle*, (Cambridge, 1991).

13.   *Language, Truth and Logic,*

14.   In his interpretation, Ayer favours the primacy of predicates for Russell's atomistic metaphysics, see *The Analytical Heritage:* Russell and Moore (Basil Blackwell, 1971), especially, chapter on "Logical Atomism as a Theory of Language".

15.   John Foster, *Ayer.* (Arguments of the Philosophers series) R.K.P. 1985, pp. 21 ff.

16.   Such bi-conditionals originate from Fregean definition of number in terms of concepts. See Philip Petit ("Realism and Reesponse-Dependence", *Mind and Content* (Centennial Issue of *Mind*) pp. 587-626, for a discussion on its relation to reference-dependence.   Peter Carruther *(see supra* f.n. 15) essentially argues with this point vis-a-vis Ayer. So, it transpires that these bi-conditionals will invite the nativist's step in Ayer's reasoning. This is considered to be essential because phenomenalism cannot be anti-nativistic, see in this   connection, the arguments given in P. Carruther's *Human Knowledge and Human Nature,* (Oxford, 19992), especially Chapter XI.

17.   Strawson distinguishes three varieties of empiricism; Berkeley's subjective state variety, Hume's naturalistic variety and Russell-Ayer's atomistic variety, and comments on that saying that these three varieties may get mixed to obtain a composite variety.   Here, he cites the example of Ayer and says that he was an adherent of the third variety. But later Ayer preferred a theory in which the first is mixed with the second, see Strawson *Analysis and Metaphysics: An Intorduction to Philosophy* (Oxford, 1992), p. 73.

18.   Michael Dummett "Realism" in *Synthese* (1982).

19.   Foster, *op. cit.*

20.   Carruther's project is motivated to reconcile empiricism with nativism on the one hand, and to integrate the product called evolutionary nativism with 'robust' realism (see Chapters 10, 11, 12). If it is so, then Ayer's project can also be similarly treated as integrating phenomenalism, nativism and realism, see P. Carruther, *Human Knowledge and Human Nature* (Oxford, 1992).

21.   See the 'Perface' to *Fact, Science and Morality,* where Ayer's remark almost

HEMJITH BALKRISHNAN P.

comes to disown phenomenalism, edited by Graham MacDonald and Crispin Wright. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986).

22. The reference to C.I. Lewis, occurs in Lenn E. Goodman's article titled "Difficulties of Phenomenalism". *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29 (1992), pp. 251-252, see esp. p. 242.

23. *Ibid.,* Such an evaluation is due in the proposed doctoral dissertation titled, *'A Critical Appraisal of A. J. Ayer's Phenomenalism as a Form of Realism.*

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STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

Journal of the Department of Philosophy
University of Poona, Pune.

Editors :

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Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

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SARTREAN CONCEPT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Jean Paul Sartre, one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century, propagated a theme : a theme which he pursued with immense energy and elaborated with originality, a theme which gave all importance to man and his existential predicaments. His entire philosophy was essentially focussed on human freedom. Being a gifted literary genius, he exposed through his writings, in a stunning fashion, how human beings are trapped in social injustice, unstable intersubjective relationship rooted in conflict and, yet, are inescapably responsible for all the ways in which they face the situations which confront them.

In his phenomenological essay on ontology, *Being and Nothingness,*[1] Sartre makes it clear that his understanding of consciousness involves three aspects : (i) consciousness is always consciousness of something. This is the prereflective consciousness. Husserlian influence can be noted here, (ii) In and through my consciousness of something, I become conscious of myself as an ego. This is the reflective consciousness and it shows Sartre's Cartesian legacy, (iii) By virtue of consciousness, the for-itself, i.e., the incarnate consciousness, introduces nothingness into the midst of the in-itself, i.e., anything other than for-itself which are not conscious. It is on the basis of the analysis of consciousness that Sartre interprets his views on the other and intersubjective relationship in his *Being and Nothingness.*

With regard to his understanding of the other and intersubjectivity, Sartre is greatly influenced by three of his well known predecessors-Hege, Husserl and Heidegger.

Hegel accepts a reciprocal relation, which he defines as self-apprehension of one in another.[2] He remarks : "By opposing the other and confronting the other, each one asserts his right of being an individual".[3] He illustrates this with the example

of master-slave relationship, in his *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Sartre only partially agrees with Hegel's view, for human existence .is primordially a matter of mutual recognition that we are aware of ourselves and strive for the social meanings in our lives.

. Husserl considers the other only as sense-correlate of one's own consciousness. However, the existence of the other remains bracketed. He thinks that the other's conscious states can never be directly presented and, hence, can never be self-evident. Thus, even as sense-correlate, the constitutional status of the other is secondary. One's apprehension of the other will always be dependant on one's own self-constitution. Husserl believes that the other's conscious life must be presented mediately, for any conscious process that is presented immediately must be one's own. The distinction between the other and myself does not stem from the exteriority of our bodies but from the simple fact that each of us exists in interiority and that a knowledge valid for interiority can be effected only in the interiority which, in principle, excludes all knowledge of the other as he knows himself. Since Husserl has reduced being to a series of meanings, the only connection which he has been able to establish between my being and that of the other is a connection of knowledge.[4] But it must be noted that this epistemological standpoint presupposes an ontological foundation because any knowledge assumes the one who exists in order to know something. Here lies the significance of Sartrean ontology.

In deriving his idea of man, the for-itself or the incarnate consciousness, Sartre has been influenced by Heidegger's concept of *Dasein.* In *Being and Time* Heidegger points out that the characteristic of the Being of *Dasein* is its Being-with, i.e., *Mitsein.*[5] By introducing the concept of Being-with, Heidegger tries to expose the nature of the relation of a *Dasein* to another. *Mitsein* does not mean the reciprocal relation of recognition and of conflict. It expresses, rather, a sort of ontological solidarity for the building up of the world. He remarks that the relation between the other and me is not a frontal opposition but rather an oblique interdependence.[6] It is not a relatioon of you and me but it is a relation of we.

Having seen the important predecessors of Sartre with respect to their views on interesubjectivity, the question is how does Sartre react to their views. Not satisfied fully with the above

opinions of his predecessors, though he accepts and adopts some of their views, Sartre gives an elaborate elucidation of the nature of intersubjective relation in a unique manner. But to understand this elucidation, one needs to have at least a redimentary familiarity with the general trends of his ontology. He accepts two modes of being *viz.* being-for-itself (*pour-soi*) and being-in-itself (*en-soi*). The for-itself represents the embodied or incarnate consciousness. It has the capacity to act or choose. It has the power of transcendence. It alone can realise the inherent potentialities of in-itself. It alone can set up relations among others. It introduces unity, meaning and purpose into the realm of the in-itself. It brings about growth, decay and destruction. It illuminates the chaotic mass of aggregates leading them to unity. In the absence of the for-itself, there cannot be a unified universe. This being of man. human reality, forms the foundation of the entire ontology of Sartre and it is this incarnate consciousness which gets entangled inescapably in inersubjective relationship. The in-itself on the other hand includes all that is non-conscious, i.e., everything other than for-itself. It is characterised by a complete incapacity and opacity.

Here, Sartre makes an interesting transition to intersubjective relation by stating that my awareness of my own existence gives me an awareness of the existence of the other. I can be myself only by being separated from the other. The other is the thinkinng substance of the same essence as I am, a substance which will never disappear into primary and secondary qualities and whose essential structure I find in myself. Sartre sayas: "Others are the other, i.e. the self which is not mine".[7] The other appears to me orginally and primarily as a body. The presence of this body makes me aware of the concerte existence of the other. My first contact with the other is through seeing, i.e., through the sense of the sight. Sartre points out: "Being seen-by-the-other" is the truth of "seeing-the-other".[8] Sartre gives the example of a persons who peeps through a key-hole to see what's going on in that room. But after a while. he, the one is peeping through the key-hole, becomes aware of another person watching him from behind. This realisation induces a senses of shame in him, i.e. in the key-hole looker. He, the one who has peeped into the room through the key-hole, feels as if he has become an object for the other's look or watching, i.e. other's look

objectifies him. He feels quite helpless and is filled with shame for being caught red-handed (while doing something which he ought not have done). He realises that there in no way out of this embarrasssing situation. Sartre says : "The original relation of myself and the other is a concrete relation which at each instant I experience. At each instant the other is looking at me".[9]

The other's look enables him ever to sustain himself as the subject by transforming me into an object. This objectification fills me with shame. Sartre remarks: "Shame is to recognise that I am an object of other's look".[10] It is to apprehend myself as seen by the other, to comprehend myself as submitting most unwillingly and yet helplessly to the unpredictable judgement and evaluatioon of the other.

On account of the other's look, my ego, i.e. my subjectivity, erodes and flows to him. I feel an emptiness in me and I am made alien to myself. As a subject and, therefore, as boundless freedom, the other fixes all my possibilities, reveals to me my limitations, yet not revealing anything of his subjectivity. Sartre points out: "By his look, the other becomes a transcendence transcended".[11] That is, though the other and I are transcendent beings by nature, he overcomes my transcendence by his look. His look cancels the distance between him and myself. That look haunts me even in his absence, i.e. his look discloses his distanceless presence. It is not his actual or physical presence, but my awareness of his presence, that guarantees his direct and immediate presence of me. As an object, I am forced to submit myself to the whims and fancies of the other.

Between the other and me there is a reciprocal and dynamic relation which is essentially conflict. Sartre points out: "Everything that goes for me goes for the other, while I try to free myself from the grip of the other, he tries to free himself from mine. While I try to enslave the other, he tries to enslave me".[12] Thus, it follows that relation with the others is essentially conflict. Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others. The other holds a secret, the secret of what I am. The conflicts with the other can further be elucidated in terms of Sartre's understanding

of attitudes towards the other. One set of attitudes is exemplified by love, language and masochism and the other kind of attitudes by indifference. desire, hatred and sadism.

When we consider the attitude of love, its aim, remarks Sartre, is to be loved. The one who loves and the one who is loved attempt to become the object of each other's fascination. Both attempt to seduce the freedom and subjectivity of the other. The only reason that the project of love continues is that the one who loves does not realise or in bad faith or in self-deception chooses not to realise that the one who is loved is engaged in the same process.

In intersubjective relationships it is not necessary to invent or use language because it is already given in the recognition of the other. It is through language that a person strives to regain his alienated self by adopting the other's opinion about himself. But though Sartre admits language as a form of seduction of other's freedom, it need not always be so. Sometimes we are utterly indifferent to spoken words as if we do not care what others say. So, it is not inevitable that language is unavoidable to build up a stable intersubjective relation.

Another attitude towards the other, *viz.* masochism, is described as an attempt to remain as an object for the other. But if this could be achieved, one would become an in-itself and, thus, forego his subjectivity. This masochistic attitude is a failure because the more one tries to taste his objectivity, the more he will be submerged by the consciousness of his own subjectivity. Thus, in every way, the masochist's objectivity escapes him. He is condemned for ever to be conscious of his subjectivity. In seeking his objectivity in vain, he finds the objectivity of the other.

In the attitude of indifference, a person scarcely notices the other. He acts as if he is alone in this world. He simply does not care for anything about the other. He behaves as if the other does not exist. He refuses to acknoledge the fact that the other's look can fix his possibilities and his body. Sartre points out : "This state of blindness towards the other can be maintained for a long time as long as my bad faith desires.

It can be extended— with relapses— over several years, or even over a whole life. There are men who die without— save for brief and terrifying flashes of illumination— ever having suspected what the other is".[13] To such persons, this sort of terrifying flashes reveal that the other sees them and the more they try to objectify the other the more they jeopardise their tennous state of indifference towards the others. Hence, attitude of indifference becomes a failure.

Another attitude towards the other, desire, is not the desire for pleasure or the desire for the cessation of pain. It is not simply the desire for physical possession. Sartre in this context remarks : "Generally, desire is not the desire of doing— since desire cannot posit its suppression as its supreme End, nor single out any particular act as its ultimate goal. It is purely and simply the desire of a transcendent object".[14] The attitude of desire becomes a failure because satisfaction of pleasure is the death of desire. It is not only its fulfilment but also its limit and end.

In the attitude of sadism, one tries to incarnate the other's consciousness, to make him aware of his body. The sadist, by inflicting pain and suffering, forces his victim to recognise the latter's objectivity. The use of torture and pain reduces the body to mere flesh. But as the sadist, by means of torture, is about to achieve his aim, viz. forcing his victim to renounce the latter's fredom, finds that he is now confronting a mere object of flesh. Sartre, consequently, points out that the sadist glimpses his failure in the look of his victim.[15] The victim then reaffirms his freedom while the sadist apprehends himself as the object, an instrument, inflicting pain.

Hatred, anohter attitude in intersubjectivity implies a fundamental resignation. The for-itself abandons its claim to realise any union with the other. This attitude is equivalent to projecting the realisation of a world in which the other does not exist. He points out: "What I hate in the other is his existence in general as a transcendence trancended".[16] It means that I hate his capacity to transcend my transcendence. That is why hatred indirectly implies a recognition of other's freedom. But this recognition

is abstract and negative. Hatred knows the other only as an object. It wishes to destroy the transcendence which haunts it. My project of suppressing him is a project recapturing my non-substantial freedom as a for-itself. In hatred, there is given an understanding that my dimension of being alienated from the world is a real . enslavement which comes to me through the other. It is the suppression of this enslavement which is projected. That is why hate is a black feeling, i.e. a feeling which aims at the suppression of an other which *qua* project is consciously projected against the disapproval of others. The attitude of hate ends in failure because to do away with the other's transcendence, a for-itself must first recognise the other as a for-itself. Moreover, if a for-itself succeeds in suppressing the other, then he would thereby become the living memory of the other. The other would then become a part of him, a part which he could never change or destroy.

Sartre discusses his notion of intersubjectivity not only in his philosophical works but also in his literary creations. What he has discussed in abstract language in his philosophical treatise, he concretises it in his literary works. However, his literary works being an extension of his philosophical ideas, have the same conclusion, *viz.* our interesubjective relations are rooted in mutual and reciprocal negations and in conflicts. We shall now look into Sartre's two literary works briefly to understand his elucidation of conflict as the essence of human relationships.

Sartre's earlier writings seemed to come from a secure and peaceful world untouched by social injustices and atrocities. But his later works reveal his talent as a mature writer who is well aware of social conditions, political problems and individual trauma and upheavals. His popular works like *The Wall and No Exit* hauntingly expose how bad faith, indifference, sadism, hatred, selfishness etc., worsen human relationships. These works reveal, though born free, how man is limited by his environment. He superbly crafts characters who are trapped in the eternal webs of time and exquisitely describes how this trapped feeling sours interesubjective relationships.

In his short story *The Wall,* Sartre's understanding of death. the orientation of the for-itself towards the future, the other,

the look, the nature of intersubjective relations and its various attitudes such as indifference, sadism, hatred, seduction by means of language, etc. along with the concept of bad faith are exquisitely brought out through the careful characterisations of the story. His advocacy of conflict as the essence of intersubjective relationship can be noticed as the story progresses. Of the many attitudes towards the other, which are elaborated in *The Wall*, indifference, sadism, and hatred are worth metioning because they contribute to the souring intersubjective relationships among the characters.

The story of *The Wall* begins in the background of the Spanish civil war and its theme focuses on three persons : Pablo, Tom and Juan, accused as anarchists and they await execution. Another prominent character is a Belgian sadist doctor. The story starts with the indifferent and meaningless questioning of the condemned prisoners by the officers. The officers are not at all concerned with the destiny of those who are charged. They are least worried about the fact that they are playing with the lives of prisoners. So also, the utter silence and indifference of young Juan, whose only fault is that he is the brother of an anarchist, marks his hopelessness towards the furture. Again, towards the end of the story, Pablo realises that the anarchist leader, Ramon Gris, is more useful than himself to the cause of Spain and that he himself has already become indifferent to Spain and anarchy and even towards his own death.

Another attitude towards the other, *viz.* sadism, is brought to light in this story through the conduct of the Belgian sadist doctor. This attitude is revealed when the doctor describes, step by step, the procedure of execution. In a paternal way the doctor even consoles them saying that execution will be over quickly. But the sadist discovers the failure of his effort in the look of his victims. The look of the young Juan reveals to the doctor that the latter cannot destroy the freedom of the former. The doctor is also subjected to the hatred of all the accused. But it must be noted that this hatred fails to overcome the freedom of the doctor and this realisation worsens the relationship among them.

Another factor which sours the relationship is the awareness of their own limited freedom. *The Wall* presents a pathetic picture

of confined freedom. i.e. the freedom with its limitations or restrictions. In the story the various situations, the fellow human beings and the fear of death limits the freedom of the accused. The wall in front of the courtyard of the cell, from which the story gets its title, is the symbol of confined freedom.

In the play, *No Exit,* also Sartre's treatment of intersubjective relationship is made concrete as in *The Wall. No Exit* presents an uncommon, unknown, condemned world, the hell, where three persons meet after death. Each one is condemned to stay in the company of the other for ever despite their mutual dislike. All the characters in the play have some common features. They have not fully recovered from the impact of their earthly life, all are victims of bad faith and each tries to throw dust on the other's eye. Inspite of all these similarities, they differ from one another. They tragically fail to set up a stable relation among themselves. The same was the case even when they were alive. Bad faith, enforced pride, pseudo-jusitifications for their misdeeds, possesssiveness, personal preferences and expectations and above all the past life haunts them giving no room for love or trust. Instead, indifference, hatred, suspicion, jealousy and the like fill their lives. Each one realises his or her defects and limitations but shuns to accept them. One tries to free oneself from the grip of the other. Then they realise that the hell is nothing other than the other people. There is no exit from this hell. This disturbing presence of the others and the prevailing uncompromisable relationship among themselves indicate that conflict is the essence of human relationships.

It must be noted that Sartre takes the problem of intersubjectivity for granted. He never asks why there is intersubjectivity at all. He is concerned only with the various modes of expressing intersubjectivity.Though the problem of intersubjectivity is basically an epistemological problem, Sartre'sapproach to it makes it totally ontological. It must be noted that any epistemological problem can be discussed only on an ontological basis. Sartre's contention, *viz.* intersubjective relations are essentially conflict is difficult to accept. Conflicts and differences do arise in human relationships. But it is arbitrary to conclude that our intersubjective relations are founded on conflict and negation. There is no justification

to universalise a partial experience and then to assert that the partial experience contains truth in its entirety.

Again Sartre's description of the look of the other cannot be accepted unquestionably. The look of the other need not always be an objectifying look. For instance, the look of a mother at her infant is an adoring look which reveals her love for the infant. Likewise, the look of an admirer at his favourite author is a look of admiration. The meaning of a look varies from one context to another, it needs to be understood contextually. Moreover, we can also propose a counter model to the Sartrean objectifying look, i.e., I as the subject and the other as an object. That means, the other becomes the object of my look. My look freezes his freedom and possibilities, erodes his subjectivity.

We can think of a person who establishes two modes of intersubjective relationships, the horizontal as well as the vertical. The first kind points to a relation among men. The second kind of relation, viz. the vertical, points to the relation between man and the object of faith, viz. God. Sartre may not agree with the possibility of this second mode of relationship, for he operates under the Nietzschean claim of death of god. But from an ordinary human point of view, these two modes of relationship are possible. The vertical relationship becomes inevitable necessity for the ordinary man to take refuge whenever he is submerged in sorrows or anguish or in forlorn moments. By setting up such an ideal model of intersubjective relation, he soothes himself or in way saves himself in a unique personal manner which cannot be linguistically explained or rationally demonstrated but only be felt within.

Intersubjective relationships, it may be pointed out, can be built on the basis of common shared interests. For such relationships, persons need not know each other. That means, it need not be a direct, person to person relationship which develops as a result of personal acquaintance. Two or more persons share a common interest and though they live apart in different parts of the globe they are united in thoughts and ideas for a common cause and, thus, there develops an unseen bond tied by a common aim. For example, the members of Green Peace are in one

way or the other related among themselves because they share a common interest, *viz.* preservation of environment. They raise their voice together against any harmful environmental incident. In this way there develops a relation among them, indeed, a unique, practical as well as a realistic side of interesubjective relationship.

Within our society we can notice different strata of human relationships. For instance, within the family, the basic building block of society, there is a greater degree of intimacy, commitment and dedication to one another than what we notice in any other social institution. There are innumerable positive attitudes in life for setting up very stable relationships like deep rooted understanding, strong faith, passionate commitment, love in the sense of *agape.*

The relation that is established bewteen a shopkeeper and his customer is a momentary one, a relation of transaction, one without any sort of involvement. It is a relation which sprouts out of need and the satisfaction of need. The shop-keeper nedds the customer to boost his business while the customer needs the shop-keeper to satisfy his wants. When these two motives are satisfied there ends that brief encounter. Morever, the relation between a doctor and the patient and that between a teacher and the student(s) indicate a relation of understanding, faithfulness and involvement among themselves. These sorts of relationships are made strong by means of faith, a good rapport and a sense of obligation. So also, the relation which exists between the social welfare organisers like Amnesty International, Red Cross, SOS, etc.. and the needy ones reveal how man alone can love, serve and understand one another.

Every man can have positive and negative attitudes. It is not correct for one to stress only the negative attitudes. And it is all the more unacceptable to insist that our intersubjective relationships are based upon mutal and reciprocal negation and negative attitudes. Attitudes like love, masochism, use of language, hatred, indifference, sadism etc. are present in man in varying degrees. But there is something else too over and above all these. It may be noted that Sartre's inadequate elucidation and illegitimate conclusion regarding intersubjectivity has its source

12   **L. SINDHU**

in Sartre's universalizing of his painful experiences and on account of the absence of a panoramic view of human subjectivity. What Sartre says is true and meaningfull but only partially.

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1. The text followed here is the 1975 edition.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* Washington Square Press Edition, New York, 1975, p. 320.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.,* p. 318.

5. *Ibid.,* p. 330.

6. *Ibid.,* p. 331.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 312.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 345.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.,* p. 350.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 471.

12. *Ibid.,* p. 475.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 496.

14. *Ibid.,* p. 501.

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AN UNDERSTANDINGS OF CONTEMPORARY FOUNDATIONALISM

I. The Varieties of Knowing

Knowing how to ride on a bi-cycle and knowing that a bi-cycle has two wheels are two distinguished senses of 'knowing'— the non- informative and informative, respectively. The former does not require a person, S, to believe what he knows since what he knows is not an assertion of anything. What constitutes S's knowing is a successful activity of a particular kind. This sense of knowing is not in the form of 'S knows that p' but in 'S knows ϕ -ing' where ϕ stands for an activity. On the other hand, the informative sense requires S to believe what he knows. That is, if S knows that p, then S believes that p. There are varieties of knowing in each of the two senses. Riding a bi-cycle is different from swimming. They have different initital physical conditions and skills. These two are different from knowing how to talk or write in English since, unlike riding and swimming, language is a rule-governed activity. Moreover, insofar as the rules of English grammar differ from the rules of arithmetic, knowing how to use a language is also different from knowing how to calculate, even though both are rule-governed activities. However, these varieties of knowing are epistemologically uninteresting since they are non-informative. In the rest of this section, I illustrate the varieties which belong to the informative senses and, I try to show how scepticism is in the root of any attempt to have a proper characterization of knowledge which stands valid across all the varieties.

Suppose, I see and know that a glass of water is in front of me. I know it in the sense that I believe in something on the basis of my present immediate sense experience, I know that a black-board is behind my chair, in he sense that I believe in something on the basis of my past sense experience. I know

that *this* glass of water can extinguish a lighted match stick, here the basis is my past sense experience of the same type of things. Whether or not you put one more glass of water, I know that two glasses of water must be in front of me, if one more is placed besides this one. The basis is mathematical inference, that is, I believe that 1+1=2, without depending on my sense experience. I know that you will bring another glass of water if it is true that (i) if this glass of water falls down, you will bring another glass of water and, (ii) this glass of water has fallen down. Here, my knowledge is based on a logical inference, i.e., *modus ponens*, no sense experience or mathematical calculations. Moreover, I know that water is H_2O in the sense that I believe in something by relying on some authority.

Consider the following counter-examples which can be put forth by a sceptic. Suppose, there is a glass of gene in front of me. I see it, my eye-sight is quite alright, yet I do not know that the glass contains gene. Suppose, someone quietly removes the black-board. My past sense experience of the black-board does not guarantee the present existence of the black-board behind my chair. Suppose, the match stick has been so notoriously manufactured that a glass of water is not enough to extinguish the huge fire it produces. My past experience of the same type of events does not come to my rescue. Suppose, all of us have been taught from our childhood that 1+1=3. The, when I say "1+1=2", I do not know the answer of "1+1=?". Suppose, I know $[(p \ \& \ (p \to q)) \to q]$ but I do not know how to employ it, analogous to that I know the rules of multiplication but, for example, I do not know how to use multiplication in solving a particular problem of arithmetic. Or, for example, I do not trust in the truth of $((p \ \& \ (p \to q)) \to q)$ but believe in your manners so much that I believe you will get another glass of water if this glass of water falls down. Suppose, the scientists have discovered XYZ, distinguished from H_2O, which constitute water. Or, suppose, I do not know what exactly is meant by H_2O but I say "water is H_2O". Am I justified in saying that I know that water is H_2O?

You may try to overcome the secptic's counter-examples. For example, you may say that tasting the gene is also a sense

experience and I could have tasted and known that; that past experiences are usually taken to be supportive evidences, not to be the genuine instances of knowledge; that the relation between particular events and type events is different from the way in which I have considered; that the result of "1+1=?" is not determined solely in terms of social conventions; that knowing the truth of *modus ponens* is not sufficient for knowing its use; that the new scientific discoveries do not nullify but rectify or, rather, clarify the old ones. In these or some other ways, you may counter the counter-examples. But, what will you do if the stubborn sceptic further devices counter-examples, again and again, and never gives up.

II. The need of Foundational beliefs

No doubt, by countering the counter-examples, you are refining the senses of knowing. That is, you abstract a sense which satisfies more conditions so as to resist more number of counter-examples than the original one, For example, a knowledge-claim based on both visual experience and taste can resist more number of counter-examples than the one on visual experience alone. The former satisfies a condition, namely, knowledge by sense experience need not be knowledge by visual experience alone, to which the latter does not. Thus the sense of 'knowledge by sense experiences in general' can be abstracted from 'knowlege by particular sense experinces' as much as the quality of 'rationality' can be bastracted from individual human beings. This abstraction is a way in which we characterize certain objects. As by abstracting 'rationality' we characterize 'man' as 'rational animal', so also, by abstracting a sense of knowing you characterize a sense of knowing in terms of that particular abstracted sense. Furthermore, the more your characteriztion owes to abstraction, more is the chance of accommodating all other senses of knowing. For example, if 'sense experiences in general' is further abstracted to 'experiences in general', the knowledge-claims based on past sense experiences as well as the experiences of the events and event types can be accommodated. And, again, further abstracting the 'experiences in general' to 'theory or language dependent experiences in general', we may accommodate the logical inferences too. That is, ultimately, when you respond to the stubborn sceptic, you are characterizing

the nature of proper knowledge-claims in such a way that your characterization must be true to all the varieties of knowing (in the informative sense). But why? I mean, what is the purpose behind an attempt for the proper characterization of knowing?

A foundationalist's purpose behind a proper characterization of 'knowing' is, not only that all the varieties of knowing can be accounted, but also that all the possible counter-examples can be paralyzed. That is, a knowledge-claim in confirmation to a proper characterization is, in principle, immune to all possible doubts. In other words, indubitability is an intrinsic quality of a proper knowledge-claim.[1] If, by itself, a belief is incorrigible, it is indubitable. Such incorrigible beliefs are the foundational beliefs. Of course, this is not so for all the foundationalists but for most of the traditional versions and the contemporary stronger versions. Whether corrigible or incorrigible, a foundational belief has a privileged epistemic status over the not-foundational ones. Either it is self-justified or, at least, for a particular moment of time, it requires no justification. The main point is, if a non-foundational belief is justified, it must be based on some foundational belief(s) for its justification. In other words, a belief is justified only when it is either one of those foundational beliefs or one which is derivable from some of those foundational beliefs.

Why does a foundationalist hold some foundational beliefs? A traditional foundationalist wants to establish a sense of knowing which defeats all possible doubts. When one attempts to establish such a sense of knowing, he has two tasks: (i) What is the particular sense of knowing he should explore? (ii) How to explain or define that particular sense? For example, one may attempt to explore a sense of knowing in which we know something by sense experience; or that in which we know logical inferences. But, since he is supposed to account for all the instances of knowing, he has to explain or define his chosen primary sense of knowing in such a way that the definition or explanation must not include false knowledge-claims inside knowledge, nor exclude true knowledge-claims from knowledge. For example, although a foundationalist has not succeeded in this respect, he may choose the sense in which he intuitively knows his own thinking being

and tell that it is a genuine case of knowledge if and only if it is a distinct and clear conceptual understanding. Or, choosing the Kantian sense of proper knowledge, he may say that it is a genuine case of knowledge if and only if it is a synthetic *a priori* statement.

He is liable to hold foundational beliefs when he attempts to accomplish the second task, that is, the task of providing a definition of knowledge. Whatever may be that difinition, *ex hypothesi,* that cannot concede an unjustified belief. Because, that would lead to the victory of the sceptic against whom the whole battle has been raised. How to exclude the unjustified beliefs? False beliefs may be outrightly rejected, but how to differentiate the justified true beliefs from the unjustified true beliefs. In other words, the task of defining knowledge virtually leads to the task of defining justified true belief. Wehn it turns to be a case of justified true beliefs, one is supposed to hold some foundational beliefs. Because, otherwise, it will create the problem of infinite regression, or the problem of circularity. Suppose S has a belief p_1 which is in need of justification and p_2 justifies p_1. But p_2 is in need of justification. If p_3 justifies p_2, p_3 is in need of justification, and so on. Either this chain will never end, or it will go back to one of the beliefs, p_1—pn, thereby, the justification will be circular unless one puts forth some beliefs which are not in need of justification.[2] Such beliefs are the foundational beliefs. And, of course, once one holds foundational beliefs he is liable to provide an account of basic relation between the foundational beliefs and the non-foundational beliefs. That is, he is to show how the non-foundational beliefs are epistemically dependent on the foundational beliefs.

III. Two Criticisms Against Foundationalism

1. *What is the justification of a Principle of justification?*

If (a) S is justified in believing p on the basis of q, then, (b) S has to be justified in believing (a); and if (b), then (c) S has to be justified in believing (b); and if (c), then (d) S has to be justified in believing (c) and so on. This is also called 'Epistemic Ascent argument' (Cf. Shatz, D. (1983)

p. 98).. The argument ascends every possible epistemic justification by demading the justification of whatever principle of justification one can adopt. That is, with respect to foundationalism, it asks for a justification of how one justifies a non-foundational belief by means of the principle that a non-foundational belief is justified if it is based on a foundational belief. The argument shows the possibility of an infinite regression. To avoid that possibility, a foundationalist is not supposed to put a stopping point somewhere. Because, that would imply that the stopping point is a genuine foundational belief and the foundational beliefs held by the foundationalist are fake. Thus, the foundationalist is supposed to break the argument down from its very starting point. That is, his claim would be something like this: If S is justified in believing p on the basis of q, S need not be justified in believing that he is justified in believing p on the basis of q. How does he claim it to be so? It is with the simple argumant that if S need not believe R, S need not justify that he believes R, and R is the basic relation between the foundational beliefs and the non-foundational beliefis.[3] For example, if I am justified in believing (i) This glass of water has fallen down and (ii) If this glass of water falls down then you will bring another glass of water; then, I need not believe, and hence need not be justified in believing, the dependence of (iii). You will bring another glass of water, on my foundational belief that (i) and (ii) entails (iii). The intrinsic properties of (i) and (ii) may be such that I will believe in (iii) without believing, and hence without being justified in believing, (i) and (ii) entails (iii). Analogously, suppose that some of the mathematically true statements belong to my foundational beliefs. Then, I can be justified in believing that there would be two glasses of water before me if you put one more glass of water, and yet I may not be believing that my belief that there are two glasses of water depends on my belief that one glass of water plus one glass of water makes two glasses of water.

2. What is the justification of a foundational belief?

If the foundational beliefs are not justified, the non-foundational beliefs connot be justified. The 1st criticism asks for the justification of S's belief that J, where J is the principle of justification.

The second asks for the justification of the foundational beliefs. If you show, by means of other belifs, that the foundational beliefs are justifiably true, then, the foundational beliefs are no more foundational, If you do not show but assume that they are justfiebly true, all your justified non-foundational beliefs hang on a frail assumption. Of course this criticism is not a damaging one, if the alleged assumption works well and no counter-examples are there against the thesis that justified true beliefs cannot be derived from false beliefs. But Gettier's problem is an antithesis to this thesis. Gettier's problem shows that we can have justified true beliefs on the basis of false beliefs (Cf. Gettier, E.L. (1963)). Hence, a non-foundational belief may be justified but derived from the foundationl beliefs which happen to be false. For example, I believe that someone from our department owns a racing bi-cycle. I belive it so because I see Ravi riding on that bi-cycle everyday. But, in fact, Sinu is the owner of that bi-cycle, although Ravi rides on that every day. So, my belief that someone from our department owns a racing bi-cycle is a justified true belief which is based on my false belief that Ravi owns the bi-cycle.

The above counter-example is not due to a clever use of the word 'someone', nor due to a dubious use of 'justified true belief, First of all, justification of beliefs is required due to the fact that 'truth condition' and 'belief condition' are not sufficient for 'knowledge'.[4] Hence, you cannot avoid the problem by arguing that I am not justified since I do not possess the required conviction. You cannot argue like that because, though my belief that Ravi owns the bi-cycle is false, I may be more convinced of this belief than the belief that Sinu is the owner. So also, knowing that someone is the owner on the basis of the belief that Ravi is the owner and knowing that someone is the owner on the basis of the belief that Sinu is the owner are not two grades of knowing. Because, there can be a set of reasons for the former independent of the set of reasons for the latter. That is why you cannot argue something like this: That the reason for which I believe someone owns that bi-cycle is contrary to the reason for which I would have otherwise believed the same and, hence, if I am justified in the latter case then I am not justified in the former case.

IV. The Contemporary Foundationalists' Stand-Point

Some of the contemporary modest foundationalists (e.g, Audi (1978), (1983)) defend their theories against the above criticisms by claiming that the foundational beliefs need not be incorrigible or indefeasible. This claim presupposes that foundationalism is neutral to scepticism. If foundational beliefs need not be incorrigible or indefeasible, the foundationlist need not respond to a doubt which is imposed on the truth of foundational beliefs. And, granted that scepticism and epistemology are the two sides of the same coin, that is, one functions like a question and the other as the answer, theory of justification is separable from epistemology since theory of justification can be neutral to scepticism.

How does a foundationalist accept corrigibility or defeasibility of a foundational belief? This is by separating the structure of beliefs from the content of beliefs. What becomes true/false is the content of a belief. A particular belief itself has no structure. It is a part of the structure of a body of beliefs in which it may or may not be the foundational. If it is a foundational one, so far so good. If it is not foundational but justified, a foundational belief must be there in the structure of the body of beliefs. The content of a belief is independent of the structure to which that belief belongs. Thus, the nature of the content of a foundational belief need not be determined by its position in he structure of the body of beliefs. That is, even if it is foundational, it may not be incorrigible. The epistemic independence of a foundational belief can be upheld along with its defeasibility.

Alston (1976b) defends foundationalism against the first criticism, regarding the justification of the principle of justification J, by distinguishing Simple foundationalism from Iterative foundationalism. This distinction presupposes the 'structure-content' distinction. If the structure of a body of beliefs is not separated from the belief contents, then, whatever belief that may be, the belief content must belong to a structure of beliefs. Consequently, the belief content of J cannot be isolated from the structure of beliefs. On the contrary, Simple foundationalism presupposes that J can be isolated from the structure of beliefs. Because, as Alston argues, the content of J is at a level higher than that

of all other beliefs of any particular structure. This level distinction has not been recognized by Iterative foundationlism. Therefore, it calls some J_1 for the justification of J and some J_2 for J_1 and so on, ultimately, leading to an infinite regression.

The 'structure-content' distinction is supported by anoter distinction, namely, the distinction between 'S has a disposition to justify that p' and 'S is disposed to justify that p' (Cf. Audi, R. (1982)). For example, I have the disposition to justify that you will bring another glass of water; but I may not be disposed to justify that. I may be seriously engaged in reading this paper and least bothered about the glass of water. The content of my non-foundational belief (viz., you will bring another glass of water) is not *actually* dependent on the content of my foundational belief (*viz.*, '(i) This glass of water falls down and (ii) If this glass of water falls down, you will bring another glass of water). Their dependence is formal; that is, the structure of the beliefs ((i) and (ii) being foundational and (iii) being non-foundational) can enable one to justify that (iii). At a particular moment of time one may not have the belief contents of (i), (ii) and (iii); yet, by virtue of the structural significance of those beliefs with respect to one's body of beliefs, one has the disposition to justify that (iii).

Among the contemporary foundationalists, Chisholm holds a strong foundationalism which has been interpreted by Alston as Iterative foundationalism. For Chisholm, the foundational beliefs are 'self-presenting' propositions and they are certain. However, insofar as he advocates psychological foundationalism (Cf. Chisholm (1977)) and maintains the preconceptual sensory beliefs as the foundational beliefs, he presupposes the above distinction between 'having a disposition to justify' and 'disposed to justify' which, in turn, supports the 'structure-content' distinction. As a foundational belief, the preconception sensory belief, (This is red), for example, is not only certain and self-presenting but also a member of the set of beliefs that S possesses. Otherwise, if S does not posses (This is red), S cannot be justified in believing anything dependent on (This is red) for its justification. But, if S possessses (This is red), then, the 'self-presenting' status of (This is red) is plausible only when S internally justifies that (This is red).

If S cannot justify internally, but depends on external world, then, either S does not possess (This is red) or it is not certain that (This is red). That is, contrary to Triplet's ((1990), pp. 103 & 105) interpretation, Chisholm holds internalist foundationalism[5] (Cf. Chisholm (1988)) in addtion to psychological foundationalism and strong foundationalism. But how can one internally justify (this is red) and yet (This is red) is not a belief which requires any justificatioon? This can be explained only by adopting the distinction between 'having a disposition to justify' and 'disposed to justify'. S has the disposition to justify (This is red) but S is not disposed to justify (This is red).[6]

The difference between Audi's modest psychological foundationalism and Chisholm's strong psychological foundationalism is this. Chisholm maintains that, with respect to the foundational beliefs, S is permanently prohibited from being disposed to justify that foundational belief, e.g., (This is red) yet, S has the disposition to justify (This is red) since S possesses that belief and (This is red) is self-presenting. On the other hand, for Audi, this distinction between 'having a dispostion...' and 'disposed to...' does not lead to a permanent separation of 'what S has as a disposition to justify' from 'what S is disposed to justify'. that is, the obstacles for which S is not disposed to justify that p, even if S has the disposition to justify that p, are simply empirical, not logical or conceptual. But, for Chisholm, it is conceptual or logical in the sense that p is, as a foundational belief, logically prohibited from being justified by anybody, including S; therefore, S is never disposed to justify that p. On the other hand, since S has the belief that p and p is self-presenting, S has the disposition to justify that p.

Some of the contemporary foundationalists, notably, Audi (1978) and (1983), hold that foundationalism is compatible with reliabilism and naturalism. Although, if we examine critically, this stand-point is questionable on different grounds[7], the above distinction safe-guards this stand-point in the following way. The underlying thematic points of naturalism and reliabilism are that philosophical scepticism is untenable or, at least, as Goldman (1985) views, scepticism should not be over -proportionately emphasized in epistemology and that the psychological/cognitive mechanism

involved in the process of human understanding should be taken into consideration for an account of knowledge or justification. The structure-content distinction ensures the possibility of corrigible foundational beliefs which, in turn leads to the view that foundationalism is neutral to scepticism. For a psychological-reliabilistic account too, corrigibility is a natural presupposition. In view of the fact that our psychological/cognitive processes are reliable but, obviously, not predictable in an absolute manner, an account of justification based on the workings of those processes does not claim absolute certainty, not even on the core statements. Thus, foundationalism and naturalism go together. Yet, foundationalism is contrasted with coherentism on the ground that the former advances a pyramidical structure of beliefs, whereas the latter advances a webby one. Had there been no structure-content distinction and belief contents were the only significant aspect of justification, then, foundationalism could not be significantly distinguished from coherentism. For, hardly there is any belief content which is justifiable on a foundationalistic account but not on a coherentistic account. Thus, the structure-content distinction enables a foundationalist to go together with naturalism and, at the same time, go against coherentism.*

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NOTES

1. I have not considered theory of justification independent of theory of knowledge. But some contermporary foundationalists do so, by arguing that a theory of justification is concerned with the structure of a body of belifs, whereas a theory of knowledge is concerned with the belief contents. In view of this and some other considerations, I stress that this eassy is "An understaning..." rather than "An exposition...". See Triplett. T. (1990), for a better exposition of and for an outstanding bibliography which has more than 150 entries on recent work on foundationalism. See Lehrer, K. (1974), for an interpretation in which a theory of justification is dependent on a theory of knowledge; see Alston, W.P. (1976a). (1976b) and Audi, R. (1983), for interpretations in which a theory of justification is independent of a theory of knowledge.

2.   In fact, this is how foundationalism can be clearly distinguished from coherentism. Even if both foundationalism and coherentism attempt to defeat the sceptic, the former accepts foudnational beliefs, whereas the latter does not.

3.   This is a simplified version of foundationalists' arguments. For some details, see Alston, W.P. (1976a), (1976b). And, for the criticism, see Shatz, D. (1983).

4.   See Lehrer (1974) for a detailed account of this point. That is how the insufficiency of Truth Condition and Belief Condition calls for Justification Condition of knowledge.

5.   Chisholm's defence of internalism is based on the idea that epistemological theories are aimed at the uprooting of scepticism. One can achieve this goal by explicating 'justification'; and the first step or this explication is to recognize the distinction between S's true beliefs and S's justified true beliefs. If a theory of justification does not draw this distinction, it is a 'Non-theory'- e.g., 'S is externally justified in believing p = Df p is true; and S is a thinking subject' (Chisholm (1988), p. 287). Chisholm tries to show that no extenalist theory of justification can be a genuine theory, unless it makes use of internal concepts.

6.   I believe, the same argument holds good for Moser (1985) insofar as he advocates for both psychological foundationalism and 'incorrigibility'. Of course, his concept of 'given-belief', the 'immediate apprehension' of redness, for example, given to the sensory experience of S may differ from Chisholm's 'self-presenting' redness which S possesses as a sensory belief (This is red). But both presuppose the 'structure-content' distinction *via* the distinction between 'having a disposition...' and 'disposed to...' insofar as they commonly accept psychological foundationalism and incorrigibility of foundational beliefs.

7.   I have discussed this point in Lenka (1992).

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
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